On Oct 6, 2010, at 11:04 PM, silky wrote:
On Thu, Oct 7, 2010 at 11:27 AM, Randall Webmail
<[email protected]> wrote:
From: silky <[email protected]>
The core Tahoe developers promise never to change Tahoe-LAFS to
facilitate government access to data stored or transmitted by
it. Even
if it were desirable to facilitate such access—which it is not—we
believe it would not be technically feasible to do so without
severely> compromising Tahoe-LAFS' security against other
attackers. [...]
How will you stand by this if it becomes illegal not to comply
though?
The USG can come down on PKZIP Inc, but how are they going to
harass an Open Source project? (Especially one with no
particular Home Office or Agent For Service of Process)?
Eh? I don't see why the project being "Open Source" has any
relevancy.
If it's not based in America, then I agree I don't understand the law
there (but then I also don't understand why Zooko would make any
statement at all, if the whole thing was irrelevant for him).
The USG says it wants to have back doors into all encryption
programs. They could have put Phil Zimmerman in prison and
bankrupted PKZIP, Inc. if they liked - but what leverage do they
have against an Open Source project, which by its very nature has
no domicile and no developer (like Phil) against whom to apply
coercion?
NO ONE PERSON owns or controls Tahoe-LAFS. What if a few mooks
visit Zooko and say "Nice little Open Source project you got here.
Be a shame if anything was to happen to it ..."
Like that's going to get a USG Back Door into Tahoe-LFAS?
I'm just trying to understand the level of commitment this statement
belies. What happens when a given project refuses to comply with what
may be *law*? Jail? I don't know. Intrigued to understand the
ramifications.
Unless ALL of the Tahoe-LFAS developers are subject to USG
jurisdiction and/or coercion and NOBODY who views the OPEN SOURCE
code notices the USG back door, there ain't gonna be a back door
into Tahoe-LFAS.
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