On 2010-12-01 11:18 PM, Ian G wrote:
On 1/12/10 6:12 AM, [email protected] wrote:
Can anyone give me a good rundown of the current anonymous payment
systems, technologies and/or algorithms?


OK, there are some issues here. There is technology, algorithms,
patents, techniques, protocols, applications, services, business models
... all lumped into one general term without care.

Anonymous payment systems are a bit of a contradiction, internally. What
you're probably talking about is untraceable payment systems, which
typically use Chaum or Brands or Wagner algorithms (there are a handful
of other variants). In this model, the "coin" is stripped of its
identifying information as it transfers from Ivan to Alice to Bob. When
Bob deposits the coin to Ivan (issuer) for credit to his account, or for
rollover to new coins, the chain of traceability is broken.

Then, there is another variation called nymous payment systems. This
model is typically done with a client-server public-private key
arrangement, where the client registers the public key, and signs
requests (including payments) which are sent to the server. The privacy
trick with this one is that the issuer doesn't need to know who holds
the private key; so while everything is traceable, it's also nymous.


For anonymous payments to actually be anonymous, we need both nymity and untraceability.

Nymity means that anyone can have lots of different and seemingly unrelated communication end points, such as, for example, email addresses.

With Pecunix, you can pay anyone who has an email address, with no requirement for the recipient to demonstrate a true name known to the state - but transfers between one email address and another are traceable.

For anonymity, one has to be able to have cheap and disposable nyms, *and* be able to transfer funds between nyms without anyone being able to discover that one nym is getting the money from the other nym.
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