On Sat, 2011-01-15 at 17:08 +0200, Alexander Klimov wrote:
> > As I understand it, the Playstation 3 filesystem crypto was defeated
> > by simply deleting the encrypted files, filling up the disk with
> > movies and then placing the cyphertext in the movie data stream
> > (they may have had to ensure it went back into the right sector).
> > Playing back the movies prompted the hardware to happily decrypt the
> > data and output the plaintext of the files.
> 
> It is what actually happened here.

Hmmm. This raises the whole question of why you are using an encrypted
file system. The use case that I am typically concerned with is where I
am encrypting my data and do now want it available to others who do not
have the encryption key.

The PS 3 case is about protecting files from the device owner in a
system where the decryption keys must be present in some form in order
for the device to function. This opens up a whole range of "oracle" and
related attacks such as this one where you fool the key holding logic to
do your decryption for you. This is really a DRM problem, which is a bit
different from protecting your own files.

                        -Jeff


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