Peter Gutmann wrote:
Marsh Ray <[email protected]> writes:
So the Intel "DRNG" has observable shared internal state and is shared among
multiple cores.
The rule for security there is that if an attacker can get physical access to
the same CPU as you, you're toast via any number of side-channel attacks
anyway. So the solution is "don't do that, then". I don't really see this
issue as a problem.
I guess reversing the trend towards virtualization and cloud computing
is "difficult".
Then the question would be whether to trust the CPU or the
virtualization O/S as a trusted source of randomness. In either case you
are deemed to be (HW or SW) version-dependent.
If a processor manufacturer gets the RNG right, they might get a product
differentiation advantage.
The more generic challenge can be described with the following question:
Can any software process hosted in a virtualization environment be
provided with a) a secret random source, b) a place to store long-term
secrets, and c) some mechanism for external assessment of software
integrity?
Regards,
--
- Thierry Moreau
CONNOTECH Experts-conseils inc.
9130 Place de Montgolfier
Montreal, QC, Canada H2M 2A1
Tel. +1-514-385-5691
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