Hey Guys - Watching the other OTR thread, what destroyed OTR's deniability property for Manning? If Manning's machine was logging (does anyone even know?), I would expect the logs to be the culprit. But if only Lamo's machine had logs, would the property still hold (as Marsh said, there are a number of compelling reasons not to find Lamo credible). In any case, it seems to me that "Perfect Forward Secrecy" [1] no longer holds, and Manning's conundrum is a proof by counter example: * Shortly after Bob receives the message [from Alice], it becomes unreadable to anyone, anywhere
Should OTR - combined with logging - be considered a bad or flawed implementation? (According to [1], there's thousands of users of the protocol, all of whom could be logging). Jeff [1] http://www.cacr.math.uwaterloo.ca/conferences/2006/psw/Goldberg.pdf _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list [email protected] http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
