On Fri, Sep 2, 2011 at 11:50 AM, Marsh Ray <[email protected]> wrote: > ... > What's the difference between a private key in the wild and a pwned CA that, > even months after a breakin and audit, doesn't revoke or even know what it > signed?
i should have been more clear; by pwning the HSM i meant to imply the root or signing intermediary private key lifted. not just malicious CSRs processed on demand. the difference being that arbitrary certs could be created for arbitrary domains effective against all old versions of software/OS anchored to the compromised CA. lots of re-installs and old versions floating around out there at any given moment. (how long would it take a modern system to generate and sign forgeries of every cert in the ssl observatory?) _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list [email protected] http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
