On Sat, Sep 24, 2011 at 6:36 PM, Peter Gutmann <[email protected]> wrote: > Ben Laurie <[email protected]> writes: > >>a) Key continuity is nice, but ... are you swapping one set of problems for >>another? What happens when I lose my key? How do I roll my key? I just added >>a second server with a different key, and now a bunch of users have the >>"wrong" key - what do I do? How do I deal with a compromised key? > > The slides are actually material taken from a book draft, which covers key > continuity issues in some detail. So the (non :-)-answer in this case is "See > the section on key continuity on page X".
So how about telling us what page X says. > >>b) Entering passwords on a new site: again, nice, but how will you detect >>sites that merely mimic password entry? Wide acceptance would lead to >>avoidance techniques that seem hard to detect. > > Uhh, I'm not sure what the point is here, why would a site mimic password > entry? So as to steal your password. > Another thing to remember is that all of this is risk-assessment, not the > boolean "has a cert" that browsers currently use. Very emphatically not the > browsers' "has a cert" mechanism. So even with a worst-case key-continuity > failure, at most you're going to move the risk slider some way towards "more > risky" so that you have to fall back on other measures to assess a site's > safety. That's the main contribution of the slides, that we need to diversify > our measures and get away from the "has a cert -> good" that's never really > worked since it was introduced. This is the part I agree with! _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list [email protected] http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
