On Mon, Nov 28, 2011 at 9:32 PM, Chris Richardson <ch...@randomnonce.org> wrote: > Right. Or to think about it a different way: > > Facebook uses a CA-signed cert. Users connecting to Facebook get no > errors/warnings (assuming no one mucks with the connection) > If someone is mucking with my connection, I get a self-signed Facebook > cert and the appropriate warning screen. > > In this case, I know that that my connection is being mucked with > because I know (ahead-of-time/out-of-band) that Facebook uses a > CA-signed cert. > > If in several years, I get a cert-does-not-have-audit-proof warning > for Facebook, how will I know if that's because > 1. Facebook has chosen a CA that does not use the audit system > 2. Facebook has chosen a CA that uses the audit system, but Facebook > chooses not to participate in the audit system > 3. Someone is mucking with my connection. > > The current system is no stronger than the weakest CA. I think this > proposal is interesting, but I'm not certain it's any stronger than > the systems that do not participate in it
Note that the CAs do not have to participate: the holders of the certs can register them in the logs. So, the question is: why would Facebook not want to participate in the audit? _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
