On 29/01/12 10:45 AM, Noon Silk wrote:
... it's not sensible to say "QKD is snake oil", without direct reference to something.
Well, if you don't like the conclusion, there are books written on how to attack it :) that doesn't mean much tho.
QKD is snake oil because it achieves a benefit over other techniques that is marginal, unreliable, unproven, and costs a hell of a lot of money.
The notion that you can spot someone fiddling with your packets is marketing blather, in the scheme of things. In the real world, this will generally be interpreted as faulty equipment (insert some bayesian statistics here) so you can't rely on it being a feature that delivers value. If you want more, think about an aggressive attacker ... all he's got to do is put a wiretap on the fibre, futze with the packets enough until you get sick of it, and then you'll change it all because you can't deal with it.
And, as the existing product out there provides pretty solid key exchange for zero cost, relatively speaking, what's the point in paying megabucks for it? QKD has to do something pretty remarkable make it worth all those dollars, and what it does isn't nearly interesting enough.
It's straight forward economics, really. iang _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list [email protected] http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
