> From: [email protected] > Subject: cryptography Digest, Vol 25, Issue 2 > To: [email protected] > Date: Thu, 1 Mar 2012 17:04:14 -0500 > > Send cryptography mailing list submissions to > [email protected] > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > [email protected] > > You can reach the person managing the list at > [email protected] > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of cryptography digest..." > > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Re: Constitutional Showdown Voided as Feds Decrypt Laptop > (Jeffrey Walton) > 2. Certificate Transparency: working code (Ben Laurie) > 3. Re: Certificate Transparency: working code (Thierry Moreau) > 4. Re: Constitutional Showdown Voided as Feds Decrypt Laptop > (Randall Webmail) > 5. Re: Certificate Transparency: working code (Nico Williams) > 6. Re: Constitutional Showdown Voided as Feds Decrypt Laptop > (Nico Williams) > 7. Re: Certificate Transparency: working code (James A. Donald) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Message: 1 > Date: Thu, 1 Mar 2012 12:02:32 -0500 > From: Jeffrey Walton <[email protected]> > To: "James S. Tyre" <[email protected]> > Cc: [email protected] > Subject: Re: [cryptography] Constitutional Showdown Voided as Feds > Decrypt Laptop > Message-ID: > <cah8yc8kc9uffayx3n5ytbgvcmmgwkplndsf3vbj39tepwzx...@mail.gmail.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > On Wed, Feb 29, 2012 at 5:53 PM, James S. Tyre <[email protected]> wrote: > > (This is the case in Colorado, not the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals case > > which has been > > much discussed of late.) > > > > http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/02/decryption-flap-mooted > > > > Constitutional Showdown Voided as Feds Decrypt Laptop > > > > ? ?By David Kravets > > ? ?Email Author > > ? ?February 29, 2012 | > > ? ?5:17 pm > > > > Colorado federal authorities have decrypted a laptop seized from a > > bank-fraud defendant, > > mooting a judge's order that the defendant unlock the hard drive so the > > government could > > use its contents as evidence against her. > > > > The development ends a contentious legal showdown over whether forcing a > > defendant to > > decrypt a laptop is a breach of the 5th Amendment right against compelled > > self > > incrimination. > > > > The authorities seized the encrypted Toshiba laptop from defendant Ramona > > Fricosu in 2010 > > with valid court warrants while investigating alleged mortgage fraud, and > > demanded she > > decrypt it. Colorado U.S. District Judge Robert Blackburn ordered the woman > > in January to > > decrypt the laptop by the end of February. The judge refused to stay his > > decision to allow > > Fricosu time to appeal. > > > > "They must have used or found successful one of the passwords the > > co-defendant provided > > them," Fricosu's attorney, Philip Dubois, said in a telephone interview > > Wednesday. > Perhaps Fricosu reused a password and was on a mailing list using Mailman... > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 2 > Date: Thu, 1 Mar 2012 19:17:51 +0000 > From: Ben Laurie <[email protected]> > To: Crypto discussion list <[email protected]> > Subject: [cryptography] Certificate Transparency: working code > Message-ID: > <cag5kpzz__renbn2byqob7wmqtmedqdn8y_axwpifccwm3k2...@mail.gmail.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="windows-1252" > > http://www.links.org/?p=1226 > > "Certificate Transparency: Spec and Working Code<http://www.links.org/?p=1226> > > Quite a few people have said to me that Certificate Transparency (CT) > sounds like a good idea, but they?d like to see a proper spec. > > Well, there?s been one of those for quite a while, you can find the latest > version in the code > repository<http://code.google.com/p/certificate-transparency/source/browse/doc/sunlight.xml>, > or for your viewing convenience, I just made an HTML > version<http://www.links.org/files/sunlight.html> > . > > Today, though, to go with that spec, I?m happy to announce working > code<http://code.google.com/p/certificate-transparency/> for > a subset of the protocol. This covers the trickiest part ? a fully > backwards compatible SSL handshake between servers and clients. The rest of > the protocol will necessarily all be new code for interacting with the log > server and other new components, and so should not have these issues. > > If you build the code according to the > README<http://code.google.com/p/certificate-transparency/source/browse/src/README>, > then you will find instructions in > test/README<http://code.google.com/p/certificate-transparency/source/browse/src/test/README> > for > the demo. > > What this does, in short, is the following: > > - Run a CT log server. Currently this has no persistence across runs, > but does keep a full log in memory. > - Issue a self-signed server certificate. A CA issued certificate would > also be fine, but not so easy to automate for a demo. > - Use the CT client to register that certificate with the log server and > to obtain a log proof for it. > - Use the CT client to convert that proof into a fake ?certificate? > which can be included in the certificate chain in the TLS handshake. > - Run an Apache 2.2 instance to serve the self-signed certificate and > the log proof certificate. Note that Apache is unmodified, all that is > needed is appropriate configuration. > - Use the CT client to connect to the Apache instance and verify the > presented log proof. > - You can also connect to Apache with an existing browser to check that > you can still access the site despite the presence of the log proof. > > There?s plenty more to be done, but this is the part that needs the > earliest scrutiny, since we are bending the rules to get back compatibility > and avoid the need to change server software. Client software has to change > anyway to provide any benefit to users, so that?s less of a worry. > > We welcome discussion, suggestions and questions on the mailing > list<https://groups.google.com/group/certificate-transparency> > ." > -------------- next part -------------- > HTML attachment scrubbed and removed > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 3 > Date: Thu, 01 Mar 2012 16:14:27 -0500 > From: Thierry Moreau <[email protected]> > To: Ben Laurie <[email protected]> > Cc: Crypto discussion list <[email protected]> > Subject: Re: [cryptography] Certificate Transparency: working code > Message-ID: <[email protected]> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252; format=flowed > > Ben Laurie wrote: > > http://www.links.org/?p=1226 > > > > Quite a few people have said to me that Certificate Transparency (CT) > > sounds like a good idea, but they?d like to see a proper spec. > > > > Well, there?s been one of those for quite a while, you can find the > > latest version [...], > > or for your viewing convenience, I just made an HTML version > > <http://www.links.org/files/sunlight.html>. > > > > May I ask a (maybe stupid) question? > > "... audit proofs will be valid indefinitely ..." > > Then what remains of the scheme reputation once Mallory managed to > inject a fraudulent certificate in whatever is being audited (It's > called a "log" but I understand it as a grow-only repository)? > > Actually, my expectation would be to read an explanation of which > security services are being offered, and which kind and level of > assurance the CT server operating organization is expected to provide. > What is the problem being addressed and to who does the main benefit > accrue / from whom involvement is expected? Once I can see these, I may > appreciate Apache and browser backward compatibility features and the like. > > Thanks for your patience with my scrutiny. > > > -- > - Thierry Moreau > > CONNOTECH Experts-conseils inc. > 9130 Place de Montgolfier > Montreal, QC, Canada H2M 2A1 > > Tel. +1-514-385-5691 > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 4 > Date: Thu, 1 Mar 2012 16:22:22 -0500 (EST) > From: Randall Webmail <[email protected]> > To: Crypto List <[email protected]> > Subject: Re: [cryptography] Constitutional Showdown Voided as Feds > Decrypt Laptop > Message-ID: > <983652243.1774287.1330636942100.javamail.r...@md03.insight.synacor.com> > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 > > From: "Jeffrey Walton" <[email protected]> > > >> "They must have used or found successful one of the passwords the > >> co-defendant provided > >> them," Fricosu's attorney, Philip Dubois, said in a telephone interview > >> Wednesday. > > >Perhaps Fricosu reused a password and was on a mailing list using Mailman... > > Yeah - what's the deal with Mailman sending the password in clear-text, once > a month? > > Did anyone really think that was a good idea? Was it a tradeoff between > security and help desk support costs? What other reason could there be? > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 5 > Date: Thu, 1 Mar 2012 15:26:31 -0600 > From: Nico Williams <[email protected]> > To: Thierry Moreau <[email protected]> > Cc: Crypto discussion list <[email protected]> > Subject: Re: [cryptography] Certificate Transparency: working code > Message-ID: > <CAK3OfOjsZuSkwBHJG2GGwuLs689V=gcd9zbs06ygzyxtggi...@mail.gmail.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > On Thu, Mar 1, 2012 at 3:14 PM, Thierry Moreau > <[email protected]> wrote: > > May I ask a (maybe stupid) question? > > > > "... audit proofs will be valid indefinitely ..." > > > > Then what remains of the scheme reputation once Mallory managed to inject a > > fraudulent certificate in whatever is being audited (It's called a "log" but > > I understand it as a grow-only repository)? > > IIUC... > > Someone (domain owners) has to audit the CAs by reviewing their audit > logs. If enough domain owners do this then the remaining domain > owners' clients get protection by the deterrent effect of having CAs > be auditable and mostly-audited too -- something not too unlike herd > immunity. > > Security with CT is asynchronous as far as the client is concerned, > but with some help from CAs this could be made as good as synchronous. > The client synchronously gets a proof that the server cert has been > added to the log. The client could even get synchronous confirmation > that the logs have been audited by the target server's owners up to a > given point in time -- hopefully very recently. There will be some > latency from "a cert gets added to the log" to "that addition was > audited", but if auditable CAs commit to issuing certificates with > notBefore set in the future by enough time that most domain owners can > have audited the issuance and revoked it if necessary *before* the new > cert becomes valid, then the client gets as good as synchronous > protection. > > I think the audit-by-domain-owners latency could be made as short as > seconds, but hours will do. > > Nico > -- > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 6 > Date: Thu, 1 Mar 2012 15:33:12 -0600 > From: Nico Williams <[email protected]> > To: Randall Webmail <[email protected]> > Cc: Crypto List <[email protected]> > Subject: Re: [cryptography] Constitutional Showdown Voided as Feds > Decrypt Laptop > Message-ID: > <CAK3OfOhff9r_FEBYw+RrCbNtEZtpxMijVm_=pbytj_dqkiz...@mail.gmail.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > On Thu, Mar 1, 2012 at 3:22 PM, Randall Webmail <[email protected]> wrote: > > From: "Jeffrey Walton" <[email protected]> > >>Perhaps Fricosu reused a password and was on a mailing list using Mailman... > > > > Yeah - what's the deal with Mailman sending the password in clear-text, > > once a month? > > > > Did anyone really think that was a good idea? ?Was it a tradeoff between > > security and help desk support costs? ? What other reason could there be? > > Mailman passwords are of very low value. > > Nico > -- > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 7 > Date: Fri, 02 Mar 2012 08:01:05 +1000 > From: "James A. Donald" <[email protected]> > To: [email protected] > Subject: Re: [cryptography] Certificate Transparency: working code > Message-ID: <[email protected]> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed > > On 2012-03-02 7:14 AM, Thierry Moreau wrote: > > Then what remains of the scheme reputation once Mallory managed to > > inject a fraudulent certificate in whatever is being audited (It's > > called a "log" but I understand it as a grow-only repository)? > > Suppose an Iranian CA were to issue certificate for a US site. The US > site would readily discover it, causing such grave embarrassment for the > Iranian CA that they would probably refrain. > > > ------------------------------ > > _______________________________________________ > cryptography mailing list > [email protected] > http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography > > > End of cryptography Digest, Vol 25, Issue 2 > *******************************************
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