On 1 March 2012 13:14, Thierry Moreau <[email protected]> wrote: > May I ask a (maybe stupid) question? > > "... audit proofs will be valid indefinitely ..." > > Then what remains of the scheme reputation once Mallory managed to inject a > fraudulent certificate in whatever is being audited (It's called a "log" but > I understand it as a grow-only repository)?
At the risk of espousing on something I didn't author while the authors are present: CT doesn't address revocation (yet). According to the original doc, revocation will still be needed. It posed the idea similar to the DNSSEC Proof of Nonexistence where the CA will publish a list of all revoked certs, sorted, updated every so often. The server would then present, or the client obtain somehow, this list. If the cert in question isn't in the list at the point it would be (because it's sorted), it's still valid. I don't know if this idea has changed, it was published before the browser-pushed CRLs that Chrome is moving to was announced. But yes, revocation still needs to be addressed, somehow. Auditing the log is designed to for finding the certificates that need revoking, hopefully very quickly. -tom _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list [email protected] http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
