On 24/03/12 03:11 AM, Jeffrey I. Schiller wrote:
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What percentage of acquirable/storable traffic do you suppose
actually exhibits perfect forward secrecy?
I bet the word "Perfect" mis-leads quite a few people. It isn't
perfect (unless you take as axiomatic that the cipher in question
cannot be broken).
Maybe the term should be renamed "Forward Secrecy... for now." :-)
This is a very good point. I'd also broaden it to include the
distinction between "endogenous crypto-assumptive attacks" and
"exogenous pain of reality." If you leave the chat records on your
laptop, which is seized and used as evidence against you, you're
perfectly screwed.
iang
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