On Wed, Aug 29, 2012 at 2:33 AM, James A. Donald <jam...@echeque.com> wrote:
>> Suppose your web page incorporates some content from
>> another url, a not altogether trusted url. Let us call
>> this other url Malloc. You, the owner of the website and
>> the author of the main part of the web page are Bob, the
>> browser is being viewed by Carol, and you incorporate
>> content from Malloc that you hope is innocent, but may not
>> be.
>>
>> How does Bob make sure his web page cannot have its
>> secrets leaked, nor can the content that Bob intends to
>> control be controlled by Malloc, so that Malloc cannot
>> man-in-the-middle, cannot spy on, nor change, the
>> conversation between Bob and Carol, cannot lead Carol to
>> think Bob said something different from that which he
>> intended to say, nor lead Bob to think that Carol clicked
>> on something other than that which she clicked on?
On 2012-08-29 1:13 PM, Ben Laurie wrote:
> Caja: http://code.google.com/p/google-caja/.
So Bob's server gets a page from Malloc's server, vanillizes it using
Caja, and serves Carol with Bob's content combined with vanilla Malloc
content.
Or does Bob's web page running on Carol's machine download a page from
Malloc's server, and caja-ize Malloc's page on Carol's machine before
permitting it to run on Carol's machine inside the context controlled by
Bob.
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