On Wed, Sep 19, 2012 at 1:48 PM, mhey...@gmail.com <mhey...@gmail.com> wrote: > ... > Every three months I, the Grantor, [store] my secret in a new > place that [...] I give to the trustee,
the frequency of key update would be driven by decay rate and coding gain assuming you had a reliably decaying, surreptitious read resistant, method of storing secrets. > If I should die, I will stop [updating] the secret and the trustee > (that I never really trusted) can [read] the secret. this approach fails safe. that is to say: if you assume a decaying key with frequent rekey schedule and limited longevity auth revocation of your dead man last rights is withdrawn easily and quickly, while also providing a means to disclose the trigger should legitimate death occur. contesting an imminent trigger, group key agreement, M of N keying, variations on this common theme, ... yes; still, key management left as exercise for the reader ;) _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
