On Thu, Oct 18, 2012 at 8:36 PM, Nico Williams <n...@cryptonector.com> wrote: > On Thu, Oct 18, 2012 at 7:52 PM, Jeffrey Walton <noloa...@gmail.com> wrote: >> I'm not really convinced that using an email address in the plaintext >> for the SRP protocol is finding-worthy, considering email addresses >> are public information. And I'm very skeptical that its a critical >> finding. > > It... depends. If you need privacy protection for the client ID then > you need it, no? I can't tell you if you do. You must decide this. > For most applications I think privacy protection for the client ID is > not really necessary.
I should have added that this sort of finding from a pen tester (or any type of audit) is just that. You generally get to decide that you don't need the missing feature (privacy prot. for the client ID) in this or that case. That said, my advice would be to hash IDs if you can: it gets you a modicum of privacy protection, and if it's cheap enough then additional protection is worth having. Lack of client ID privacy protection can lead to some attacks such as password guesses based on the ID or knowledge of the person that ID is for. If you were working for a spy agency (say), you'd definitely want priv. prot. for the client ID! So you get to decide what level of protection you want for the client ID: - none - pseudonymous (hash the IDs) - privacy protection relative to passive attackers (run over a TLS channel with anon DH cipher suites) - privacy protection relative to passive and active attackers (run over a TLS channel with server cert) Nico -- _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
