This all sounds like another variation on "encrypting data at rest." It protects against threats related to acquisition (legally or not) of the media that the data is stored on.
For example Google Compute Engine's (GCE) disks are encrypted below the level of the operating system. What this means is that the contents of the disks are encrypted, but you cannot tell that from the virtual machine. The disks look like regular disks. You (the operator of the VM) have no access to nor knowledge of the key. At first I thought all of this of limited value. However upon closer thought, it actually provides some real value. In particular it makes the destruction of the data much simpler. Destroy the key and the data is effectively gone, without having to erase the actual media. So when I "delete" a virtual disk on GCE, all Google has to do is erase the corresponding encryption key to ensure that my data is really unrecoverable. Simlarly, newer versions of the iPhone encrypt the phone's flash. The Wipe function now only has to wipe the key for the wipe to have effect. Prior to having this level of encryption, the whole flash had to be wiped, which takes time, time in which the thief can remove the battery to thwart the wipe. Although I am not familiar with this Oracle product. I suspect it offers the same feature. As long as the encryption keys are on separate media from the sensitive data, it can help avoid the compromise of the data via decommissioned disks or just disks being shipped to off-site storage (as disks do get lost in shipment). -Jeff
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