On Dec 24, 2012, at 8:19 AM, Jeffrey Walton <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Mon, Dec 24, 2012 at 8:03 AM, Ben Laurie <[email protected]> wrote: >> On Mon, Dec 24, 2012 at 12:22 PM, Jeffrey Walton <[email protected]> wrote: >>> Has anyone had the privilege of looking at the "stronger than military >>> grade" [encryption] scheme? >> >> http://innovblogdotcom.files.wordpress.com/2012/06/the-karacell-encryption-system-tech-paper1.pdf > Thanks Ben. Based on the opening paragraph, I think I'm going to read > some of it. > > The Karacell symmetric encryption system was specifically designed to > counter the anticipated threat of quantum computing, My understanding was that there was a general quantum algorithm for brute force in 2^sqrt(keylen). The real threat is to public key algorithms. The white paper just says "well known" and goes on from there. > whilst at the > same time address other issues with existing cryptosystems such as > slow computational performance, nonoptimal power consumption, These are both plausible. > nonuniform cryptographic strength over various bits of a file, ?? I've never heard that allegation against AES. I am confident that had it been known way back when, Rijndael never would have been selected. > and > ciphertext that depends upon the plaintext for pseudo-randomness. ?? Is this supposed to be a garbled reference to things like CBC and CFB? > It > is based upon a non-polynomial-time computation problem (also known as > an NP problem whose optimal algorithm has not been improved since > 1972). This final point is critical, as new cryptosystems are always > treated with great scepticism; however, by demonstrating a linkage to > a known mathematical problem, “new” cryptosystems are sometimes more > accurately considered as derivatives of previously well-studied math > problems. > Remember trapdoor knapsacks? The issue isn't the *worst case* complexity for solution, it's what a cryptanalyst would typically encounter. These claims do not instill a great feeling of confidence in me. Maybe this is a good algorithm, but I'm not holding my breath. --Steve Bellovin, https://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list [email protected] http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
