On Tue, Aug 13, 2013 at 5:10 AM, Peter Gutmann <pgut...@cs.auckland.ac.nz> wrote: > I recently got a another of the standard phishing emails for Paypal, directing > me to https://email-edg.paypal.com, which redirects to > https://view.paypal-communication.com, which has a PayPal EV certificate from > Verisign. According to this post > http://www.onelogin.com/a-paypal-phishing-attack/ it may or may not be a > phishing attack (no-one's really sure), and this post > http://www.linuxevolution.net/?p=12 says it is a phishing attack and the site > will be shut down by Paypal... back in May 2011. > > Can anyone explain this? It's either a really clever phish (or the CAs are > following their historically lax levels of checking), or Paypal has joined the > ranks of US banks in training their users to become phishing victims. If that's true, I think the more interesting fact is: it appears email-edg.paypal.com is controlled by the attacker. Why else would Paypal redirect from a host in their domain to a host not in their domain controlled by the adversary? (Its a bit different than standard phishing training where both hosts/domains are controlled by Paypal).
Has Paypal fess'ed up to any break-ins or breaches? Jeff _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
