Den 3 jan 2014 20:42 skrev "coderman" <coder...@gmail.com>:
>
> use case is long term (decade+) identity rather than privacy or
> session authorization.
>
> eternity key signs working keys tuned for speed with limited secret
> life span (month+).  working keys are used for secret exchange and any
> other temporal purpose.
>
> you may use any algorithms desired; what do you pick?
>
>
> Curve3617+NTRU eternity key
> Curve25519 working keys
> ChaCha20+Poly1305-AES for sym./mac
> ?
>
>
> this assumes key agility by signing working keys with all eternity
> keys, and promoting un-broken suites to working suites as needed.  you
> cannot retro-actively add new suites to eternity keys; these must be
> selected and generated extremely conservatively.
>
> other questions:
> - would you include another public key crypto system with the above?
> (if so, why?)
> - does GGH signature scheme avoid patent mine fields? (like NTRU patents)
> - is it true that NSA does not use any public key scheme, nor AES, for
> long term secrets?
> - are you relieved NSA has only a modest effort aimed at keeping an
> eye on quantum cryptanalysis efforts in academia and other nations?
>
>
> best regards

First of all I'd have a lifetime masterkey intended to never be touched
(meant for permanent secure storage) at the top, that signs the long-term
subkey. That means that if your long-term key (which you very likely WILL
access a few dozen to hundred times at least) is compromised, you can
replace it.

My process would be to generate a lifetime masterkey + long-term subkey +
"working key", where each long-term key signs new working keys (and revokes
them) as well as new long-term keys, and where the masterkey can revoke and
replace all other keys.

Note that NTRU now has a pledge that it is free for all open source
software (it's even officially on github with that license). They have a
long list of approved licenses where usage is all free.

- Sent from my phone
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