On 9/01/14 18:05 PM, Peter Bowen wrote:
On Wed, Jan 8, 2014 at 11:54 PM, ianG <i...@iang.org> wrote:
On 9/01/14 02:49 AM, Paul F Fraser wrote:
Software and physical safe keeping of Root CA secret key are central to
security of a large set of issued certificates.
Are there any safe techniques for handling this problem taking into
account the need to not have the control in the hands of one person?
Any links or suggestions of how to handle this problem?
The easiest place to understand the formal approach would be to look at
Baseline Requirements, which Joe pointed to. It's the latest in a series of
documents that has emphasised a certain direction.
(fwiw, the techniques described in BR are not safe, IMHO. But they are
industry 'best practice' so you might have to choose between loving
acceptance and safety.)
Is there a better reference for safe
I'm not aware of one. You probably have to invent your own process. You
might do worse by looking at what Dan pointed at:
Steve Bellovin: Nuclear Weapons, Permissive Action Links, and the
History of Public Key Cryptography, USENIX, 2006.
http://www.usenix.org/events/usenix06/tech/mp3/bellovin.mp3
http://www.usenix.org/events/usenix06/tech/slides/bellovin_2006.pdf
http://64.233.169.104/search?q=cache:_gevj9vbdqsJ:www.usenix.org/events/usenix06/tech/slides/bellovin_2006.pdf
or a place that has commentary on
the 'best practice' weaknesses?
Pointing out weaknesses in best practices is not best practices. You're
either in or your out.
iang
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