On 18 August 2014 23:29, Tony Arcieri <[email protected]> wrote: > Anyone know why this hasn't gained adoption? > > http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2817 > > I've been watching various efforts at widespread opportunistic encryption, > like TCPINC and STARTTLS in SMTP. It's made me wonder why it isn't used for > HTTP.
What's the point? Anything that speaks HTTP also speaks HTTPS, so there's no need for the "If you support it, I have TLS available." Just use any of multitude of redirect mechanisms for your webserver to kick people onto HTTPS. > Opportunistic encryption could be completely transparent. We don't need any > external facing UI changes for users (although perhaps plaintext HTTP on > port 80 could show a broken lock). Instead, if the server and client > mutually support it, TLS with an unauthenticated key exchange is used. I didn't read the draft word for word, but I don't see anything in it that indicates the client MUST NOT validate the server certificate or MUST use anonymous ciphersuites. Indeed it seems to say the opposite. -tom _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list [email protected] http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
