On Fri, May 25, 2001 at 09:34:20AM +0800, Enzo Michelangeli wrote: > On another mailing list, someone posted an interesting question: how to > ascertain that a tamperproof device (e.g., a smartcard) contains no hidden > backdoors? What about this: Don't use a tamperproof _device_. Use a device consisting of n tamperproof modules instead. Have the device built in a way such that someone needs to tamper with at least m, 1 < m <=n, modules to be successful. (Simple example: Use a chain of encryption modules from distinct manufacturers...) Hadmut --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
- Tamperproof devices and backdoors Enzo Michelangeli
- Re: Tamperproof devices and backdoors David Honig
- Re: Tamperproof devices and backdoors Ian Farquhar
- Re: Tamperproof devices and backdoors Jaap-Henk Hoepman
- Re: Tamperproof devices and backdoors Hadmut Danisch
- Re: Tamperproof devices and backdoors Hadmut Danisch
- Re: Tamperproof devices and backdoors Peter Fairbrother
- Re: Tamperproof devices and backdoors Eugene . Leitl
- Re: Tamperproof devices and backdoors Matt Crawford
- Re: Tamperproof devices and backdoors dmolnar
- Re: Tamperproof devices and backdoors dmolnar
- Re: Tamperproof devices and backdoors Matt Blaze
- Re: Tamperproof devices and backdoors David Honig
- Re: Tamperproof devices and backdoors Eugene . Leitl
- Re: Tamperproof devices and backdoors Eric Murray
