Re: If we had key escrow, Scarfo wouldn't be a problem

[Michael Froomkin - U.Miami School of Law]

To be clear, I am *NOT* arguing for key escrow.  Just saying that since
I'm against it, I accept that there may be scope for judicious,
paper-trail oriented, key logging.  

On Wed, 15 Aug 2001, Dennis Glatting wrote:

> 
> On Wed, 15 Aug 2001, Michael Froomkin - U.Miami School of Law wrote:
> 
> > I have to say I agree in a way.  It has always been my contention that
> > by opposing key escrow, we open the door to more key logging.  And
> > that's good, so long as 1) it's not a built in remote-activation
> > 'feature' of software or hardware and 2) there's a warrant
> > requirement.  This gets the balance as right as we're going to get it
> > - cops won't fish more than they already do, the act leaves a serious
> > paper trail, and judges are as involved as they want to be.
> >
> 
> With key escrow they are free to log anyway, yes? If so, then all key
> escrow adds is more information to collect.
> 
> 
> > The argument that we should have no key escrow and also no means by
> > which data is ever recoverable by legal means is unwinnable
> > politically, and not necessarily right morally either.  The issue is
> > whether there will be appropriate process and safeguards.
> >
> 
> "Legal means," I'll argue, is a joke term. In the opinion and experience
> of many, in the United States the ability to protect oneself against
> inappropriate legal means is a direct function of one's financial
> resources. For example, legal means can be interpreted as using the court
> system to harass others, such as some companies are presently doing to
> squash descent. The RIAA, MPAA, and others verses Felten, 2600, and others
> is another.
> 
> 
> > On Tue, 14 Aug 2001, Declan McCullagh wrote:
> >
> > > The Washington Post finally catches on to the fact that the Scarfo case
> > > exists, a few weeks after everyone else wrote about the hearing in Newark.
> > > The front-page story today by Jonathan Krim contains this memorable passage:
> > >
> > > http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A55606-2001Aug9.html
> > > "Encryption is virtually unbreakable by police today, with programs that
> > > can be bought for $15," said Stewart Baker, former general counsel of the
> > > National Security Agency and now partner at the Washington law firm Steptoe
> > > & Johnson. Although agreeing that surveillance should be done under strict
> > > guidelines, Baker said that "to a degree, the privacy groups got us into
> > > this by arguing that there should be no limits on encryption, and the
> > > police have to deal with it."
> > >
> > > -Declan
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
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> > A. Michael Froomkin   |    Professor of Law    |   [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > U. Miami School of Law, P.O. Box 248087, Coral Gables, FL 33124 USA
> > +1 (305) 284-4285  |  +1 (305) 284-6506 (fax)  |  http://www.law.tm
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> >
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> 

-- 
                Please visit http://www.icannwatch.org
A. Michael Froomkin   |    Professor of Law    |   [EMAIL PROTECTED]
U. Miami School of Law, P.O. Box 248087, Coral Gables, FL 33124 USA
+1 (305) 284-4285  |  +1 (305) 284-6506 (fax)  |  http://www.law.tm
                     -->It's very hot here.<--




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