On Thu, 17 Jan 2002, Steven M. Bellovin wrote: >For one thing, in Hebrew (and, I think, Arabic) vowels are not normally >written.
If something, this would lead me to believe there is less redundancy in what *is* written, and so less possibility for a dictionary attack. >Also, there are a few Hebrew letters which have different forms when >they're the final letter in a word -- my understanding is that there are >more Arabic letters that have a different final form, and that some have >up to four forms: one initial, two middle, and one final. At least Unicode codes these as the same codepoint, and treats the different forms as glyph variants. Normalizing for these before the attack shouldn't be a big deal. >Finally, Hebrew (and, as someone else mentioned, Arabic) verbs have a >three-letter root form; many nouns are derived from this root. This would facilitate the attack, especially if the root form is all that is written -- it would lead us expect shorter passwords and a densely populated search space, with less possibility for easy variations like punctuation. Sampo Syreeni, aka decoy - mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED], tel:+358-50-5756111 student/math+cs/helsinki university, http://www.iki.fi/~decoy/front openpgp: 050985C2/025E D175 ABE5 027C 9494 EEB0 E090 8BA9 0509 85C2 --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
