Ed Gerck wrote:...
> For example, using the proposed system a voter can easily, by > using a small concealed camera or a cell phone with a camera, > obtain a copy of that receipt and use it to get money for the > vote, or keep the job. And no one would know or be able to trace it.
As a voter could record what they did with pencil-and-paper or a mechanical voting machine.
The big theoretical question is whether you could tell whether the vote-seller was faking it. A design goal ought to be to make plausible fake proofs of how you voted easy to generate, IMO. Why only sell your vote to one side, when you can sell it to both sides multiple times?
In practice, if it's more trouble to generate fakes than to just vote and bring the proof to sell, then the individual vote seller will probably just vote as he's told. After all, most people eligible to vote don't bother most of the time; presumably, they just don't care that much who wins the next election. I assume most people who sell their votes aren't committed ideologues who are selling out their cause, but rather people who didn't much care either way. (But surely someone, somewhere has real data on this.)
--John Kelsey, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
--------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
