On Sun, 23 Mar 2003, Ian Grigg wrote: > Consider this simple fact: There has been no > MITM attack, in the lifetime of the Internet, > that has recorded or documented the acquisition > and fraudulent use of a credit card (CC). > > (Over any Internet medium.)
How do you view attacks based on tricking people into going to a site which claims to be affiliated with e.g. Ebay or Paypal, getting them to enter their login information as usual, and using that to steal money? It's not a pure MITM attack, but the current system at least makes it possible for people to verify with the certificate whether or not the site is a spoof. > So, let's guess the cost of each CC lost to our > MITM as $1000. (Pick your own number if you > don't like that one.) > > Then, how many attacks? None, from the above. > > Multiplied together, and you get ... nothing. So, you claim that a system designed to make MITM attacks impossible has not suffered a successful MITM attack. Sounds rather tautologous to me. > The software mandates it: mostly the browsers, > but also the servers, are configured to kick up > a stink at the thought of talking to a site that > has no certificate. > As such, SSL, as implemented, shows itself to > include a gross failure of engineering. The system was engineered very well to requirements with which you disagree. > [2] AFAIR, Anonymous-Diffie-Hellman, or ADH, is > inside the SSL/TLS protocol, and would represent > a mighty fine encrypted browsing opportunity. > Write to your browser coder today and suggest > its immediate employment in the fight against > the terrorists with the flappy ears. Just out of interest, do you have an economic cost/benefit analysis for the widespread deployment of gratuitous encryption? It's just not that important. If your browsing privacy is important, you're prepared to click through the alarming messages. If the value of privacy is less than the tiny cost of clicking "accept this certificate forever" for each site, then it's not a convincing argument for exposing people who don't understand crypto to the risk of MITM. Pete --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
