Ben Laurie wrote: > It seems to me that the difference between PGP's WoT and what you are > suggesting is that the entity which is attempting to prove the linkage > between their DN and a private key is that they get to choose which > signatures the relying party should refer to.
PGP's WoT already does that. To be clear, in PGP the entity that is attempting to prove the linkage between a DN and a public key chooses which signatures are acceptable, their "degree of trust", and how these signatures became acceptable in the first place. BTW, a similar facility also exists in X.509, where the entity that is attempting to prove the linkage may accept or reject a CA for that purpose (unfortunately, browsers make this decision "automatically" for the user but it does not need to be so). That said, the paper does not provide a way to implement the method I suggested. The paper only shows that such a method should exist. Cheers, Ed Gerck --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]