I can't give you any book recommendation at the moment. So far I've only read parts one chapter of a book I got at our universities library which was about implementing RSA efficiently. I mostly learned from various IT-Security, Cryptology lectures and exams I had - Also from Internet research I guess.
Greets Elias smu johnson wrote: > Thank you for the input. I'm kind of glad that in one way or another, > it is possible. Now I think I'm going to buy the Applied Cryptography > book so I can sort of understand in greater detail what you just wrote! > > Would you happen to be able to recommend anything else, as that book > is from 1996? I will probably still get Applied Cryptography... but > In the year 2010, it seems that cryptography books are still a bit out > of date... including the so-called "2010" revision of Cryptography > Engineering which many people say is snake oil and still 7+ years out > of date. > > Please share your thoughts if you have any kickin' around. Thanks! > > On Tue, Jul 13, 2010 at 7:15 PM, Elias Önal <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > What you quoted works for RSA etc as well. Just dispose of the private > key right after you decrypted the session AES key. IMO it's not worth > the overhead, but feel free to do that. You can even do it for each > packet/message if you want. Fetch the other parties single-use public > key and send the symmetric key plus the symmetrically encrypted > message. > Repeat that over and over. > > So now I get why you wanted to use DH which basically is El Gamal with > random single use keys. But you can use any other asymmetric crypto as > well - just generate single use keys and dispose of the private keys > right after use. Still if one gets hold of the private keys he can > decrypt the symmetric key and read all messages of that session. Same > for your DH approach, if an attacker would get the random DH secret > number he could simply calculate the shared secret by combining it > with > the other parties public number. But sure the moment the private keys > are deleted (from ram I guess?) no one will ever be able to > reconstruct > them - resulting in that forward secrecy. So just use one keypair per > message - you should be able to send like 600 messages per second > on an > average CPU. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the "Crypto++ Users" Google Group. To unsubscribe, send an email to [email protected]. More information about Crypto++ and this group is available at http://www.cryptopp.com.
