-Caveat Lector- an excerpt from: Mellon's Millions Harvey O'Conner�1933 Blue Ribbon Books New York, N.Y. --[8]-- 8 The Mellon Plan of Taxation RUNNING deeply into the interests and occupations of and masses," observes the historian, Beard, "taxation is always the very center of political conflicts." In the hubbub about the League of Nations in the election of 1920, that issue had been pretty well ignored by official spokesmen for the major parties. To the men who steered the Republican Party to victory on a tide of nationalism it was nevertheless an absorbing matter. As soon as the tumult and the shouting over the Treaty of Versailles, the League and the World Court had died with the last campaign speech, the "best minds" of the Grand Old Party concentrated on the issue of chief moment to those who had financed the lavish $7,000,000 campaign. The expensive luxury of war must be paid for-and the crucial battle for the next few years was to decide who should do the paying, and how soon. To the owners of industry the issue was resolved easily: the excess profits tax must be abolished and the 65 per cent surtax on incomes scaled down radically. Among the trade unions and farmers though the impression was widely prevalent that the war had made the rich richer and that they ought to pay for it. A reluctant Treasury Department survey, ordered by the Senate, seemed to confirm their conclusion. In 1917, for example, 55,000 corporations had made more than 15 per cent profit on their capital stock. All corporations, between January, 1916, and July, 1921, had made a clear profit Of $38,000,000,000 over and above all federal charges. This sum, it was pointed out, would have paid off the entire war bill hanging over the country in 1921, and still left the corporations a generous return. The vagaries of democratic processes had thus elevated into a prime problem of political strategy what to the business man was merely a common-sense matter of getting back to "normalcy" in taxation. It worried President-elect Harding down in St. Augustine, where he rested before his inauguration. That was why he was buttonholing visitors and asking their opinion of Andrew W. Mellon as prospective Secretary of the Treasury. Knox and Penrose had guessed the temper of the business classes better than the hesitant editor of the Marion Star. Business men were weary of war, tired of tax burdens, anxious to make money. The amount of money made was to be the sole criterion of success in the next ten years. The country was ready for Andrew W. Mellon, pastmaster in that art. In behalf of those interests which traditionally backed the Republican Party in return for tax and tariff favors, Senator Knox could not have suggested to Harding a happier choice for the Treasury. The Secretary's fabulous wealth was to throw about him a cloak of immunity from criticism by those elements�decisive in the nation-who worshiped wealth. If a million dollars could do no wrong, a hundred millions had a positive genius for being right. On the other hand, his obscurity, his lack of a personal history, his origin in Pittsburgh, removed the obvious label of "Wall Street" which demagogues would have delighted to pin on him. In fact there was nothing material for the opposition sharpshooters to aim at: he glided, wraith-like, into the Treasury, a spirit unburdened by a personal record. Certainly he was no roaring bull of Wall Street, despite his wealth. The Senate confirmed him without an opposing vote. Mellon, quiet, efficient, hard-working, slipped into the office of the Secretary of the Treasury at 9 o'clock the morning of March 5, 1921. He looked with approval at the full-length picture of Alexander Hamilton which adorned the wall. He called for S. Parker Gilbert, Under-Secretary of the Treasury under David S. Houston, to discuss contents of the neat piles of documents on the desk which awaited his attention. He liked this alert young man. In the final disorganized year of the Wilson Administration he had been actual Secretary. A Democrat perhaps? Nevertheless he knew the politics of finance, and that transcended party lines. He would keep young Gilbert. The new Secretary tackled his job with that careful economy of effort that had enabled him to dispatch the affairs of a hundred corporations from his office in the Mellon National Bank. In the outer office was David E. Finley, official Cerberus, who sorted out callers, made appointments, arranged the routine of daily life. At the Washington Hotel was J. F. Drake, president of Standard Steel Car-later to head Pullman and then Gulf Oil. On Drake he leaned for critical appraisal of office-seekers and office-holders. He also wished quiet inquiries made into the bureaus under him, particularly the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Drake was the man for that kind of job. In the opening weeks he had little time to supervise the arrangement of his apartment on Massachusetts Avenue. But Ailsa was equal to that. In fact, the girl, just turned 18, was thrilled. She was to be hostess for a Cabinet officer, to meet the President and all the dignitaries of state. It was so much more exciting than life at home. Her father was glad he had got her away from Pittsburgh. She was vivacious, intelligent, imperious perhaps. Pittsburgh's dull society had palled on her. Washington afforded more scope for America's richest heiress. Ailsa was directing the placing of the choice Mellon paintings -a fortune in oil; the exquisite Chinese ceramics and paintings on silk; the choice bits that had struck her own fancy in European shops. The Secretary himself was struggling with weightier problems. Treasury accountants, for the guidance of Congress, were making intricate calculations, such as the probable yield from various proposed surtax rates. Young Gilbert was in constant consultation with the head of the Department. The Secretary's first report to the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee was being prepared. "The country," he keynoted, "is staggering under the existing burden of taxation and debt, and is clamoring for gradual relief from war taxation." His recommendations to Chairmen Fordney and Penrose were simple and direct: Repeal the excess profits tax, cut the income tax and surtax from their 73 per cent maximum to 40 per cent immediately, and 33 per cent thereafter. He called for "rigid economy" in government expenditures and declared the business classes could have their choice of repeal of the excess profits tax or payment of the veteran? bonus. Mellon's income tax reductions stopped at the $66,000 line. Those receiving less were to pay the old tax rate. Asked what suggestions he had to offer on reductions for smaller incomes, he replied that he had prepared no suggestions along that line. To make up for the loss of revenue on the repeal of the excess profits law and reduction in rates on the higher brackets, he proposed doubling the documentary stamp taxes, a two-cent bank check tax, two cents for postal cards. A license tax on motor vehicles completed his proposal for taxes of $2.90,000,000, to balance in part the losses on the excess profits and surtax rates. A frightful clamor arose in the Senate and around the country. The trade unions and the farmers, both better organized than ever before due to the country's wartime need for manpower and food, charged that the Mellon program was class legislation in behalf of those termed, in wartime phraseology, "profiteers." Mellon stuck to his guns. "I recommended this reduction, not to relieve the rich but because the higher surtax rates have already passed the point where they can be collected." "I have never viewed taxation," he added, "as a means of rewarding one class of taxpayers or punishing another. If such a point of view ever controls our public policy, the traditions of freedom, justice and equality of opportunity, which are the distinguishing characteristics of American civilization, will have disappeared and in their place we shall have class legislation with all its attendant evils." Senator La Follette, tribune of the Western prairie people, rose in wrath to denounce the Secretary. "Brazenly and impudently," he said, Secretary Mellon had laid down the principle that "wealth will not and cannot be made to bear its full share of taxation. He favors a system that will let wealth escape. . . . He ought to be retired from his place for making such a declaration." The Secretary was not the least dismayed by La Follette's blistering attack. It was another paradox of the man that his mouselike trepidation in public appearances belied a stout heart and leathery convictions. For La Follette and his kind he had supreme contempt: such men had never had the responsibility of handling a sector of the nation's economic life, were ignorant of the principles of sound finance, believed that in some fashion tax laws should be made into a bludgeon to beat down that American initiative which had created, among others, Aluminum Company of America and Gulf Oil. "The man," he said pointedly, "who seeks to perpetuate prejudice and class hatred is doing America an ill service. In attempting to promote or defeat legislation by arraying one class of taxpayers against another, he shows a complete misconception of those principles of equality on which the country was founded. Any -man of energy and initiative in this country can get what he wants out of life. But when that initiative is crippled by legislation or by a tax system which denies him the right to receive a reasonable share of his earnings, then he will no longer exert himself and the country will be deprived of the energy on which its continued greatness depends. . . . Echoes of Thomas Mellon, long dead! The business press applauded deliriously, and reminded La Follette of his war record. Leaders of finance and industry declared that at last real statesmanship was being shown in handling the tax problem. Secretary Mellon addressed himself to Congress and the country. He was well qualified to speak on the basic injustice of a tax which levied from 20 to 65 per cent of a company's profits-that is, profits above 8 per cent of invested capital. The financial statements of his own companies spoke eloquently on that point. The business classes, he asserted, were despondent because so large a percentage of their earnings went to the federal government. Industry was paralyzed and reluctant to interest itself in plans for a renewal of activity. High taxation defeated itself: against payments of $2,505,000,000 in excess profits taxes in 1918, the return for 1921 would be only $335,000,000. Nevertheless the times were not propitious for drastic reductions in the surtax rates. The veterans were insulting in their references to Mellon's preference for the "plutocracy" over the recent saviors of the country. The farmers, experiencing a sharp deflation in prices, demanded that if relief were to be afforded any class in the population, it should be for them. Unemployment and hunger stalked the industrial cities and workers viewed bitterly the Secretary's plans for easing their employers' tax burdens. The House Ways and Means Committee ordered a strategic retreat to the inner Mellon line-the repeal of the excess profits tax. In these trenches the interests which had financed Harding's overwhelming victory took their stand. On November 23, 192 1, President Harding signed the revenue bill. His chancellor of the exchequer had not won the sweeping victory he desired but had made promising advances. The iniquitous excess profits tax was repealed, thus saving stockholders $1,500,000,000 a year, based on the 1917-1921 returns. The maximum surtax had been cut from 65 per cent to 50 per cent; an unsatisfactory reduction to be sure. Yet a man with $1,000,000 income in 1922 would turn over $556,000 to the Government, against $663,000 under the old rate. The saving for the Secretary, his family and his interests, would range upward toward a million dollars for 1922 alone. Secretary Mellon finished his apprenticeship in public finance when Warren Harding died in San Francisco. The late President was not the kind of man he admired. Their relations never passed the formal stage: for his part, the President looked with too great awe upon the inscrutable financier ever to try to break through his frigid reserve. Mellon made no effort to lower the bar. He mistrusted a man who surrounded himself with such dubious characters. Not that he protested publicly or in Cabinet; after all what went on in other departments was none of his business. He could find enough trouble in his own Treasury Department, and the affairs of his expanding corporations. The Pittsburgh banker had seen enough of political corruption in his own home city and at Harrisburg to be any more than pained when it turned up at the seat of the national government. With the new President it was different. Here was a man of his own type, a man of whom judge Mellon would have approved. Not brilliant nor showy in his talents. A steady man, though, and thoroughly sound in his views on public finance and such matters. J. L. Replogle, steel magnate, reported the Secretary's views. "Mellon told me at Vichy," said Replogle, "that 'Coolidge is not only going to make a good President, but he is going to make a great President? He said there was no comparison between Coolidge and Harding." Coolidge did not shrink in awe before the prestige clothed in his timid- looking chancellor. He was too matter-of-fact for that. Rather he recognized in Mellon a man of real power whose practical ideas on the purpose of government were as plain, severe and logical as one of his steel railroad gondolas. Between the two grew a bond of intimacy; correspondents at the national capital professed to see a deepening groove in the narrow pavement that separated the Treasury Building from the east wing portal of the White House, worn by the Secretary's frequent passage. The Secretary grew in political stature. At first he was infinitely annoyed to find that he must face the correspondents twice a week. It was an ordeal he had never faced in Pittsburgh where underlings took care of the reporters. He seemed spellbound. Nervously he nodded to them when they assembled. He knew none of these men, through whom 120,00o,ooo people were peering intently at him. Their questions. He faltered and fumbled for words. Fortunately Parker Gilbert was there to rescue his chief with a glib phrase, a pleasantry that turned away an embarrassing point. Gradually he began to realize that the correspondents were his friends. They worked for great newspapers which in themselves represented investments of millions of dollars. Their proprietors, too, were cautious, conservative men whose editorial writers broke out with peans of praise after that May Day of 1921 when Mellon laid down the new fiscal policy of the Administration. The clippings laid on his desk each morning were a happy prelude to the day's work. From these it appeared that he was not merely Pittsburgh's master money- lender but a public figure which gradually grew greater than any of his associates in the Cabinet and soon was to eclipse the President himself. The sweet wine of public praise was exhilarating. This is what he had craved those long years in Pittsburgh and had not been able to buy with all his wealth. He relaxed now when the correspondents entered, bantered with them a bit. Washington witnessed the slow metamorphosis of Mellon. His hardness seemed to mellow with age and adulation. Choice spirits of finance and politics were his guests at the Massachusetts Avenue apartment. Occasionally Ai1sa was hostess at affairs attended by dowagers, doting on the patrician whose culture they observed in his slim, elegant hands, his precious bits of art from Europe and Asia, his judgment in wines. Calvin Coolidge decided to stake the campaign of 1924 on his Secretary of the Treasury. Two reasons impelled him. The contract with the backers of the 1920 campaign for a return to normalty in taxation had not yet been fully tarried out; and the lingering stench that emanated from Washington during the reign of the Ohio gang must be deodorized by some powerful appeal which would make the people look ahead to future promise rather than at past performance. The opposition had powerful arguments against continuing the regrime Coolidge had inherited. The Republican leadership did not intend to meet these criticisms. Instead it would use the Government's taxing power to place the dominant business classes in the party's debt. In their gratitude, they would forget about the noisome scandals, contribute generously and carry the Grand Old Party to victory. The campaign was really launched on November 10 1923, an historic date in American public finance. On that day Secretary Mellon addressed to Chairman Green of the House Ways and Means Committee a program for tax reform that was almost immediately dubbed the Mellon Plan, by friend and foe alike. Its keystone was reduction of the surtax from 50 to 25 per cent. Its logic was simple and direct. Wealthy men will not pay onehalf of their income to the Government, therefore it is better to tax them at a rate they will pay. Profiting from his error in the 1921 plan, the Secretary included a reduction from 4 to 3 per cent for incomes under $4,000 and from 8 to 6 per cent for those under $8,000. The high command of the Republican Party and the business press were wild with joy. For a generation they had fought the insidious advance of the collectivist principle embodied in taxes on incomes, inheritances and excess profits. They preferred indirect taxes levied on the masses through tariffs and excises on consumption goods. The profits of entrepreneurs were regarded tenderly as the keystone of the industrial system. The Mellon Plan sounded the tocsin of retreat from socialistic finance. It reared a barricade in front of the veterans' demand for a cash bonus. Its drastic reductions gave no opportunity for sentimental generosity to the recent heroes, and would compel stringent economy; that is, in the social services, for military and naval expenditures continued to march up and were by common consent excluded from any purview of "economy." Stocks boomed on Wall Street. The newspapers added to their own enthusiastic editorials the eagerly sought comments of leaders in industry, commerce and finance. These complied promptly. Many ignored the main point, the reduction in surtaxes, to call the lesser fry's attention to the proposed 25 per cent reduction in taxes on earned incomes. Sir Oracle of the business press, the New York Times, editorialized: "if he takes up the Mellon program, urging its enactment into law, and puts the whole driving power of the Administration behind it, Mr. Coolidge may easily find that he has got an issue of commanding appeal to the country. It may prove to be exactly the kind of lead which the new President needs to assume if he is going further to strengthen his hold upon the people. Languid critics may say there is nothing inspiring in humdrum projects to enforce Government economy and lighten the burdens of taxation. But they can say this only if they lack the imagination to perceive what Mr. Mellon actually means. It would lighten the demands upon millions of purses hard to fill. It would not only do away with oppressive taxes. It would lower the cost of living. It would release capital for productive industry and enterprise of all kinds. This would result in fuller employment of labor, multiplication of goods in common consumption, and probably bring about a period of great and legitimate expansion of industry and commerce never surpassed in the United States." A vast propaganda machine was set in motion, partly Republican, partly financial-industrial. The Chamber of Commerce of the United States mobilized its 12,000 affiliates. Kiwanis, Rotary luncheon clubs listened to fervent pleas illustrated by charts. Trade associations loaded the mails in Washington and New York with millions of pieces of argument. Even Democratic newspapers deserted partisan suspicion and enthusiastically hailed Secretary Mellon and his plan. No eulogy of the Secretary was too fulsome. He was Moses leading sorely burdened business men out of the desert of high taxation. His name was coupled with Alexander Hamilton's, and Senator Smoot even declared that he displaced the first Secretary as the greatest ruler of the nation's purse. Mellon explained the necessity for reduction. "High rates tend to destroy individual initiative and enterprise and seriously impede the development of productive business. Taxpayers subject to the higher rates cannot afford for example to invest in Ameri-can railroads or industries or embark on new enterprises in the face of taxes taking away 50 per cent or more of any return that may be realized. These taxpayers are withdrawing their capi-tal from productive business and investing it instead in tax exempt securities and adopting other lawful methods of avoiding the reali-zation of taxable income. The result is to stop business transac-tions that would normally go through and to discourage men of wealth from taking the risks incidental to developing and opening new businesses. Ways will always be found to avoid taxes so de- structive in their nature and the only way to save the situation is to put taxes on a reasonable basis." In the deafening clamor of approbation raised by the daily press, unheard were the protests of obscure radical labor editors that perhaps the country already had enough factories and that what was needed was more, not less, of a redistribution of the national income. There were already enough factories to employ the nation's manpower, Labor, the railway men's national weekly, declared, but the masses lacked the purchasing power to keep them busy. A few economists stated in academic terms the proposition that the Mellon Plan would divert national income from drastic reduction of the public debt and open the way for a ruinous expansion in industry and speculation that would sooner or later plunge the nation into an unprecedented catastrophe. The business press found little or no space for such prophets of doom. Secretary Mellon again used the low tax returns of 1921 as an argument for reduction. Discovering that the 1921 returns were the latest tabulated, he compiled a table whose "force" was found "most compelling" in showing a steady decline in revenues from surtaxes in the higher brackets between 1916 and 1921. To the obvious retort that naturally tax income had been lower in the depression year of 1921 than in the preceding wartime boom years, he vouchsafed no reply, but continued an exposition of the evils of tax-exempt bonds, in which the wealthy were investing to escape taxation. These bonds, he said, were "non-productive." Invested in schools, roads, public buildings, parks, bridges, they turned no profit into any individual pocket. At this juncture treason stalked into the Republican ranks in the person of Senator James Couzens of Detroit, whose $40,000,000 fortune raised him above the level of other critics. He was surprised to hear his fellow-millionaire from Pittsburgh complaining that industrial expansion was being stifled by the 50 per cent surtax. Why, right in Detroit, Henry Ford was spending $110,000,000 to expand his automobile facilities. The Michigan Telephone Company was spending $5,000,000 General Motors had authorized a generous plant expansion program. Industries were spending freely, with plenty of money in sight, he asserted. Surtaxes fell off in 1921, Couzens continued, for lack of profits on which to pay them. As for $11,000,000,000 invested in taxexempt securities, that was merely 8 per cent of the total securities on the American market. Men retiring from business preferred to invest in such bonds to escape the worries of business management. "Does not money paid for these municipal and governmental activities," he asked, "go to labor, to cement and material manufacturers, and to manufacturers of all kinds of things used in this work? Why is the use of capital in construction of highways and other things I have mentioned not as productive as that used in private industry?" "When it is remembered," added the American City, "that the 'productive purposes' of industry include such essentials as cosmetics, jewelry, chewing gum and yachts, can it be doubted that on the average the capital outlays of municipalities confer as great a benefit on society for each dollar expended as the capital outlays of industry?" Nine years later American City could have added to its comparison Instill and Kreuger securities sold by Union Trust. Such treason as Couzens' earned its own reward. Mellon's subordinates dived into the tax returns to find out that the Detroiter paid no income tax at all. His money was tied up in tax exempts. Useless was it for him to explain that he had retired from business. "Must a system," asked Mellon, "which permits a .man with an income of $1,000,000 to pay not one cent to the support of his government remain unaltered?" In the American Banker, the Secretary explained the dodges used by the wealthy to escape the surtaxes. They took paper losses, used dummy corporations to split personal income, split up their property by gifts, and created trust funds to foil the collector. Governor Blaine of Wisconsin was indignant. He charged that millionaires, by "fraud, deceit, legal advice and the tricks of the trade" were cheating the Government. "But suppose," he cried, "that Mellon would scourge the profiteer and the millionaire with the same vigor that he does lesser criminals? Suppose he really tried to collect taxes assessed on the rich? Is it true that the Government is powerless to enforce the law against the rich, or is it just a desire on the part of Mellon to place taxes on an equality before the law? The secrecy clause in the federal income tax law is one of those devices by which wealth has been escaping a debt of highest obligation." Such personalities, echoed by Robert La Follette and John Garner, awakened interest. Orators on the stump declared that the Secretary had too big a personal stake to be able to give disinterested advice. Nevertheless the upper and middle classes remained unwavering in their support, and the business press demanded that Congress cut out the debate and vote the Mellon Plan as it stood. A Literary Digest poll showed only one state, South Dakota, had given less than half its vote for the Mellon Plan while Pennsylvania, New York and New England voted go-go per cent in favor of drastic reduction of surtaxes. Despite the best efforts of Reed Smoot, Dave Reed and Jim Watson, the Democratic-Progressive coalition in the Senate slashed to bits the Mellon Plan bill voted by the House. The Democrats tried to outbid the Administration for the support of the lower middle class by cutting the basic income tax rate down to 2 per cent. Practical politicians in the House, their eyes glued on their own chances for reelection, accepted that rate, and compromised between the Senate's retention of the 50 per cent maximum surtax and Mellon's 25 per cent, by fixing it at 37.5 per cent. The Mellon Plan was defeated 261 to 153, and the Longworth-La Follette substitute adopted almost unanimously. Mellon was furious. The substitute bill would cost the Treasury $460,000,000 against his $322,000,000, and result in a deficit. In conference between the Houses, the surtax maximum. was pushed up to 40 per cent. As if to rub salt into the Secretary's wounds, a publicity clause was inserted in the revenue bill which opened the income tax books to public inspection. The embittered Secretary denounced the completed bill as a perversion of the Mellon Plan and intimated that be would advise a veto. For the Progressive- Democratic coalition had committed rank heresy. It bad pushed up the inheritance tax from a maximum of 25 per cent on a $10,000,000 estate, to 40 per cent. "Assuming," he argued, "that all inheritances, large and small, were taxed at 40 per cent, it would be only two or three generations until private ownership of property would cease to exist. . . . Estate taxes, carried to an excess, in no way differ from the methods of the revolutionists in Russia." It was, in a way, a personal affront. Andrew Mellon lacked one year of the Biblical threescore and ten allotted to man. His fortune was tied up in closely held corporations�Gulf Oil, Aluminum, Standard Steel Car-whose stocks, dumped on the market, would sell far below their real value. "Particularly is this true," he explained, "where the sales have to be made in large blocks or where the company whose stock is offered is not generally known to the public." He met the arguments of the radical Coalition orators. "In considering a revision of estate taxes," he countered, "there should be eliminated any question of levying the tax as a means of punishing wealth or as in some way for the social good of our civilization. The theory upon which this country was founded is equality of opportunity. So long as a man uses his abilities within the bounds of the moral sense of the community, monetary success is not a crime, but on the contrary adds to the total wealth of the country and to an increase in the standard of living as a whole." "The social necessity for breaking up large fortunes in this country does not exist," he maintained. Fortunes are split among the children. He quoted approvingly the old maxim: three generations from shirt sleeves to shirt sleeves. His opponents did not agree with him. Meyer Guggenheim, they said, died in 1905 worth $50,000,000 and although his estate was divided among six sons and three daughters, the family fortune now totaled $500,000,000. Alexis I. Du Pont in 1921 left $30,000,000 but his heirs now counted their patrimony at half a billion. And Alexis had been the fourth of a wealth-begetting family. Steven V. Harkness left less than $50,000,000 but one of his sons, on his death, passed on $100,000,000 and another $170,000,000 while the Harkness fortune as a whole was rated at $400,000,000. When Charles Pratt died in 18gi, he passed on a mere $10,000,000 but the family fortune was now estimated at $300,000,000 and each of his eight sons was wealthier than his father. Vincent Astor was worth as much as his grandfather. The Secretary was reminded that after a wealthy scion handed over 40 per cent of his patrimony to the State, he had 35 years left to accumulate interest on the remainder before the State had another split. There was little danger than Paul or Ailsa would die paupers, even if they merely clipped coupons all their lives. Mellon appeared personally before the House Committees, flanked by assistants, in an effort to save his measure. It was useless, Congress passed the conference report, only nine stalwarts in the House and fifteen in the Senate clinging doggedly to the Mellon Plan. All was not lost. After all, a 40 per cent maximum surtax was better than 50 per cent. Under the new law's provisions, the citizen with a $1,000,000 income who had given the Government $663,000 of his income when Andrew Mellon came into office, who had enjoyed a cut to $556,000 in the 1921 revenue law, now need pay only about $400,000. It was progress. The Secretary signified he would not oppose President Coolidge's reluctant approval of the bill, as the best that could be got. 1924 was a hard year for Andrew Mellon. John W. Davis assailed tariffs which, he said, accounted for no small measure of the Secretary's fortune. Bob La Follette attacked on all fronts and even entered Pittsburgh to challenge the enemy in his citadel. In retrospect the issue in 1924 seems never to have been in doubt. Coolidge won by a walkaway. Actually the Republican managers were uneasy. How would the public react to Teapot Dome? Prohibitionists blamed Mellon for the scandals in the enforcement of the dry law. The farmers were in full revolt against the 1921-22 deflation, which they charged was deliberately provoked by Mellon, as chairman of the Federal Reserve Board. Union workers were intent on punishing the Administration responsible for Harry Daugherty and his anti-labor injunctions in the shopmen's and miners' strikes. The veterans blamed Mellon for the denial of their "adjusted compensation." Might not La Follette, repeating 1912, tear away enough votes to permit Davis to walk into the White House? Fall, Daugherty, and Denby had been sacrificed to appease the country. All the more vigorously the opposition centered its attention on the remaining Cabinet officer whose specific policies offended them. That was Mellon. He rather enjoyed it. Through narrowed eyes he read their denunciations, and smiled to himself. It seemed that Coolidge was not the Republican candidate after all. It was he, Andrew Mellon, erstwhile obscure Pittsburgh millionaire, son of an Ulster immigrant lad. His father and he had built an enormous fortune on sterling principles of individual initiative, enterprise, caution and foresight, and now he was leading a nation to appreciate and applaud those virtues, to safeguard their fruits, to combat blatant demagoguery which, if given free play, would pull the country down to the level of Russia. His opponent's barbs never penetrated his skin. He felt his convictions were based on tests which had been applied incessantly by the Mellons ever since his father went into business. They could not be wrong. He explained them at length in a collection of messages and speeches published under the title The People's Taxation. As if to reassure him, the more violent La Follette's attacks, the more fulsome was the adulation heaped upon the Secretary by the press, the leaders of industry and finance, all the classes which stood behind him in his fight to lower taxes and resist raids on the Treasury by farmers and veterans. "Admitting the genius of Hamilton and the value of his constructive work on the rudimentary governmental financial system at the birth of the Republic," and of other Secretaries who followed him, said the Saturday Evening Post, none of them "was so completely the master of finance as Mellon, nor any, of course, who had problems one-tenth the size and complexity of his problems since 1921." Reed Smoot called him a "world figure." Eliot Wadsworth, assistant Secretary of the Treasury, repeated the comparison at a dinner given the Secretary at the Commodore Hotel by alumni of Columbia College in honor of Alexander Hamilton. Characteristically, Mellon deprecated the encomiums. "I think," he replied, "that each successive Secretary of the Treasury at some time during his incumbency of office enjoys the distinction of being the 'greatest Secretary of the Treasury since Alexander Hamilton'; however, he goes out of office and his glory has departed." He recounted his entry into the Department with its 770,000 employees in 1921, how he had found himself not merely Secretary but ex-officio chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, of the Farm Loan Board, the War Finance Corporation, and the World War Foreign Debt Commission. He had found a growing concern expanded far beyond its legitimate peace time scope and authority; its credit, the best in the world, stretched to a point of imminent danger, its taxes overburdening the people. Retrenchment and debt reduction bad been the imperative needs. These needs he had sought to meet, he said, in cooperation with the Administration and Congress. If Congress had decided not to cooperate, so much the worse for Congress. Its defection from the Mellon Plan increased the Secretary's enormous prestige. The Mellon Plan meant tax reduction, the press had repeated endlessly, and now Congress had defeated the Mellon Plan. It was useless for the Coalition leaders to point to the figures showing that their measure had cut taxes far more deeply than the Mellon Plan. They hadn't cut them in the proper brackets, and the men who manipulated the vast propaganda machine set up for the Mellon Plan had not been actuated merely by sentimental sympathy for the little fellows. Apparently the criticism heaped upon the Secretary by his enemies had as little effect on the electorate as upon himself. The country was now rushing headlong in pursuit of the golden fruits which accompanied these piping years of prosperity. The scandals in Washington were not merely forgotten, the Senators who had unearthed them were denounced as muckrakers and scavengers. Under the best of all possible systems, the wisest of all possible men were in control. Calvin Coolidge was swept into his next four years of office by an unprecedented avalanche of votes. The victory was interpreted as a complete vindication of the Secretary and his fiscal theories. Those who viewed taxation as a means of punishing the rich for their superior acquisitiveness were sent scurrying from the field of battle. The nascent Progressive Party was smashed to bits; soon after, its leader, Bob La Follette, was claimed by death. Senator Watson scanned the political horizon and reported in these words: "The country believes Mr. Mellon is the greatest financial genius in many years. If he urges Congress to take up tax reduction in the short session it will do so. The people believe in him. They know he is free from political considerations and is animated solely by a desire to give the relief they are entitled to." Mellon however had not the faintest idea of entrusting his tax reduction schemes to the lame-duck session of the old Congress. He would wait until the Congress elected in the recent landslide came to Washington in the fall of 1925. In the meantime he did missionary work among the heathen. In the spring of 1925 he, fared forth into Dixie, to address the Mississippi Bankers Association and to point out, by inference, how shabbily they had been misrepresented by their politicians. Lower taxes, he explained, would foster Southern industry. Eminent Democrats, including Woodrow Wilson, Carter Glass and David Houston were quoted as favoring lower taxes in the higher brackets. The Mississippi bankers nodded approvingly. The Secretary might be a Republican, but he understood their kind of finance, and after all finance, as Mellon so often insisted, cut through party lines in unwavering fidelity to immutable economic laws. A nod of the sage Secretary's head was now law in Washington. If he let it be known that a maximum surtax of 20 per cent were desirable, Senator Smoot and Representative Tilson were eager to fix it at 15 per cent. His critics, confuted by the election returns, retired for a time to recompose their shattered nerves, and to debate with themselves whether an ungrateful people should not be left to whatever fate the Secretary had in store for them. On October 18, 1925, Mellon revealed his new program, which, in memory of past bad luck, he hastened to assure Congress was not intended as a hard and fast Mellon Plan but merely as a suggestion. While Congressmen craned their necks to hear, he whispered before the House Ways and Means Committee his recommendation for a 20 per cent maximum surtax, a basic income tax of 5 per cent, the reduction and eventual repeal of the hateful inheritance tax, yielding $100,000,000 a year, the repeal of the gift tax, the tax on auto trucks and accessories. He advised a Constitutional amendment to lay forever the obnoxious taxexempt state and local bond issues. The maximum surtax, which had been 40 per cent on $500,000, was to be 20 per cent on $150,000. The great difficulty with this eager Congress was to restrain its members, who had seen a great light on last election day, from voting a deficit in the Treasury. Democrats vied with Republicans in cutting rates. February 26, 1926, was one of the happiest days in Andrew Mellon's life. He stood beside Calvin Coolidge as the Chief Executive signed a tax measure, with the surtax maximum even lower than that of the Mellon Plan which had been spat upon and reviled by a previous Congress. As the movie men ground away, he smiled continuously and newspaper men reported that at last the Secretary seemed sincerely happy. He could be pardoned. He could boast that the tax load of the rich and prosperous had been cut $700,000,000 in the past two years, -the equivalent of $2,000,000 a day which was released, as he said, for productive industry. The publicity clause was no more. The inheritance tax was cut from 40 per cent to 20 per cent, and the credit on state inheritance taxes was raised from 25 per cent to 80 per cent. The capital stock tax was repealed. The gift tax was history. The man with the million dollar income who had been paying $663,000 into the federal treasury when Mellon assumed charge five years ago, was now asked to pay a trifle under $200,000. For a family whose taxable income hovered around $5,000,000 a year, as did the Mellons, the saving for 1926 over the 1921 rate was about $2,315,000. His personal saving, as contrasted with the 1924 rate, was estimated at $828,349. With the enactment of the Mellon Plan, the Pittsburgh banker reached the climax of his public career. He had justified the faith of Senators Knox and Penrose, now dead. He had released to the captains of Wall Street billions of dollars which they were now to use in the expansion of the magnificent industrial plant of the United States. He had halted the march of socialistic ideas in public finance which had seemed for a time to threaten a leveling down of million dollar incomes and a hampering of vast agglomerations of wealth. For fifty years he had labored to build up one immense fortune. Now, in five short years, he had secured that fortune against the inroads of radically minded legislators and had assured to every man in the country who wished to emulate him, an opportunity to amass money by those processes dear to the money-lender, corporation promoter and employer of labor. He was the symbol to which every ambitious aspirant to wealth vowed his allegiance. If masters of millions felt safe as long as Andrew Mellon held power in Washington, every young man starting his business career in the magic decade of 1920 was confident that wealth would be his too under a regime whose acknowledged chief was the nation's second or third wealthiest individual. pps. 124-142 --[cont]-- Aloha, He'Ping, Om, Shalom, Salaam. Em Hotep, Peace Be, Omnia Bona Bonis, All My Relations. Adieu, Adios, Aloha. Amen. Roads End Kris DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER ========== CTRL is a discussion and informational exchange list. Proselyzting propagandic screeds are not allowed. Substance�not soapboxing! These are sordid matters and 'conspiracy theory', with its many half-truths, misdirections and outright frauds is used politically by different groups with major and minor effects spread throughout the spectrum of time and thought. That being said, CTRL gives no endorsement to the validity of posts, and always suggests to readers; be wary of what you read. 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