-Caveat Lector-

an excerpt from:
Mellon's Millions
Harvey O'Conner�1933
Blue Ribbon Books
New York, N.Y.
--[8]--

8

The Mellon Plan of Taxation

RUNNING deeply into the interests and occupations of and masses," observes the
historian, Beard, "taxation is always the very center of political conflicts."

In the hubbub about the League of Nations in the election of 1920, that issue
had been pretty well ignored by official spokesmen for the major parties. To
the men who steered the Republican Party to victory on a tide of nationalism
it was nevertheless an absorbing matter. As soon as the tumult and the
shouting over the Treaty of Versailles, the League and the World Court had
died with the last campaign speech, the "best minds" of the Grand Old Party
concentrated on the issue of chief moment to those who had financed the lavish
$7,000,000 campaign. The expensive luxury of war must be paid for-and the
crucial battle for the next few years was to decide who should do the paying,
and how soon.

To the owners of industry the issue was resolved easily: the excess profits
tax must be abolished and the 65 per cent surtax on incomes scaled down
radically. Among the trade unions and farmers though the impression was widely
prevalent that the war had made the rich richer and that they ought to pay for
it. A reluctant Treasury Department survey, ordered by the Senate, seemed to
confirm their conclusion. In 1917, for example, 55,000 corporations had made
more than 15 per cent profit on their capital stock. All corporations, between
January, 1916, and July, 1921, had made a clear profit Of $38,000,000,000 over
and above all federal charges. This sum, it was pointed out, would have paid
off the entire war bill hanging over the country in 1921, and still left the
corporations a generous return.

The vagaries of democratic processes had thus elevated into a prime problem of
political strategy what to the business man was merely a common-sense matter
of getting back to "normalcy" in taxation. It worried President-elect Harding
down in St. Augustine, where he rested before his inauguration. That was why
he was buttonholing visitors and asking their opinion of Andrew W. Mellon as
prospective Secretary of the Treasury.

Knox and Penrose had guessed the temper of the business classes better than
the hesitant editor of the Marion Star. Business men were weary of war, tired
of tax burdens, anxious to make money. The amount of money made was to be the
sole criterion of success in the next ten years. The country was ready for
Andrew W. Mellon, pastmaster in that art.

In behalf of those interests which traditionally backed the Republican Party
in return for tax and tariff favors, Senator Knox could not have suggested to
Harding a happier choice for the Treasury. The Secretary's fabulous wealth was
to throw about him a cloak of immunity from criticism by those
elements�decisive in the nation-who worshiped wealth. If a million dollars
could do no wrong, a hundred millions had a positive genius for being right.
On the other hand, his obscurity, his lack of a personal history, his origin
in Pittsburgh, removed the obvious label of "Wall Street" which demagogues
would have delighted to pin on him. In fact there was nothing material for the
opposition sharpshooters to aim at: he glided, wraith-like, into the Treasury,
a spirit unburdened by a personal record. Certainly he was no roaring bull of
Wall Street, despite his wealth. The Senate confirmed him without an opposing
vote.

Mellon, quiet, efficient, hard-working, slipped into the office of the
Secretary of the Treasury at 9 o'clock the morning of March 5, 1921. He looked
with approval at the full-length picture of Alexander Hamilton which adorned
the wall. He called for S. Parker Gilbert, Under-Secretary of the Treasury
under David S. Houston, to discuss contents of the neat piles of documents on
the desk which awaited his attention. He liked this alert young man. In the
final disorganized year of the Wilson Administration he had been actual
Secretary. A Democrat perhaps? Nevertheless he knew the politics of finance,
and that transcended party lines. He would keep young Gilbert.

The new Secretary tackled his job with that careful economy of effort that had
enabled him to dispatch the affairs of a hundred corporations from his office
in the Mellon National Bank. In the outer office was David E. Finley, official
Cerberus, who sorted out callers, made appointments, arranged the routine of
daily life. At the Washington Hotel was J. F. Drake, president of Standard
Steel Car-later to head Pullman and then Gulf Oil. On Drake he leaned for
critical appraisal of office-seekers and office-holders. He also wished quiet
inquiries made into the bureaus under him, particularly the Bureau of Internal
Revenue. Drake was the man for that kind of job.

In the opening weeks he had little time to supervise the arrangement of his
apartment on Massachusetts Avenue. But Ailsa was equal to that. In fact, the
girl, just turned 18, was thrilled. She was to be hostess for a Cabinet
officer, to meet the President and all the dignitaries of state. It was so
much more exciting than life at home. Her father was glad he had got her away
from Pittsburgh. She was vivacious, intelligent, imperious perhaps.
Pittsburgh's dull society had palled on her. Washington afforded more scope
for America's richest heiress.

Ailsa was directing the placing of the choice Mellon paintings -a fortune in
oil; the exquisite Chinese ceramics and paintings on silk; the choice bits
that had struck her own fancy in European shops.

The Secretary himself was struggling with weightier problems. Treasury
accountants, for the guidance of Congress, were making intricate calculations,
such as the probable yield from various proposed surtax rates. Young Gilbert
was in constant consultation with the head of the Department. The Secretary's
first report to the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance
Committee was being prepared.

"The country," he keynoted, "is staggering under the existing burden of
taxation and debt, and is clamoring for gradual relief from war taxation." His
recommendations to Chairmen Fordney and Penrose were simple and direct: Repeal
the excess profits tax, cut the income tax and surtax from their 73 per cent
maximum to 40 per cent immediately, and 33 per cent thereafter. He called for
"rigid economy" in government expenditures and declared the business classes
could have their choice of repeal of the excess profits tax or payment of the
veteran? bonus.

Mellon's income tax reductions stopped at the $66,000 line. Those receiving
less were to pay the old tax rate. Asked what suggestions he had to offer on
reductions for smaller incomes, he replied that he had prepared no suggestions
along that line. To make up for the loss of revenue on the repeal of the
excess profits law and reduction in rates on the higher brackets, he proposed
doubling the documentary stamp taxes, a two-cent bank check tax, two cents for
postal cards. A license tax on motor vehicles completed his proposal for taxes
of $2.90,000,000, to balance in part the losses on the excess profits and
surtax rates.

A frightful clamor arose in the Senate and around the country. The trade
unions and the farmers, both better organized than ever before due to the
country's wartime need for manpower and food, charged that the Mellon program
was class legislation in behalf of those termed, in wartime phraseology,
"profiteers."

Mellon stuck to his guns. "I recommended this reduction, not to relieve the
rich but because the higher surtax rates have already passed the point where
they can be collected." "I have never viewed taxation," he added, "as a means
of rewarding one class of taxpayers or punishing another. If such a point of
view ever controls our public policy, the traditions of freedom, justice and
equality of opportunity, which are the distinguishing characteristics of
American civilization, will have disappeared and in their place we shall have
class legislation with all its attendant evils."

Senator La Follette, tribune of the Western prairie people, rose in wrath to
denounce the Secretary. "Brazenly and impudently," he said, Secretary Mellon
had laid down the principle that "wealth will not and cannot be made to bear
its full share of taxation. He favors a system that will let wealth escape. .
. . He ought to be retired from his place for making such a declaration."

The Secretary was not the least dismayed by La Follette's blistering attack.
It was another paradox of the man that his mouselike trepidation in public
appearances belied a stout heart and leathery convictions. For La Follette and
his kind he had supreme contempt: such men had never had the responsibility of
handling a sector of the nation's economic life, were ignorant of the
principles of sound finance, believed that in some fashion tax laws should be
made into a bludgeon to beat down that American initiative which had created,
among others, Aluminum Company of America and Gulf Oil.

"The man," he said pointedly, "who seeks to perpetuate prejudice and class
hatred is doing America an ill service. In attempting to promote or defeat
legislation by arraying one class of taxpayers against another, he shows a
complete misconception of those principles of equality on which the country
was founded. Any -man of energy and initiative in this country can get what he
wants out of life. But when that initiative is crippled by legislation or by a
tax system which denies him the right to receive a reasonable share of his
earnings, then he will no longer exert himself and the country will be
deprived of the energy on which its continued greatness depends. . . .

Echoes of Thomas Mellon, long dead!

The business press applauded deliriously, and reminded La Follette of his war
record. Leaders of finance and industry declared that at last real
statesmanship was being shown in handling the tax problem.

Secretary Mellon addressed himself to Congress and the country. He was well
qualified to speak on the basic injustice of a tax which levied from 20 to 65
per cent of a company's profits-that is, profits above 8 per cent of invested
capital. The financial statements of his own companies spoke eloquently on
that point. The business classes, he asserted, were despondent because so
large a percentage of their earnings went to the federal government. Industry
was paralyzed and reluctant to interest itself in plans for a renewal of
activity. High taxation defeated itself: against payments of $2,505,000,000 in
excess profits taxes in 1918, the return for 1921 would be only $335,000,000.

Nevertheless the times were not propitious for drastic reductions in the
surtax rates. The veterans were insulting in their references to Mellon's
preference for the "plutocracy" over the recent saviors of the country. The
farmers, experiencing a sharp deflation in prices, demanded that if relief
were to be afforded any class in the population, it should be for them.
Unemployment and hunger stalked the industrial cities and workers viewed
bitterly the Secretary's plans for easing their employers' tax burdens. The
House Ways and Means Committee ordered a strategic retreat to the inner Mellon
line-the repeal of the excess profits tax. In these trenches the interests
which had financed Harding's overwhelming victory took their stand.

On November 23, 192 1, President Harding signed the revenue bill. His
chancellor of the exchequer had not won the sweeping victory he desired but
had made promising advances. The iniquitous excess profits tax was repealed,
thus saving stockholders $1,500,000,000 a year, based on the 1917-1921
returns. The maximum surtax had been cut from 65 per cent to 50 per cent; an
unsatisfactory reduction to be sure. Yet a man with $1,000,000 income in 1922
would turn over $556,000 to the Government, against $663,000 under the old
rate. The saving for the Secretary, his family and his interests, would range
upward toward a million dollars for 1922 alone.

Secretary Mellon finished his apprenticeship in public finance when Warren
Harding died in San Francisco. The late President was not the kind of man he
admired. Their relations never passed the formal stage: for his part, the
President looked with too great awe upon the inscrutable financier ever to try
to break through his frigid reserve. Mellon made no effort to lower the bar.
He mistrusted a man who surrounded himself with such dubious characters. Not
that he protested publicly or in Cabinet; after all what went on in other
departments was none of his business. He could find enough trouble in his own
Treasury Department, and the affairs of his expanding corporations. The
Pittsburgh banker had seen enough of political corruption in his own home city
and at Harrisburg to be any more than pained when it turned up at the seat of
the national government.

With the new President it was different. Here was a man of his own type, a man
of whom judge Mellon would have approved. Not brilliant nor showy in his
talents. A steady man, though, and thoroughly sound in his views on public
finance and such matters.

J. L. Replogle, steel magnate, reported the Secretary's views. "Mellon told me
at Vichy," said Replogle, "that 'Coolidge is not only going to make a good
President, but he is going to make a great President? He said there was no
comparison between Coolidge and Harding."

Coolidge did not shrink in awe before the prestige clothed in his timid-
looking chancellor. He was too matter-of-fact for that. Rather he recognized
in Mellon a man of real power whose practical ideas on the purpose of
government were as plain, severe and logical as one of his steel railroad
gondolas. Between the two grew a bond of intimacy; correspondents at the
national capital professed to see a deepening groove in the narrow pavement
that separated the Treasury Building from the east wing portal of the White
House, worn by the Secretary's frequent passage.

The Secretary grew in political stature. At first he was infinitely annoyed to
find that he must face the correspondents twice a week. It was an ordeal he
had never faced in Pittsburgh where underlings took care of the reporters. He
seemed spellbound. Nervously he nodded to them when they assembled. He knew
none of these men, through whom 120,00o,ooo people were peering intently at
him. Their questions. He faltered and fumbled for words. Fortunately Parker
Gilbert was there to rescue his chief with a glib phrase, a pleasantry that
turned away an embarrassing point.

Gradually he began to realize that the correspondents were his friends. They
worked for great newspapers which in themselves represented investments of
millions of dollars. Their proprietors, too, were cautious, conservative men
whose editorial writers broke out with peans of praise after that May Day of
1921 when Mellon laid down the new fiscal policy of the Administration. The
clippings laid on his desk each morning were a happy prelude to the day's
work. From these it appeared that he was not merely Pittsburgh's master money-
lender but a public figure which gradually grew greater than any of his
associates in the Cabinet and soon was to eclipse the President himself. The
sweet wine of public praise was exhilarating. This is what he had craved those
long years in Pittsburgh and had not been able to buy with all his wealth. He
relaxed now when the correspondents entered, bantered with them a bit.

Washington witnessed the slow metamorphosis of Mellon. His hardness seemed to
mellow with age and adulation. Choice spirits of finance and politics were his
guests at the Massachusetts Avenue apartment. Occasionally Ai1sa was hostess
at affairs attended by dowagers, doting on the patrician whose culture they
observed in his slim, elegant hands, his precious bits of art from Europe and
Asia, his judgment in wines.

Calvin Coolidge decided to stake the campaign of 1924 on his Secretary of the
Treasury. Two reasons impelled him. The contract with the backers of the 1920
campaign for a return to normalty in taxation had not yet been fully tarried
out; and the lingering stench that emanated from Washington during the reign
of the Ohio gang must be deodorized by some powerful appeal which would make
the people look ahead to future promise rather than at past performance.

The opposition had powerful arguments against continuing the regrime Coolidge
had inherited. The Republican leadership did not intend to meet these
criticisms. Instead it would use the Government's taxing power to place the
dominant business classes in the party's debt. In their gratitude, they would
forget about the noisome scandals, contribute generously and carry the Grand
Old Party to victory.

The campaign was really launched on November 10 1923, an historic date in
American public finance. On that day Secretary Mellon addressed to Chairman
Green of the House Ways and Means Committee a program for tax reform that was
almost immediately dubbed the Mellon Plan, by friend and foe alike. Its
keystone was reduction of the surtax from 50 to 25 per cent. Its logic was
simple and direct. Wealthy men will not pay onehalf of their income to the
Government, therefore it is better to tax them at a rate they will pay.
Profiting from his error in the 1921 plan, the Secretary included a reduction
from 4 to 3 per cent for incomes under $4,000 and from 8 to 6 per cent for
those under $8,000.

The high command of the Republican Party and the business press were wild with
joy. For a generation they had fought the insidious advance of the
collectivist principle embodied in taxes on incomes, inheritances and excess
profits. They preferred indirect taxes levied on the masses through tariffs
and excises on consumption goods. The profits of entrepreneurs were regarded
tenderly as the keystone of the industrial system.

The Mellon Plan sounded the tocsin of retreat from socialistic finance. It
reared a barricade in front of the veterans' demand for a cash bonus. Its
drastic reductions gave no opportunity for sentimental generosity to the
recent heroes, and would compel stringent economy; that is, in the social
services, for military and naval expenditures continued to march up and were
by common consent excluded from any purview of "economy."

Stocks boomed on Wall Street. The newspapers added to their own enthusiastic
editorials the eagerly sought comments of leaders in industry, commerce and
finance.  These complied promptly. Many ignored the main point, the reduction
in surtaxes, to call the lesser fry's attention to the proposed 25 per cent
reduction in taxes on earned incomes.

Sir Oracle of the business press, the New York Times, editorialized:

"if he takes up the Mellon program, urging its enactment into law, and puts
the whole driving power of the Administration behind it, Mr. Coolidge may
easily find that he has got an issue of commanding appeal to the country. It
may prove to be exactly the kind of lead which the new President needs to
assume if he is going further to strengthen his hold upon the people. Languid
critics may say there is nothing inspiring in humdrum projects to enforce
Government economy and lighten the burdens of taxation. But they can say this
only if they lack the imagination to perceive what Mr. Mellon actually means.
It would lighten the demands upon millions of purses hard to fill. It would
not only do away with oppressive taxes. It would lower the cost of living. It
would release capital for productive industry and enterprise of all kinds.
This would result in fuller employment of labor, multiplication of goods in
common consumption, and probably bring about a period of great and legitimate
expansion of industry and commerce never surpassed in the United States."

A vast propaganda machine was set in motion, partly Republican, partly
financial-industrial. The Chamber of Commerce of the United States mobilized
its 12,000 affiliates. Kiwanis, Rotary luncheon clubs listened to fervent
pleas illustrated by charts. Trade associations loaded the mails in Washington
and New York with millions of pieces of argument. Even Democratic newspapers
deserted partisan suspicion and enthusiastically hailed Secretary Mellon and
his plan. No eulogy of the Secretary was too fulsome. He was Moses leading
sorely burdened business men out of the desert of high taxation. His name was
coupled with Alexander Hamilton's, and Senator Smoot even declared that he
displaced the first Secretary as the greatest ruler of the nation's purse.

Mellon explained the necessity for reduction. "High rates tend to destroy
individual initiative and enterprise and seriously impede the development of
productive business. Taxpayers subject to the higher rates cannot afford for
example to invest in Ameri-can railroads or industries or embark on new
enterprises in the face of taxes taking away 50 per cent or more of any return
that may be realized. These taxpayers are withdrawing their capi-tal from
productive business and investing it instead in tax exempt securities and
adopting other lawful methods of avoiding the reali-zation of taxable income.
The result is to stop business transac-tions that would normally go through
and to discourage men of wealth from taking the risks incidental to developing
and opening new businesses. Ways will always be found to avoid taxes so de-
structive in their nature and the only way to save the situation is to put
taxes on a reasonable basis."

In the deafening clamor of approbation raised by the daily press, unheard were
the protests of obscure radical labor editors that perhaps the country already
had enough factories and that what was needed was more, not less, of a
redistribution of the national income. There were already enough factories to
employ the nation's manpower, Labor, the railway men's national weekly,
declared, but the masses lacked the purchasing power to keep them busy. A few
economists stated in academic terms the proposition that the Mellon Plan would
divert national income from drastic reduction of the public debt and open the
way for a ruinous expansion in industry and speculation that would sooner or
later plunge the nation into an unprecedented catastrophe. The business press
found little or no space for such prophets of doom.

Secretary Mellon again used the low tax returns of 1921 as an argument for
reduction. Discovering that the 1921 returns were the latest tabulated, he
compiled a table whose "force" was found "most compelling" in showing a steady
decline in revenues from surtaxes in the higher brackets between 1916 and
1921. To the obvious retort that naturally tax income had been lower in the
depression year of 1921 than in the preceding wartime boom years, he
vouchsafed no reply, but continued an exposition of the evils of tax-exempt
bonds, in which the wealthy were investing to escape taxation. These bonds, he
said, were "non-productive." Invested in schools, roads, public buildings,
parks, bridges, they turned no profit into any individual pocket.

At this juncture treason stalked into the Republican ranks in the person of
Senator James Couzens of Detroit, whose $40,000,000 fortune raised him above
the level of other critics. He was surprised to hear his fellow-millionaire
from Pittsburgh complaining that industrial expansion was being stifled by the
50 per cent surtax. Why, right in Detroit, Henry Ford was spending
$110,000,000 to expand his automobile facilities. The Michigan Telephone
Company was spending $5,000,000 General Motors had authorized a generous plant
expansion program. Industries were spending freely, with plenty of money in
sight, he asserted.

Surtaxes fell off in 1921, Couzens continued, for lack of profits on which to
pay them. As for $11,000,000,000 invested in taxexempt securities, that was
merely 8 per cent of the total securities on the American market. Men retiring
from business preferred to invest in such bonds to escape the worries of
business management. "Does not money paid for these municipal and governmental
activities," he asked, "go to labor, to cement and material manufacturers, and
to manufacturers of all kinds of things used in this work? Why is the use of
capital in construction of highways and other things I have mentioned not as
productive as that used in private industry?"

"When it is remembered," added the American City, "that the 'productive
purposes' of industry include such essentials as cosmetics, jewelry, chewing
gum and yachts, can it be doubted that on the average the capital outlays of
municipalities confer as great a benefit on society for each dollar expended
as the capital outlays of industry?" Nine years later American City could have
added to its comparison Instill and Kreuger securities sold by Union Trust.

Such treason as Couzens' earned its own reward. Mellon's subordinates dived
into the tax returns to find out that the Detroiter paid no income tax at all.
His money was tied up in tax exempts. Useless was it for him to explain that
he had retired from business. "Must a system," asked Mellon, "which permits a
.man with an income of $1,000,000 to pay not one cent to the support of his
government remain unaltered?"

In the American Banker, the Secretary explained the dodges used by the wealthy
to escape the surtaxes. They took paper losses, used dummy corporations to
split personal income, split up their property by gifts, and created trust
funds to foil the collector.

Governor Blaine of Wisconsin was indignant. He charged that millionaires, by
"fraud, deceit, legal advice and the tricks of the trade" were cheating the
Government. "But suppose," he cried, "that Mellon would scourge the profiteer
and the millionaire with the same vigor that he does lesser criminals? Suppose
he really tried to collect taxes assessed on the rich? Is it true that the
Government is powerless to enforce the law against the rich, or is it just a
desire on the part of Mellon to place taxes on an equality before the law? The
secrecy clause in the federal income tax law is one of those devices by which
wealth has been escaping a debt of highest obligation."

Such personalities, echoed by Robert La Follette and John Garner, awakened
interest. Orators on the stump declared that the Secretary had too big a
personal stake to be able to give disinterested advice. Nevertheless the upper
and middle classes remained unwavering in their support, and the business
press demanded that Congress cut out the debate and vote the Mellon Plan as it
stood. A Literary Digest poll showed only one state, South Dakota, had given
less than half its vote for the Mellon Plan while Pennsylvania, New York and
New England voted go-go per cent in favor of drastic reduction of surtaxes.

Despite the best efforts of Reed Smoot, Dave Reed and Jim Watson, the
Democratic-Progressive coalition in the Senate slashed to bits the Mellon Plan
bill voted by the House. The Democrats tried to outbid the Administration for
the support of the lower middle class by cutting the basic income tax rate
down to 2 per cent. Practical politicians in the House, their eyes glued on
their own chances for reelection, accepted that rate, and compromised between
the Senate's retention of the 50 per cent maximum surtax and Mellon's 25 per
cent, by fixing it at 37.5 per cent. The Mellon Plan was defeated 261 to 153,
and the Longworth-La Follette substitute adopted almost unanimously. Mellon
was furious. The substitute bill would cost the Treasury $460,000,000 against
his $322,000,000, and result in a deficit.

In conference between the Houses, the surtax maximum. was pushed up to 40 per
cent. As if to rub salt into the Secretary's wounds, a publicity clause was
inserted in the revenue bill which opened the income tax books to public
inspection.

The embittered Secretary denounced the completed bill as a perversion of the
Mellon Plan and intimated that be would advise a veto. For the Progressive-
Democratic coalition had committed rank heresy. It bad pushed up the
inheritance tax from a maximum of 25 per cent on a $10,000,000 estate, to 40
per cent.

"Assuming," he argued, "that all inheritances, large and small, were taxed at
40 per cent, it would be only two or three generations until private ownership
of property would cease to exist. . . . Estate taxes, carried to an excess, in
no way differ from the methods of the revolutionists in Russia."

It was, in a way, a personal affront. Andrew Mellon lacked one year of the
Biblical threescore and ten allotted to man. His fortune was tied up in
closely held corporations�Gulf Oil, Aluminum, Standard Steel Car-whose stocks,
dumped on the market, would sell far below their real value. "Particularly is
this true," he explained, "where the sales have to be made in large blocks or
where the company whose stock is offered is not generally known to the
public."

He met the arguments of the radical Coalition orators. "In considering a
revision of estate taxes," he countered, "there should be eliminated any
question of levying the tax as a means of punishing wealth or as in some way
for the social good of our civilization. The theory upon which this country
was founded is equality of opportunity. So long as a man uses his abilities
within the bounds of the moral sense of the community, monetary success is not
a crime, but on the contrary adds to the total wealth of the country and to an
increase in the standard of living as a whole."

"The social necessity for breaking up large fortunes in this country does not
exist," he maintained. Fortunes are split among the children. He quoted
approvingly the old maxim: three generations from shirt sleeves to shirt
sleeves.

His opponents did not agree with him. Meyer Guggenheim, they said, died in
1905 worth $50,000,000 and although his estate was divided among six sons and
three daughters, the family fortune now totaled $500,000,000. Alexis I. Du
Pont in 1921 left $30,000,000 but his heirs now counted their patrimony at
half a billion. And Alexis had been the fourth of a wealth-begetting family.
Steven V. Harkness left less than $50,000,000 but one of his sons, on his
death, passed on $100,000,000 and another $170,000,000 while the Harkness
fortune as a whole was rated at $400,000,000. When Charles Pratt died in 18gi,
he passed on a mere $10,000,000 but the family fortune was now estimated at
$300,000,000 and each of his eight sons was wealthier than his father. Vincent
Astor was worth as much as his grandfather.

The Secretary was reminded that after a wealthy scion handed over 40 per cent
of his patrimony to the State, he had 35 years left to accumulate interest on
the remainder before the State had another split. There was little danger than
Paul or Ailsa would die paupers, even if they merely clipped coupons all their
lives.

Mellon appeared personally before the House Committees, flanked by assistants,
in an effort to save his measure. It was useless, Congress passed the
conference report, only nine stalwarts in the House and fifteen in the Senate
clinging doggedly to the Mellon Plan.

All was not lost. After all, a 40 per cent maximum surtax was better than 50
per cent. Under the new law's provisions, the citizen with a $1,000,000 income
who had given the Government $663,000 of his income when Andrew Mellon came
into office, who had enjoyed a cut to $556,000 in the 1921 revenue law, now
need pay only about $400,000. It was progress. The Secretary signified he
would not oppose President Coolidge's reluctant approval of the bill, as the
best that could be got.

1924 was a hard year for Andrew Mellon. John W. Davis assailed tariffs which,
he said, accounted for no small measure of the Secretary's fortune. Bob La
Follette attacked on all fronts and even entered Pittsburgh to challenge the
enemy in his citadel.

In retrospect the issue in 1924 seems never to have been in doubt. Coolidge
won by a walkaway. Actually the Republican managers were uneasy. How would the
public react to Teapot Dome? Prohibitionists blamed Mellon for the scandals in
the enforcement of the dry law. The farmers were in full revolt against the
1921-22 deflation, which they charged was deliberately provoked by Mellon, as
chairman of the Federal Reserve Board. Union workers were intent on punishing
the Administration responsible for Harry Daugherty and his anti-labor
injunctions in the shopmen's and miners' strikes. The veterans blamed Mellon
for the denial of their "adjusted compensation." Might not La Follette,
repeating 1912, tear away enough votes to permit Davis to walk into the White
House?

Fall, Daugherty, and Denby had been sacrificed to appease the country. All the
more vigorously the opposition centered its attention on the remaining Cabinet
officer whose specific policies offended them. That was Mellon.

He rather enjoyed it. Through narrowed eyes he read their denunciations, and
smiled to himself. It seemed that Coolidge was not the Republican candidate
after all. It was he, Andrew Mellon, erstwhile obscure Pittsburgh millionaire,
son of an Ulster immigrant lad. His father and he had built an enormous
fortune on sterling principles of individual initiative, enterprise, caution
and foresight, and now he was leading a nation to appreciate and applaud those
virtues, to safeguard their fruits, to combat blatant demagoguery which, if
given free play, would pull the country down to the level of Russia.

His opponent's barbs never penetrated his skin. He felt his convictions were
based on tests which had been applied incessantly by the Mellons ever since
his father went into business. They could not be wrong. He explained them at
length in a collection of messages and speeches published under the title The
People's Taxation.

As if to reassure him, the more violent La Follette's attacks, the more
fulsome was the adulation heaped upon the Secretary by the press, the leaders
of industry and finance, all the classes which stood behind him in his fight
to lower taxes and resist raids on the Treasury by farmers and veterans.

"Admitting the genius of Hamilton and the value of his constructive work on
the rudimentary governmental financial system at the birth of the Republic,"
and of other Secretaries who followed him, said the Saturday Evening Post,
none of them "was so completely the master of finance as Mellon, nor any, of
course, who had problems one-tenth the size and complexity of his problems
since 1921." Reed Smoot called him a "world figure."

Eliot Wadsworth, assistant Secretary of the Treasury, repeated the comparison
at a dinner given the Secretary at the Commodore Hotel by alumni of Columbia
College in honor of Alexander Hamilton. Characteristically, Mellon deprecated
the encomiums. "I think," he replied, "that each successive Secretary of the
Treasury at some time during his incumbency of office enjoys the distinction
of being the 'greatest Secretary of the Treasury since Alexander Hamilton';
however, he goes out of office and his glory has departed." He recounted his
entry into the Department with its 770,000 employees in 1921, how he had found
himself not merely Secretary but ex-officio chairman of the Federal Reserve
Board, of the Farm Loan Board, the War Finance Corporation, and the World War
Foreign Debt Commission. He had found a growing concern expanded far beyond
its legitimate peace time scope and authority; its credit, the best in the
world, stretched to a point of imminent danger, its taxes overburdening the
people. Retrenchment and debt reduction bad been the imperative needs. These
needs he had sought to meet, he said, in cooperation with the Administration
and Congress.

If Congress had decided not to cooperate, so much the worse for Congress. Its
defection from the Mellon Plan increased the Secretary's enormous prestige.
The Mellon Plan meant tax reduction, the press had repeated endlessly, and now
Congress had defeated the Mellon Plan. It was useless for the Coalition
leaders to point to the figures showing that their measure had cut taxes far
more deeply than the Mellon Plan. They hadn't cut them in the proper brackets,
and the men who manipulated the vast propaganda machine set up for the Mellon
Plan had not been actuated merely by sentimental sympathy for the little
fellows.

Apparently the criticism heaped upon the Secretary by his enemies had as
little effect on the electorate as upon himself. The country was now rushing
headlong in pursuit of the golden fruits which accompanied these piping years
of prosperity. The scandals in Washington were not merely forgotten, the
Senators who had unearthed them were denounced as muckrakers and scavengers.
Under the best of all possible systems, the wisest of all possible men were in
control. Calvin Coolidge was swept into his next four years of office by an
unprecedented avalanche of votes.

The victory was interpreted as a complete vindication of the Secretary and his
fiscal theories. Those who viewed taxation as a means of punishing the rich
for their superior acquisitiveness were sent scurrying from the field of
battle. The nascent Progressive Party was smashed to bits; soon after, its
leader, Bob La Follette, was claimed by death.

Senator Watson scanned the political horizon and reported in these words: "The
country believes Mr. Mellon is the greatest financial genius in many years. If
he urges Congress to take up tax reduction in the short session it will do so.
The people believe in him. They know he is free from political considerations
and is animated solely by a desire to give the relief they are entitled to."

Mellon however had not the faintest idea of entrusting his tax reduction
schemes to the lame-duck session of the old Congress. He would wait until the
Congress elected in the recent landslide came to Washington in the fall of
1925. In the meantime he did missionary work among the heathen. In the spring
of 1925 he, fared forth into Dixie, to address the Mississippi Bankers
Association and to point out, by inference, how shabbily they had been
misrepresented by their politicians. Lower taxes, he explained, would foster
Southern industry. Eminent Democrats, including Woodrow Wilson, Carter Glass
and David Houston were quoted as favoring lower taxes in the higher brackets.
The Mississippi bankers nodded approvingly. The Secretary might be a
Republican, but he understood their kind of finance, and after all finance, as
Mellon so often insisted, cut through party lines in unwavering fidelity to
immutable economic laws.

A nod of the sage Secretary's head was now law in Washington. If he let it be
known that a maximum surtax of 20 per cent were desirable, Senator Smoot and
Representative Tilson were eager to fix it at 15 per cent. His critics,
confuted by the election returns, retired for a time to recompose their
shattered nerves, and to debate with themselves whether an ungrateful people
should not be left to whatever fate the Secretary had in store for them.

On October 18, 1925, Mellon revealed his new program, which, in memory of past
bad luck, he hastened to assure Congress was not intended as a hard and fast
Mellon Plan but merely as a suggestion. While Congressmen craned their necks
to hear, he whispered before the House Ways and Means Committee his
recommendation for a 20 per cent maximum surtax, a basic income tax of 5 per
cent, the reduction and eventual repeal of the hateful inheritance tax,
yielding $100,000,000 a year, the repeal of the gift tax, the tax on auto
trucks and accessories. He advised a Constitutional amendment to lay forever
the obnoxious taxexempt state and local bond issues. The maximum surtax, which
had been 40 per cent on $500,000, was to be 20 per cent on $150,000.

The great difficulty with this eager Congress was to restrain its members, who
had seen a great light on last election day, from voting a deficit in the
Treasury. Democrats vied with Republicans in cutting rates.

February 26, 1926, was one of the happiest days in Andrew Mellon's life. He
stood beside Calvin Coolidge as the Chief Executive signed a tax measure, with
the surtax maximum even lower than that of the Mellon Plan which had been spat
upon and reviled by a previous Congress. As the movie men ground away, he
smiled continuously and newspaper men reported that at last the Secretary
seemed sincerely happy.

He could be pardoned. He could boast that the tax load of the rich and
prosperous had been cut $700,000,000 in the past two years, -the equivalent of
$2,000,000 a day which was released, as he said, for productive industry. The
publicity clause was no more. The inheritance tax was cut from 40 per cent to
20 per cent, and the credit on state inheritance taxes was raised from 25 per
cent to 80 per cent. The capital stock tax was repealed. The gift tax was
history. The man with the million dollar income who had been paying $663,000
into the federal treasury when Mellon assumed charge five years ago, was now
asked to pay a trifle under $200,000. For a family whose taxable income
hovered around $5,000,000 a year, as did the Mellons, the saving for 1926 over
the 1921 rate was about $2,315,000. His personal saving, as contrasted with
the 1924 rate, was estimated at $828,349.

With the enactment of the Mellon Plan, the Pittsburgh banker reached the
climax of his public career. He had justified the faith of Senators Knox and
Penrose, now dead. He had released to the captains of Wall Street billions of
dollars which they were now to use in the expansion of the magnificent
industrial plant of the United States. He had halted the march of socialistic
ideas in public finance which had seemed for a time to threaten a leveling
down of million dollar incomes and a hampering of vast agglomerations of
wealth. For fifty years he had labored to build up one immense fortune. Now,
in five short years, he had secured that fortune against the inroads of
radically minded legislators and had assured to every man in the country who
wished to emulate him, an opportunity to amass money by those processes dear
to the money-lender, corporation promoter and employer of labor.

He was the symbol to which every ambitious aspirant to wealth vowed his
allegiance. If masters of millions felt safe as long as Andrew Mellon held
power in Washington, every young man starting his business career in the magic
decade of 1920 was confident that wealth would be his too under a regime whose
acknowledged chief was the nation's second or third wealthiest individual.

pps. 124-142
--[cont]--
Aloha, He'Ping,
Om, Shalom, Salaam.
Em Hotep, Peace Be,
Omnia Bona Bonis,
All My Relations.
Adieu, Adios, Aloha.
Amen.
Roads End
Kris

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