-Caveat Lector-

an excerpt from:
Mellon's Millions
Harvey O'Conner�1933
Blue Ribbon Books
New York, N.Y.
--[9]--

9

The Bureau of Internal Revenue is Liberalized

THE Founding Fathers tried to bar active business men from the Treasury. They
wanted the Secretary, like Caesar's wife, to be above the suspicion that he
might, in the administration of taxes, favor himself or his friends.

By the time the proprietor of Gulf Oil, Aluminum and Union Trust was called
to head the nation's finance, their statute had become a dead letter. Not
until the suspicion they feared had raised its head was the federal law
exhumed. By then the Secretary's department had already awarded $4,000,000 in
tax refunds to one of the Secretary's corporations, and loose tongues were
charging that Andrew W. Mellon was feathering his own nest. His denial of
personal interference or even knowledge of such refunds left skeptics
unconvinced.

The Bureau of Internal Revenue was the key point of interest to the nation's
heavy taxpayers. To obtain substantial tax reductions from Congress, it was
necessary to overcome the objections of demagogues, but a mere order to the
Bureau of Internal Revenue to "liberalize" its rules could accomplish wonders
in slicing down the imposts on wealthy individuals and corporations. In the
latter part of 1921, administrative heads in the Bureau let it be known that
the tax laws would henceforth be interpreted more liberally, i.e., more
liberally to the taxpayers even though it might be charged that this
constituted discrimination against the public generally.

     It was to the Bureau therefore that those in the "higher brackets" sent
their attorneys, experts, and Congressmen, to protest against errors in tax
administration. Persistence in such cases usually paid. The tax laws were
often confusing; the Bureau own rulings, for the most part, were unpublished.
Usually there were two or three ways, each legal, that an assessor could turn
in deciding a case. The maze was so intricate that no layman could hope to
understand the basis of any specific award, and each award so obscure when
buried among hundreds of thousands of others; that it attracted no attention.

When the good news got a-round that the rule of reason had been installed in
the Bureau, big taxpayers rushed to Washington to hire talent to have their
returns reanalyzed, resubmitted, reconsidered and revised. Expert knowledge
on just how far the Bureau's rules could be stretched was confined to the
Bureau's own employees.

The labor turnover in the Bureau became so great, the financial rewards
offered to ex-employees by corporations and wealthy individuals so alluring,
that a clamor arose in the halls of Congress. It was charged that no fewer
than 27,000 lawyers, accountants and tax experts were practicing in these
cases, that a majority of former Bureau employees bobbed up within a short
time with clients, in insolent violation of the Bureau's rules. Editors�with
the exception of the New York World-regarded these charges as too full, of
"dynamite" to touch. In any event the higher accountancy practiced in tax
matters was as effective in deflecting public interest as if the records were
kept in Sanscrit.

It took a $40,000,000 Senator to attack the situation, which by now was
bringing protests even from the National Industrial Conference Board. Senator
Couzens, he of tax-exempt bond fame, proposed on February 21, 1924, Senate
investigation by a special committee. On March 12 it was authorized and
Senator Watson was named chairman, flanked by Couzens of Michigan and Ernst,
of Kentucky, Republicans, and King of Utah and Jones of New Mexico, Democrats.

Secretary Mellon amiably dumped a roomful of documents before the befuddled
committee while Bureau experts dealt abstrusely with tax intricacies.
Nevertheless certain discoveries whetted Couzens' curiosity. Did S. T. de la
Mater, former chief of the amortization division, possess a "little black
book" enumerating the Mellon companies? Why did "This is a Mellon company"
appear on a Standard Steel Car tax report? What was the significance of the
notation, "What is not to be done is the matter of assessing a tax," written
on an Aluminum Company letter?

Secretary Mellon bristled. He was merely a minor stockholder in these
companies. He had never seen any of the reports, had given no orders, had
never interfered with the routine of the Bureau in these matters. He offered
full cooperation in the investigation.

Couzens and his Democratic colleagues were incredulous. But they were
helpless in the toils of the financial jargon and interminable involutions of
Bureau practice. Clearly if any headway were to be made, counsel must be
hired and the Bureau inspected by experts.

At this point converged the trails of two gentlemen of politics who failed to
see eye to eye with the august Secretary of the Treasury. The broad-brimmed
black hat and long white mustachios of Governor Pinchot of Pennsylvania
appeared at the national capital. He conferred with Couzens on the stalled
investigation. Couzens mentioned the names of several choices to head the
quiz. Pinchot demurred, in favor of his friend, Francis J. Heney, of San
Francisco. Couzens wired Heney, the famed prosecutor of the Oregon land fraud
cases and of the Ruef-Schmitz ring in his own home city.

Heney looked over the material in the committee's possession. He talked with
former employees of the Bureau. The nose of this bloodhound of public
corruption twitched with eagerness and anticipation. "I've never started an
investigation with so much good material," he told Couzens. "This is worse
than Teapot Dome."

The Michigan Senator offered a resolution to the committee April 9 to retain
Heney as counsel. His name was the spark that set off the powder keg. "We
were not appointed," shouted Senator Watson, his face flushed with anger, "to
find out if there was crime, but to elicit information to enable us to
improve the Department, simplify the tax laws and such matters. I am opposed
to making this a muckraking committee. If you are going to take up all these
rumors we'll never get through." Senator Ernst was even more indignant.
"This," he prophesied, "will be another cesspool muckraking performance and I
am tired of it." Heney, he complained, was a "prosecuting attorney'' type.

The news traveled with lightning speed to the Treasury. For once in his life
Andrew Mellon exploded. Trembling with rage, he darted over to the White
House. If Francis J. Heney were retained as counsel, Andrew Mellon's
resignation was in the President's hands. When Senator Reed of Pennsylvania,
faithful shield of the Secretary in the Upper House, reached the Secretary's
apartment that evening for a conference with Treasury officials and others,
he found the Pittsburgh banker still beside himself with rage and hardly
coherent in his language.

Coolidge was cool but troubled. Even such a consistent defender of
Republicanism as Mark Sullivan had been forced to admit that there were a
"good many things done badly" in the income tax division. On the other hand
Mellon had been deified by the business classes. His resignation would rock
the Administration. For his own part, the President was just as sick of
muckraking as Senator Ernst. Already he had had to fire two of his
Secretaries, Daugherty and Denby, and Fall had been a victim to cesspool
dragging during Harding's regime. The Senate scavengers needed a lesson in
the proper division of authority between the Executive and the Legislative
arms.

That night Coolidge dictated a sizzling letter to the Senate. By what right
did Couzens hire, out of his own pocket, a special investigator to pry into
the Bureau of Internal Revenue? -Why were the so-called Mellon companies
singled out for attack? How much longer would the Senate insist on violating
Constitutional guarantees against search and seizure by demanding documents
from Executive branches? It was time, he concluded, to return to the usual
form of the law of the land, in which Congress made the laws and the
Executive administered them. If the Senate were to continue its folly, a
breakdown in Government would result.

Attached to Coolidge's message was a letter from the Secretary, complaining
that Couzens was conducting a private vendetta against him and seeking
political capital. He denied any wrongdoing and added the warning that
"Government business cannot continue to be conducted under the frequent
interference by investigations of Congress, entirely destructive in their
character. . . . Government by investigation is not government."

Senator Walsh, premier investigator and scalpsman in the Teapot Dome hunt,
described the President's message as the "most arrogant sent by an Executive
to a Parliamentary body since the days of the Stuarts and Tudors."

The Times, bellwether of the business press, applauded the message. The
private hiring of a lawyer "is not only altogether irregular, it is
indecent," it said. "It is an insult at once to the Senate and to the entire
Government of the United States."

The New York World alone demurred. "Mr. Coolidge should either have kept his
temper while protesting against the abuse of power by Senator Couzens, or
lost his temper sooner at the graft and stupidity in his own Cabinet," it
observed with some acidity. "The utter disproportion between the anger of the
Congressional rebuke and the gentility of the Denby and Daugherty resignation
letters is too startling. . . . Mr. Coolidge is furiously angry at Senator
Couzens because he has had to bottle up his anger at Senators Walsh and
Wheeler."

Mellon himself, addressing the Pittsburgh Chamber of Commerce the next day at
a dinner given in his honor, asserted that the morale of the Treasury
Department had been shattered, its productivity in handling tax cases reduced
by 50 per cent. Later the heads of five divisions in the Bureau signed
statements that the Couzens committee's investigation had not interfered with
or harmed the work of their divisions.

In the Senate, debate waxed furious. "I am no muckraker," said Senator
Watson, asking the discharge of the committee. "I would rather pull a man out
of the mud than push him into it." Senator Reed of Missouri turned the thin
blade of sarcasm in Watson's ribs. "This Republic will live even if Andrew W.
Mellon is investigated," he said. "When I hear so astute a politician as the
Senator from Indiana trying to stop an investigation, I almost know there is
something they do not want disclosed."

Couzens demanded that the Senate either authorize the committee to "go to the
bottom of this matter or whitewash and ignore the charges." Senator Ernst was
on his feet. "Every time the name of Mellon or a Mellon company was
mentioned," he said, pointing an accusing finger at Couzens, "up he went like
a horse at a county fair with his head and his tail in the air, to find out
about Mellon."

The Administration's furious onslaught checkmated Couzens' effort to employ
Heney. Although a majority of the committee had authorized the attorney's
retention, it was contended that Couzens had no legal right to pay his salary
pending authorization by the Senate. Luckily for the Administration, Couzens
was stricken at the height of the debate and taken to Johns Hopkins for a
major operation. The Detroiter was removed from the scene of battle by his
physicians and ordered not to return until fall. Although the Senate,
sniffing fire in so much smoke, passed the Jones resolution authorizing the
appointment of publicly paid counsel, the committee failed to meet until
Couzens called it together on November 11, 1924. By that time Calvin Coolidge
had been assured four more years of office by a majority of 7,400,000 votes
and Secretary Mellon was undisputedly first in command at the capital.
Attacks on him now were a form of lese majesty that business men would not
tolerate and their press would not report.

Committee bearings began November 20 and lasted until June 1, 1925, but even
the voluminous New York Times could find little space for them. The more
sensational revelations concerning Mellon companies received passing
attention. Hardly a word of the committee's recommendations, published in
January and February, 1926, reached the reading public. Business was off on a
wild joyride in the Great Bull Market.

Amortization is a big word. Perhaps that is one reason why the committee's
findings on amortization allowances got so little space in the press. Chief
Counsel L. C. Manson was obliged to report that $210,000,000 of such
allowances was illegal, out of a total of $425,000,000 made in major cases.
Engineers in the Bureau, be found, were really the final authority in
determining amortization allowances, and they changed their bases of
calculation almost with the shifting winds. No published rules guided them.

The theory back of these allowances was this: Many corporations during the
World War had been forced to expand their plant to take care of Government
orders for war supplies, and later found these facilities unusable or greatly
depreciated. Nevertheless they had been assessed excess profit taxes which
failed to take into account their extraordinary expenditures, useless after
the war, on specialized plant facilities. "The amortization provision,"
explained Manson, "in effect permits the taxpayer extraordinary depreciation.
It permits him to charge back as against income of the high war tax era that
extraordinary depreciation which took place, representing for instance the
difference between the war cost of his plant and what that plant is worth
after the war, what it could be replaced for: and represented by the loss due
to the investment in plant or equipment which is not useful for postwar
business or operations."

The point which interested the corporations was that the more generous the
amortization allowance, the bigger the deduction they would be allowed on war
taxes�30 to 80 per cent of the amortization allowance.

It seemed curious to the committee that many corporations, despite their
claim that specially built war plant was useless surplus, nevertheless
continued building after the war. The bases used by the Bureau to determine
just what was "useless plant?" also seemed strange. Take the Aluminum Company
of America, for instance:

In its 1918 tax returns, Aluminum claimed allowance for $6,055,000
amortization on war plant that would be useless after the Armistice. By 1921
the claim had grown to $18,124,000, of which the Bureau allowed $15,589,000.
The claim was based on production for 1921-22-23 as the normal useful
capacity of the plant, and the amount unused, that had been built for war
needs, would be allowed as amortization.

Choice of the depression year 1921 was a happy one for Aluminum. Its
production had been very low. As for 1922 and 1923, the Bureau had only
estimated what production would be, but prospects in 1921 were far from rosy.

The production figures for Aluminum actually were:

Year    Pounds of Aluminum Produced
1919            128,461,000
1920            1377930,000
1921            54,000,000
1922            73,632,000
1923            128,659,000

Commented the committee:

"This taxpayer's allowance for amortization for loss of value in use was
based on the assumption that its capacity in excess of 82,000,000 [the median
for 1921-23] represented a loss, It will be noted that the assumed required
capacity, which is made the basis of the amortization allowance in this case,
would produce less than 64 per cent of the actual production in 1912 and
1923, and less than 60 per cent of the actual production in 1920."

The income tax unit found Aluminum's capacity to be 146,000,000 pounds a
year, of which, it followed, 64,000,000 pounds, or 44 per cent, was "excess."
The committee's accountants asserted that $6,438,000 of Aluminum's
amortization was not based on sound engineering principles nor upon the
published rules announced tardily by the Bureau's solicitor in October, 1925.
Because it was impossible to determine exactly, the committee did not
estimate the deduction in taxes allowed Aluminum on this $6,438,000. It
ranged somewhere between 30 and 80 per cent.

Aluminum Company achieved, the distinction at this time of asserting the
truth of mutually contradictory statements. While it was pleading before the
Bureau that it possessed war-expanded plant far beyond its needs, the Federal
Trade Commission was hearing the contrary. There Aluminum, defending itself
against monopoly charges, was declaring that the reason certain customers
could not get their orders filled was that it could not meet their demand.
When this contention was placed before the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
Aluminum counsel unblushingly stated that one branch of the Government could
not take cognizance of statements made before other branches.

Mellon companies other than Aluminum shared in the Bureau's beneficence. The
Alan Wood Iron and Steel Company's amortization was based on its 1921
production alone, although that year "was the worst year industrially that
this country has seen since 1893." Koppers, New York Shipbuilding, Standard
Steel Car, also received unwarranted allowance, the committee's investigators
reported. Standard Steel Car, devoted to munitions work during the war, was
granted a $3,039,763 amortization allowance. It was another case in which S.
T. de la Mater, chief of the division, asked for hurry-up action. A. Cullery,
an engineer in the division, told an associate checking the company's returns
to be careful for he had "found them to be a bunch of crooks." Senator
Couzens asked Chief Solicitor Nelson Hartson of the Bureau what a crossed out
notation on the case, "This is a Mellon company," signified, but Hartson had
no explanation.

Ernst & Ernst, accountants, have a justly high rating among business firms.
Plodding bookkeepers, following old-fashioned methods of posting entries and
balancing ledgers, were amazed to see the prodigies performed with figures
when a corps of Ernst & Ernst accountants entered an office. Profits vanished
into depletion, depreciation and obsolescence.

Why any corporation should pay for such dolorous legerdemain was not
apparent: at first blush to the man in the street. But to corporations faced
by excess profits taxes which ranged up to 65 per cent, such accountancy was
a godsend. If a million dollars suddenly vanished from profits and appeared
under the heading Depreciation, corporations might be saved as much as
$650,000, and so be that much richer instead of a million dollars poorer, as
the figures seemed to indicate.

W. L. Mellon and George S. Davison called in E. C. Ernst in 1919 to go over
the books in connection with a proposed merger involving; Gulf Oil
Corporation. Ernst discovered that Gulf's bookkeeping was somewhat
antiquated. The corporation had no "uniform and accurate basis for
bookkeeping on depreciation, depletion and obsolescence" in 1917-19, the
years of the big profits. It was needful, he advised, to overhaul the entire
system and revise the tax returns for those years.

Early in February, a month before Gulf's principal owner was to become
Secretary of the Treasury, Ernst & Ernst conferred with officials of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue. On February 19 the firm filed revised tax returns
showing that Gulf owed the Government $87,000 on 1917 taxes, but had overpaid
in 1918 by $1,430,000 and in 1919 by $2,431,000. Speedy action was requested
because Mr. Mellon desired "to have the cases of all outside interests in
which he might be connected closed prior to March 4, 1921."

In five working days the returns were inspected and Gulf Oil informed on
February 28 of the Bureau's approval. Cases of similar magnitude had taken
the Bureau one to two years to decide and some were still pending in 1926.
Gulf's $3,774,O00 error in its first returns was not held to throw doubt on
its revised figures, especially when prepared by such an outstanding firm as
Ernst & Ernst. Thoughtfully the accountants had insisted that the Bureau's
ruling be made irrevocable. The case could not be opened thereafter for any
reason whatever.

To Senator Couzens it was all an outrageous example of Treasury favoritism to
its chief. In vain did Senator Reed, Mellon representative in the Upper
House, point out that the report had been approved by a Democratic
Commissioner before Mellon had entered the Treasury.

All in all, Gulf had paid $10,320,000 in taxes during 19 15-19, of which
$3,996,000 was refunded. Accountants for the Couzens committee insisted
however that the Mellon company still owed the Government $4,590,000,
including the refunds.

The bookkeeping mystery by which Gulf and other oil and mining corporations
profited so handsomely was known as discovery depletion. It was another of
those technical terms which effectively barred the public from understanding
what Senator Couzens' committee was talking about. Spokesmen for the oil
industry had explained it very carefully to the House Ways and Means
Committee in 19 18, when oil consumption was outstripping production by
60,000 barrels a day. Wildcatters sometimes prospected for years, drilling
only into dry holes and heavy losses. When they did strike oil, the
Government's tax agents stepped in with a heavy excise which entirely
overlooked their previous losses. Naturally, wildcatters were discouraged and
exploration for new wells was declining just when the country needed every
drop it could squeeze out of the reluctant earth.

Congress obliged the wildcatters, it thought, with an allowance for discovery
depletion. Actually, the Couzens committee discovered, corporations which had
risked nothing were reaping the benefit. Of 13,671 cases in which discovery
depletion was claimed, only 35 represented actual discoveries of new oil
deposits by wildcatters. Albert H. Fay, former chief of the natural resources
division of the income tax unit, on whom the committee relied in its inquiry,
estimated that only $10,000,000 out of annual deductions of $300,000,000 for
discovery depletion had been credited to bona fide wildcatters.

It worked this way. Within 30, days after bringing in a new well, the
discoverer placed a valuation on it. If this was, say, $1,000,000, he was
allowed a discovery depletion of $1,000,000. Only income in excess of
$1,000,000 was taxed. Actually, the discoverer, i.e., the wildcatter, sold
out immediately to the corporation, which then proceeded to claim the
exemption which Congress had intended only for the wildcatter.

Passed as an emergency measure to stimulate wartime production of oil, the
law stiff remained on the statute books and had been stretched to benefit
even corporations bringing in wells in territory already proved to be
oil-bearing.

Another neat trick was the Bureau's 5 per cent discount factor on deferred
receipts. S. M. Greenidge, head of the engineering division of the income tax
unit, maintained that the discount factor made no difference. Committee
accountants disagreed. They took as an example, a 500,000-barrel well, to be
worked out within ten years, with oil running at $1 a barrel. A 5 per cent
discount factor gave a present value Of $451,562 to the $500,000 to be
realized within the decade. With a 10 per cent discount factor, the present
value would be $411,919. Under the law and the Bureau's 5 per cent ruling,
the $451,562 of operating profitspresent value-was deducted as tax free
depletion, and the tax based on the remaining $48,318. But under the 10 per
cent discount, the tax would be based on $88,081, the difference between
$411,gig and $500,000. It was therefore to the oil company's interest to have
as low a discount factor as possible.- "The conclusion is inevitable,"
commented the committee, "that either Mr. Greenidge deliberately attempted to
mislead this committee, or is hopelessly ignorant of the work over which he
has jurisdiction."

Couzens maintained that the 5 per cent discount factor was ridiculously low
for the oil industry. It really meant, he insisted, that the Bureau
considered that investors were willing to risk their money in a hazardous
industry for a mere 5 per cent return.

"The oil industry generally," the committee summarized, "has received
excessive allowance for depletion, but the allowance to the Gulf OR
Corporation, in the high-tax years, is so excessive as to constitute a gross
discrimination against even the oil industry. From the depletion allowances
and net incomes of sixteen large oil companies [including Standard companies]
comparable to the Gulf Oil Corporation, we have computed the per cent of
depletion to net income and have compared this with the per cent of depletion
to net income allowed the Gulf Oil Corporation, as follows:

Per Cent Depletion to Net In- Per Cent Deple-

        come, Average of All Com-       tion to Net
        panies on Exhibit IT,, Except   come, Gulf Oil
Year    Gulf Oil Corporation            Corporation

1917    37.8    20-7
1918    27.6    177-9
1919    48.2    448.6

Senator Couzens' investigators turned up several surprising items. A
corporation, for example, could bargain with the Government over its tax
assessments. Although thousands of small home-owners and farmers were being
sold out when their taxes became delinquent, Atlantic, Gulf & West Indies
Steamship Company received more consideration. Its tax of $9,083,000 with
penalties of $830,000 was compromised for $2,631,000, although "the records
of the income tax unit show that this taxpayer resorted to every conceivable
fraudulent expedient for the purpose of concealing the immense profits earned
by it and its subsidiaries in 1917, 1918, 1919 and 192o, and that these
frauds were expressly approved by the directors of the taxpayer." Secretary
Mellon defended his Department's course. "Throwing the company into
bankruptcy might have gotten the Government nothing." Consequently it was
compromised "as in all creditordebtor relationships."

J. H. Hillman Company claims for tax refunds were allowed because their
officers were "underpaid." Three executives received $12,000 each, whereas
they should have received $50,000 each plus 10 per cent of net earnings, it
maintained. The company thereby saved $81,000 in taxes. "Considered from
every angle," the committee said, "we contend that the policy of grantMg
corporations relief by special assessment because said corporations pay their
officers too small salaries is unsound, illegal and ridiculous."

Padded assets helped corporations. They were allowed to subtract a sum equal
to 8 per cent of invested capital from profits before calculating the excess
profits tax. The higher the assets the better; the bigger salaries paid
executives, the less profits there were on which to pay taxes. Some companies
claimed their own books did not reflect their true capital resources and set
up fictitious valuations. Crucible Steel kept two sets of books, one for the
tax examiners and another for its stockholders. In filing consolidated
returns, holding and super-holding companies counted their alleged assets in
with the assets of basic companies.

The Bureau was found to be the happy hunting ground for exemployees who
profited from their private knowledge of cases and the fact that only I 15.5
per cent of the Bureau's rulings had ever been made public to taxpayers.
"Taxpayers found that by employing 'experts' with inside information they
could secure the allowance of deductions in amounts vastly in excess of the
claims made in their original returns, upon a basis specifically condemned by
the only published ruling on the subject. The 'expert' with 'inside'
information knew that such allowances had been made in other cases and could
urge such cases as precedents to be applied in his own case. . . . This
special knowledge of secret precedents has created a demand by large
taxpayers for the services of income tax unit employees, and is the principal
cause of the immense turnover in the personnel of the unit."

Interest was provoked by the activities of W. A. Seifert of Pittsburgh.
Seifert was a member of the firm of Smith, Shaw, McClay & Seifert, whose
offices were in the same suite in the Union Trust Building with Reed, Smith,
Shaw & McClay, attorneys for U. S. Steel, the Mellons and other industrial
overlords of Pittsburgh. Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay could not practice before
the Bureau because its senior partner was Senator David A. Reed. Seifert was
credited in Washington with uncanny success in the adjudication of tax cases.

Upon his request, for example, Mellon National Bank, Union Trust and Union
Savings were permitted to file separate returns for 1917 when it had been
ruled previously that they should file a consolidated return, requiring a
higher tax. Union Trust owns 99 per cent of the Mellon National Bank's stock
and 98 per cent of Union Savings'. The Government lost $91,472-37 on that
deal. When the error was admitted, nothing could be done about it because the
Bureau had signed a clause forbidding reconsideration of the case. L. E.
Rusch, an employee of the income tax unit, cooperated with Smith, Shaw,
McClay & Seifert in, the Mellon bank case. Later he resigned his $4,000 a
year job and opened luxuriously furnished offices in Washington. After
practicing for several years, he retired to devote himself to silver foxes.

D. F. Hickey, an employee of the income tax unit for five years ending April
3, 1924, and of the estate tax division for one year ending May 31, 1925,
followed with close interest the cooperation visible between Seifert on the
outside and Rusch on the inside on a number of cases involving Pittsburgh
firms. The "intelligence unit" was set on his trail. He was transferred to
the estate tax division and later quit the Bureau in disgust.

John H. Briggs, engineer and Yale graduate, who won promotion to head of the
non-metal and metal valuations sections, had many of his rulings tossed aside
by superiors without explanation. When he protested, the chief of the
engineering division reminded him sharply against "taking issue with the
decisions or instructions of superior officers." When he appealed to the
assistant deputy commissioner, that worthy advised him "to keep still and
leave things run as smoothly as possible." Briggs was summarily dismissed in
1925.

Employees who helped the committee unduly found their jobs endangered.
Despite the committee's assurance that they would be protected, several were
discharged. It was a salutary lesson to remaining employees that not even a
Senatorial investigation gave immunity.

The Couzens committee never got "to the bottom" of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue. Administration Senators dipped its authority to hold hearings or
draw records after June 1, 1925. Nevertheless its counsel was able to report
that nearly half of all amortization allowances of more than $500,000 were
improper and that Congress could save the tax on two-thirds of $210,000,000
of such allowances by prompt action. Because of lack of time, its staff was
unable to penetrate the mysteries of tax refunds, but Counsel Manson declared
that many of the allowances were illegal and not based on sound principles.
Such refunds in fouryears of Secretary Mellon's incumbency had reached
$459,000,000. The Secretary himself had been allowed a $404,000 individual
refund, second only to John D. Rockefeller's $457,000. M. Greenidge, in
charge of the division which made valuations, appeared to the committee to be
"ill informed of the work under his jurisdiction, incompetent, and generally
unfit for any position in the Government service requiring the exercise of
engineering ability and sound discretion."

Opponents of the Administration who watched the commit-tee's, work carefully
wondered at the moderation of its chief counsel and his delicacy in avoiding
offense to the Secretary. They could not help contrasting his gentle demeanor
and his refusal to fix personal responsibility for conditions in the Bureau,
with the relentless prosecution by Senator Walsh in the Teapot Dome case.
They speculated on the dramatic vigor which Heney would have injected into
the investigation.

Nevertheless Senator Couzens could summarize his conclusions in the
statement: "Give me the control of the Internal Revenue Bureau and I will run
the whole darned country. . . . The Commissioner of the Bureau has the power
to perpetuate a political party in power indefinitely. He can arrange things
so that heavy campaign contributions will be paid out of the public treasury
merely by returning it to contributors in the form of tax refunds. It is a
power that no man should be allowed to exercise in secret."

On the morning of March 7, 1925, the New York World published on its front
page the committee's report that William Boyce Thompson, chairman of the ways
and means committee of the Republican National Committee and active with Will
Hays in raising the Republican campaign fund of 1920, had been relieved of
his share of a $573,000 income tax. That afternoon Commissioner Blair of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue and an assistant appeared at the door of the
Senate and asked for Couzens, They handed him a letter which in effect
demanded that he pay an extra $10,861,131.50 on the sale of his Ford Motor
Company stock in 1919. As the statute of limitations expired on the claim
within a week, he was asked to sign a waiver or submit to assessment. Because
he had the "temerity to dare to criticize a Republican Administration or a
Republican Cabinet officer," charged the Michigan Senator, "they proposed
immediately when things got too warm to penalize that Senator to the extent
of ten to eleven million dollars."

Why, he asked, had Treasury officials waited until within a few days of
expiration of the statute of limitations on this case, when they had had in
their files for three years the memorandum on which the claim was based? The
memorandum had been prepared in 1922, he charged, for use against Henry Ford
when he was fighting Senator Newberry in Michigan.

Carter Glass, financial luminary for the Senate Democrats, challenged the
Treasury's new policy of reopening cases decided under a previous
administration. The Treasury's answer was that "unjustifiable acts of public
officials do not bind their successors in office." Aroused by this slap at a
Democratic Secretary of the Treasury, Glass stated that Mellon had reopened
the case "simply because he and the Senator from Michigan hate each other. I
don't believe the Secretary has a foot to stand on in a court of equity or
law, or that he can recover one dollar."

New mystery developed when Solicitor Nelson  T. Hartson, who would have had
to prosecute the case against Couzens, resigned from the Bureau two weeks
after Commissioner Blair's demand on the Senator. Mellon denied that his
resignation had anything to do with the Couzens tax suit, and Hartson himself
maintained a gloomy silence. His successor was Alexander W. Gregg, 26 years
old, another bright young man to whom Mellon had taken a fancy.

The celebrated Couzens suit, after the due lapse of years, came up before the
board of tax appeals, and was decided in his favor.

The issue of tax refunds would not down. When the Secretary asked $75,000,000
for refunds in the deficiency appropriation bill of 1929, John Garner,
Democratic leader, arose in fiery wrath on the floor of the House to denounce
what he termed bargain counter methods pursued with big taxpayers. "The
Treasury Department," he stated, "is the greatest Santa Claus in history. The
only people lacking sense enough to render tax returns correctly were the big
corporations."

It was curious indeed to note the alarming errors made by corporations and
wealthy individuals, whose returns presumably had been computed by able
accountants and attorneys. Old judge Mellon would have been surprised by the
laxity in his son's bookkeeping which permitted the same amount to be added
twice in computing the tax. The error meant a refund to Andrew Mellon of
$66,268. Pennsylvania, Garner said, either had the most generous taxpayers in
the United States, or "the most ignorant people who do not know how to make
out their tax returns." He threatened that when the Democrats came into
power, he would look "into Uncle Andy's books."

Pittsburgh firms indubitably shared generously in tax refunds, whether due to
the city's eminence in heavy industry or to the able efforts of Smith, Shaw,
McClay & Seifert. Allegheny Steel received a refund in 1929 Of $555,000; the
H. C. Frick estate, $802,000; McClintic-Marshall, $874,000; Pressed Steel
Car, $486,000; Aluminum, $1,267,000.

U. S. Steel led the way. In one check the Corporation received $27,000,000.
Secretary Mellon retorted that the Corporation patriotically had paid
whatever Treasury experts assessed during the war. He praised "its very fair
attitude toward the Government." In any event, he reminded Garner, all
refunds of more than $75,000 went to a joint Congressional committee for
approval. Garner snorted. The joint committee met with but one Republican
member present, his pocket stuffed with proxies. Confronted with a mass of
returns, the committee perfunctorily approved all of them without inspection,
save only the U. S. -Steel case. And that was because L. H. Parker, former
Treasury official, had reported that "the number of considerations given to
the U. S. Steel claim by the Treasury Department were very questionable in
both law and fact."

Secretary Mellon covered his indignation with admirable patience. "Suggestion
that refunds are made for political or any other improper purpose is simply
preposterous," he answered. 'Ile courts, with their rulings in tax appeals,
were the real Santa Claus. Explicitly he outlined the Bureau's procedure.
When taxpayers underestimate their taxes, they must pay more; if they
overestimate, a refund must be made. Corporation taxation is at best a
complicated job and new court rulings often shift the basis for assessments.
Field examiners and auditors�civil service employees -make the
recommendations on which taxes are based. These are reviewed by the auditor
of the Bureau's revenue division, assisted by the valuation division. If the
refund is for less than $10,000, it goes to the Commissioner for approval or
rejection. If for more, to the Bureau's general counsel for review. If for
more than $75,000, it is passed on by the Congressional joint committee.

The largest amount of refunds, Mellon explained, was due to court decisions
on war taxation. Large sums were paid in by corporations when the rules had
not yet been fully established. A good deal of discretion must be left to the
Bureau. If all tax appeals were thrown into the federal courts, indescribable
confusion would arise, resulting in a breakdown of the tax system. Actually,
he concluded triumphantly, more money had been collected in additional taxes
than was disbursed in refunds. The refunds totaled only 2.8 per cent of all
taxes collected.

The Secretary's didactical exposition of the Bureau's functioning was
admirable, both Couzens and Garner admitted. It fell short though, they
complained, of answering the points raised by the Couzens committee and by
tax experts who had quit the Bureau in disgust, or had been fired because,
they claimed, they protested glaring irregularities.

Andrew Mellon himself was imperturbable in the face of accusations that as
Secretary he was obliged to assume responsibility for refunds upward Of
$7,000,000 to himself and his companies. The right hand knew not what the
left did in the Treasury Department; the refunds as a matter of fact were as
much of a surprise to him, when brought to his attention, as to the outside
world. As for the mysterious notations which appeared in the files regarding
so-called Mellon companies, they were blamed on overzealous employees who
deluded themselves that they could ingratiate themselves with their superior
by favoring cases in which he had an interest. The Secretary's enormous
wealth, declared his defenders in the Senate, automatically removed from him
any suspicion that he would seek to use his governmental position to add a
few unimportant millions to his fortune.

Business men stood loyally behind the Secretary. They were satisfied with the
Bureau. True, it was necessary to employ experts who had been in the Bureau
in order to gain the most consideration. Their fees might be stiff, but they
were cheap compared with the savings.

As for the tax refunds, which totaled $1,271,000,000 since 1922, the entire
issue was shrouded in mystery. No check was ever made by an outside agency.
No Francis Heney was ever permitted to scrutinize them. The Couzens committee
had been stopped by its own time limit. Business men agreed that war taxes
had been too high, and if the Treasury was reasonable in refunding, it was no
more than right, now that the emergency of war was over and the Treasury was
overflowing with money.

Garner's threat to inspect "Uncle Andy's books" turned out to be an idle one.
When his party assumed leadership of the House, be found too many other
matters with which to occupy his time. Truth to tell, it was easy to utter
mouth-filling phrases charging the Secretary with unnumbered derelictions but
it required a patience, an aggressiveness and a single-mindedness apparently
beyond the capacity of the new majority in the House to dig into the facts of
the case. Perhaps, too, as former Chairman Hawley of the Ways and Means
Committee had suggested, such an investigation would also disclose Democratic
tycoons of finance and industry as beneficiaries under the Mellon regime.

pps. 143-161
--[cont]--
Aloha, He'Ping,
Om, Shalom, Salaam.
Em Hotep, Peace Be,
Omnia Bona Bonis,
All My Relations.
Adieu, Adios, Aloha.
Amen.
Roads End
Kris

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