-Caveat Lector- WJPBR Email News List [EMAIL PROTECTED] Peace at any cost is a Prelude to War! Fighting in Afghanistan Could Draw Russia Into the Conflict 23 January 2001 Summary The battle between Afghanistan’s Taleban and the opposition Northern Alliance continues through an unusually mild winter, setting the stage for an early spring offensive. The continuous fighting, however, will leave both sides depleted and looking for external support. Pakistan traditionally commits resources to the Taleban cause, but this spring’s offensive could draw Russia to participate more actively in the defense of the Northern Alliance. Analysis Afghanistan’s Taleban and Northern Alliance forces engaged in an artillery duel on Jan. 23, about 30 miles north of Kabul, according to AFP. The battle is another in a series of assaults and counter assaults that have carried into the winter. The Taleban has taken advantage of this winter’s unusually mild weather to continue offensive operations to place its forces in a better position for an early spring offensive. The continuous fighting, however, is stretching the Taleban’s and Northern Alliance’s resources. While the Taleban will look toward its traditional sponsor Pakistan for supplies and forces for the spring, the Northern Alliance relies upon Russian assistance. Moscow has little desire to re-enter a ground war in Afghanistan. Instead, it will seek other methods to counter Pakistan’s support, such as calling on India to divert Pakistan’s attention. Or, more directly, Russia may choose to launch air strikes into Afghanistan. The ongoing fighting marks a diversion from the usual battlefield operations in Afghanistan, where heavy winter snows preclude extensive operations. Typically, the lull in winter fighting is a time when both forces rest and rearm. Taleban forces historically drive the Northern Alliance forces back to their bases in the Badakhshan region of Afghanistan by the time winter arrives. During the lull in winter fighting Northern Alliance forces trek into Tajikistan and pick up supplies. Then they return to the mountains and wait for spring to begin offensive operations. This year’s inability to rest and rearm could adversely affect the Northern Alliance. Its forces could be hard pressed come spring as it uses its supplies during ongoing operations throughout the winter. This is the intent of the Taleban forces – to prevent the full re-supply and rest of Northern Alliance forces before the annual spring offensive. Where Northern Alliance draws supplies from Russia through Tajikistan, Pakistan and other Islamic nations funnel supplies to the Taleban. Further, the Taleban also draws fighters from these nations into its ranks, whereas Russian troops rarely support Northern Alliance forces on the ground, other than with occasional advisors. The mild winter has both facilitated and complicated the Taleban’s goals. While the Taleban has carried on the offensive unimpeded by the weather, the Northern Alliance has re-supplied more rapidly. Northern Alliance forces base themselves in the Badakhshan, a rugged, mountainous and easily defended area close to the source of supplies. The re-supply, difficult in normal winter conditions, is easier during this milder winter. This supply capability, enhanced by increased Russian materiel support, has spurred the Taleban’s need to cut off or exhaust Northern Alliance supplies. Continuous fighting, however, weakens both sides as operations leave soldiers fatigued or dead. The Taleban, then, will probably draw on Pakistani “volunteers” to increase its forces for the spring offensive. The possibility of an offensive capable of defeating a weary Northern Alliance would draw Russia’s attention. Russia supports the Northern Alliance and would probably take steps to forestall its defeat. Moscow has a vested interest in the Afghanistan conflict. A continuation of the war allows Russia to maintain forces in Central Asia and to access and control Central Asian resources. Moscow feels compelled to protect its interests by deploying soldiers in this oil- and gas-rich region. Russia, however, will not send in ground troops, due to the memory of an unpopular war in Afghanistan and the lesson of Chechnya, which continues to drain resources. Instead, Russia will seek alternatives. Russia is likely to look to India, its strategic partner, to distract Pakistan, in an effort to undermine the Taleban’s chances of gaining fresh troops. Pakistan and India maintain a large military presence in Kashmir, a region both countries claim. A recent cease-fire has allowed Pakistan to withdraw some troops from the line of control in Kashmir. The possibility of a massive spring offensive in Afghanistan and the reduced requirement for soldiers in Kashmir could induce Pakistan to allow some of its soldiers to volunteer for service. Moscow may ask New Delhi to heighten tensions once again in Kashmir, tying down Pakistani troops. Islamabad, however, would probably accelerate its involvement in negotiations over Kashmir, thus keeping its forces freed for other contingencies. Seeing this, India may not be amenable to Russia’s requests to disrupt peace talks, as New Delhi also seeks to end the longstanding conflict in Kashmir. Russia’s next option is direct action. While averse to sending in ground forces, Moscow could use its air force to support the Northern Alliance. Russia has a large military force in Tajikistan and recently negotiated for airbases and the deployment of ground attack aircraft. These aircraft could provide air support to the Northern Alliance forces. Spring in Afghanistan likely promises an early escalation of fighting. The Taleban will look to draw on fresh fighters from Pakistan to facilitate an operation that it hopes will end the yo-yo war. Russia, unwilling to allow the Taleban to destroy the Northern Alliance, will look to India for assistance. Islamabad would probably support peaceful negotiations over Kashmir, and New Delhi may find it hard to concede to Moscow’s request. Russia would be left with little choice but to actively support the Northern Alliance with air strikes. *COPYRIGHT NOTICE** In accordance with Title 17 U. S. C. Section 107, any copyrighted work in this message is distributed under fair use without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for nonprofit research and educational purposes only.[Ref. http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml ] Want to be on our lists? 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