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http://northstar.state.mn.us/courts/library/archive/supct/9906/c0981183.htm



STATE OF MINNESOTA: IN SUPREME COURT C0-98-1183

Ramsey County Blatz, C.J.


Larry Dewayne Davis, Appellant,

vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent.


Filed: June 10, 1999
Office of Appellate Courts



S Y L L A B U S

The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support appellant's
conviction of attempted first-degree murder. Further, the evidence was
sufficient to support the trial court's determination that appellant
knew the nature of his acts and that they were wrong so that appellant
was not relieved of criminal liability by his mental illness.

Affirmed.

Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc.

O P I N I O N

BLATZ, Chief Justice.

Appellant Larry Dewayne Davis was found guilty of first-degree and
second-degree murder, and attempted first-degree and second-degree
murder. Although appellant pled not guilty by reason of insanity, the
trial court rejected his insanity defense. Appellant was sentenced to
life imprisonment for first-degree murder and to a consecutive 180-month
term for attempted first-degree murder. On appeal, he argues that the
evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for attempted
first-degree murder, and that the trial court erred in rejecting his
insanity defense. We affirm.

At about 10:45 p.m. on Saturday, May 24, 1997, appellant broke a window
and entered the duplex apartment Joanne Kinne and Dolores Fensky shared
at 729 Edmund in St. Paul. Kinne was showering in the bathroom next to
the kitchen. Brian and Theresa Allen, who lived in the upstairs
apartment, heard the sound of breaking glass coming from the front of
the duplex. After looking outside and seeing nothing unusual, Theresa
telephoned Fenske. Fenske also noticed nothing unusual. Theresa called
the police while Fenske, based on Theresa's phone call, warned Kinne to
get out of the shower and dress.

Kinne got out of the shower and went to the bathroom door. She saw
appellant standing behind Fenske near the kitchen sink. As Kinne reached
behind the bathroom door to get her robe, appellant grabbed Fenske and
wrapped a telephone cord around her. Fenske protested the appellant's
actions, and Kinne shouted, �[w]hat do you want? Leave us alone.�
Appellant remained silent.

Fenske then fell or was pushed to the floor, blocking the bathroom
doorway and Kinne's exit. Appellant grabbed a knife from the dish
drainer in the sink and began stabbing Fenske in the head. He said
nothing and stared directly at Kinne. When the blade of the knife broke
off in Fenske's neck, appellant reached back into the dish drainer,
grabbed another knife, and continued stabbing Fenske. Kinne lunged at
appellant to stop him from stabbing Fenske. Appellant made an overhand
stabbing motion toward Kinne before realizing that the second knife
blade had also broken off. He fumbled in the dish drainer apparently
looking for a third knife, but none were left.

Upstairs, Theresa Allen heard Kinne yelling, �[l]eave us alone. What do
you want? Just leave us alone.� Theresa rushed down the apartment's back
steps and toward Kinne's apartment while Brian called 911. As Kinne
heard Theresa coming down the back steps, appellant jumped up and ran
toward the living room. Kinne ran to her apartment's back door. Before
Theresa reached Kinne's apartment, a hysterical Kinne flew out of her
apartment. They went upstairs, and Brian relayed the information to 911.


Officer David Titus arrived at 10:55 p.m. and noticed a broken window.
Inside the apartment, the officer found Fenske on the kitchen floor but
did not find appellant. A canine unit was called to the scene. Although
the dog picked up a scent at the rear of the duplex, the dog lost the
scent a block from the crime scene.

Approximately ten minutes later, police responded to a call reporting a
suspicious person in an alley three blocks from the crime scene. Ian
Hedberg was visiting friends in the area, and he reported to police that
he saw a man standing at the end of an alley and looking around as if he
wanted to hide while police sirens wailed nearby. Police could not
locate the unidentified man reported by Hedberg.

At 12:10 a.m., Officer Catherine Pavlak saw a man walking about seven
blocks from the crime scene. After reviewing the description of the
stabbing suspect, Pavlak stopped appellant. Appellant told Pavlak that
he was coming from his girlfriend's house and going to White Castle.
Pavlak continued talking to appellant until Officers Thomas Arnold and
Patrick Scott arrived. Upon arriving, both officers noticed dirt, sand,
and leaves on appellant's arms and clothes, and blood on appellant's
jeans. DNA testing later showed that samples of the blood matched
Fenske's blood. Appellant initially was compliant as Pavlak guided him
to the squad car, but he tried to grab Arnold's gun when Scott tried to
handcuff him. A struggle ensued, with appellant trying to grab the
officers' guns. After appellant was subdued, Hedberg came to the car and
identified appellant as the person in the alley.

Shortly after appellant's arrest, police showed Kinne a six-person photo
lineup at St. Paul police headquarters. She immediately identified
appellant as the intruder who assaulted Fenske and her.

Fenske died at 1:30 a.m. the morning following her attack. An autopsy
revealed 30 sharp force injuries to Fenske's head, neck, face, and
hands. The examiner testified that the injuries were consistent with the
victim lying on the floor and trying to resist attack. The cause of
death was loss of blood due to multiple force injuries.

Appellant pled not guilty by reason of insanity, and the court held a
bifurcated bench trial. After the first phase of the bench trial,
appellant was found guilty of first-degree murder and attempted
first-degree murder. The trial then entered its second phase to
determine whether appellant was legally mentally ill when he committed
the crimes.

During the second phase of the trial, appellant presented evidence that
he has a family history of mental illness. Both appellant's father and
aunt have been hospitalized for mental illnesses. Appellant first
exhibited symptoms of mental illness on November 1, 1996. On that day,
he complained to his mother that voices from the television and radio
told him that he and his family were going to hell.

The next morning, while visiting an apartment rental agency, appellant
assaulted an office worker without provocation. The police were called
and appellant was taken to United Hospital. There, he assaulted four
staff members and another patient. Appellant was transferred to St.
Paul-Ramsey Medical Center, where Dr. Daniel Larson conducted a Rule 20
evaluation of appellant and concluded that he suffered from a psychosis.


A commitment hearing was held on November 26, 1996. Two court-appointed
examiners recommended that appellant be committed. The court found that
appellant was mentally ill and chemically dependent, and committed him
to the Anoka-Metro Regional Treatment Center. While there, he was placed
on Haldol, a psychotropic drug used to manage psychosis. Appellant did
not complain of psychotic symptoms while on Haldol, and no symptoms were
observed by the staff.

Appellant was provisionally discharged from Anoka-Metro Regional
Treatment Center to live with his mother on January 28, 1997. Upon
discharge, he was given a case manager, Audrey Fischer, who assisted him
in finding an apartment and securing financial assistance. According to
Fischer, she and appellant talked about his mental illness symptoms and
what to do if they should reappear.

On April 11, 1997, appellant met with his outpatient psychiatrist.
Appellant, having reduced his dosage of Haldol on his own, wanted to
discontinue taking Haldol. The doctor told appellant to continue taking
Haldol but to reduce his dosage of Cogentin, a drug used to counter
Haldol's side effects. Misunderstanding the doctor's instructions,
appellant discontinued all medications.

Fischer last saw appellant on May 16, 1997. At that time, appellant did
not report hearing voices or exhibit any symptoms of mental illness.
However, on May 23, the day before his attack on Fenske, appellant
skipped his appointment with Fischer.

Tiffany Coddon, appellant's former girlfriend, was the last person known
to spend time with appellant before the homicide. Coddon gave appellant
a 15-minute ride to Edmund and Dale Streets during the afternoon of May
24, and did not notice him behaving strangely.

Officer Pavlak, who stopped appellant about 90 minutes after the crime,
is the first person known to have spoken to appellant after the
homicide. Appellant did not mention hearing voices, and Pavlak did not
perceive that appellant was responding to things that were not there. A
paramedic, a nurse, and the various doctors who attended to appellant
after the altercation with police also did not notice signs that
appellant was hallucinating or delusional.

Appellant spoke to investigators two days later, explaining that voices
told him that his family was dead and in hell, and that he could join
them by dying. The voices told appellant that �the Dude� would kill him
if he broke into the house next door. After hearing the voices,
appellant waited for a few minutes, and then went next door and kicked
in the window. When the Dude didn't shoot him, appellant wandered
through the house. He believed that the Dude would come if he stabbed
Fenske, so he grabbed a knife and began stabbing her. When the Dude
didn't come, appellant left through the window and hid in some bushes
because he knew police were looking for him. Appellant also stated that
he fought with the police because voices told him that he would be shot
if he went for their guns.

During his interview with police, appellant acknowledged that his acts
were wrong and that he would not do them again. He asked the officer to
apologize to his mother and the people at 729 Edmund.

Appellant was admitted to the St. Peter Regional Treatment Center for a
Rule 20 evaluation six days after the stabbing. Dr. Michael Farnsworth,
a psychiatrist and the medical director of the treatment center, and Dr.
Kristin Kienlen, a staff psychologist at the treatment center, were part
of the treatment team that met weekly with appellant. During the
evaluation, appellant reported hearing voices but did not seem
preoccupied with them, and was able to differentiate between real and
unreal. He did not report command hallucinations, and told Dr.
Farnsworth that he would not comply with the voices because �the voices
lie.� Dr. Kienlen also did not observe any bizarre, unusual, or
disorganized behavior by appellant. According to Dr. Kienlen,
psychological tests administered to appellant suggested that he was
feigning or exaggerating his symptoms of mental illness.

Upon the conclusion of the evaluation, appellant was given an Axis 1
diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia, alcohol dependence, and cannabis
dependence, and an Axis 2 diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder.
Dr. Farnsworth and Dr. Kienlen both opined that appellant was not
legally insane when he killed Fenske as he exhibited an ability to plan
during the crime and he attempted to elude police after the crime. In
both doctors' opinions, appellant did not exhibit the symptoms of an
individual who is acutely psychotic or schizophrenic.

Appellant presented two expert witnesses, Dr. Daniel Dossa and Dr.
Dennis Philander. Dr. Dossa interviewed appellant twice and concurred
with the Axis 1 diagnosis of schizophrenia. However, in contrast to the
state's experts, Dr. Dossa opined that appellant was acting pursuant to
oratory hallucinations and delusional thought processes at the time of
the crimes. He testified that appellant met the test for legal insanity
because appellant's actions were in response to command hallucinations
which continued through his struggle with the police. He based his
opinion on appellant's history of unprovoked assaults, appellant's
discontinuing his medication, appellant's �bizarre� description of the
evening's events, the fact that appellant's actions served no purpose,
and the fact that appellant did not attempt to hide his involvement in
the crime by changing his clothes. However, Dr. Dossa admitted that his
opinion could have been affected by two facts appellant did not tell him
� that Fenske was on the ground before appellant began stabbing her [1]
and that appellant left the apartment after noise sounded from the back
stairs.

Dr. Philander concurred with the Axis 1 diagnosis of paranoid
schizophrenia and chemical dependency, adding that appellant's symptoms
were present with such intensity that his entire reality was impaired.
Dr. Philander stated that appellant was experiencing delusions at the
time of the crime and during his interviews with police because he had
stopped taking Haldol. He testified that appellant was acting pursuant
to command hallucinations that did not allow for choice. On
cross-examination, Dr. Philander acknowledged explaining the legal
insanity standard to appellant during their first interview, creating a
concern about appellant tailoring descriptions of his symptoms to match
the standard. However, Dr. Philander did not think that appellant was
exaggerating his symptoms based on appellant's consistent explanations
of his behavior.

On this record, the trial court found that appellant should not be
excused from criminal responsibility by reason of mental illness.

I.

Appellant first contends that the evidence was insufficient to support
his conviction of attempted first-degree murder. In reviewing a
sufficiency of the evidence claim, we view the evidence in a light most
favorable to the verdict to determine �whether the facts in the record
and the legitimate inferences drawn from them would permit the jury to
reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of the offense of which he was convicted.� State v. Moore, 481
N.W.2d 355, 360 (Minn. 1992). �We review criminal bench trials the same
as jury trials when determining whether the evidence is sufficient to
sustain convictions.� State v. Hough, 585 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. 1998).

A person is guilty of attempted murder when he or she, �with intent to
commit a [murder], does an act which is a substantial step toward, and
more than preparation for, the commission of the [murder].� Minn. Stat.
� 609.17, subd. 1 (1998); see also State v. Gisege, 561 N.W.2d 152, 156
(Minn. 1997). Appellant argues that the evidence does not support the
trial court's findings both that he had the intent to kill Kinne and
that he took a substantial step toward killing her.

We turn first to whether the evidence is sufficient to support the trial
court's finding that appellant had the intent to commit first-degree
murder. Intent may be proved by circumstantial evidence including the
defendant's conduct, State v. Whisonant, 331 N.W.2d 766, 768 (Minn.
1983), and the character of the assault, State v. Steinbuch, 514 N.W.2d
793, 800 (Minn. 1994). Further, intent may be inferred from events
occurring before and after the crime. State v. Andrews, 388 N.W.2d 723,
728 (Minn. 1986).

In this case, Kinne testified that appellant was repeatedly stabbing
Fenske in the head while staring directly at Kinne. When Kinne lunged at
appellant to stop him from stabbing Fenske, he raised the knife and made
an overhand stabbing motion towards Kinne. Realizing that the knife
blade had broken off while he was stabbing Fenske, appellant reached
back into the dish drainer, where he had already found two knives.
However, when noises sounded from the apartment's back stairs, appellant
bolted. Viewing these facts most favorably to the decision, we hold that
the trial court could reasonably conclude from appellant's conduct and
the surrounding circumstances that he intended to murder Kinne.

We turn next to whether the evidence is sufficient to support the trial
court's finding that appellant took a substantial step, more than
preparation, toward murdering Kinne. There need not have been actual
injury to the victim in order to support the trial court's finding that
appellant took a substantial step toward completing the crime. See
generally Whisonant, 331 N.W.2d at 768 (convicting defendant of
attempted murder when defendant shot at but missed victim).

In this case, the trial court could have reasonably found that
appellant's motions showed an attempt to stab Kinne that was frustrated
only by the knife's blade already being broken off. Although appellant
did not actually inflict physical harm on Kinne, his actions are
analogous to a defendant who shoots at but misses his victim. Further,
the trial court could have concluded that appellant then searched the
dish drainer for another knife to stab Kinne with before he was scared
away by noise on the back stairs. In light of appellant's overhand
motion toward Kinne with the broken knife and his subsequent search of
the dish drainer, we hold that the trial court could reasonably have
found that appellant took a substantial step toward murdering Kinne.

II.

Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in finding that
appellant failed to prove that he was mentally ill at the time that the
crimes were committed. On appeal, we �conduct[] `a rigorous review of
the record to determine whether the evidence, direct and circumstantial,
viewed most favorably to support a finding of guilt, was sufficient to
permit the [trial court] to reach its conclusion.'� DeMars v. State, 352
N.W.2d 13, 16 (Minn. 1984) (quoting State v. Mytych, 292 Minn. 245, 252,
194 N.W.2d 276, 279 (1972)).

In order to be excused from criminal liability by reason of insanity, a
defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was
laboring under a defect of reason due to mental illness or deficiency
such that he either did not know the nature of his act or did not know
that the act was wrong. Minn. Stat. � 611.026 (1998); State v. Wilson,
539 N.W.2d 241, 244 (Minn. 1995). Both expert and lay testimony are
admissible, and the fact finder has broad discretion to determine the
appropriate weight to assign expert psychiatric testimony. Wilson, 539
N.W.2d at 244-45. The trial court may also �consider evidence that
relates to cognition, volition, and capacity to control behavior.� Id.
at 244.

In the instant case, the trial court found that appellant suffers from
paranoid schizophrenia and antisocial personality disorder. It then
summarized the testimony of the people known to have talked to appellant
directly before and after the attack, including appellant's social
worker, his ex-girlfriend, and the medical personnel who attended to
appellant after his arrest. The court found that none of these people
noticed appellant exhibiting symptoms of psychosis. Further, the court
credited highly the state's experts' opinions.

The state's two experts, who began meeting with appellant six days after
the attack and met with him regularly for 90 days, concluded that
appellant was not mentally ill under the statutory standard. Dr.
Farnsworth testified that although appellant complained about hearing
voices, appellant did not demonstrate corroborative or reactive
behaviors supporting his claim. Moreover, both Dr. Farnsworth and Dr.
Kienlen agreed that appellant's actions surrounding the attack reflected
a thought process that included consideration of alternative choices.
Finally, psychological tests suggested that appellant was feigning or
exaggerating mental illness symptoms.

Appellant's experts contradicted the state's experts. Dr. Dossa
testified that appellant experienced oratory hallucinations and paranoid
and persecutory delusions that significantly impaired his ability to
understand both the nature and wrongfulness of his acts. Dr. Philander
opined that appellant believed on the day of the crime that his family
was in hell and that in order to join them he had to follow the Dude's
directive to kill Fenske. Dr. Philander therefore stated that although
appellant knew the nature of his acts, he could not appreciate the
wrongfulness of his conduct.

In addition to assessing expert witness testimony, the trial court can
look to events surrounding the crime in making a determination about
appellant's sanity. Wilson, 539 N.W.2d at 245-46. In this case, the
trial court was presented with significant evidence indicating that
appellant knew the nature of his acts and their wrongfulness at the time
of the murder. Upon hearing voices, appellant paused for a few minutes
in the neighboring apartment before breaking into Kinne's apartment,
giving him time to reflect on his actions. After stabbing Fenske,
appellant fled the crime scene as someone descended the back steps,
arguably to avoid being caught. He then hid in bushes to avoid being
detected by police. After being discovered, he lied to Officer Pavlak
and then struggled with police. Two days after the incident, when being
questioned by police detectives, appellant stated that he was sorry,
that he knew his actions were wrong, and that he would not do them again
if he could go back in time.

In this case, there was ample evidence to justify the trial court's
rejection of appellant's claim that his mental illness prevented him
from understanding the nature of his acts and that they were wrong.
Therefore, we hold that there is sufficient evidence to support the
trial court's conclusion that appellant was not so mentally ill at the
time he committed the offenses as to be excused for his culpable
behavior. Appellant's convictions for first-degree murder and attempted
first-degree murder are affirmed.

Affirmed.


----------------------------------------------------------------------

Footnotes
[1] Dr. Dossa testified that knowing that Fenske was on the ground
before appellant began stabbing her could have impacted his decision
because appellant stated to Dr. Dossa during one of their interviews, �I
know it was wrong after I [stabbed Fenske], after she fell to the
floor.�

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