In a message dated 12/28/98 12:32:24 PM Eastern Standard Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: > Subj: THE DOUBLE ROLE OF DRUG TRAFFICKING IN STATE TERR > Date: 12/28/98 12:32:24 PM Eastern Standard Time > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Agent Smiley) > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > > > > Message http://www.egroups.com/list/chiapas-l/?start=8875 > > > > THE DOUBLE ROLE OF DRUG TRAFFICKING IN STATE TERRORISM AND MILITARIZED > > DEMOCRACY > > > > SAMUEL BLIXEN > > > > On May 19, members of the Mexican army's special group Ledin combed the > > foothills between Tianal and Sikiculum, in Chiapas, Mexico, in search of > > drugs, according to the explanation given by the National Institute for > > Combatting Drugs. The army set up four camps around Aguascalientes II, to > > some extent confirming Zapatista allegations of an imminent military > > offensive that, throughout the negotiation process, acted as a > counterpoint > > in the sporadic peace talks. General Castillo denied the allegations, > > attributing the deployment of troops to the suppression of a supposed > > "Southeastern cartel", operating in the states of Chiapas, Campeche and > > Tabasco. > > > > In mid-1996, the Fray Bartolom� de Las Casas Human Rights Center denounced > > the fact that northern Chiapas "was living in a state of latent civil war", > > > as a consequence of the actions of four paramilitary groups: "Los > > Chinchulines" operating in the municipality of Chil�n; "Peace and Justice" > > in Sabanilla; the "Luis Donaldo Colosio Civic Front" and the "Independent > > Youth Organization", laying waste to Tila and Salto de Agua. > > > > Some 600 campesinos were killed or disappeared in the last three years at > > the hands of "guardias blancas" (White Guards) which human rights > > organizations claim are trained and supported by the state security > apparatus. > > > > Simultaneously, in June 1996, the US State Department announced the > > donation of US$5 million to supplement a training program for members of > > the Mexican military in the war against drugs; and in August, Senator > Jesse > > Helms lifted his veto of General Geoffrey McCaffrey's proposal to give 50 > > "used" Huey HU-1H helicopters to the Mexican army; in exchange, the > Mexican > > government "accepted" that the helicopters would be subject to US > > "monitoring" of their use, and furthermore authorized US public security > > agencies, in particular the Customs Service, to fly over Mexican territory. > > > > > Beyond the issues directly related to the negotiation process in Chiapas, > > and the strategies of those involved, the episodes mentioned here reveal a > > pattern: the active, operative participation of the Mexican army in the > > fight against drug trafficking; the growing militarization of the State; > > Mexico's military dependence on US security agencies; the implementation > of > > a political-military counterinsurgency strategy; and the Pentagon's > > commitment to selling the concept of "narco-terrorism" as a means of > > defining the "enemy" of the armed forces of Latin America, against which > > the doctrine of Continental Security will be unleashed. > > > > The Mexican army, that historically has maintained a stringent > > "nationalistic" stance towards the United States, now supports a form of > > militarization that, disguising itself as a "war on drugs", imposes a > > "democracy of national security". > > > > In the view of many social groups , politicians and Latin American > military > > officials, out of all the possible options, "narcotrafficking" and its > > offspring, "narco-terrorism", are considered extremely dubious tools for > > sustaining a strategy that extends US national security interests > > throughout the continent, working simultaneously in geographic, economic > > and military spheres. > > > > In order to fill the post-cold war vacuum, drug-trafficking when viewed as > > a threat to the democratic processes on the grounds that it leads to > > political corruption and social disintegration, can replace the role that > > "communism" played during the 1960s and 1970s to justify a policy of > > military intervention and economic hegemony. > > > > The establishment of a common enemy, transnational and dangerous, is vital > > for any strategy of hegemony. As with communism before it, drug > trafficking > > defined as the principal enemy of the democratic process tends to cover up > > the primary cause of destabilization in Latin America: the profound social > > injustices and insupportable levels of marginalization and poverty caused > > by neoliberal economic recipes. > > > > Just as "narco-terrorism" is a crude generalization to explain the social > > disruptions, rebellions, violence and uprisings, "narcotrafficking" > > provides an easy justification for the deployment of military strategies. > > > > In all Latin America, and in a wide spectrum of society that includes > > progressive parties, churches and social organizations, the definition of > > drug-trafficking as the main threat to democratic processes raises > > suspicions, in art because of the numerous precedents that link drug deals > > with the financing of undercover operations promoted by the CIA and other > > US agencies carrying out national security policies. > > > > In this sense, the scenario unfolding in Mexico has significant > > similarities with the recent history of Central America, where > > counterinsurgency strategies included the appearance of paramilitary > > groups, and the pursuit of political objectives > > > > The reported presence of Argentine military advisors among the forces > > deployed in Chiapas, who earlier had served as advisors in El Salvador, > > Honduras and Guatemala in the 1980s, suggests the survival of a secret and > > clandestine system of coordination of military intelligence, that > threatens > > to maintain a "national security ethic". > > > > Although the institutional responsibility for State terrorism throughout > > Latin America has still not been officially recognized, journalists and > > human rights organizations have compiled a body of information that > reveals > > the existence of a continentally coordinated plot in which the Argentine > > military has occupied a protagonistic role in key areas. > > > > The Argentinean military leadership, with a reputation following > successful > > and effective experiences in the dirty war against "subversion" after the > > coup d'etat in March 1976, sent out advisors to Central American armies > and > > extreme right organizations. The commander at the time of the First Army > > Corps, General Guillermo Su�rez Mas�n, promoted the creation of the > Foreign > > Task Force (GTE) of Batallion 601, a military intelligence apparatus > linked > > to the SIDE (Secretary of State Information). The military detachments and > > Argentine agents were to have two simultaneous missions: to assist their > > Central American allies and to persecute Argentine exiles, especially > > montonero groups. > > > > According to some reports, the Argentine military intelligence apparatus > > and extreme-right Central American groups share contacts initiated by the > > Italian neofascist organization Avanguardia Nazionale. The link dates back > > as far as 1973, when the Italian terrorist Stephano Delle Chiaie began > > operating in Argentina, with ties to the Chilean DINA, the political > police > > under Augusto Pinochet's regime, directed by the then Colonel Manuel > > Contreras (later promoted to general). Delle Chaie, who > > coordinated his activities with the Chilean agent (and presumed CIA agent) > > Michael Townley (convicted in the US of assassinating Chile's ex-Foreign > > Minister Orlando Letelier) served also as a go-between with Salvadoran > army > > officer Roberto D'Aubisson during the first advisory missions. > > > > Until 1980, the Argentine advisors deployed in El Salvador and Guatemala > > instructed paramilitary groups in the use of torture as a means of > > extortion, and as a source of funding for clandestine operations. The > > organization of the June 1980 coup d'etat that brought General Luis Garc�a > > Meza to power in Bolivia instigated a qualitative change in the financial > > sources of Central American paramilitary groups. > > > > Several researchers of the genesis of the Bolivian "narco-dictatorship" > > argue that the Argentine assistance, in arms and military personnel - 400 > > advisors - was the product of a pact allowing the drug cartels to finance > > the coup. The Bolivian drug-traffickers' decision to back the military and > > to guarantee the expansion of their business from a position of power was > > detected by the DEA station in Buenos Aires in March 1980, according to > the > > revelations of former agent Michael Levine. The CIA and the DEA, however, > > have buried the evidence, in order not to unermine the process. > > > > The contact with the Argentine military was Colonel Luis Arce G�mez, later > > Minister of Interior under the dictatorship (now imprisoned in the US on > > drug charges). Arce intervened in favor of his cousin, the drug baron > > Roberto Su�rez, to establish a mechanism for drug trafficking and > > money-laundering that would rely on the cover of the Argentine advisors in > > Central America; in exchange, the Bolivian drug traffickers would finance > > the region's paramilitary groups. The pact was made in Bolivia between > > Arce, Su�rez, Stephano Della Chaie and Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Miori > > Pereyra, member of the Argentine contingent in Bolivia and delegate of > > General Su�rez Mas�n. Miori assisted Della Chaie to mount a terrorist > > squadron in Bolivia, known as the "Novios de la Muerte" (Bridegrooms of > > Death). This squadron, linked to the nazi criminal Klaus Barbie, > > coordinated the Special Security Service and instructed Bolivian soldiers > > in the techniques of prisoner torture while at the same time providing > > protection to the cocaine business. (The link between the Argentine > > advisors and this death squad offers a parallel trail to its relation with > > drug-trafficking: the testimony given by the Bolivian drug-trafficker > Sonia > > Altala before a US jury confirms that the "Bridgerooms of Death" were > > maintained by the trafficking organization that depended on Minister Arce > > G�mez). > > > > The relation between drug traffickers and paramilitary groups took on a > new > > dimension soon after Garc�a Meza's coup, after the agreements of the > Fourth > > Congress of the Latin American Anti-Communist League, affiliated to the > > World Anti-Communist League (WACL), that took place in Buenos Aires. > > Presided over by Su�rez Mas�n, the WACL president attended, as did Woo Jae > > Sung, an important figure in the Moon Sect, representatives of the Italian > > masonic lodge Propaganda Due, delegates of the former Nicaraguan dictator > > Anastasio Somoza and the anti-Castro terrorist organization Alpha 66, the > > Salvadoran Roberto D'Aubisson, the Guatemalan neo-fascist Mario Sandoval > > Alarc�n, and the Italian terrorist Stephano Della Chaie, among others; > John > > Carbaugh, assistant to Senator Jesse Helms, and Margo Carlisle, assistant > > to Senator James McClure, participated as observers. Su�rez Mas�n argued > > the need to develop the anti-communist struggle in Central America, to > > counteract the triumph of Sandinismo. The WACL provided US$8 million for > > the initial cost of a detachment of Argentine advisors sent to Central > > America. According to some sources, the money came from secret funds > > managed by the CIA. > > > > The Argentine colonel Josu� Osvaldo Ribeiro, alias "Balita", held overall > > responsibility for the detachment in Central America. Lieutenant Colonel > > Miori served as "messenger". He is attributed with a fundamental role in > > the coordination of drug trafficking through El Salvador. The cocaine was > > transferred in the Salvadoran Air Force bases and then sent on to the > > United States. Part of the drugs financed the death squads set up by mayor > > D'Aubisson. > > > > The paramilitary groups were assisted by Lieutenant colonel Santiago Hoya, > > alias "Santiago Villegas". Hoya and Colonel Ribeiro had a decisive role in > > the origins of what was later known as the Iran Contra scandal. Ribeiro, > > who is attributed with a protagonistic role in the disappearance of exiles > > in the context of "Operation Condor" as well as the modernization of the > > Paraguayan intelligence services, passed on his coordination experiences > > learned in Argentina to military officers from Uruguay, Chile and Paraguay. > > > >From his room in the Honduras Maya Hotel in Tegucigalpa, Ribeiro began > > coordinating with the members of the Somocista National Guard abroad, > while > > Hoya, as "chief of operations", directed the construction of the training > > camp known as Sagittarius, on the outskirts of Tegucigalpa, and the > > clandestine concentration camp known as "La Quinta". > > > > Hoya and Ribeiro widened contacts with General Gustavo Alvarez Mart�nez, > > head of the Honduran army's G-2; former Somocista National Guard captain > > Emilio Echaverry; and with the "contra" leders Ar�stides S�nchez, Enrique > > Berm�dez and Frank Arana. US congressional testimonies reveal that the CIA > > had delegated the responsibility for organizing the Nicaraguan "contras" > to > > the Argentine advisors before the National Security Council implemented > > President Ronald Reagan's secret order to bypass the obstacle of > > prohibitions imposed by Congress. Ribeiro and Hoya were protagonists in > the > > negotiations that culminated in the creation of the second collective > > "contra" leadership after the formation of the 15th of September Legion, > > made up of ex-Somocista guards in the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN). > > > > Details of the Argentine activities in Central America, their coordinating > > role and the form in which they were combining the interests of the > > Argentine and Bolivian dictatorships with the National Security Council's > > interests, was recently brought together by the San Jos� Mercury News' > > investigations into the CIA's participation in introducing drugs into the > > United States in order to finance clandestine arms provisions to the > > contras. According to this investigation, one of the Argentine advisors' > > favorites, Somocista Colonel Enrique Berm�dez, made a major leap forward > in > > this illicit form of financing the war, when he authorize two fellow > > Nicaraguans, Danilo Bland�n and Jose Norwin Meneses, to mount a drug > > trafficking scheme using the incipient structure of the FDN in Los Angeles. > > > > > The investigation revealed that the drugs distributed in Los Angeles (to > > which the San Jos� Mercury News attributed the crack boom among the black > > population) was deposited in Salvadoran air bases and transferred by plane > > from there to airports in Texas, under CIA protection. Towards the end of > > 1981, the smuggling system had managed to ship a ton of drugs. Bland�n, > who > > currently receives a salary from the US government as a DEA special agent, > > admitted that between 1981 and 1988 cocaine introduction reached up to 100 > > kilos a week. The coincidence of dates, actors and geographic locations > > permits the suggestion that part of the drugs handled by Bland�n with CIA > > authorization was supplied by Bolivian narco-traffickers, even after the > > removal of Garc�a Meza in Bolivia, and the restoration of democracy in > > Argentina in 1983. The Argentines were also the architects of the system > > that later used the Reagan government to channel undercover assistance to > > the contras. The Batallion 601 agents Raul Guglielminetti alias "Mayor > > Guastavino", Leandor Sanchez Reisse, alias "Lenny" and Jorge Franco, alias > > "Fiorito" specialized in laundering the funds from drug trafficking. > Franco > > travelled to Central America on two opportunities, one of them using his > > real identity. Franco, at the time, was listed as "disappeared" in the > Army > > Institute of Social Works, but it is suspected that he was in Central > > America until at least 1987. > > > > Leandro S�nchez Reisse is the only member of the External Task Force of > > Batallion 601 who has confessed the link between the Argentine advisors > and > > drug trafficking to finance undercover operations. S�nchez Reisse, an > > accountant by profession, was caught in Geneva, Switzerland, when he was > > tring to deposit the ransom money of Uruguayan banker Carlos Koldobsky, > > kidnapped in Buenos Aires. In 1985 he managed to escape from the Champ > > Dollon prison. He took refuge in the United States, under CIA protection. > > In order to avoid the extradition demanded by Ra�l Alfons�n's government, > > S�nchez Reisse offered to testify before the Terrorism, Narcotraffic and > > International Operations subcommission of the US Senate Exterior Relations > > Committee. > > > > S�nchez Reisse revealed that General Su�rez Mas�n and the section of the > > army under his command received drug money as early as 1987 to fund > > counterinsurgency efforts in Central America. He explained that two > > businesses in Miami, one called Argenshow, dedicated to contracting > singers > > for Latin American tours, and another called Silver Dollar, in reality a > > pawn shop, managed by Ra�l Guglielminetti, were the two locations for > > transferring money. He admitted that Silver Dollar and Argenshow had > > channelled US$30mn in drug money sent via Panama to Switzerland, > > Liechtenstein, the Bahamas and the Cayman Islands. The money, he said, > > ended up in the hands of the Nicaraguan contras. He also revealed that > > since the mid-80s the CIA was fully informed of the two Florida businesses > > and that it gave its approval to the money laundering operations. The > > Batallion 601 accountant revealed to the Senate subcommittee the Argentine > > participation in the Irangate scandal. He confessed that an Argentine > > implicated in the 1977 kidnapping of Luchino Revelli Beaumont,of New York, > > to contract fifty Argentine mercenaries to infiltrate Iran and attempt to > > rescue the 52 US hostages under Khomeini's power. The plan failed to take > > shape because of Argentine demands to take into account the safety of > > lives, according to S�nchez Reisse. > > > > The Silver Dollar enterprise served as a cover for the first arms supplies > > to the contras. The initial transactions were made through the > > intermediation of Norman Faber, an associate of then-director of the CIA, > > William Casey, in another phantom company that served to divert money to > > the contras. > > > > It is presumed that from as early as 1982, George Morales, a Colombian > drug > > trafficker with US nationality, operated with the Argentine advisors in > > arms trafficking to the contras through El Salvador, using planes from his > > Miami-based air-taxi service Aviation Activities Corporation. The > airplanes > > were authorized by the CIA to return with cocaine shipments, as long as > > they donated a percentage to the contras. Morales told the lawyer Jack > > Blum, Subcommittee advisor, that they obtained some > > US$4 million. > > > > Another SIDE agent operated in Central America along with S�nchez Reisse > > and Raul Guglielminetti. Juan Martin Ciga Correa, alias "Major Santamaria", > > > with vast links to the ultra-right, specialized in financial affairs. The > > Argentine authorities have a warrant out for the arrest of Ciga Correa for > > the 1974 assassination of Carlos Prats Gonzalez, former commander of the > > Chilean army. Ciga Correa acted as the link between the Chilean DINA > agents > > Michael Townley and Enrique Arancibia Clavel and the ultra-right > > organization Triple A, in the organization and execution of the > > assassination of Prats and his wife. Ciga was furthermore involved with > > Guglielminetti in the business of arms trafficking and extorsive > > kidnappings carried out in Costa Rica. He has been identified as one of > the > > current advisors to the paramilitary groups that operate in Chiapas, > Mexico. > > > > If, as the "Argentine connection" suggests, the vast drug trafficking > > network has served to finance undercover operations and is intimately > > linked to military intelligence agencies, the current proposals to > > militarize the war on drugs are seriously flawed because of the links and > > commitments between drug traffickers, intelligence agencies and > > paramilitary groups over the years. > > > > Drug trafficking, along with other "common" criminal activities, was born > > out of politics and ideology, and developed in a framework of impunity > that > > military dictatorships granted as part of a policy of state terrorism. > > There are no reasons to believe that a radical and effective change has > > taken place regarding this policy. The insistence with which the concept > of > > "narco-terrorism" is pushed forward to justify a strategy of > > counterinsurgency and militarization in Latin America, accompanied by the > > growth of paramilitary groups, appears to guarantee the survival of those > > ideological and political mechanisms. All the more so, when the recently > > emerging democracies prove incapable of purging the military and police of > > members involved in human rights violations, drug trafficking, kidnappings > > and other "common" crimes. > > > > > > > > Sources > > > > Carlos Juvenal: "Buenos Muchachos. La industria del secuestro in Argentina" > . > > Elisabeth Reimann: "Confesiones de un contra". > > Martin Andersen: "Dossier Secreto. El mito de la guerra sucia." > > Michael Levine: "La guerra falsa." > > Jeffrey Robinson: "The Laundrymen." > > CONADEP: "Nunca m�s." > > Claudio D�az & Antonio Zucco: "La ultraderecha argentina." > > Juan Gasparini: "La pista sucia." > > Horacio Vebitky: "La posguerra sucia." > > Enrique Yeves: "La contra, una guerra sucia." > > Gabriel Pasquino & Eduardo de Miguel: "Blanca y radiante." > > Frederic Laurent: "L'orchestre noir." > > Gustavo S�nchez Salazar: "Barbie, criminal hasta el fin." > > Juan Jos� Salinas: "Los mercenarios. Contras y carapintadas", in the > > magazine, El Porte�o, No. 79. > > Semanario Madres de la Plaza de Mayo, Nos. 65-98. > > San Jos� Mercury News: "Crack plague's roots are in Nicaraguan war", > > editions August 18, 19 & 20, 1996. > > Carlos Fazio: "El tercer v�nculo", editorial Joaqu�n Mortiz, Mexico, 1996. > > > > > > > > Samuel Blixen, is an Uruguayan journalist who writes for Brecha Magazine > > (Uruguay). He is a correspondent for Noticias Aliadas (Peru) and National > > Radio (Sweden). He has worked with the Geopolitical Drug Observatory (OGD) > > in France. He wrote several books: "El Enjuague Uruguayo. Secreto bancario > > y tr�fico de drogas", "Bancotr�fico. Diez a�os de pol�tica bancaria en > > democracia" and "El Vientre del C�ndor. Del archivo del terror al caso > > Berr�os". > > > > http://www.worldcom.nl/tni/drugs/folder1/blixen.htm > > > > > > Back to Contents: Democracy, Human Rights and Militarism > > > > NPC Information Associates > > [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > 770-457-6758 > > "Intelligence for the Underdog!" > > > > > > > > ----- > See the original message at http://www.egroups.com/list/chiapas-l/?start= > 8875
Message http://www.egroups.com/list/chiapas-l/?start=8875 > > THE DOUBLE ROLE OF DRUG TRAFFICKING IN STATE TERRORISM AND MILITARIZED > DEMOCRACY > > SAMUEL BLIXEN > > On May 19, members of the Mexican army's special group Ledin combed the > foothills between Tianal and Sikiculum, in Chiapas, Mexico, in search of > drugs, according to the explanation given by the National Institute for > Combatting Drugs. The army set up four camps around Aguascalientes II, to > some extent confirming Zapatista allegations of an imminent military > offensive that, throughout the negotiation process, acted as a counterpoint > in the sporadic peace talks. General Castillo denied the allegations, > attributing the deployment of troops to the suppression of a supposed > "Southeastern cartel", operating in the states of Chiapas, Campeche and > Tabasco. > > In mid-1996, the Fray Bartolom� de Las Casas Human Rights Center denounced > the fact that northern Chiapas "was living in a state of latent civil war", > as a consequence of the actions of four paramilitary groups: "Los > Chinchulines" operating in the municipality of Chil�n; "Peace and Justice" > in Sabanilla; the "Luis Donaldo Colosio Civic Front" and the "Independent > Youth Organization", laying waste to Tila and Salto de Agua. > > Some 600 campesinos were killed or disappeared in the last three years at > the hands of "guardias blancas" (White Guards) which human rights > organizations claim are trained and supported by the state security apparatus. > > Simultaneously, in June 1996, the US State Department announced the > donation of US$5 million to supplement a training program for members of > the Mexican military in the war against drugs; and in August, Senator Jesse > Helms lifted his veto of General Geoffrey McCaffrey's proposal to give 50 > "used" Huey HU-1H helicopters to the Mexican army; in exchange, the Mexican > government "accepted" that the helicopters would be subject to US > "monitoring" of their use, and furthermore authorized US public security > agencies, in particular the Customs Service, to fly over Mexican territory. > > Beyond the issues directly related to the negotiation process in Chiapas, > and the strategies of those involved, the episodes mentioned here reveal a > pattern: the active, operative participation of the Mexican army in the > fight against drug trafficking; the growing militarization of the State; > Mexico's military dependence on US security agencies; the implementation of > a political-military counterinsurgency strategy; and the Pentagon's > commitment to selling the concept of "narco-terrorism" as a means of > defining the "enemy" of the armed forces of Latin America, against which > the doctrine of Continental Security will be unleashed. > > The Mexican army, that historically has maintained a stringent > "nationalistic" stance towards the United States, now supports a form of > militarization that, disguising itself as a "war on drugs", imposes a > "democracy of national security". > > In the view of many social groups , politicians and Latin American military > officials, out of all the possible options, "narcotrafficking" and its > offspring, "narco-terrorism", are considered extremely dubious tools for > sustaining a strategy that extends US national security interests > throughout the continent, working simultaneously in geographic, economic > and military spheres. > > In order to fill the post-cold war vacuum, drug-trafficking when viewed as > a threat to the democratic processes on the grounds that it leads to > political corruption and social disintegration, can replace the role that > "communism" played during the 1960s and 1970s to justify a policy of > military intervention and economic hegemony. > > The establishment of a common enemy, transnational and dangerous, is vital > for any strategy of hegemony. As with communism before it, drug trafficking > defined as the principal enemy of the democratic process tends to cover up > the primary cause of destabilization in Latin America: the profound social > injustices and insupportable levels of marginalization and poverty caused > by neoliberal economic recipes. > > Just as "narco-terrorism" is a crude generalization to explain the social > disruptions, rebellions, violence and uprisings, "narcotrafficking" > provides an easy justification for the deployment of military strategies. > > In all Latin America, and in a wide spectrum of society that includes > progressive parties, churches and social organizations, the definition of > drug-trafficking as the main threat to democratic processes raises > suspicions, in art because of the numerous precedents that link drug deals > with the financing of undercover operations promoted by the CIA and other > US agencies carrying out national security policies. > > In this sense, the scenario unfolding in Mexico has significant > similarities with the recent history of Central America, where > counterinsurgency strategies included the appearance of paramilitary > groups, and the pursuit of political objectives > > The reported presence of Argentine military advisors among the forces > deployed in Chiapas, who earlier had served as advisors in El Salvador, > Honduras and Guatemala in the 1980s, suggests the survival of a secret and > clandestine system of coordination of military intelligence, that threatens > to maintain a "national security ethic". > > Although the institutional responsibility for State terrorism throughout > Latin America has still not been officially recognized, journalists and > human rights organizations have compiled a body of information that reveals > the existence of a continentally coordinated plot in which the Argentine > military has occupied a protagonistic role in key areas. > > The Argentinean military leadership, with a reputation following successful > and effective experiences in the dirty war against "subversion" after the > coup d'etat in March 1976, sent out advisors to Central American armies and > extreme right organizations. The commander at the time of the First Army > Corps, General Guillermo Su�rez Mas�n, promoted the creation of the Foreign > Task Force (GTE) of Batallion 601, a military intelligence apparatus linked > to the SIDE (Secretary of State Information). The military detachments and > Argentine agents were to have two simultaneous missions: to assist their > Central American allies and to persecute Argentine exiles, especially > montonero groups. > > According to some reports, the Argentine military intelligence apparatus > and extreme-right Central American groups share contacts initiated by the > Italian neofascist organization Avanguardia Nazionale. The link dates back > as far as 1973, when the Italian terrorist Stephano Delle Chiaie began > operating in Argentina, with ties to the Chilean DINA, the political police > under Augusto Pinochet's regime, directed by the then Colonel Manuel > Contreras (later promoted to general). Delle Chaie, who > coordinated his activities with the Chilean agent (and presumed CIA agent) > Michael Townley (convicted in the US of assassinating Chile's ex-Foreign > Minister Orlando Letelier) served also as a go-between with Salvadoran army > officer Roberto D'Aubisson during the first advisory missions. > > Until 1980, the Argentine advisors deployed in El Salvador and Guatemala > instructed paramilitary groups in the use of torture as a means of > extortion, and as a source of funding for clandestine operations. The > organization of the June 1980 coup d'etat that brought General Luis Garc�a > Meza to power in Bolivia instigated a qualitative change in the financial > sources of Central American paramilitary groups. > > Several researchers of the genesis of the Bolivian "narco-dictatorship" > argue that the Argentine assistance, in arms and military personnel - 400 > advisors - was the product of a pact allowing the drug cartels to finance > the coup. The Bolivian drug-traffickers' decision to back the military and > to guarantee the expansion of their business from a position of power was > detected by the DEA station in Buenos Aires in March 1980, according to the > revelations of former agent Michael Levine. The CIA and the DEA, however, > have buried the evidence, in order not to unermine the process. > > The contact with the Argentine military was Colonel Luis Arce G�mez, later > Minister of Interior under the dictatorship (now imprisoned in the US on > drug charges). Arce intervened in favor of his cousin, the drug baron > Roberto Su�rez, to establish a mechanism for drug trafficking and > money-laundering that would rely on the cover of the Argentine advisors in > Central America; in exchange, the Bolivian drug traffickers would finance > the region's paramilitary groups. The pact was made in Bolivia between > Arce, Su�rez, Stephano Della Chaie and Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Miori > Pereyra, member of the Argentine contingent in Bolivia and delegate of > General Su�rez Mas�n. Miori assisted Della Chaie to mount a terrorist > squadron in Bolivia, known as the "Novios de la Muerte" (Bridegrooms of > Death). This squadron, linked to the nazi criminal Klaus Barbie, > coordinated the Special Security Service and instructed Bolivian soldiers > in the techniques of prisoner torture while at the same time providing > protection to the cocaine business. (The link between the Argentine > advisors and this death squad offers a parallel trail to its relation with > drug-trafficking: the testimony given by the Bolivian drug-trafficker Sonia > Altala before a US jury confirms that the "Bridgerooms of Death" were > maintained by the trafficking organization that depended on Minister Arce > G�mez). > > The relation between drug traffickers and paramilitary groups took on a new > dimension soon after Garc�a Meza's coup, after the agreements of the Fourth > Congress of the Latin American Anti-Communist League, affiliated to the > World Anti-Communist League (WACL), that took place in Buenos Aires. > Presided over by Su�rez Mas�n, the WACL president attended, as did Woo Jae > Sung, an important figure in the Moon Sect, representatives of the Italian > masonic lodge Propaganda Due, delegates of the former Nicaraguan dictator > Anastasio Somoza and the anti-Castro terrorist organization Alpha 66, the > Salvadoran Roberto D'Aubisson, the Guatemalan neo-fascist Mario Sandoval > Alarc�n, and the Italian terrorist Stephano Della Chaie, among others; John > Carbaugh, assistant to Senator Jesse Helms, and Margo Carlisle, assistant > to Senator James McClure, participated as observers. Su�rez Mas�n argued > the need to develop the anti-communist struggle in Central America, to > counteract the triumph of Sandinismo. The WACL provided US$8 million for > the initial cost of a detachment of Argentine advisors sent to Central > America. According to some sources, the money came from secret funds > managed by the CIA. > > The Argentine colonel Josu� Osvaldo Ribeiro, alias "Balita", held overall > responsibility for the detachment in Central America. Lieutenant Colonel > Miori served as "messenger". He is attributed with a fundamental role in > the coordination of drug trafficking through El Salvador. The cocaine was > transferred in the Salvadoran Air Force bases and then sent on to the > United States. Part of the drugs financed the death squads set up by mayor > D'Aubisson. > > The paramilitary groups were assisted by Lieutenant colonel Santiago Hoya, > alias "Santiago Villegas". Hoya and Colonel Ribeiro had a decisive role in > the origins of what was later known as the Iran Contra scandal. Ribeiro, > who is attributed with a protagonistic role in the disappearance of exiles > in the context of "Operation Condor" as well as the modernization of the > Paraguayan intelligence services, passed on his coordination experiences > learned in Argentina to military officers from Uruguay, Chile and Paraguay. > >From his room in the Honduras Maya Hotel in Tegucigalpa, Ribeiro began > coordinating with the members of the Somocista National Guard abroad, while > Hoya, as "chief of operations", directed the construction of the training > camp known as Sagittarius, on the outskirts of Tegucigalpa, and the > clandestine concentration camp known as "La Quinta". > > Hoya and Ribeiro widened contacts with General Gustavo Alvarez Mart�nez, > head of the Honduran army's G-2; former Somocista National Guard captain > Emilio Echaverry; and with the "contra" leders Ar�stides S�nchez, Enrique > Berm�dez and Frank Arana. US congressional testimonies reveal that the CIA > had delegated the responsibility for organizing the Nicaraguan "contras" to > the Argentine advisors before the National Security Council implemented > President Ronald Reagan's secret order to bypass the obstacle of > prohibitions imposed by Congress. Ribeiro and Hoya were protagonists in the > negotiations that culminated in the creation of the second collective > "contra" leadership after the formation of the 15th of September Legion, > made up of ex-Somocista guards in the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN). > > Details of the Argentine activities in Central America, their coordinating > role and the form in which they were combining the interests of the > Argentine and Bolivian dictatorships with the National Security Council's > interests, was recently brought together by the San Jos� Mercury News' > investigations into the CIA's participation in introducing drugs into the > United States in order to finance clandestine arms provisions to the > contras. According to this investigation, one of the Argentine advisors' > favorites, Somocista Colonel Enrique Berm�dez, made a major leap forward in > this illicit form of financing the war, when he authorize two fellow > Nicaraguans, Danilo Bland�n and Jose Norwin Meneses, to mount a drug > trafficking scheme using the incipient structure of the FDN in Los Angeles. > > The investigation revealed that the drugs distributed in Los Angeles (to > which the San Jos� Mercury News attributed the crack boom among the black > population) was deposited in Salvadoran air bases and transferred by plane > from there to airports in Texas, under CIA protection. Towards the end of > 1981, the smuggling system had managed to ship a ton of drugs. Bland�n, who > currently receives a salary from the US government as a DEA special agent, > admitted that between 1981 and 1988 cocaine introduction reached up to 100 > kilos a week. The coincidence of dates, actors and geographic locations > permits the suggestion that part of the drugs handled by Bland�n with CIA > authorization was supplied by Bolivian narco-traffickers, even after the > removal of Garc�a Meza in Bolivia, and the restoration of democracy in > Argentina in 1983. The Argentines were also the architects of the system > that later used the Reagan government to channel undercover assistance to > the contras. The Batallion 601 agents Raul Guglielminetti alias "Mayor > Guastavino", Leandor Sanchez Reisse, alias "Lenny" and Jorge Franco, alias > "Fiorito" specialized in laundering the funds from drug trafficking. Franco > travelled to Central America on two opportunities, one of them using his > real identity. Franco, at the time, was listed as "disappeared" in the Army > Institute of Social Works, but it is suspected that he was in Central > America until at least 1987. > > Leandro S�nchez Reisse is the only member of the External Task Force of > Batallion 601 who has confessed the link between the Argentine advisors and > drug trafficking to finance undercover operations. S�nchez Reisse, an > accountant by profession, was caught in Geneva, Switzerland, when he was > tring to deposit the ransom money of Uruguayan banker Carlos Koldobsky, > kidnapped in Buenos Aires. In 1985 he managed to escape from the Champ > Dollon prison. He took refuge in the United States, under CIA protection. > In order to avoid the extradition demanded by Ra�l Alfons�n's government, > S�nchez Reisse offered to testify before the Terrorism, Narcotraffic and > International Operations subcommission of the US Senate Exterior Relations > Committee. > > S�nchez Reisse revealed that General Su�rez Mas�n and the section of the > army under his command received drug money as early as 1987 to fund > counterinsurgency efforts in Central America. He explained that two > businesses in Miami, one called Argenshow, dedicated to contracting singers > for Latin American tours, and another called Silver Dollar, in reality a > pawn shop, managed by Ra�l Guglielminetti, were the two locations for > transferring money. He admitted that Silver Dollar and Argenshow had > channelled US$30mn in drug money sent via Panama to Switzerland, > Liechtenstein, the Bahamas and the Cayman Islands. The money, he said, > ended up in the hands of the Nicaraguan contras. He also revealed that > since the mid-80s the CIA was fully informed of the two Florida businesses > and that it gave its approval to the money laundering operations. The > Batallion 601 accountant revealed to the Senate subcommittee the Argentine > participation in the Irangate scandal. He confessed that an Argentine > implicated in the 1977 kidnapping of Luchino Revelli Beaumont,of New York, > to contract fifty Argentine mercenaries to infiltrate Iran and attempt to > rescue the 52 US hostages under Khomeini's power. The plan failed to take > shape because of Argentine demands to take into account the safety of > lives, according to S�nchez Reisse. > > The Silver Dollar enterprise served as a cover for the first arms supplies > to the contras. The initial transactions were made through the > intermediation of Norman Faber, an associate of then-director of the CIA, > William Casey, in another phantom company that served to divert money to > the contras. > > It is presumed that from as early as 1982, George Morales, a Colombian drug > trafficker with US nationality, operated with the Argentine advisors in > arms trafficking to the contras through El Salvador, using planes from his > Miami-based air-taxi service Aviation Activities Corporation. The airplanes > were authorized by the CIA to return with cocaine shipments, as long as > they donated a percentage to the contras. Morales told the lawyer Jack > Blum, Subcommittee advisor, that they obtained some > US$4 million. > > Another SIDE agent operated in Central America along with S�nchez Reisse > and Raul Guglielminetti. Juan Martin Ciga Correa, alias "Major Santamaria", > with vast links to the ultra-right, specialized in financial affairs. The > Argentine authorities have a warrant out for the arrest of Ciga Correa for > the 1974 assassination of Carlos Prats Gonzalez, former commander of the > Chilean army. Ciga Correa acted as the link between the Chilean DINA agents > Michael Townley and Enrique Arancibia Clavel and the ultra-right > organization Triple A, in the organization and execution of the > assassination of Prats and his wife. Ciga was furthermore involved with > Guglielminetti in the business of arms trafficking and extorsive > kidnappings carried out in Costa Rica. He has been identified as one of the > current advisors to the paramilitary groups that operate in Chiapas, Mexico. > > If, as the "Argentine connection" suggests, the vast drug trafficking > network has served to finance undercover operations and is intimately > linked to military intelligence agencies, the current proposals to > militarize the war on drugs are seriously flawed because of the links and > commitments between drug traffickers, intelligence agencies and > paramilitary groups over the years. > > Drug trafficking, along with other "common" criminal activities, was born > out of politics and ideology, and developed in a framework of impunity that > military dictatorships granted as part of a policy of state terrorism. > There are no reasons to believe that a radical and effective change has > taken place regarding this policy. The insistence with which the concept of > "narco-terrorism" is pushed forward to justify a strategy of > counterinsurgency and militarization in Latin America, accompanied by the > growth of paramilitary groups, appears to guarantee the survival of those > ideological and political mechanisms. All the more so, when the recently > emerging democracies prove incapable of purging the military and police of > members involved in human rights violations, drug trafficking, kidnappings > and other "common" crimes. > > > > Sources > > Carlos Juvenal: "Buenos Muchachos. La industria del secuestro in Argentina". > Elisabeth Reimann: "Confesiones de un contra". > Martin Andersen: "Dossier Secreto. El mito de la guerra sucia." > Michael Levine: "La guerra falsa." > Jeffrey Robinson: "The Laundrymen." > CONADEP: "Nunca m�s." > Claudio D�az & Antonio Zucco: "La ultraderecha argentina." > Juan Gasparini: "La pista sucia." > Horacio Vebitky: "La posguerra sucia." > Enrique Yeves: "La contra, una guerra sucia." > Gabriel Pasquino & Eduardo de Miguel: "Blanca y radiante." > Frederic Laurent: "L'orchestre noir." > Gustavo S�nchez Salazar: "Barbie, criminal hasta el fin." > Juan Jos� Salinas: "Los mercenarios. Contras y carapintadas", in the > magazine, El Porte�o, No. 79. > Semanario Madres de la Plaza de Mayo, Nos. 65-98. > San Jos� Mercury News: "Crack plague's roots are in Nicaraguan war", > editions August 18, 19 & 20, 1996. > Carlos Fazio: "El tercer v�nculo", editorial Joaqu�n Mortiz, Mexico, 1996. > > > > Samuel Blixen, is an Uruguayan journalist who writes for Brecha Magazine > (Uruguay). He is a correspondent for Noticias Aliadas (Peru) and National > Radio (Sweden). He has worked with the Geopolitical Drug Observatory (OGD) > in France. He wrote several books: "El Enjuague Uruguayo. Secreto bancario > y tr�fico de drogas", "Bancotr�fico. Diez a�os de pol�tica bancaria en > democracia" and "El Vientre del C�ndor. Del archivo del terror al caso > Berr�os". > > http://www.worldcom.nl/tni/drugs/folder1/blixen.htm > > > Back to Contents: Democracy, Human Rights and Militarism > > NPC Information Associates > [EMAIL PROTECTED] > 770-457-6758 > "Intelligence for the Underdog!" > > ----- See the original message at http://www.egroups.com/list/chiapas-l/?start=8875
