From: Sanho Tree <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> (by way of Michael Novick
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>)

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE                           November 30, 1998
CONTACT: Michael Schmitz                        (202) 225-2201

CIA Confirms It Allowed Contra Drug Trafficking
Rep. Waters Calls On Committee to Hold Hearings In 106th Congress

Washington, D.C. - Today Representative Maxine Waters (CA-35) called on
House Intelligence Committee Chairman Porter Goss to hold investigative
hearings into dramatic new developments in the scandal involving the CIA's
complicity with Contra drug traffickers.

"While the House Judiciary Committee continues to deliberate about the
constitutional significance of trying to hide a private, extramarital
affair, the CIA recently released a report that suggests further action
against highest level Reagan Administration officials should have been
pursued. This should be at the very top of the agenda for legislative
business when the House Intelligence Committee reconvenes in the 106th
Congress," Rep. Waters stated.

Rep. Waters summed up the findings of the CIA's internal review, "simply
stated, the CIA's Inspector General confirmed the CIA knew of Contra drug
trafficking and chose to continue to work with and support the drug
traffickers on their payroll."

Rep. Waters called the CIA Inspector General's Report a "remarkable reversal
and admission of guilt by an agency that had always vehemently denied any
knowledge of or involvement with drug trafficking."

"I was not surprised that the CIA employees who were in the field during the
Contra war denied that they were supporting known drug traffickers when
interviewed by the Inspector General," commented Rep. Waters. "These same
employees face potential criminal prosecution if found to have knowingly
supported drug traffickers in their singular pursuit of overthrowing the
Contras."

"I was surprised at the number of sources cited in the Inspector General's
Report that confirm the CIA knew of and covered up Contra drug trafficking
because of the central role so many of these Contra drug runners played in
the anti-Sandinista effort.

The Report also described a secret 1982 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
between the CIA and the Department of Justice that allowed drug trafficking
by CIA assets, agents, and contractors to go unreported to federal law
enforcement agencies. Rep. Waters explained that the MOU provides documented
proof of the conscious effort by the Attorney General and the Director of
Central Intelligence to protect Contra drug trafficking in the name of their
Contra war effort. It is shocking, inexcusable, and should be acted upon by
Congress."

  # # #

The Honorable Porter J. Goss
Chairman
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
H405 Capitol
Washington, DC 20515

                                                November 30, 1998

Dear Chairman Goss:

As the House Permanent Select Intelligence Committee considers its
legislative business for the 106th Congress, I urge the Committee to place
the investigation into the allegations of U.S. intelligence involvement with
Contra drug trafficking at the top of its agenda.

I believe the dramatic new developments in this ongoing scandal make it
imperative that the House Intelligence Committee hold full public hearings
to be able to fully and adequately complete its investigation. I ask you to
set a date for the commencement of these hearings as soon as possible after
the start of the 106th Congress.

The facts detailed in Volume II of the CIA Inspector General's Report
suggest that further action against high level Reagan Administration
officials and CIA officials should have been pursued. The Select
Intelligence Committee should take immediate steps to pursue these new
revelations.

Remarkably, the declassified version of Volume II confirmed many of the key
allegations of CIA and Reagan Administration support for Contra drug
trafficking to the U.S. This is remarkable because of the long-standing
policy of the CIA to deny any involvement with or knowledge of drug
trafficking by the Contras and their supporters. In short, it is a complete
reversal of the CIA's stated position to the public, press, and of course,
Congress.

The Washington Post reported the new revelations on November 3 with the
headline "CIA Ignored Tips Alleging Contra Drug Links, Report Says," while
the New York Times covered this damning report on October 10 stating "C.I.A.
Said to Ignore Charges of Contra Drug Dealing in '80s." A number of other
national and regional news organizations ran stories acknowledging the fact
that the CIA's Inspector General confirmed the CIA knew of Contra drug
trafficking and chose to continue to work with and support the drug
traffickers on their payroll.

Extensive new evidence revealed

The declassified version of the Report released by the CIA Inspector General
described how the CIA knew, at the highest level, that the Contra rebels
intended to sell drugs in the United States to finance its war efforts. The
Report details the voluminous evidence that the CIA and the Reagan
Administration possessed regarding drug trafficking by CIA assets,
contractors and individual supporters involved in the Contra movement.

This evidence included some 1,000 cables sent to CIA headquarters in Langley
alleging drug trafficking by at least 58 Contra leaders, 14 Contra pilots on
the CIA payroll, CIA contractors and front companies, and the terrorist
organization that later formed the core of the FDN, the leading Northern
Front Contra organization. The Report states that these cables and leads
were almost entirely ignored by CIA headquarters and the Reagan
Administration in pursuit of their all-consuming goal of overthrowing the
Nicaraguan government by any means necessary.

Read Together - Reports Reveal Devastating Picture

A complete reading of the CIA's internal review, Volumes I and II, and the
Department of Justice's own recently released report confirms U.S.
government knowledge of and complicity with Contra drug trafficking to the
United States.

For example, at the same time the CIA was starting its official involvement
with the Contra rebels, a leading Contra faction, the Legion of September
15, "had made a decision to engage in drug smuggling to the United States in
order to finance its anti-Sandinista operations." The infamous Legion of
September 15 group included CIA asset Enrique Bermudez, the Contras' top
military commander, and a number of other key Contra military commanders.

Volume I of the IG's Report detailed the ties between Bermudez, Norwin
Meneses and Danilo Blandon, the drug kingpins that Gary Webb wrote about in
his Dark Alliance series. Volume I reported that Bermudez asked the two drug
kingpins to raise money and supplies for the FDN and assured them their
support was welcome because "the ends justify the means."

Volume II reported that the CIA already knew that the Legion had completed
"one drug shipment to Miami" by the time the CIA offered its official
support in September 1981. The declassified version of the Report documents
that the CIA also knew of the Legion's other exploits, including
"kidnapping, extortion and robbery to fund its operations" in addition to
the "bombing of Nicaraguan civilian airliners and airline hijacking." And
despite all this information, the CIA continued to work with most of these
CIA assets, violating existing law.

When both reports are read together, it is clear that the Contra military
commander's embrace of the drug kingpins Meneses and Blandon was part of the
ongoing drug trafficking efforts by the FDN, and its precursor, the Legion
of September 15, to raise funds for their military efforts.

The Report also revealed the significance of a number of other previously
lesser known participants in the Contra drug operations.

The Report discussed the involvement of CIA agent Ivan Gomez in drug money
laundering. Volume II revealed how a CIA Security/Counterintelligence
section review of Gomez rejected his application for career CIA officer
employment because "he was unable to [provide credible answers regarding
drug trafficking]. Consequently, [Gomez] was amicably terminated effective
31 March 1988." Volume II detailed the findings of the CIA's interview with
Gomez concluding the interviewer "believes Gomez directly participated in
illegal drug transactions, concealed participation in illegal drug
transactions, and concealed information about involvement in illegal drug
activity."

Unfortunately, the information of Gomez' drug trafficking was not included
in Volume I, despite the extensive discussion of Ivan Gomez in "Volume I:
The California Story." In Volume I, Carlos Cabezas stated that Gomez was
with the CIA, and that Gomez was at meetings with Cabezas and other drug
traffickers "to ensure that the profits from the cocaine went to the Contras
and not into someone's pocket." Volume II filled in the blanks showing how
Ivan Gomez was involved in drug money laundering before and after drug
trafficker Carlos Cabezas met Gomez to give him drug money for the Contras.
Volume II also unambiguously states that Gomez was a CIA "agent" and "covert
action asset."

In another example, Sebastian Pinel was identified as a "leader of one
counterrevolutionary group in Honduras" in a number of CIA cables to Langley
Headquarters. Pinel had previously been identified as one of the sources of
cocaine for the Carlos Cabezas/Julio Zavala cocaine ring at the center of
the San Francisco Frogman case. By identifying Pinel as both a Los Angeles
distributor of cocaine for Cabezas/Zavala, and a leader of a Honduran Contra
organization, Volume II adds more direct evidence of Contra involvement in
the Frogman drug smuggling case.

Manuel Porro Rubiales, identified in Volume II as a 15th of September Legion
leader and member of the FDN General Staff support unit, was previously
known to Federal law enforcement officials because he was arrested for drug
trafficking as part of the DEA's Operation Alligator sweep in New Orleans in
1979. When he was arrested, Manuel Porro identified Norwin Meneses as a
supplier to his drug ring. The new information in Volume II sheds light on
how future Contra leaders were involved in bringing drugs into the U.S. even
before they became Contra leaders.

1982 Memorandum of Understanding Shows Premeditation

As you are also aware, the Report describes the previously secret 1982
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the CIA and the Department of
Justice that allowed drug trafficking by CIA assets, agents, and contractors
to go unreported to federal law enforcement agencies. In my opinion, it
provides documented evidence of the conscious effort by the Attorney General
and the Director of Central Intelligence to protect their Contra warriors
from being prosecuted for their widespread drug trafficking.

Volume II detailed how effective the MOU was in protecting the involvement
of CIA assets in drug trafficking. Ivan Gomez' case was reviewed by the
CIA's Office of General Counsel (OGC) which detailed how Gomez had received
"$35,000 cash in a paper bag" and admitted that "Gomez could be guilty as a
principal, accessory after the fact, or of conspiracy if he knew the money
was part of a drug transaction."

But the CIA's General Counsel then explained that any charge of Gomez
trafficking drugs "is not a non-employee offense required to be reported
under the [MOU's] procedures ... Although Gomez ... has ... been an
independent contractor (for the CIA), he has never been an "employee' as
defined in the MOU]." As a result of this legal hairsplitting allowed by the
1982 Memorandum of Understanding, the CIA never issued a referral to the FBI
or DoJ for Gomez' drug trafficking and money laundering. Volume II also
clearly states that no information relating to Gomez' possible involvement
in drug trafficking was ever provided to Congress by the CIA.

The Intelligence Committee needs to identify and question every individual
that was part of developing and implementing this incredible MOU. Justice
demands that those responsible for this governmental license to traffic
drugs are held responsible for the damage to our nation which this MOU
allowed.

There are many CIA sources that remain anonymous and protected in these
Reports despite their possible involvement in drug trafficking. Many unnamed
sources are identified only as a CIA officer or CIA personnel throughout
Volume I and II. In addition, the CIA devoted entire sections of Volume II
to "A CIA Independent Contractor," "A Second CIA Independent Contractor,"
and "A Third CIA Independent Contractor." These CIA contractors were
identified as drug traffickers, yet these drug traffickers had their
identities protected in the CIA's Report. Why?

It is my belief that the Committee must address the many questions of
Executive misconduct and probable criminal activity when full Committee
hearings commence. I believe it is particularly important to identify the
many unnamed sources of information that were discussed in the declassified
versions of the CIA's reports.

At the end of Volume II, the Inspector General of the CIA laid down a
challenge for legislators and law enforcement officials to continue the
investigation of the CIA's protection of Contra drug traffickers, stating
simply, "[t]his is grist for more work, if anyone wants to do it." We must
rise to meet his challenge in the 106th Congress. I call on you, as
Committee Chair, to ensure we meet this challenge when the 106th Congress
convenes.

Sincerely,

Maxine Waters
Member of Congress




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