-Caveat Lector- from: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- srv/politics/special/clinton/stories/housetext011199.htm <A HREF="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- srv/politics/special/clinton/stories/housetext011199.htm">Washingtonpost.com Special Report: Clinton Accu </A> --[3]-- For the record. Om K ----- MOTIVE FOR LIES TO STAFF It is abundantly clear that the President's assertions to staff were designed for dissemination to the American people. But it is more important to understand that the President intended his aides to relate that false story to investigators and grand jurors alike. We know that this is true for the following reasons: the Special Division had recently appointed the Office of Independent Counsel to investigate the Monica Lewinsky matter; the President realized that Jones' attorneys and investigators were investigating this matter; the Washington Post journalists and investigators were exposing the details of the Lewinsky affair; and, an investigation relating to perjury charges based on Presidential activities in the Oval Office would certainly lead to interviews with West Wing employees and high level staffers. Because the President would not appear before the grand jury, his version of events would be supplied by those staffers to whom he had lied. The President actually acknowledged that he knew his aides might be called before the grand jury. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, pgs. 105-109; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 557-557) In addition, Mr. Podesta testified that he knew that he was likely to be a witness in the ongoing grand jury criminal investigation. He said that he was "sensitive about not exchanging information because I knew I was a potential witness." (Podesta 6/23/98 GJ, p. 79; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 3332) He also recalled that the President volunteered to provide information about Ms. Lewinsky to him even though Mr. Podesta had not asked for these details. (Podesta 6/23/98 GJ, p. 79; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 3332) In other words, the President's lies and deceptions to his White House aides, coupled with his steadfast refusal to testify had the effect of presenting a false account of events to investigators and grand jurors. The President's aides believed the President when he told them his contrived account. The aides' eventual testimony provided the President's calculated falsehoods to the grand jury which, in turn, gave the jurors an inaccurate and misleading set of facts upon which to base any decisions. WIN, WIN, WIN President Clinton also implemented a win-at-all-costs strategy calculated to obstruct the administration of justice in the Jones case and in the grand jury. This is demonstrated in testimony presented by Richard "Dick" Morris to the federal grand jury. Mr. Morris, a former presidential advisor, testified that on January 21, 1998, he met President Clinton and they discussed the turbulent events of the day. The President again denied the accusations against him. After further discussions, they decided to have an overnight poll taken to determine if the American people would forgive the President for adultery, perjury, and obstruction of justice. When Mr. Morris received the results, he called the President: And I said, "They're just too shocked by this. It's just too new, it's too raw." And I said, "And the problem is they're willing to forgive you for adultery, but not for perjury or obstruction of justice or the various other things." (Morris 8/18/98 GJ, p. 28; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 2929) Morris recalls the following exchange: Morris: And I said, "They're just not ready for it." meaning the voters. WJC Well, we just have to win, then. (Morris 8/18/98 GJ, p. 30; H.Doc. 105-216, p. 2930) The President, of course, cannot recall this statement. (Presidential Responses to Questions, Numbers 69, 70, and 71) THE PLOT TO DISCREDIT MONICA LEWINSKY In order to "win," it was necessary to convince the public, and hopefully the grand jurors who read the newspapers, that Monica Lewinsky was unworthy of belief. If the account given by Ms. Lewinsky to Linda Tripp was believed, then there would emerge a tawdry affair in and near the Oval Office. Moreover, the President's own perjury and that of Monica Lewinsky would surface. To do this, the President employed the full power and credibility of the White House and its press corps to destroy the witness. Thus on January 29, 1998: Inside the White House, the debate goes on about the best way to destroy That Woman, as President Bill Clinton called Monica Lewinsky. Should they paint her as a friendly fantasist or a malicious stalker? (The Plain Dealer) Again: "That poor child has serious emotional problems," Rep. Charles Rangel, Democrat of New York, said Tuesday night before the State of the Union. "She's fantasizing. And I haven't heard that she played with a full deck in her other experiences." (The Plain Dealer) >From Gene Lyons, an Arkansas columnist on January 30: But it's also very easy to take a mirror's eye view of this thing, look at this thing from a completely different direction and take the same evidence and posit a totally innocent relationship in which the president was, in a sense, the victim of someone rather like the woman who followed David Letterman around. (NBC News) >From another "source" on February 1: Monica had become known at the White House, says one source, as "the stalker." And on February 4: The media have reported that sources describe Lewinsky as "infatuated" with the president, "star struck" and even "a stalker." (Buffalo News) Finally, on January 31: One White House aide called reporters to offer information about Monica Lewinsky's past, her weight problems and what the aide said was her nickname - "The Stalker." Junior staff members, speaking on the condition that they not be identified, said she was known as a flirt, wore her skirts too short, and was "A little bit weird." Little by little, ever since allegations of an affair between U.S. President Bill Clinton and Lewinsky surfaced 10 days ago, White House sources have waged a behind-the-scenes campaign to portray her as an untrustworthy climber obsessed with the President. Just hours after the story broke, one White House source made unsolicited calls offering that Lewinsky was the "troubled" product of divorced parents and may have been following the footsteps of her mother, who wrote a tell-all book about the private lives of three famous opera singers. One story had Lewinsky following former Clinton aide George Stephanopoulos to Starbucks. After observing what kind of coffee he ordered, she showed up the next day at his secretary's desk with a cup of the same coffee to "surprise him." (Toronto Sun) This sounds familiar because it is the exact tactic used to destroy the reputation and credibility of Paula Jones. The difference is that these false rumors were emanating from the White House, the bastion of the free world, to protect one man from being forced to answer for his deportment in the highest office in the land. On August 17, 1998, the President testified before the grand jury. He then was specifically asked whether he knew that his aides (Blumenthal, Bowles, Podesta and Currie) were likely to be called before the grand jury. Q It may have been misleading, sir, and you knew though, after January 21st when the Post article broke and said that Judge Starr was looking into this, you knew that they might be witnesses. You knew that they might be called into a grand jury, didn't you? WJC That's right. I think I was quite careful what I said after that. I may have said something to all these people to that effect, but I'll also - whenever anybody asked me any details, I said, look, I don't want you to be a witness or I turn you into a witness or give you information that would get you in trouble. I just wouldn't talk. I, by and large, didn't talk to people about it. Q If all of these people - let's leave Mrs. Currie for a minute. Vernon Jordan, Sid Blumenthal, John Podesta, Harold Ickes, Erskine Bowles, Harry Thomasson, after the story broke, after Judge Starr's involvement was known on January 21st, have said that you denied a sexual relationship with them. Are you denying that? WJC No. Q And you've told us that you -- WJC I'm just telling you what I meant by it. I told you what I meant by it when they started this deposition. Q You've told us now that you were being careful, but that it might have been misleading. Is that correct? WJC It might have been *** So, what I was trying to do was to give them something they could - that would be true, even if misleading in the context of this deposition, and keep them out of trouble, and let's deal - and deal with what I thought was the almost ludicrous suggestion that I had urged someone to lie or tried to suborn perjury, in other words. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, pgs. 106-108; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 558-560) As the President testified before the grand jury, he maintained that he was being truthful with his aides. (Exhibit 20) He stated that when he spoke to them, he was very careful with his wording. The President stated that he wanted his statement regarding "sexual relations" to be literally true because he was only referring to intercourse. However, recall that John Podesta said that the President denied sex "in any way whatsoever" "including oral sex." The President told Mr. Podesta, Mr. Bowles, Ms. Williams, and Harold Ickes that he did not have a "sexual relationship" with that woman. Importantly, seven days after the President's grand jury appearance, the White House issued a document entitled, "Talking Points January 24, 1998." (Chart W; Exhibit 16) This "Talking Points" document outlines proposed questions that the President may be asked. It also outlines suggested answers to those questions. The "Talking Points" purport to state the President's view of sexual relations and his view of the relationship with Monica Lewinsky. (Exhibit 17) The "Talking Points" state as follows: Q. What acts does the President believe constitute a sexual relationship? A. I can't believe we're on national television discussing this. I am not about to engage in an "act-by-act" discussion of what constitutes a sexual relationship. Q. Well, for example, Ms. Lewinsky is on tape indicating that the President does not believe oral sex is adultery. Would oral sex, to the President, constitute a sexual relationship? A. Of course it would. The President's own talking points refute the President's "literal truth" argument. EFFECT OF THE PRESIDENT'S CONDUCT Some "experts" have questioned whether the President's deportment affects his office, the government of the United States or the dignity and honor of the country. Our founders decided in the Constitutional Convention that one of the duties imposed upon the President is to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed." Furthermore, he is required to take an oath to "Preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States." Twice this President stood on the steps of the Capitol, raised his right hand to God and repeated that oath. The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." The Seventh Amendment insures that in civil suits "the right of trial by jury shall be preserved." Finally, the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees due process of law and the equal protection of the laws. THE EFFECT ON MS. JONES' RIGHTS Paula Jones is an American citizen, just a single citizen who felt that she had suffered a legal wrong. More important, that legal wrong was based upon the Constitution of the United States. She claimed essentially that she was subjected to sexual harassment, which, in turn, constitutes discrimination on the basis of gender. The case was not brought against just any citizen, but against the President of the United States, who was under a legal and moral obligation to preserve and protect Ms. Jones' rights. It is relatively simple to mouth high-minded platitudes and to prosecute vigorously rights violations by someone else. It is, however, a test of courage, honor and integrity to enforce those rights against yourself. The President failed that test. As a citizen, Ms. Jones enjoyed an absolute constitutional right to petition the Judicial Branch of government to redress that wrong by filing a lawsuit in the United States District Court, which she did. At this point she became entitled to a trial by jury if she chose, due process of law and the equal protection of the laws no matter who the defendant was in her suit. Due process contemplates the right to a full and fair trail, which, in turn, means the right to call and question witnesses, to cross-examine adverse witnesses and to have her case decided by an unbiased and fully informed jury. What did she actually get? None of the above. On May 27, 1997, the United States Supreme Court ruled in a nine to zero decision that, "like every other citizen," Paula Jones "has a right to an orderly disposition of her claims." In accordance with the Supreme Court's decision, United States District Judge Susan Webber Wright ruled on December 11, 1997, that Ms. Jones was entitled to information regarding state or federal employees with whom the President had sexual relations from May, 1986 to the present. Judge Wright had determined that the information was reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Six days after this ruling, the President filed an answer to Ms. Jones' Amended Complaint. The President's Answer stated: "President Clinton denies that he engaged in any improper co nduct with respect to plaintiff or any other woman." Ms. Jones' right to call and depose witnesses was thwarted by perjurious and misleading affidavits and motions; her right to elicit testimony from adverse witnesses was compromised by perjury and false and misleading statements under oath. As a result, had a jury tried the case, it would have been deprived of critical information. That result is bad enough, but it reaches constitutional proportions when denial of the civil rights is directed by the President of the United States who twice took an oath to preserve, protect and defend those rights. But we now know what the "sanctity of an oath" means to the President. THE EFFECT ON THE OFFICE OF PRESIDENT Moreover, the President is the spokesman for the government and the people of the United States concerning both domestic and foreign matters. His honesty and integrity, therefore, directly influence the credibility of this country. When, as here, that spokesman is guilty of a continuing pattern of lies, misleading statements, and deceits over a long period of time, the believability of any of his pronouncements is seriously called into question. Indeed, how can anyone in or out of our country any longer believe anything he says? And what does that do to confidence in the honor and integrity of the United States? Make no mistake, the conduct of the President is inextricably bound to the welfare of the people of the United States. Not only does it affect economic and national defense, but even more directly, it affects the moral and law-abiding fibre of the commonwealth, without which no nation can survive. When, as here, that conduct involves a pattern of abuses of power, of perjury, of deceit, of obstruction of justice and of the Congress, and of other illegal activities, the resulting damage to the honor and respect due to the United States is, of necessity, devastating. THE EFFECT ON THE SYSTEM Again: there is no such thing as non-serious lying under oath. Every time a witness lies, that witness chips a stone from the foundation of our entire legal system. Likewise, every act of obstruction of justice, of witness tampering or of perjury adversely affects the judicial branch of government like a pebble tossed into a lake. You may not notice the effect at once, but you can be certain that the tranquility of that lake has been disturbed. And if enough pebbles are thrown into the water, the lake itself may disappear. So too with the truth-seeking process of the courts. Every unanswered and unpunished assault upon it has its lasting effect and given enough of them, the system itself will implode. That is why two women who testified before the Committee had been indicted, convicted and punished severely for false statements under oath in civil cases. And that is why only recently a federal grand jury in Chicago indicted four former college football players because they gave false testimony under oath to a grand jury. Nobody suggested that they should not be charged because their motives may have been to protect their careers and family. And nobody has suggested that the perjury was non-serious because it involved only lies about sports; i.e., betting on college football games. DISREGARD OF THE RULE OF LAW Apart from all else, the President's illegal actions constitute an attack upon and utter disregard for the truth, and for the rule of law. Much worse, they manifest an arrogant disdain not only for the rights of his fellow citizens, but also for the functions and the integrity of the other two co-equal branches of our constitutional system. One of the witnesses that appeared earlier likened the government of the United States to a three-legged stool. The analysis is apt, because the entire structure of our country rests upon three equal supports: the Legislative, the Judicial, and the Executive. Remove one of those supports, and the State will totter. Remove two and the structure will collapse altogether. EFFECT ON THE JUDICIAL BRANCH The President mounted a direct assault upon the truth-seeking process which is the very essence and foundation of the Judicial Branch. Not content with that, though, Mr. Clinton renewed his lies, half-truths and obstruction to this Congress when he filed his answers to simple requests to admit or deny. In so doing, he also demonstrated his lack of respect for the constitutional functions of the Legislative Branch. Actions do not lose their public character merely because they may not directly affect the domestic and foreign functioning of the Executive Branch. Their significance must be examined for their effect on the functioning of the entire system of government. Viewed in that manner, the President's actions were both public and extremely destructive. THE CONDUCT CHARGED WARRANTS CONVICTION AND REMOVAL The Articles state offenses that warrant the President's conviction and removal from office. The Senate's own precedents establish that perjury and obstruction warrant conviction and removal from office. Those same precedents establish that the perjury and obstruction need not have any direct connection to the officer's official duties. PRECEDENTS In the 1980s, the Senate convicted and removed from office three federal judges for making perjurious statements. Background and History of Impeachment Hearings before the Subcomm. On the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess. at 190-193 (Comm. Print 1998), (Testimony of Charles Cooper) ("Cooper Testimony") Although able counsel represented each judge, none of them argued that perjury or making false statements are not impeachable offenses. Nor did a single Congressman or Senator, in any of the three impeachment proceedings, suggest that perjury does not constitute a high crime and misdemeanor. Finally, in the cases of Judge Claiborne and Judge Nixon, it was undisputed that the perjury was not committed in connection with the exercise of the judges' judicial powers. JUDGE NIXON In 1989, Judge Walter L. Nixon, Jr., was impeached, convicted, and removed from office for committing perjury. Judge Nixon's offense stemmed from his grand jury testimony and statements to federal officers concerning his intervention in the state drug prosecution of Drew Fairchild, the son of Wiley Fairchild, a business partner of Judge Nixon's. Although Judge Nixon had no official role or function in Drew Fairchild's case (which was assigned to a state court judge), Wiley Fairchild had asked Judge Nixon to help out by speaking to the prosecutor. Judge Nixon did so, and the prosecutor, a long-time friend of Judge Nixon's, dropped the case. When the FBI and the Department of Justice interviewed Judge Nixon, he denied any involvement whatsoever. Subsequently, a federal grand jury was empaneled and Judge Nixon again denied his involvement before that grand jury. After a lengthy criminal prosecution, Judge Nixon was convicted on two counts of perjury before the grand jury and sentenced to five years in prison on each count. Not long thereafter, the House impeached Judge Nixon by a vote of 417 to 0. The first article of impeachment charged him with making the false or misleading statement to the grand jury that he could not "recall" discussing the Fairchild case with the prosecutor. The second article charged Nixon with making affirmative false or misleading statements to the grand jury that he had "nothing whatsoever officially or unofficially to do with the Drew Fairchild case." The third article alleged that Judge Nixon made numerous false statements (not under oath) to federal investigators prior to his grand jury te stimony. See 135 Cong. Rec. H1802-03. The House unanimously impeached Judge Nixon, and the House Managers' Report expressed no doubt that perjury is an impeachable offense: It is difficult to imagine an act more subversive to the legal process than lying from the witness stand. A judge who violates his testimonial oath and misleads a grand jury is clearly unfit to remain on the bench. If a judge's truthfulness cannot be guaranteed, if he sets less than the highest standard for candor, how can ordinary citizens who appear in court be expected to abide by their testimonial oath? House of Representatives' Brief in Support of the Articles of Impeachment at 59 (1989). House Manager Sensenbrenner addressed the question even more directly: There are basically two questions before you in connection with this impeachment. First, does the conduct alleged in the three articles of impeachment state an impeachable offense? There is really no debate on this point. The articles allege misconduct that is criminal and wholly inconsistent with judicial integrity and the judicial oath. Everyone agrees that a judge who lies under oath, or who deceives Federal investigators by lying in an interview, is not fit to remain on the bench. 135 Cong. Rec. S14,497 (Statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) The Senate agreed, overwhelmingly voting to convict Judge Nixon of perjury on the first two articles (89-8 and 78-19, respectively). As Senator Carl Levin explained: The record amply supports the finding in the criminal trial that Judge Nixon's statements to the grand jury were false and misleading and constituted perjury. Those are the statements cited in articles I and II and it is on those articles that I vote to convict Judge Nixon and remove him from office. 135 Cong. Rec. S14,637 (Statement of Sen. Levin). JUDGE HASTINGS Also in 1989, the House impeached Judge Alcee L. Hastings for, among other things, committing numerous acts of perjury. The Senate convicted him, and he was removed from office. Initially, Judge Hastings had been indicted by a federal grand jury for conspiracy stemming from his alleged bribery conspiracy with his friend Mr. William Borders to "fix" cases before Judge Hastings in exchange for cash payments from defendants. Mr. Borders was convicted, but, at his own trial, Judge Hastings took the stand and unequivocally denied any participation in a conspiracy with Mr. Borders. The jury acquitted Judge Hastings on all counts. Nevertheless, the House impeached Judge Hastings, approving seventeen articles of impeachment, fourteen of which were for lying under oath at his trial. The House voted 413 to 3 to impeach. The House Managers' Report left no doubt that perjury alone is impeachable: It is important to realize that each instance of false testimony charged in the false statement articles is more than enough reason to convict Judge Hastings and remove him from office. Even if the evidence were insufficient to prove that Judge Hastings was part of the conspiracy with William Borders, which the House in no way concedes, the fact that he lied under oath to assure his acquittal is conduct that cannot be tolerated of a United States District Judge. To bolster one's defense by lying to a jury is separate, independent corrupt conduct. For this reason alone, Judge Hastings should be removed from public office. The House of Representatives' Brief in Support of the Articles of Impeachment at 127-28 (1989). Representative John Conyers (D-Mich.) also argued for the impeachment of Judge Hastings: [W]e can no more close our eyes to acts that constitute high crimes and misdemeanors when practiced by judges whose views we approve than we could against judges whose views we detested. It would be disloyal . . . to my oath of office at this late state of my career to attempt to set up a double standard for those who share my philosophy and for those who may oppose it. In order to be true to our principles, we must demand that all persons live up to the same high standards that we demand of everyone else. 134 Cong. Rec. H6184 (1988) (Statement of Rep. Conyers). JUDGE CLAIBORNE In 1986, Judge Harry E. Claiborne was impeached, convicted, and removed from office for making false statements under penalties of perjury. In particular, Judge Claiborne had filed false income tax returns in 1979 and 1980, grossly understating his income. As a result, he was convicted by a jury of two counts of willfully making a false statement on a federal tax return in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1). Subsequently, the House unanimously (406-0) approved four articles of impeachment. The proposition that Claiborne's perjurious personal income tax filings were not impeachable was never even seriously considered. As the House Managers explained: [T]he constitutional issues raised by the first two Articles of Impeachment [concerning the filing of false tax returns] are readily resolved. The Constitution provides that Judge Claiborne may be impeached and convicted for "High Crimes and Misdemeanors." Article II, Section 4. The willful making or subscribing of a false statement on a tax return is a felony offense under the laws of the United States. The commission of such a felony is a proper basis for Judge Claiborne's impeachment and conviction in the Senate. Proceedings of the United States Senate Impeachment Trial of Judge Harry E. Claiborne, S. Doc. No. 99-48, at 40 (1986)("Claiborne Proceedings") (emphases added). House Manager Rodino, in his oral argument to the Senate, emphatically made the same point: Honor in the eyes of the American people lies in public officials who respect the law, not in those who violate the trust that has been given to them when they are trusted with public office. Judge Harry E. Claiborne has, sad to say, undermined the integrity of the judicial branch of Government. To restore that integrity and to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice, Judge Claiborne must be convicted on the fourth Article of Impeachment [that of reducing confidence in the integrity of the judiciary]. 132 Cong. Rec. S15,481 (1986) (Statement of Rep. Rodino). The Senate agreed. Telling are the words of then-Senator Albert Gore, Jr. In voting to convict Judge Claiborne and remove him from office: The conclusion is inescapable that Claiborne filed false income tax returns and that he did so willfully rather than negligently. . . . Given the circumstances, it is incumbent upon the Senate to fulfill its constitutional responsibility and strip this man of his title. An individual who has knowingly falsified tax returns has no business receiving a salary derived from the tax dollars of honest citizens. More importantly, an individual guilty of such reprehensible conduct ought not be permitted to exercise the awesome powers which the Constitution entrusts to the Federal Judiciary. Claiborne Proceedings, S. Doc. No. 99-48, at 372 (1986). APPLICATION TO THE PRESIDENT To avoid the conclusive force of these recent precedents -- and in particular the exact precedent supporting impeachment for, conviction, and removal for perjury -- the only recourse for the President's defenders is to argue that a high crime or misdemeanor for a judge is not necessarily a high crime or misdemeanor for the President. The arguments advanced in support of this dubious proposition do not withstand serious scrutiny. See generally Cooper Testimony, at 193. The Constitution provides that Article III judges "shall hold their Offices during good Behavior, U.S. Const. Art. III, 1. Thus, these arguments suggest that judges are impeachable for "misbehavior" while other federal officials are only impeachable for treason, bribery, and other high crimes and misdemeanors. The staff of the House Judiciary Committee in the 1970s and the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal in the 1990s both issued reports rejecting these arguments. In 1974, the staff of the Judiciary Committee's Impeachment Inquiry issued a report which included the following conclusion: Does Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution, which states that judges 'shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour,' limit the relevance of the ten impeachments of judges with respect to presidential impeachment standards as has been argued by some? It does not. The argument is that 'good behavior' implies an additional ground for impeachment of judges not applicable to other civil officers. However, the only impeachment provision discussed in the Convention and included in the Constitution is Article II, Section 4, which by its expressed terms, applies to all civil officers, including judges, and defines impeachment offenses as 'Treason, Bribery, and other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.' Staff of House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., Constitutional Grounds for Presidential Impeachment (Comm. Print 1974) ("1974 Staff Report") at 17. The National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal came to the same conclusion. The Commission concluded that "the most plausible reading of the phrase 'during good Behavior' is that it means tenure for life, subject to the impeachment power. . . . The ratification debates about the federal judiciary seem to have proceeded on the assumption that good-behavior tenure meant removal only through impeachment and conviction." National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal, Report of the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal 17-18 (1993)(footnote omitted). The record of the 1986 impeachment of Judge Claiborne also argues against different impeachment standards for federal judges and presidents. Judge Claiborne filed a motion asking the Senate to dismiss the articles of impeachment against him for failure to state impeachable offenses. One of the motion's arguments was that "[t]he standard for impeachment of a judge is different than that for other officers" and that the Constitution limited "removal of the judiciary to acts involving misconduct related to discharge of office." Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss the Articles of Impeachment on the Grounds They Do Not State Impeachable Offenses 4 (hereinafter cited as " Claiborne Motion"), reprinted in Hearings Before the Senate Impeachment Trial Committee, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 245 (1986)(hereinafter cited as "Senate Claiborne Hearings"). Representative Kastenmeier responded that "reliance on the term 'good behavior' as stating a sanction for judges is totally misplaced and virtually all commentators agree that that is directed to affirming the life tenure of judges during good behavior. It is not to set them down, differently, as judicial officers from civil officers." Id. at 81-82. He further stated that "[n]or . . . is there any support for the notion that . . . Federal judges are not civil officers of the United States, subject to the impeachment clause of article II of the Constitution." Id . at 81. The Senate never voted on Claiborne's motion. However, the Senate was clearly not swayed by the arguments contained therein because it later voted to convict Judge Claiborne. 132 Cong. Rec. S15,760-62 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986). The Senate thus rejected the claim that the standard of impeachable offenses was different for judges than for presidents. Moreover, even assuming that presidential high crimes and misdemeanors could be different from judicial ones, surely the President ought not be held to a lower standard of impeachability than judges. In the course of the 1980s judicial impeachments, Congress emphasized unequivocally that the removal from office of federal judges guilty of crimes indistinguishable from those currently charged against the President was essential to the preservation of the rule of law. If the perjury of just one judge so undermines the rule of law as to make it intolerable that he remain in office, then how much more so does perjury committed by the President of the United States, who alone is charged with the duty "to take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." See generally, Cooper Testimony at 194) It is just as devastating to our system of government when a President commits perjury. As the House Judiciary Committee stated in justifying an article of impeachment against President Nixon, the President not only has "the obligation that every citizen has to live under the law," but in addition has the duty "not merely to live by the law but to see that law faithfully applied." Impeachment of Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States, H. Rept. No. 93-1305, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. at 180 (1974). The Constitution provides that he "shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." U.S. Const. Art. II, § 3. When a President, as chief law enforcement officer of the United States, commits perjury, he violates this constitutional oath unique to his office and casts doubt on the notion that we are a nation ruled by laws and not men. PERJURY AND OBSTRUCTION ARE AS SERIOUS AS BRIBERY Further evidence that perjury and obstruction warrant conviction and removal comes directly from the text of the Constitution. Because the Constitution specifically mentions bribery, no one can dispute that it is an impeachable offense. U.S. Const., art. II, § 4. Because the constitutional language does not limit the term, we must take it to mean all forms of bribery. Our statutes specifically criminalize bribery of witnesses with the intent to influence their testimony in judicial proceedings. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(3) & (4), (c)(2) & (3). See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503 (general obstruction of justice statute), 1512 (witness tampering statute). Indeed, in a criminal case, the efforts to provide Ms. Lewinsky with job assistance in return for submitting a false affidavit charged in the Articles might easily have been charged under these statutes. No one could reasonably argue that the President's bribing a witness to provide false testimony - even in a private lawsuit - does not rise to the level of an impeachable offense. The plain language of the Constitution indicates that it is. Having established that point, the rest is easy. Bribing a witness is illegal because it leads to false testimony that in turn undermines the ability of the judicial system to reach just results. Thus, among other things, the Framers clearly intended impeachment to protect the judicial system from these kinds of attacks. Perjury and obstruction of justice are illegal for exactly the same reason, and they accomplish exactly the same ends through slightly different means. Simple logic establishes that perjury and obstruction of justice -- even in a private lawsuit -- are exactly the types of other high crimes and misdemeanors that are of the same magnitude as bribery. HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS Although Congress has never adopted a fixed definition of "high crimes and misdemeanors," much of the background and history of the impeachment process contradicts the President's claim that these offenses are private and therefore do not warrant conviction and removal. Two reports prepared in 1974 on the background and history of impeachment are particularly helpful in evaluating the President's defense. Both reports support the conclusion that the facts in this case compel the conviction and removal of President Clinton. Many have commented on the report on "Constitutional Grounds for Presidential Impeachment" prepared in February 1974 by the staff of the Nixon impeachment inquiry. The general principles concerning grounds for impeachment set forth in that report indicate that perjury and obstruction of justice are impeachable offenses. Consider this key language from the staff report describing the type of conduct which gives rise to impeachment: The emphasis has been on the significant effects of the conduct -- undermining the integrity of office, disregard of constitutional duties and oath of office, arrogation of power, abuse of the governmental process, adverse impact on the system of government. 1974 Staff Report at 26 (emphases added). Perjury and obstruction of justice clearly "undermine the integrity of office." They unavoidably erode respect for the office of the President. Such offenses obviously involve "disregard of [the President's] constitutional duties and oath of office." Moreover, these offenses have a direct and serious "adverse impact on the system of government." Obstruction of justice is by definition an assault on the due administration of justice -- a core function of our system of government. The thoughtful report on "The Law of Presidential Impeachment" prepared by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York in January of 1974 also places a great deal of emphasis on the corrosive impact of presidential misconduct on the integrity of office: It is our conclusion, in summary, that the grounds for impeachment are not limited to or synonymous with crimes . . . . Rather, we believe that acts which undermine the integrity of government are appropriate grounds whether or not they happen to constitute offenses under the general criminal law. In our view, the essential nexus to damaging the integrity of government may be found in acts which constitute corruption in, or flagrant abuse of the powers of, official position. It may also be found in acts which, without directly affecting governmental processes, undermine that degree of public confidence in the probity of executive and judicial officers that is essential to the effectiveness of government in a free society. Association of the Bar of the City of New York, The Law of Presidential Impeachment, (1974) at 161 (emphases added). The commission of perjury and obstruction of justice by a President are acts that without doubt "undermine that degree of public confidence in the probity of the [the President] that is essential to the effectiveness of government in a free society." Such acts inevitably subvert the respect for law which is essential to the well-being of our constitutional system. That the President's perjury and obstruction do not directly involve his official conduct does not diminish their significance. The record is clear that federal officials have been impeached for reasons other than official misconduct. As set forth above, two recent impeachments of federal judges are compelling examples. In 1989, Judge Walter Nixon was impeached, convicted, and removed from office for committing perjury before a federal grand jury. Judge Nixon's perjury involved his efforts to fix a state case for the son of a business partner -- a matter in which he had no official role. In 1986, Judge Harry E. Claiborne was impeached, convicted, and removed from office for making false statements under penalty of perjury on his income tax returns. That misconduct had nothing to do with his official responsibilities. Nothing in the text, structure, or history of the Constitution suggests that officials are subject to impeachment only for official misconduct. Perjury and obstruction of justice -- even regarding a private matter -- are offenses that substantially affect the President's official duties because they are grossly incompatible with his preeminent duty to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed." Regardless of their genesis, perjury and obstruction of justice are acts of public misconduct -- they cannot be dismissed as understandable or trivial. Perjury and obstruction of justice are not private matters; they are crimes against the system of justice, for which impeachment, conviction, and removal are appropriate. The record of Judge Claiborne's impeachment proceedings affirms that conclusion. Representative Hamilton Fish, the ranking member of the Judiciary Committee and one of the House managers in the Senate trial, stated that "[i]mpeachable conduct does not have to occur in the course of the performance of an officer's official duties. Evidence of misconduct, misbehavior, high crimes, and misdemeanors can be justified upon one's private dealings as well as one's exercise of public office. That, of course, is the situation in this case." 132 Cong. Rec. H4713 (daily ed. July 22, 1986). Judge Claiborne's unsuccessful motion that the Senate dismiss the articles of impeachment for failure to state impeachable offenses provides additional evidence that personal misconduct can justify impeachment. One of the arguments his attorney made for the motion was that "there is no allegation . . . that the behavior of Judge Claiborne in any way was related to misbehavior in his official function as a judge; it was private misbehavior." (Senate Claiborne Hearings, at 77, Statement of Judge Claiborne's counsel, Oscar Goodman). (See also Claiborne Motion, at 3) Representative Kastenmeier responded by stating that "it would be absurd to conclude that a judge who had committed murder, mayhem, rape, or perhaps espionage in his private life, could not be removed from office by the U.S. Senate." (Senate Claiborne Hearings, at 81) Kastenmeier's response was repeated by the House of Representatives in its pleading opposing Claiborne's motion to dismiss. (Opposition to Claiborne Motion at 2) The Senate did not vote on Judge Claiborne's motion, but it later voted to convict him. 132 Cong. Rec. S15,760-62 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986). The Senate thus agreed with the House that private improprieties could be, and were in this instance, impeachable offenses. The Claiborne case makes clear that perjury, even if it relates to a matter wholly separated from a federal officer's official duties -- a judge's personal tax returns -- is an impeachable offense. Judge Nixon's false statements were also in regard to a matter distinct from his official duties. In short, the Senate's own precedents establish that misconduct need not be in one's official capacity to warrant removal. CONCLUSION This is a defining moment for the Presidency as an institution, because if the President is not convicted as a consequence of the conduct that has been portrayed, then no House of Representatives will ever be able to impeach again and no Senate will ever convict. The bar will be so high that only a convicted felon or a traitor will need to be concerned. Experts pointed to the fact that the House refused to impeach President Nixon for lying on an income tax return. Can you imagine a future President, faced with possible impeachment, pointing to the perjuries, lies, obstructions, and tampering with witnesses by the current occupant of the office as not rising to the level of high crimes and misdemeanors? If this is not enough, what is? How far can the standard be lowered without completely compromising the credibility of the office for all time? © Copyright 1999 The Washington Post Company Back to the top ----- Aloha, He'Ping, Om, Shalom, Salaam. Em Hotep, Peace Be, Omnia Bona Bonis, All My Relations. Adieu, Adios, Aloha. Amen. Roads End Kris DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER ========== CTRL is a discussion and informational exchange list. Proselyzting propagandic screeds are not allowed. Substance—not soapboxing! 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