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As always, Caveat Lector.
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K
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<A HREF="aol://5863:126/alt.conspiracy:480726">CIA Circle The Wagons</A>
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Subject: CIA Circle The Wagons
From: Ralph McGehee <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Thu, Jan 21, 1999 7:12 AM
Message-id: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
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CIRCLING THE WAGONS
A year or so ago there was a discussion about the real name of Edward
Shirley, a former CIA case officer using that pen name in authoring the
book "KNOW THINE ENEMY: A SPY'S JOURNEY INTO REVOLUTIONARY IRAN."
Monday's 1/18/99 New York Times included an op-ed by Reuel Mark Gerecht
wherein he identifies himself as that Edward Shirley.
"Know Thine Enemy" was highly critical of the leadership of the CIA's
Directorate of Operations.
I do not yet have a copy of Monday's op-ed but in an article by Tim
Weiner in the 8/30/98 New York Times, "Rethinking the Ban on Political
Assassinations," he mentions a former CIA officer, Reuel Gerecht and says
he wrote in the Wall Street Journal: "In the war against terrorism --
against those who are killing Americans -- The U.S. must be willing to
kill terrorist chiefs. The only way to stop Mr. Bin Laden is to kill him."
Selected quotes from KNOW THINE ENEMY:
At a CIA conference on Iran, one bright analyst... explained
the Iranian patronage system with finesse and subtlety....Not long before,
he'd had the misfortune of briefing senior case officers on Iranian
terrorism. He was shocked at how dull-witted they were. The Directorate of
Intelligence was in horrible shape, with first-rate bureaucrats and
second-rate analysts rising to the top....The Directorate of Operations
was, however, a "wasteland, a Mecca for know-nothing men...." Reading
Persian newspapers was a sure sign of questionable target love. One
Harvard-educated case officer, a rare breed in the 1980s CIA [remarked]
that most case officers view books as recognition signals for clandestine
meetings and not as something to read.
It is astonishing how Khomeni caught the West off guard. As Khomeni
was bucking the Pahlavi regime from his exile in France, Washington and
the New York Times unbelievably called the Ayatollah an enigma.
As clearly as Hitler in Mein Kampf, Khomeni had told the world his
intentions in [his book] "Islamic Government" and in mass-distributed
cassette recordings. An eminent professor of Middle Eastern studies had
tried to warn the CIA....The professor translated passages of "Islamic
Government" and sent them to Langley, but the CIA...in late 1978, after
the Shah was finished, finally paid for a translation of "Islamic
Government....When I arrived on the Iran desk, I found numerous unopened
copies stacked along the walls.
A successful operations officer had to learn to compromise. He had
to forgive mistakes, join the team, and not engage in unhelpful criticism.
Above all else, he couldn't rock the boat if he expected to rise....Too
many senior officers had gone unpunished for horrendous mistakes. To
respect channels in the CIA, seven times out of ten, was to be an
accomplice to mediocrity or fraud.
Good men were leaving the Agency in ever greater numbers. And good men
entering were rare. Long before [Aldrich Ames] the clandestine service
was falling apart. "The Directorate of Operations Iran desk officer
sent in 1985 to debrief Ghorbanifar, couldn't recognize the names of
senior Iranian officials..." The same officer remarked with pride that
he hadn't finished reading a book in four years....Within a few years,
despite numerous mistakes, he'd become the Acting Deputy Director of
Operations, America's most powerful master spy.
Soul-searching is a case officer's worst enemy. Case officers are
action oriented. They recruit, not analyze. [End quotes].
OTHER INFORMATION
Recently Admiral Crowe published his findings re the failure of
administration and intelligence to anticipate and warn about the
terrorist attacks on two embassies in Africa. A few months earlier
Admiral Jeremiah published a scathing review of the failure of
intelligence to predict India's explosion of nuclear devices.
It is interesting to reflect on just what impact these highly
critical reviews have on the Central Intelligence Agency. With
great assurance we can say all that happens is that the Agency
circles the wagons, makes no changes, and when the dust settles,
goes on as before.
Ralph McGehee
http://www.members.tripod.com/CIABASE/index.html
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Aloha, He'Ping,
Om, Shalom, Salaam.
Em Hotep, Peace Be,
Omnia Bona Bonis,
All My Relations.
Adieu, Adios, Aloha.
Amen.
Roads End
Kris
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