-Caveat Lector- >From Fed of am Scientists http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/crs-iraq-op.htm CRS Report ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Iraq's Opposition Movements Kenneth Katzman, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division March 26, 1998 Summary Many in Congress believe that the only way to blunt the term threat from Iraq is to remove Saddam from power, but the Administration is skeptical of new proposals to rebuild the opposition movement. The Iraqi opposition has been generally ineffective in shaking Saddam Husayn's grip on power, in part because differences within and between different dissident groups and with the regional backers of these groups. The conference report on the State Department authorization for FY1998-99, as well as the Senate version of S.1768, a supplemental appropriation, includes U.S. funds for opposition activities. This report will be updated to reflect legislative and other developments. Introduction1 During the latest crisis over access to suspected weapons production sites in Iraq, a growing number of foreign policy experts and Members of Congress have called for a long term U.S. effort to overthrow Iraq's President Saddam Husayn. These critics of current policy maintain that confrontations between Iraq and the United States and United Nations will flare repeatedly, and Iraq will pose a constant threat to its neighbors and the international community, as long as Saddam remains in power. Some Members, including Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott, Senator John McCain, and others, have said the Administration should look beyond the immediate crisis and consider steps including: recognizing a coalition of opposition groups as the legitimate government of Iraq; releasing Iraqi frozen assets to those groups; granting export licenses for the purchase of arms by those groups; lifting sanctions for those portions of Iraq controlled by the opposition; establishing an opposition Radio Free Iraq; extending no fly zones to cover the entire country; and barring Iraq from moving armor in all or parts of Iraq. The Administration has said it would continue to have ties to the opposition and look for ways to support it more effectively but that some of the above ideas are impractical. (For further information on Iraq, see Issue Brief 92117, Iraqi Compliance With Cease-f re Agreements; and Issue Brief 94049, Iraq-U.S. Confrontations. ) Postwar Attempts to Oust Saddam Both the Bush and the Clinton Administrations previously pursued unsuccessful efforts to topple Saddam Husayn. Many of the past difficulties are relevant to the current debate on whether or how to oust the Iraqi President. Prior to Desert Storm, which began January 17, 1991, President Bush called on the Iraqi people to overthrow Saddam. Opposition Shiite Muslims in southern Iraq and Kurdish factions in northern Iraq, heartened by the U.S. call (and probably anticipating U.S. support) launched all-out rebellions against Saddam and his Sunni Muslim-dominated regime2 within days of the end of the Gulf war (February 28, l991). The rebellion in southern Iraq spread northward and reached the suburbs of Baghdad, but Republican Guard forces gained the upper hand against the rebels by mid-March 1991, and the uprising there petered out. (Saddam had largely kept the Republican Guard out of the fighting in Desert Storm for the purpose of preserving his hold on power after the war.) The Kurds in the north, benefitting from a U.S.-led no fly zone established in April 1991, were able to carve out an autonomous enclave in northern Iraq, free of Iraqi troops and governmental presence. However, Iraq is an Arab state that would not accept Kurdish independence or leadership, and the 4 million Kurds in northern Iraq did not represent a major threat to Saddam's rule. According to press reports, in May 1991, about two months after the failure of the Shiite and Kurdish uprisings, President Bush notified Congress of an intelligence finding justifying new U.S. efforts to topple Saddam Husayn. Press accounts indicate that about $15 - $20 million were allocated to efforts to cultivate ties to military and security officials around the Iraqi leader in the hopes of fomenting a coup d'etat.3 The published accounts suggest that some funds might have gone to opposition Shiite, Kurdish, and other exiled opponents of Saddam, but that Bush Administration officials reportedly focused on promoting a narrowly-based military takeover. These officials reportedly believed that a military coup offered the best hope of bringing to power a more favorable regime while preserving Iraq's integrity. It was feared that Shiite and Kurdish groups, if they succeeded in ousting Saddam, would fragment the country into warring ethnic and tribal groups, and open Iraq to political and military influence from neighboring Iran, Turkey, and Syria. Saudi Arabia, in particular, was said to fear that fragmentation of Iraq could lead to the establishment of a radical Islamic enclave in southern Iraq, linked to Iran. An Opposition Coalition Emerges Although reports in July 1992 of a serious but failed coup attempt suggested Administration policy might ultimately succeed, the Administration appeared to shift strategy from promoting a coup to one of backing the diverse opposition groups that had led the postwar rebellions. Saddam's Kurdish, Shiite, and other opponents were coalescing into a broad and diverse opposition movement that appeared to be gaining support inside Iraq. Sensing an opportunity, Congress more than doubled the budget (to $40 million for FY1993) for the covert effort to oust Saddam and placed emphasis on support for opposition groups and clandestine anti-Saddam radio stations.4 The Iraqi National Congress (INC) served as the vehicle for U. S. support. The INC was formed when the two main Kurdish militias-the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) headed by Masud Barzani and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) headed by Jalal Talabani-decided to participate in a June 1992 meeting in Vienna of nearly 200 delegates from dozens of opposition groups. In October 1992, the major Shiite groups came into the coalition and the INC held a pivotal meeting in Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq, choosing a three man Leadership Council and 26 member executive council. The three leaders include moderate Shiite Muslim cleric Muhammad Bahr al-Ulum; ex-Iraqi general Hasan Naqib; and Masud Barzani. Although Bahr al-Ulum did not represent the more influential radical Shiite fundamentalists in the opposition, his selection was perceived as more palatable to the United States than the appointment of a fundamentalist. Selected to chair the executive council was Ahmad Chalabi, a secular Iraqi Shiite Muslim and mathematician by training, who previously was chairman of the Petra Bank in Jordan. The INC represented the first major attempt by opponents of Saddam to join forces, bringing together not only Sunni and Shiite Arabs (both Islamic fundamentalist and secular) and Kurds, but also varying political stripes including democrats, nationalists, ex- military officers, and others. In the aggregate, the major component groups in the INC appeared to have a substantial political base inside Iraq, a source of armed force (the Kurdish militias) and an enclave in northern Iraq from which to seriously challenge Saddam's rule. Its constituent groups were able to unite around a platform that appeared to match U.S. values and U.S. interests. The INC platform included establishment of "human rights and rule of law within a constitutional, democratic, and pluralistic Iraq;" preservation of Iraq's territorial integrity, and complete compliance with international law, 5 including U.N. resolutions relating to Iraq. All INC groups, including the Islamic fundamentalists, denounced the invasion of Kuwait, and the INC said it was committed to Kuwait's sovereignty. However, many observers have noted that the INC might not act as a democratic body if it came to power, because most of its groups have an authoritarian internal structure. Observers also believe the Kurds would seek independence or full autonomy from an INC-dominated Iraq. The INC stopped short of declaring itself a provisional government but it began seeking international support as a viable and democratic alternative to the Iraqi regime. The Kurds. Iraq's Kurds have been fighting for autonomy from the Iraqi government since the 1920s, shortly after their region in what is now northern Iraq was incorporated into the newly formed Iraqi state after World War I. In 1961, the KDP began an insurgency that has continued until today, albeit interrupted by periods of negotiations with Baghdad for Kurdish autonomy. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), split off from the KDP in the 1960s. The two Kurdish parties, which agreed to merge their fighters into a unified army of about 35,000, formed the backbone of the INC's military threat to Saddam Husayn. Shiite Islamic Fundamentalists. The Iraqi Shiite Islamic fundamentalists came into the INC under the banner of the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI). SAIRI was set up in 1982 to increase Iranian control over Shiite opposition groups in Iraq and the Persian Gulf monarchies. SAIRI has about 4,000-8,000 fighters, composed of Iraqi Shiite exiles and prisoners of war, operating against the Iraqi military in southern Iraq.6 Although SAIRI has distanced itself from Iran to some extent, Iran's Revolutionary Guard reportedly continues to provide it with weapons and training. SAIRI's close ties to Iran contributed to the failure of the Shiite uprising in southern Iraq after the 1991 Gulf war; most Iraqis do not want an Islamic government or to be controlled by Iran. SAIRI's leader, Ayatollah Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim was the late Ayatollah Khomeini's choice to head an Islamic Republic of Iraq. Ex-Iraqi Military Officers. The INC attempted to broaden its appeal by placing Hasan al-Naqib, a retired general in the Iraqi military, on its executive council. Naqib, a Sunni Muslim Arab, no longer has a major following in the Iraqi military but he was perceived to have some appeal to nationalist Arab Iraqis. He was Iraq' s military attache to the United States (1958-60) before the Ba'th Party took power in 1968 and commanded Iraqi forces present in Jordan during 1967-70. In that position, he argued for greater Iraqi aid for Palestinian guerrillas fighting King Husayn in 1970, and he broke with the Iraqi regime in 1978 to become a military adviser to the PLO. The Fragmentation of the Opposition The differences within the INC eventually led to its virtual collapse as a viable challenge to Saddam Husayn. In May 1994, the two main Kurdish parties began fighting with each other over territory, revenues obtained from duties levied at the Iraq-Turkey border, and control over the Kurdish regional government based in Irbil. To bolster their positions against each other, the two factions sought outside support. The KDP, always more amenable than its rivals to pursue autonomy negotiations with Baghdad, sought backing from Saddam Husayn. The PUK obtained a measure of support from Iran. The two Kurdish parties called on the INC as a mediator in their internecine disputes, but this task diverted the INC from its principal mission of fighting the regime. The Iraqi National Accord (INA). As a result of the growing difficulties within the INC, the United States began seeking out other opponents who could threaten the Iraqi regime.7 This search for alternatives to the INC clearly complicated the U.S. anti- Saddam effort. One group, the Iraqi National Accord (INA), headed by Iyad Alawi, consisted primarily of military and security officers who had defected from Iraq and who were perceived to have residual influence over military and security elites around Saddam. The INA's prospects for success appeared to brighten in August 1995 when Saddam's son- in-law Husayn Kamil al-Majid-architect of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs -defected to Jordan. The defection suggested to many in the region that Saddam's grip on power was weakening; King Husayn subsequently denounced Saddam and agreed to allow the INA to operate from Jordan. However, Iraq's intelligence services were able to penetrate the INA's dissident operations and, in June 1996, Baghdad arrested 100 military officers linked to the 1NA and executed 30 others. Alawi claims that INA sympathizers continue to operate throughout Iraq. Iraq's counteroffensive against the opposition was completed two months after the INA arrests. In late August 1996, the KDP asked Baghdad to provide armed support for its capture of Irbil from the rival PUK. Iraq took advantage of the request to strike against the INC base in Salahuddin, a city near Irbil in northern Iraq, as well as remaining INA operatives using northern Iraq as a base. In the campaign, two hundred oppositionists were executed and as many as 2,000 arrested. Six hundred fifty oppositionists (mostly INC) were evacuated and resettled in the United States under the parole authority of the U. S . Attorney General. The lNC has since been plagued by the dissociation of many of its constituent groups from the INC umbrella, a cutoff of funds from its international backers (including the United States), and continued pressure from Iraqi intelligence services.8 U.S. Policy Options Largely because of the past opposition failures, the Administration appears reluctant to embrace a policy of aggressive support for Iraqi opposition movements or other courses of action designed to remove Saddam from power. Although U.S. officials say they would like to work more effectively with the opposition, Secretary of State Albright said on February 26, 1998, in testimony before a Senate Appropriations subcommittee, that the opposition is fragmented and that it would be "wrong to create false or unsustainable expectations" about what U.S. support for the opposition can accomplish. National Security Adviser Samuel Berger said that renewed U. S. support for the opposition could present the United States with the unwanted choice of being drawn into a civil war in Iraq or abandoning its allies. The United States might also be placed in the position of supporting a successor regime that is not viable or does not have U. S. interests in mind. U.S. officials add that a Reagan Administration Executive order (EO 12333)9 bars U.S. attempts to assassinate a foreign leader, and that there are no plans to skirt or repeal that executive order in the case of Saddam. At the same time, and under pressure from Members who want to back the opposition, the Administration wants to keep open the option, real or apparent, of renewing support to opposition groups. Some believe that U.S. contacts with the opposition give the United States additional leverage over Saddam. Others believe that, even if the opposition does not overthrow Saddam, it could place pressure on his regime and tie him down militarily. INC members visited Washington in mid-February and were received by State Department and National Security Council officials, as well as Members of Congress. In their meetings, the INC asked for $100 million in new U.S. covert assistance in a plan to rebuild its presence in Iraq and, ultimately, declare a provisional government. If coupled with U. S. establishment of a country-wide no fly zone and total military exclusion zones in Iraq, the INC says it can precipitate wholesale military defections leading to the fall of Saddam Husayn. The INC representatives received no specific Administration commitments, according to observers. Some of the options suggested by Members of Congress, the INC, and outside experts have been under development within the Administration for use should the President decide to renew active support for the opposition. According to a New York Times report of February 26, 1998, since the inspection crisis began, the Central . Intelligence Agency has been drafting a plan that calls for INC supporters to attack key pillars of Iraqi political and economic power, such as utility plants and government media stations, and establishment of a "Radio Free Iraq''.l0 The plan does not appear to include the formation of military exclusion zones, which U.S. military planner believe would require extensive use of U. S . airpower to enforce. However, the Times report notes that the plan, which would cost tens of millions of dollars per year, has not yet been presented to the President for his approval, and that many Administration officials have deep doubts about its viability. The INC and their supporters also favor using $1.9 billion in Iraqi assets frozen in U.S. banks since the Gulf war in the campaign against Saddam Husayn. However, there are about $5 billion in U.S. claims for those assets, 11 and both the Bush and Clinton Administrations proposed legislation to distribute those assets to U.S. claimants. The legislation has not been enacted. U.S. claimants would be expected to strongly oppose efforts to use the frozen assets for purposes other than the payment of claims. (For more information on this issue, see CRS Report 98-240 F, Iraq: Compensation and Assets Issues. March 10, 1998, by Kenneth Katzman.) U.S. support for the opposition appears to have strong support in Congress, despite Administration doubts. The conference report on the State Department authorization for FY1998-99 (H.R. 1757) provides $10 million in direct aid to the opposition, and $5 million to establish a Radio Free Iraq under Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. On March 23, a bipartisan group of Senators succeeded in amending a supplemental appropriation (S.1768, funding the U. S. buildup in the Gulf and Bosnia peacekeeping) to provide $5 million in direct aid to the opposition and $5 million for a Radio Free Iraq. The monies would be available provided the Administration submits a plan to Congress, within thirty days of enactment, to aid the opposition and establish Radio Free Iraq. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ FOOTNOTES l Much of the information in this paper concerns U.S. covert operations. The information is derived from press accounts of those activities. CRS has no Bav to independently confirm the- press accounts of these operations 2 Shiites constitute about 60% of Iraq's population but have historically been repressed and under represented in governing bodies by the members of the Sunni Muslim sect. Kurds are about 15% of the population of about 20 million. 3 Tyler, Patrick. Plan On Iraq Coup Told To Congress. New York Times, February 9, 1992. 4 Sciolino, Elaine. Greater U.S. Effort Backed To Oust Iraqi. New York Times, June 2, 1992. 5 The Iraqi National Congress and the International Community. Document provided by INC representatives, February 1993. 6 Baram, Amatzia. From Radicalism to Radical Pmgmatism: The Shiite Fundamentalist Opposition Movements of Iraq, in Piscatori, James, ed. Islamic Fundamentalism and the Gulf Crisis. Chicago, Illinois: The Fundamentalism Project, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1991. Pp. 34-35. 7 An account of this shift in U.S. strategy is essayed in Hoagland, Jim. How CIA's Secret War On Saddam Collapsed. Washington Post, June 26, 1997. 8 Burgess, John and Ottaway, David. Iraqi Opposition Unable to Mount Viable Challenge. Washington Post, February 12, 1998. 9 This Executive order of December 4, 1981 superseded a similar directive issued by President Gerald Ford. 10 Weiner, Tim. CIA Drafts Covert Plan to Topple Hussein. New York Times, February 26, 1998. 11 These claims are not related directly to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf war. The latter invasion-related claims are handled through a separate U.N. process established specifically for the purpose of compensating the victims of Iraq's aggression against Kuwait. END >From Iraqi National Congress http://www.inc.org.uk/ The Iraqi National Congress Introduction The rule of Saddam Hussein has been a national tragedy of unprecedented proportions for Iraq and her people. Saddam's dictatorship has destroyed civil society in Iraq and brought the country to the brink of destruction. The Iraqi people manifested their absolute rejection of Saddam's regime in the Iraqi Popular Uprisings of 1991. The diverse forces of the Iraqi opposition have united in the Iraqi National Congress (INC) which embodies the true will of the Iraqi people. The INC is uniting all opposition forces to work towards the common objectives of saving the Iraqi people from their long national tragedy while at the same time ensuring the territorial integrity and independence of the nation under a democratic, constitutional, parliamentary and pluralistic structure. In order to accomplish these goals the INC presents a credible political alternative for all the Iraqi people without prejudice or differentiation and with full representation of all groups and communities within the population, including Sunnis, Shias, Kurds, Christians and all other minorities. The INC has developed a common stand on such questions as the political objectives of the opposition, Iraq's rights and responsibilities toward the international community, as well as the actual political and military strategy to remove Saddam's regime. The INC's immediate goals are to establish itself as a responsible and credible authority with a base on Iraqi soil, to provide for the humanitarian relief of the Iraqi people who are suffering intolerable conditions, and to enlist the support of the international community in the struggle against Saddam. With these objectives in mind, the INC began a series of meetings in the Middle East and Europe to establish a formal structure and to put in place a plan of action to remove the dictatorship. Meeting in Vienna, in June 1992, the INC elected a National Assembly of 87 members; this was expanded to 234 members at Salahuddin, in liberated northern Iraq in October 1992. The Salahuddin meeting was a historic event-- the first unified opposition meeting on Iraqi soil since Saddam and his Baath party seized power in 1968. The INC has established its headquarters in Salahuddin with its external base in London. The National Assembly has elected an Executive Council to manage the daily operations of the struggle against Saddam. The membership of the Executive Council comprises the full spectrum of regional and political groups in the Iraqi opposition, representing groups based in Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and other countries in the region and Europe. The INC National Assembly continues to stress the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 688 (1991) that demands the end of the repression of the Iraqi people, as well as UNSC resolutions 706 and 712 (1991) and 986(1995) calling for immediate humanitarian aid to the Iraqi people. The INC seeks the help of neighbouring Arab and Islamic states and the entire international community to support the will of the Iraqi people and help them end their long national nightmare. + + + + + + + + + + The Iraqi National Congress THE FUTURE OF IRAQ'S UNITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY The Iraqi National Congress Assessment The Iraqi National Congress is firmly committed to the sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Iraq within its present internationally recognised boundaries. Preservation of this commitment is an organising principle of INC policy and action. As a guide to the international community the following assessment of the state of the Iraqi nation is provided. I. DESTRUCTION OF DICTATORSHIP The single greatest threat to the unity and territorial integrity of Iraq is the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein. Saddam's regime has systematically destroyed the civil society upon which Iraqi nationhood is based, the economic and defensive capability by which the country is protected, and the respect of the international community through which its sovereignty is legitimised. Until Saddam's tyranny is replaced by the constitutional, parliamentary and democratic structure represented by the Iraqi National Congress, Iraq and her neighbors are at risk from factionalism, conflict, and chaos. A. Destruction of Civil Society �In order to consolidate his dictatorship, Saddam has systematically attempted to eliminate Iraq's civil society through arbitrary and extra-legal terror and ethnic and sectarian persecution. These brutal and calculated weapons of control are destroying Iraq's social cohesion, judicial structure, and national identity. Concerning the regime's judicial principles the United Nations Human Rights Commission reports: �"Testimony received by the Special Rapporteur continues to affirm that arbitrary arrest and detention are routinely practiced in [Saddam Hussein's] Iraq and remain a major contributing factor to the general climate of fear. "In [Saddam Hussein's] Iraq, neither is the due process of law generally respected nor is the rule of law upheld. On the contrary, information and testimony received reveals a consistent if not routine failure to respect due process. ...(T)he rule of law has been completely undermined. Rule proceeds from the personal whims and wishes of a few individuals who hold positions in the inner circle of the President [Saddam Hussein]. The horror and social chaos created by Saddam's terror and the total absence of responsible and impartial judicial authority is creating an Iraq where each person must rely solely upon themselves for survival. Surely there is no more direct prelude to national dissolution. In addition to the terror inflicted on the population at large, Saddam has specifically targeted particular ethnic groups for destruction in order to divide the Iraqi people and eliminate the natural cohesions of family and faith. In the north, the "Anfal" genocide directed against the Iraqi Kurdish population is well documented, including chemical attacks and mass executions numbering in the hundreds of thousands. In addition, the Turkoman population has been stripped of their Iraqi citizenship, robbed of their property and driven into exile. In the south, military attacks against civilians are commonplace and continuing. The ancient tribes of Iraq's southern marshes have been derided as subhuman and their environment systematically degraded. The majority Shia population have seen their clergy arrested and killed and their places of study, worship, and burial blasphemed. Over 200,000 Iraqi Shias have been denied their national rights and been driven into exile. Even in the regime's Baghdad stronghold, the cynical practice of division and discrimination is pursued -- witness the recent arrest of merchants on Saddam's momentary whim. Saddam's ethnic, sectarian, and arbitrary persecution is creating a society divided against itself, without national identity or purpose. Left unchecked, Saddam's policies will lead to the permanent division of Iraq into chaotic and uncontrollable social fragments and contributing to extreme regional instability. B. Destruction of National Resource Saddam's destruction of Iraqi civil society has been paralleled by his destruction of the national resources upon which it is based and from which Iraq draws its strength for national defence and economic progress. Through unsustainable and unwarranted military spending leading to pyrrhic regional aggression, Saddam has weakened Iraq's national security resources while correspondingly increasing the threats against the nation. This is a clear program for regional instability and conflict, endangering the survival and integrity of Iraq. Only by eliminating the megalomaniacal ambition of Saddam and redirecting the resources of Iraq towards economic progress rather than military ambition can our nation be preserved. C. Loss of International Recognition Central to the continuing existence of Iraq is the recognition of her sovereignty by the international community. Saddam's blatant disregard for international law has gravely jeopardised Iraq's legal and practical position. Most damaging to Iraq's international standing and recourse to international justice were Saddam's unprovoked aggressions against Iran and Kuwait in total defiance of the United Nations Charter. Yet despite the international condemnation these actions brought upon his regime, Saddam's defiance continues. United Nations Security Council resolutions, justly mandating the end of Saddam's repression, the elimination of his inhuman weapons of mass destruction and the restitution of Saddam's victims are being daily abrogated by the regime. Saddam is cynically destroying Iraq's sovereignty to maintain his dictatorship. Until a responsible government, based upon respect for the United Nations Charter and other applicable international law is returned to the Iraqi people, Iraq's sovereignty will inevitably be further compromised by international sanction. II. STABILITY OF DEMOCRACY The Iraqi National Congress is dedicated to the institution of constitutional, democratic, and pluralistic government in Iraq, guaranteeing essential human rights to all its citizens. Through the creation of such a societal structure the Iraqi people will again enjoy the protection of an independent and impartial judiciary, the development of a responsive and peaceful economy, and the cooperation of the international community -- the essential requirements of a united, sovereign, and respected nation. The INC's membership, comprising all elements of Iraqi society and enjoying the widespread support of the Iraqi people, is a visible demonstration of this vision for Iraq's future. Specific conditions which now apply to Iraq's national status being addressed by the INC include the need to restore a strong central government, guarantee regional autonomy through a federal structure, and work within the international mandates imposed upon the outlaw regime. Democracy is the only guarantor of stability for a diverse nation in a volatile region. �A. Stable Central Authority A strong central government based on the acceptance of the Iraqi people is the foundation of the Iraqi National Congress' plan for Iraq's future government. The federal system envisaged as a model for the internal government structure of a unified and pluralistic Iraq does not threaten this commitment. Rather than divide, federalism will unite, guaranteeing a strong central government with sovereignty over the whole of Iraqi territory. Under the federal structure proposed by the INC, specific matters of Iraqi sovereignty reserved to Iraq's central authority will include: control of Iraq's borders and all other aspects of Iraq's foreign affairs; control of the military and all other institutions of national defense; and control of economic powers, including monetary and fiscal policy. Only matters of local jurisdiction and regional and local interest will be granted to regional authority, thus assuring internal cohesion while protecting minority rights. A strong and democratic central government, delegating essential regional, minority and individual rights will ensure Iraq's internal stability to create unity through diversity.. B. Stable Rule of Law The governmental structure proposed by the INC is based upon equality before the law for all Iraqi citizens, constitutionally codified in a bill of rights and enfranchised through free and democratic elections. Only a specifically codified system of justice ratified by a fair democratic process can unify the disparate elements of Iraqi society in a common nationhood. C. Restoration of International Legitimacy The United Nations Security Council resolutions pertaining to the protection of the Iraqi people are the clearest manifestation of the importance of international law to the nation's future. In particular, UNSC resolutions 688 (1991), 706,(1991), 712 (1991), and 778 (1992) which prohibits Saddam from the continued repression of the Iraqi people and provide for their humanitarian relief are central to the INC program for national reconciliation and reconstruction. For this reason the INC supports the safe haven north of the 36th parallel and calls for the extension of the no-fly zone south of the 32nd parallel into a similar security zone. Rather than foreshadowing the partition of Iraq, these zones of free political activity and protection of basic liberties are the seedbeds of a new and democratic society where the common future of all Iraqis can be discussed and peacefully created without fear of attack and oppression. In liberated northern Iraq, elections have been held and a democratic and representative authority created. In the democratic space thus provided, the Iraqi National Congress has forged an united Iraqi opposition committed to constitutional, democratic and pluralistic government. Through conformity to international law as agreed to in the United Nations Charter and expressed by the United Nations Security Council, the democratic structure embodied in the Iraqi National Congress will preserve the unity, territorial integrity and sovereignty of a democratic and peaceful Iraq -- for the good of her people and in the interests of regional and world stability. III. CONCLUSION Saddam is destroying the Iraqi nation by division, oppression and aggression. The Iraqi National Congress is the only representative body expressing the political will of the Iraqi people in opposition to Saddam's dictatorship. Only through INC plans for the implementation of a constitutional, democratic, and pluralistic government structure, will Iraq's unity, territorial integrity, and sovereignty be preserved. ~~~~~~~~~~~~ A<>E<>R The only real voyage of discovery consists not in seeking new landscapes but in having new eyes. -Marcel Proust + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Forwarded as information only; no endorsement to be presumed + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107, this material is distributed without charge or profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this type of information for non-profit research and educational purposes only. DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER ========== CTRL is a discussion and informational exchange list. Proselyzting propagandic screeds are not allowed. Substance�not soapboxing! 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