-Caveat Lector-
Wow! I could barely read this, it's so thick with fnords.
An amazing piece of sophistry. I wonder how long ago it
was that they were recommending that the IMF give money
to Russia for exactly the same reasons they say not to now.
How do they market this Econmist (sic. see end)? "Comes with
its very own Memory Hole!"
G.
> -Caveat Lector-
>
>from:
>http://www.economist.com
><A HREF="http://www.economist.com/">The Economist </A>
>----
>
>Russia, financial outcast
>
>Russia has been in default since last August on most debts and will soon
>want more money from the West so it can roll over the rest. The West
>should say no
>
>Russia, financial outcast
>Russia in default
>Russia’s economy
>
>Search archive
>
>
>THE jar is all but empty, and once again Russia is looking to the West
>for more honey. Once again, the spectre of bankruptcy looms. Once again,
>Russia’s apologists present the prospect of the bear, once rebuffed,
>sinking even further into resentful degradation and nerve-racking
>unpredictability, and bristling all the while with nuclear missiles.
>This time, however, the rich countries should steel themselves and say,
>“Sorry, not until you’ve put your house in order.” Unless Russia gets a
>radically new economic regime, any further western money is likely to be
>squandered—at best used to prop up a system that does not work, at worst
>to find its way into the pockets of corrupt politicians, officials and
>businessmen.
So the system does work; and what percentage of the "corrupt
politicians, officials and businessmen" that it works for are
Russian?
>
>Since the rouble’s crash last August, many of the tentative gains of the
>preceding few years have been blown away. Misfortune has been piled on
>misfortune. Last autumn’s worst harvest in 45 years means that even
>bread may soon be in short supply. The price of oil, Russia’s main
>earner of foreign exchange, has tumbled. Investors, bruised by the
>collapse of Asian markets, do not wish now to be crushed in Russia.
"Tentative gains" - what kind of intangible thing is that?
And which of these misfortunes is Russia's fault? Of course!
The price of oil is so low because Russia sells so much oil.
They should stop selling oil - they'll make more money that way.
The
>inflation rate, judging by December’s figures, may rise to 100%, or even
>higher if the government decides to pay off wage arrears by printing
>money. As it is, many public-sector workers—teachers, for instance, who
>are supposed to get a princely $20 a month—have not been paid for a
>whole year. Much of Russia’s nascent middle-class has been pulverised.
"As it is" - implying that the action contemplated in the
first sentence will exacerbate the problem mentioned in the
second; in other words, if they print money to pay workers
then it will take even longer for workers to get paid. Very
sound reasoning: bring up the inflation bugaboo and Econmist
readers will believe any gibberish. Anyways, 100% inflation
would probably result in an economy which is more efficient
than one where household goods are bartered for food, and
even big companies barter because they can't afford to pay
taxes on money that they can't even borrow.
>
>The monetised economy is barely half the size of the Netherlands’.
Remember that: they have no money. We must not give them
any and they certainly musn't print any. That way they
can buy more.
The
>murder rate may be the world’s highest. Male life expectancy has fallen
>to African levels: 58 years is now the average life-span, and the
>population is contracting by 800,000 souls a year. The country seems to
>be dying on its feet.
>
>True, Russia now has in Yevgeny Primakov a prime minister who, as a
>former head of the KGB, is gathering power and has the experience to
>make use of it. But he is not a man with a vision of the future or the
>determination to make changes for the better, more someone to manage the
>country’s decline. With Boris Yeltsin yet again shoved to the margin by
>ill health, Russia has no presidential guidance. The federation
>threatens to fragment. It has no real leader, no moral compass, no
>tangible hope that things material will soon improve.
"Russia now has" - implying change. But the rest of the
paragraph confirms that things are exactly as before. But
Econmist subscribers are being prompted to change their
opinions and actions regarding Russia. Kick 'em while they're
down! It'll make you feel better for waiting until you read it
in the Econmist to pull out of Russia long after the pirates
have pillaged the investments the Econmist told you to make in
Russia.
>
>Mr Primakov has chosen the path of least political resistance, eschewing
>virtually anything that smacks of economic risk or reform. He has hired
>old sweats from the days of Soviet central planning to run the central
>bank and what passes for economic policy. He has salvaged a shred or two
>of national pride by continuing to behave awkwardly abroad. Above all,
>he has managed to avert civil strife, at least tempering Russia’s steady
>decline with a measure of political stability.
ROTFLMAO! Who says they don't learn from the West! All he has
to do now is have an affair with an intern. I wonder how Alan
Greenspan likes being thought of as an "old sweat."
>
>Soon Russia will face some big bills for the repayment of various loans
>(see article). It has no chance of paying them all without more
>borrowing. The argument for helping it out rests mainly on the belief
>that a refusal to do so could upset whatever equilibrium exists. A
>general default on debt, of which some $17 billion falls due this year,
>would mean Russia’s exclusion from the world’s financial markets. In the
>short term, Russia wants “only” $7 billion, partly to roll over
>repayments to the IMF that fall due throughout this year; it is not
>asking for budgetary support.
Phew! They're going to borrow money to pay back money that
they borrowed. At least they're not going to use it to pay
the workers and cause inflation. Then the workers would buy
less.
"A general default on debt... would mean Russia's exclusion
from the world's financial markets." So we'd better exclude
them from the world's financial markets before that happens.
>
>A bankrupted Russia, say those who would give it the money, would become
>an economic outlaw deprived of any incentive to co-operate on many
>issues, foreign and financial. It would turn its back on democracy. It
>could bully its neighbours with impunity. It would topple backwards into
>nostalgic communism or forwards into Slavophile fascism.
>
>Really? The benefit of the doubt that the West has repeatedly granted
>Russia on a range of questions, from abiding by IMF conditions to
>rooting out corruption or behaving better on such matters as Iraq,
>Kosovo and the sale of nuclear technology, has reaped but the scantest
>of rewards. Why should the record change? Mr Primakov, after all, is a
>past-master at reassuring the West of Russia’s good intentions at one
>moment and then abetting the West’s enemies at the next.
Would Slavophobic fascism be better? Maybe desperate, instead
of nostalgic, communism? Does the author get a bonus for
gratuitous adjectives?
Ex-KGB Primakov is a "past-master" at "abetting the West's
enemies." Because he was good at his previous job, then he
must be bad at his current job. Can someone explain those
syllogism thingies again -- they don't seem to be working for me.
>
>When the importuning has to stop
>
>Not that the West should turn its back on Russia for ever. It is still a
>land of magnificent opportunity. Once it has begun to create a workable
>financial system, a tax base, a set of laws that people respect and
>obey, above all a modicum of honesty in public and private dealing,
>western interest will revive. And even in the shorter run all is not
>lost. For all his faults, Mr Primakov has afforded his country a
>breathing-space. So long as the Russians’ extraordinary stoicism
>continues to put off a social explosion, their latest prime minister may
>succeed in carrying the country forward to two big elections—one
>parliamentary, the other presidential—which might provide it with a new
>lease of proper politics and leadership.
We've ripped off all the goodies. Let's abandon them until
they get more stuff we can steal.
"...a set of laws that people respect and obey" The stiff upper
lip of the classhole: "I don't care if you starve, but at least
have the common decency to obey the law while doing so."
"So long as the Russians' extraordinary stoicism continues
to put off a social explosion, their latest prime minister may
succeed in carrying the country forward..." Apparently by doing
nothing to relieve the burden which requires extraordinary stoicism.
And apparently for no other purpose than to pass the baton.
>
>The election to Russia’s lower house of parliament, the Duma, due in
>December, is likely to produce much the same bloody-minded mix of
>nationalists, communists and regional bigwigs as before. The
>presidential contest, due in June 2000 if Mr Yeltsin lasts that long, is
>more important.
>
>Here there is a flicker of hope. In the past, Mr Yeltsin’s adversarial
>heroics have saved the democratic day. But, since his re-election in
>1996, he has failed to build the consensus for reform that Russia’s
>rough system of largely presidential, partly parliamentary government
>crucially needs. Of those who might follow him—Mr Primakov (though he
>denies such ambitions); Moscow’s mayor, Yuri Luzhkov; and ex-General
>Alexander Lebed—none can win the presidency without building alliances.
>The sooner Russia has a proper president, the better.
Adversarial heroics: good.
Failure to build consensus: bad.
Likelihood of one without the other: nil.
"The sooner Russia has a proper president, the better."
How do you say 'el presidente' in Russian?
>
>In the meantime, the West can still do some good, even with the Kremlin
>in a sulk. It can continue to offer money to help decommission nuclear
>weapons and clean up the contamination they are causing. It can provide
>humanitarian aid, including cash for food and medicine, and give support
>to groups struggling to strengthen the press, the protection of human
>rights and other aspects of the building of democracy. It should pay for
>cohorts of young Russians to come to western countries to learn about
>decency in business. It can engage directly with Russia’s ever more
>powerful regions, rather than concentrate entirely on leaders and
>institutions in Moscow. And it should help neighbouring countries,
>whether democratic Balts or stumbling Ukrainians, to step out of the
>shadow of a menacing bear.
"[The West] should pay for cohorts of young Russians to come
to western countries to learn about decency in business."
But don't blame the westerners who went to Russia for teaching
them something other than decency in business.
Set the regions against each other and rebuild the Iron
Curtain on the Russian border; that'll make them feel more
secure. Can we get a rush on that decommisioning job?
>
>All of this would be evidence that the West was still ready to support
>the things it believes in. But a profligate dependency, with no will to
>reform, is not one of them. In the end, whatever help is offered, only
>Russians can make their country work. They may as well realise this
>sooner rather than later.
>
And how long ago was it that we wanted them to learn that
later rather than sooner?
>=====
>
>RUSSIA IN DEFAULT
>
>Money can’t buy me love
>
>M O S C O W A N D W A S H I N G T O N , D C
>Russia looks set to become even more of a financial outcast this year.
>Will it become a political outcast too?
>
>Bearish on debt
>
>Who is running
>Russia?
>
>Russia’s economy
>
>THE Russians have long aspired to join the G7, the group of leading
>industrialised countries. But now membership of another tightly drawn
>club of seven is looming: what might be called the “P7” group of leading
>pariahs that have borrowed money from the International Monetary Fund (
>IMF) and failed to pay it back.
>
>Last year’s financial crash, when the government defaulted on $40
>billion of rouble bonds, rocked the world financial system. Since then,
>the government has fallen behind on a further $1.5 billion due on the
>largest chunk of its dollar debts, which were inherited from the Soviet
>Union.
Communism is dead! Long live indentured servitude!
Worse is to come. Without more international help, Russia will be
>unable to pay $4.8 billion or so that is due this year to the IMF and
>World Bank.
>
>That would place the world’s sixth-most-populous country, a nuclear
>superpower and permanent member of the UN Security Council, in the
>company of Afghanistan, Liberia, Sudan, Iraq, Congo, Somalia and
>Yugoslavia (see chart 1)—poor, war-ridden places, some barely existing
>as states. It would also be an embarrassing failure for the western
>countries and institutions (chiefly America and the IMF) that have
>sponsored and financed Russia’s attempts at economic reform. Although
>their leaders argue now that matters would have been even worse without
>their help, the current economic mess far exceeds their worst fears in
>1991, when the loans and aid began.
The IMF didn't fail! Their policies are designed for third
world countries, so first they have to turn Russia into a
third world country. So far, so good.
>
>Down to the last kopek
>
>The arithmetic is depressing. Even the most optimistic bankers no longer
>expect Russia to pay the entire $17.5 billion in interest and principal
>that is due this year. Without further aid, even finding the $9 billion
>it needs to service the “untouchable” debt incurred since 1991 looks
>impossible.
>
>This reflects the poverty and weakness of the Russian state, rather than
>of Russia itself. The country’s annual current-account surplus,
>excluding interest payments, is a healthy $18 billion. But Russians’
>reluctance to invest at home, or hold their own currency, means that
>most of the inflow zips straight out of the country to Switzerland or
>Cyprus. Little reaches the tax collectors, or the central bank’s
>reserves (see chart 2).
Those darn Rooskies! It's a good thing foreign investors
don't try to get more money out of Russia than they put in.
Let's make some proposals to stem the currency outflow and
see how loudly the Econmist screams.
>
>Neither the government nor the central bank can pay Russia’s debts. Tax
>revenues last year were running at around $1 billion a month, less than
>those of New York city. The central government was spending $1.5 billion
>a month. Although tax collection is improving, there is no chance of
>finding $9 billion from that. And raiding the central bank will not help
>much. Only $7 billion of its $11.6 billion reserves are in cash; the
>bare minimum, to cover a month’s imports, is $4 billion. Were the state
>to drain central-bank reserves as well as sell gold and shares in
>state-owned energy companies, chiefly Gazprom, it would raise only some
>$4 billion. That is not enough to pay the IMF, let alone satisfy all the
>other creditors.
$4 billion is all they can raise from central bank reserves,
gold and Gazprom? At least they won't be tempted to take over
high-priced money losers like Amazon.com.
>
>The Russian budget for 1999 assumes that $7 billion will come from new
>international credits. Few find this plausible. Scorched by default,
>western bankers say they would rather eat nuclear waste than lend to
>Russia in its current state.
They may get their wish.
Foreign governments might lend a little,
>but only if the IMF and its sister organisations also stump up some
>cash.
>
>In the past, IMF money was always forthcoming. Whenever Russia has been
>in a scrape, a word of guidance from the American government to the
>world’s financial overseers has been enough to overrule bureaucratic
>scruples about wobbly public finances, the risk of theft and the slender
>chances of getting the money back.
If the American government co-signed the loan, then let them
pay it back. And nobody wants there money back, anyway: they
just want the Russians to keep paying the interest on it forever.
Nobody bases their decision on whether to invest in America
on the likelihood that America will pay off its debt.
>
>No longer. Perhaps belatedly, a new consensus now unites both the
>international financial institutions and their political masters in
>Washington: that without deep changes in the way Russia is governed,
>lending the country any more money is useless, or even harmful. There is
>no support in America’s Congress or in the White House for further
>loans. Those politicians who remain interested in Russia, such as Curt
>Weldon, a Republican congressman, urge a new focus. Mr Weldon wants to
>steer money away from central government, co-financing, for example,
>local mortgage-lending programmes. The West’s priority should not be
>bailing out the government, he says, but building a Russian middle
>class.
How can you have a middle class without any money? How can
you pay a mortgage without money?
>
>Unfortunately, this new American resolve is matched by a new, less
>sensible, consensus in Russia. Politicians in the country now believe
>that it is precisely IMF and western advice on such matters as budgetary
>stringency and privatisation that is largely to blame for Russia’s
>plight. The new rulers do not see why they should sweat to pay back
>loans that formed part of their predecessors’ failed experiment in
>“shock therapy” and “wild capitalism”.
The IMF and the West take credit for "budgetary stringency and
privatisation" and blame the Russians for "shock therapy and
wild capitalism." The shock therapy was budgetary stringency, and
the wild capitalism was privatisation.
Moreover, there is no appetite
>for painful structural reforms of the kind that the West believes are
>inescapable; the great achievement of Russia’s new government, which
>took office in September, is merely to have maintained a dismal
>stability. Things may get worse, goes the unspoken motto, but at least
>they will do so quietly.
I thought the "extraordinary Russian stoicism" was responsible
for stability; the government was attempting to succeed at
lasting long enough to get someone else to fail.
>
>A mission from the IMF is currently in Moscow. And Stanley Fischer, the
>IMF’s first deputy managing director, met Yevgeny Primakov, Russia’s
>prime minister, in Davos last weekend. Yet there is little sign of any
>meeting of minds. The Russian side finds the IMF’s insistence on higher
>taxes and lower revenues impractical and exasperating. The IMF finds the
>main assumptions in the budget—on the exchange rate, inflation, revenues
>and spending—ridiculous. It strongly opposes the government’s planned
>cut in value-added tax; it wants to see taxes collected in cash, rather
>than IOUs; it demands that the country’s corrupt and phoney banking
>system should be reformed; it wants a proper bankruptcy law, and market
>prices for energy and housing. Oh, and it wants decent treatment of
>other creditors too (see article).
Money meets in Davos; minds aren't required. The IMF wants
taxes collected in non-existent cash. They want market prices
for energy and housing. Sure. Throw everybody out of their
homes; they'll pay more rent that way. Maybe they'll even take
out a mortgage.
>
>Don’t care was made to care
>
>The immediate future is likely to be messy. There will be months of
>brinkmanship, during which Russia pays some creditors, at least in part,
>while keeping others at bay. Russia is constrained far more in theory
>than in practice, because the public and western banks and governments
>are proving remarkably stoical.
??? Is remarkable stoicism more powerful than extraordinary
stoicism?
>
>Surprisingly, perhaps, IMF debt looks to Russians like a softer target
>than Eurobonds. The first step against IMF defaulters is (wait for it) a
>telegram, and after two weeks a reminder. After a month, the IMF’s
>managing director informs the board members (who presumably have read it
>in the newspapers) that payment is overdue. After two months he formally
>complains to the board. After three months, the board may decide to
>suspend the offending country’s right to use IMF money. Subsequent steps
>towards infamy include a declaration of non-co-operation (after up to 15
>months), a suspension of voting rights and so forth. The full process
>can take years. Sudan has been in bad standing since 1990.
They can suspend the country's right to use IMF money, but
they can't get the money back? What do they do: record the
serial numbers? Do they charge interest on money they won't
let the country use? Has somebody told Bill that Sudan is
standing again?
>
>Such thunderous huffing and puffing from the IMF would be humiliating
>for any government that prized financial respectability. But set against
>Russia’s other choices it seems to allow plenty of time to sort
>something out.
>
>Indeed it may be a chance for a formerly communist superpower to show
>its frustration at the way the capitalist world is run. Mr Primakov
>loathes what he calls a “unipolar” world (meaning one dominated by
>America). In part, Russia views the IMF not as a global financial
>referee but as a tool of American economic hegemony. What could be more
>satisfying than to bend its rules by, say, missing a couple of payments
>and demanding an arrangement that no country but Russia could have hoped
>to obtain? “Primakov hates the idea of rules that apply equally to all
>countries. He wants special treatment for Russia on principle,” notes
>one of the architects of western policy towards Russia.
What rule is Russia breaking that all other countries are
complying with? Don't tell us, just accuse the Russians of
anti-Americanism. Americanism must be the primary factor
of Russian policy -- that's why they call their citizens Russians.
>
>Russia may therefore try to play off western powers against each other
>by, for example, exploiting European and Japanese edginess about
>America’s role in Russia. Mr Primakov might also honour debts from some
>western governments and the World Bank, which Russians see as rather
>softer creditors, but default on the IMF, with its tiresome conditions.
>If not a policy of divide and rule, it is at least one of divide and
>survive.
Well at least Europe and Japan are allowed to be edgy about
America's role in Russia, even if Russia is not. And Westerners
are allowed to play off Russia's regions against each other but
Russia is criticised for doing the same with distinct,
sovereign nations. What was that about rules that apply to
all equally? I guess "all" doesn't include hypocrites and liars.
>
>Some Russians also calculate that an IMF default will not do lasting
>damage. In December Russia is due to elect a new parliament; and in the
>middle of 2000, if not earlier, a new president. The West is impatient
>with the current crew and fed up with all the broken promises made by
>past Russian governments. Nevertheless, a new leadership in Russia could
>make pro-western noises (even Mr Primakov could one day tempt some
>economic liberals into his government). If so, the West might make a
>gesture of support—though Russians would be wrong to expect more than a
>token.
The West is fed up with broken promises, so they are eager to
hear some more. Non sequitur.
>
>So far, Russia’s approach is going down badly in the West. Those in
>Washington who deal with the Russian government complain that it treats
>the negotiations like a poker game, rather than a joint effort to rescue
>the economy. But cynics give Russia’s tactics a chance of succeeding.
>They note that the generous treatment received by Russia since 1991
>demonstrates that the IMF’s rules apply less consistently and harshly to
>a large country with nuclear weapons than they do to others.
A joint effort to rescue the economy for the sole benefit
of non-Russians. Cynic and skeptic are not interchangeable.
What American general compared American and Soviet foreign
policy by saying "They play chess; we play poker." ? Of course,
it's less dangerous to play poker with nukes than casino chips.
>
>Nonetheless, for a good part of this year Russia will be flirting with
>financial outlawry.
Flirting? Financial outlawry has been screwing them regularly
since before the Wall came down.
The crunch is likely to come in July, when a
>technical fluke makes Russia’s monthly payments to the IMF, for most
>months below $400m, suddenly shoot up to $1.2 billion. Until then, the
>betting is that Russia will pay everything but its debts to the London
>and Paris Clubs on time. After that, expect the telegrams to start
>flying.
>
>Believe in yesterday
>
>Being a financial pariah will do little further damage to the day-to-day
>functioning of Russia’s crippled economy. Barring an unlikely attempt by
>the West and the IMF to punish Russia further, the wheels of trade will
>continue to turn, oiled by letters of credit and export guarantees.
>
>Western firms determined to invest in Russia will continue to do so.
>(The well-connected may even be able to drum up support from their g
>overnments.) Although Russia will be cut off from the international
>capital markets, some parts of Russia, such as the city of Moscow and
>some oil companies, will still be able to borrow from western banks.
They'll be cut off. Except when they're not.
>
>The real danger is that isolation will postpone even further the day
>when conditions in the country will improve. Integration with the world
>economy has enabled the most successful post-communist countries, such
>as Hungary and Estonia, to begin to repair the damage of the past five
>decades. Cut off from foreign capital, Russia faces years of poverty and
>stagnation. That means misery, danger and waste: sickly, brutalised
>children; monstrously run asylums; crowded, plague-ridden prisons; leaky
>nuclear installations; rampant organised crime and corrupt officialdom;
>the erosion of cultural life and the education system; and the decline
>of civil liberties.
So they'll be no worse off than they are now.
>
>All these stem from the financial and moral weakness of the state. A
>government that cannot tax its powerful citizens is in no position to
>protect its weakest ones. Even in the best case, changing this would
>take decades. Yet before the August crisis, there had been signs of
>hope. There was a growing middle class, particularly in larger cities.
>
>The needs of the poorest were beginning to be met by a thriving, if
>tiny, voluntary sector. Some Russian businesses had revealed glimmerings
>of respect for shareholders, staff and customers. Higher standards were
>encouraged by a growing foreign business presence—which, miraculously,
>paid its taxes. Even some bits of the public sector were behaving
>better.
"...thriving, if tiny," --Contradiction.
Foreign businesses have money. It would be miraculous if
Russian businesses paid their taxes. Or do they mean that it's
not common practice outside of Russia for foreign businesses to
pay taxes?
>
>Now the prospect is of almost unrelieved gloom. The economy is
>shrinking, and most Russians think their lives will get worse before
>they get better. That threatens others too, because Russia’s pollution,
>crime and disease will inevitably cross its frontiers. Moreover, the
>prospect of a fascist, feudal, or thieving government in charge of
>thousands of nuclear and other weapons now seems less remote. “The
>world’s second-largest nuclear power is falling into the hands of people
>who will do absolutely anything for money,” argues David Satter, a
>Washington-based Russia-watcher.
Those second-largest guys are always copying the largest.
The dream of a strong, friendly Russian
>government shouldering its share of the world’s problems is sunk.
Would you be strong and friendly if you were shouldering
the problems that Russia is?
>Yet this dream lay behind the whole thrust of western policy, first
>towards Mikhail Gorbachev’s Soviet Union and, later, towards Russia. The
>West supported democrats and reformers (sometimes with its fingers
>crossed), in the hope that their virtues would rub off on their country.
And they did.
>
>In reality, the results were dismal. Pro-western politicians in Russia
>turned out to be at best politically inept, at worst corrupt. Their
>failure has been matched by a collapse in the moral standing that the
>West gained among Russians when communism fell. Not for two decades have
>Russians been so mistrustful and cynical. The epitaph on the West’s
>policy to Russia, says Gordon Smith, a Republican senator involved in
>foreign policy, is “money can’t buy me love”.
Prostitution is one of the few thriving businesses in Russia.
>
>So what happens now? The West has dramatically scaled back its
>ambitions. Rather than pursuing grand dreams of making Russia friendly
>and prosperous, America is tossing it $300m to keep its nuclear industry
>together, while proceeding with its own anti-missile defences. Russia is
>all but ignored in the Gulf and the Balkans. NATO is expanding
>eastwards. Trade and investment are now concentrated mainly on Russia’s
>vast energy industry, rather than trying to transform Russian business.
>
>This approach has not been exhausted. The West could, for instance,
>trade more with Russia, by opening its markets.
The peasants have no money for bread.
Let them buy cake.
There could be detailed
>work with competent Russian regions and institutions. Competition
>between regions for foreign investment has already yielded some positive
>results, as in Novgorod, a region outside St Petersburg, where tax
>breaks and a business-friendly governor have attracted Russia’s biggest
>cluster of foreign investment in light industry. All the same, so long
>as Russia’s misery endures, the West’s grim, unambitious task will be
>restricted to doing what it can to limit the damage.
>
>© Copyright1999 The Econmist Limited. All Rights Reserved.
^^^^^^^^
I thought it seemed a little hazy.
Is this really how it appears on the web page?
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