-Caveat Lector-
An excerpt from:
Merchants of Grain
Dan Morgan�1979,1980
Penguin Books
ISBN 01400.5502 9
--[2]--
2
Bread and Dynasties
"Our business fills a great human and economic need."
-LEOPOLD LOUIS-DREYFUS, 1912
One of the -traders busily trying to sell grain to Exportkhleb in that summer
of 1975 was a short, husky-voiced man who usually dressed in a rumpled pin-
striped suit. If anybody had caught up with Gerard Louis-Dreyfus on his
travels and asked him what made him run, he would not have said "profit" or
"cash flow" or "corporate growth," as most other businessmen would. He might
well have answered as had his great-grandfather Leopold, the most
spectacularly successful of the nineteenth-century merchants of grain.
Satisfying "a great human and economic need" has been the rationale for
merchants through time. It has always justified their explorations,
adventures, and fortune seeking, just as it has been said to excuse their
wealth, opulent life-styles, and (from time to time) exalted places in
society. "Merchant princes" moved in the company of the well Born because they
had proven qualities of boldness, and skills in trade that were essential to
the perpetuation of the wealth and power of the nations in which they lived.
At the end of the eighteenth century a human need requiring the services of
merchants developed on a scale that had never been experienced before in
history. The need was for bread. By 1800, England was a country that ran on
coal and wheat; bread had become the established food of the Industrial
Revolution, the staple of populations drawn away from their usual food supply
on farms and in villages. British millers turned to the new American nation
and, imported flour from Baltimore and Richmond. Wheat and oats came from
Sweden and Poland. But it was the surpluses that began to be produced in the
remote hinterlands of the Black Sea that often made the difference between
misery and sufficiency in Europe's crowded communities of urban workers.
The first masters of this early wheat trade were Greeks. Greek traders and
shipowners had been active for centuries all across the eastern Mediterranean,
where they also acted as agents for British and French commercial companies
and manufacturers. Eventually, the most prominent of these adventurer-
traders�families such as the Rallis-set up their own offices in London and
took control of the British trade to and from Constantinople, Smyrna, and the
Levant. From there it was an easy leap to Odessa, the new city that was
becoming a wheat port at the edge of the Black Sea.
It was an odd Russian city, in many ways, less severe in its climate,
architecture, and mood than most others. The polyglot merchant community,
drawn there by wheat, gave Odessa in the early nineteenth century its special
character as a somewhat rakish Riviera enclave in Imperial Russia. Along with
the Greeks were Italians, Slavonians, Triestians, Genoese, French, Germans,
Englishmen, and Spaniards. Italian, first spoken there by the Tuscan merchants
who came to obtain grain for their native province, was the lingua franca of
the city. Street signs in Italian as well as Russian pointed the way to broad,
tree-shaded boulevards where the most successful of the wheat entrepreneurs
built their villas.
The town had grown rapidly, encouraged in its expansion by Empress Catherine
the Great, who had hastily tried to consolidate the southern territories won
by Russia in its battles with the Turks in 1774. As the Turks were driven out
of their strongholds along the Black Sea and in the Crimea, Catherine had
invited colonists to settle the land. Russian landlords, aspiring to a lordly
life-style, built manors and brought in serfs to farm vast acreages. Along
with them came Swiss, Germans, Serbs, Bulgarians. In 1794, Catherine had
founded Odessa. By the turn of the century, oxcarts full of wheat were
clattering down the rutted roads through the bleak steppe to the port, first
by the hundreds, then by the thousands, and finally by the tens of thousands.
At the marketplaces, the peasants sold their wheat (and sometimes their oxen
and oxcarts, too, for tallow, hide, and firewood) before returning to their
villages.
There was little place for the surplus to go, except abroad. Odessa lacked
flour mills or processing plants, and the sparse population of southern Russia
did not require wheat in such great volumes as was coming off the estates and
farms. This rising tide of wheat and oats out of the Black Sea region, managed
by Mediterranean merchants, was the first major grain passage to develop from
the bread revolution.
It was something quite new in human history. Grain, to be sure, had always
been traded and distributed over long distances. Wheat had been on the move
since the first primitive strains were cultivated in the Middle East in 70M
B.C. and began to spread slowly around the world. Wheat was carried to Egypt,
to northern Mesopotamia and Iran-and then on to China and India. Migrating
-people and traders took it up the Danube River valley into Europe in the
fourth millennium B.C. Somewhat later, traders traveling by sea in search of
copper and tin brought wheat to Spain and Italy.
Russia in the twentieth century and England in the nineteenth were not the
first great powers to experience food deficits. Neither Rome nor Greece was
self-sufficient in ancient times. Roman landowners tended to give over their
fields to sheep or cattle, leaving the empire dependent upon grain sent as
tribute from its annexed or conquered territories: Sicily, Spain, North
Africa, Gaul, Brittany, and Egypt. In the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.,
Athens often depended on the grain trade for its nourishment. Spartan armies
invaded Attica in many summers and destroyed the wheat, barley, orchards, and
vineyards. To Socrates, one mark of a statesman was the knowledge of how much
wheat was needed to feed the population of Athens.
The grain trade then, and for many centuries afterward, depended on financiers
ready to put up the money to buy the goods, a shipowner prepared to carry
them, and a merchantadventurer. The merchants of Athens (and of other
Mediterranean ports later on) had little or no capital of their own. They
accepted credit from bankers, chartered a ship, and often rode along on the
dangerous voyages to be on hand to pay for the grain in person. This did not
mean that the grain always reached its destination. Piraeus was called
"thieves' harbor" because, rightly or wrongly, many of the merchants around it
were suspected of "rascality and ill-will."*[* George Calhoun in Business Life
of Ancient Athens. Calhoun describes a merchant-adventurer called Parmeniscus
who bought corn in Egypt but en route home to Athens received a message from
his partner, Dionysodorus, that grain prices were failing there. Parmeniscus
sold the grain in Rhodes, and for a while, until his bankers got wise, he used
the money borrowed from them to carry on a lively grain trade between Egypt
and Rhodes.] Along with the upright merchants were swindlers who diverted
cargoes from their rightful destinations to ports where they commanded a
higher price, regardless of the need for food supplies back home.
Much later, as European populations grew, Mediterranean merchants performed
remarkable feats of moving grain to combat the recurring famines. Florentine
merchants handled ten thousand tons of Sicilian grain a year in the fourteenth
century. At the end of the sixteenth century, when Tuscany suffered famines,
the grand dukes of Tuscany, Venice, and Genoa organized flotillas that brought
tens of thousands of tons of grain from the Baltic and Black Seas; and ports
such as Livorno (Leghorn) rose to prominence as grain depots for the central
Mediterranean. Merchants rose to such occasions, for mercy missions also
turned a profit. But these were spectacular feats rather than the everyday
work. The lifeblood of the early traders was the commerce in the superfluous
luxuries for which the rich would pay: chocolate, coffee, tea, tobacco,
spices, sugar, ivory, and indigo.
Until the late eighteenth century, familiar commoditieswheat for bread, cotton
for cloth (most cloth then was made of wool), and tallow for candles-scarcely
were traded internationally. Fernand Braudel estimates that in the late
seventeenth century, no more than three bushels 'of grain out of every one
hundred consumed in Europe were grown in another country. And even as
civilization expanded, grain was usually cultivated, distributed, and consumed
all within a few miles-within the distance that a farmer could haul his grain
on an ox-drawn cart to the village mill. Snowy white bread-the "Queen's
bread," as it was called when Maria de Medici ate it-was food only for the
wooden bowls and pewter plates of noblemen and wealthy burghers. The poor ate
mostly coarse gruels, soups, porridges, lentils, chick peas, and sometimes
even "flour" from acorns.
By 1800, however, bread eating was on its way to being democratized. The
milling technology for making fine, white flour free of hulls and bran had
been introduced widely. France had founded the first school of baking, in
1780. Bread was a staple food for the workingman and his family, detached as
he was from his old village or farm. Workers in Paris, London, and Manchester
in 1800 paid half their wages for bread alone. Eating bread was a badge of
attainment and social status. Once achieved, it was Pot easily given up, as
governments invariably found when they took administrative measures to lower
the quality of bread to conserve wheat.
It was no coincidence that the century in which bread eating finally extended
downward to all elements of society in western Europe (even to paupers in the
poorhouses and orphanages) was also the century of revolution. Riots in France
in 1789 began in the towns, where bread was in short supply, and a reduction
in bread prices was the result. An adequate wheat supply was, therefore, a
prerequisite of social order and political stability. Towns and cities were
filling up with people who had to live on. the surplus. But often the only
surplus was in the distant wheatgrowing corners of the world.
This was the social and political imperative behind the rapid increase in the
international cereal trade of the nineteenth century. By the middle of the
century, Greeks were sending their sailing vessels beyond Odessa into the Sea
of Azov to collect wheat that was being cultivated farther east, in the Volga
River basin and even beyond, at the western edges of Siberia. Along with the
wheat came oats for the horse population of London, barley for brewing and
animal feed, and the hard durum wheat that produced the yellow flour for
Italian pasta.
>From the beginning, it was a wide-open, disorganized trade, requiring iron
nerves. All the natural and human hazards that are present in the twentieth
century were also evident in the early stages of the modern grain trade. The
weather was a constant source of uncertainty. Droughts destroyed some crops,
while in other years the harvest was so abundant that the farms tacked
adequate manpower to cut, bind, and thresh it and transport it to market. One-
third of the south Russian grain crop of 1845�the year of the Great Hunger in
Ireland-was left in the fields because of lack of manpower to harvest it. Good
crops in other parts of Europe could depress the prices of Russian wheat. The
prices of wheat and barley at Danzig, the port for grain grown east of the
Oder River in the lands partitioned to Poland in the 1790s, often set the
wheat price in England. Also, there was competition from oats out of Sweden,
where British merchants financed granaries with their own capital.
Government policies, ranging from embargoes to import duties, also created
hazards for the early traders. Emperor Nicholas I forbade wheat exports during
the Crimean War, for fear that the cargoes would fall into the hands of the
enemy. This embargo caused a panic in Tuscany, which had come to rely on
Russian grain, and wheat was imported into Italy from Spain to replace it.
All of these uncertainties affected price.
Odessa merchants usually shipped wheat to England without any idea of the
price-it would fetch when samples of it finally were laid out on tables in
London's Mark Lane several months later. The grain was dispatched unpriced�"to
arrive"�which meant that -it often was floating on the high seas, en route. to
western Europe, without a customer. It was not even certain that the wheat
could enter England, for import embargoes could be put on and taken off within
a few weeks, depending on the price that British farmers were receiving for
their own grain. The British trade laws of 1815, designed to protect home
farmers, forbade imports of any wheat when the domestic price dropped below a
fixed sum. Bumper crops, drought, flooding, poor harvest conditions,
transportation breakdowns-these events in England, all beyond the control of
the Black Sea merchants, nonetheless affected their fortunes, and those of the
peasants and landlords on the steppes.
Information, good communications, and mobility could overcome some of the
risks, and the Greeks set up an elaborate, farflung system to reduce the
hazards. Constantinople, on the Bosphorus, overlooked the sailing vessels
passing from Odessa to the Mediterranean and thence to north European ports.
Not surprisingly, it became an intelligence center for the wheat trade. From
Constantinople, Greek merchants dispatched samples taken from the vessels
overland to their London agents, who sold the cargoes direct to millers on the
basis of the samples. When the captains put in at Cork or Falmouth, they
received orders to proceed directly to the customer's unloading port. The
Greeks excelled at this trade. They swarmed all over the Baltic Exchange,
already then the clearing house for news about grain and shipping. The Greek
presence even caught the attention of that omniscient observer of British
economic institutions, Karl Marx, who wrote in 1853: "How important ... the
Black Sea trade generally is becoming, may be seen at the Manchester Exchange,
where dark complexioned Greek buyers are increasing in numbers and importance
and where Greek and South Slavonian -dialects are heard along with German and
English."
>From the mid-eighteenth century onward, Britain's farms had made heroic
efforts to keep up with the increasing food demands of the growing cities and
towns. Wheat cultivation spread rap-idly across England (replacing rye in
many places) as a result of improved farm equipment and farming methods. But
although farm modernization progressed, England encountered the same
experience that Japan and Russia were to know one century later. Agriculture
could not keep up. In 1846, the British Parliament finally conceded defeat and
repealed the protectionist Corn Laws.*[* In England, "corn" refers to all
grain.]
This was one of modern history's great political dramas, and it was made more
compelling because of its background of human misery: the Irish potato famine
that began when blight struck the potato fields in 1844. More expensive bread
was the price that urban British workers had been paying for protection, but
the system favored the interests of the farmers and landed aristocrats who
made up the backbone of Prime Minister Sir Robert Peel's conservative party.
In 1845, however, Peel decided that the starving Irish would have to be fed on
foreign grain and that the impediments of the Corn Laws complicated this task.
His decision to import American corn as a relief measure in 1845�"Peel's
brimstone," it was called-was denounced for its potentially depressing impact
on grain prices; but Peel felt that as long as the Corn Laws existed, such
government relief was the only salvation for the starving. Peel succeeded in
getting the repeal of the Corn Laws through Parliament, though it wrecked his
political career and may not have helped the Irish. As the famine continued,
with Peel out of office, free trade functioned in Ireland-on the export side.
Cartloads of wheat, barley, and oats moved steadily off the farms and. into
ports, past potato fields stinking and blackened by blight. It was not the
grain. trade that was at fault, but the social and economic structure of
Ireland. Tenant farmers paid rent to their landlords with oats and wheat; many
preferred to starve instead of perishing in ditches after being forcibly
evicted from their hovels for nonpayment of rent.
But Parliament, with its stroke of repeal, had changed the world. Repeal of
the protectionist system had opened England to the wheat of all the world,
created incentives for the settlement of vast territories across the oceans,
and established the conditions for modem international trade, with new sea
routes and modem trading empires.
It was not surprising that many of the new masters of this trade grew up in a
narrow strip of western Europe extending along the Rhine River and, beyond, to
Switzerland and Marseilles. The Rhine was Europe's greatest commercial artery.
To the north were Antwerp and Rotterdam, two ports with access to the Atlantic
Ocean. Along it, merchants, brokers, grain warehousemen, millers, and shippers
functioned at Duisburg, Mannheim, Basel, and other trading centers. Barges
carried flour and wheat in both directions. Its tributary, the Main River,
reached toward southeast Europe-toward the Danube cities of Vienna and
Budapest and toward the southeast European wheat basin. So it was natural that
the Rhine and its environs would spawn more than their share of merchants. Of
the five global grain firms that dominate the market today, three grew up in
this crossroads of trade in the last half of the nineteenth century. The
Fribourgs of French Lorraine, the Louis-Dreyfuses of Alsace, and the Bunges of
Antwerp all went into the grain trade. A fourth dynasty began not far away.
Georges Andre came down from his tiny Swiss mountain village of Sainte-Croix
in 1877 and started a grain business at Nyon that was still thriving all over
the world a century later.
It was also logical that many of the nineteenth-century traders, like the
Fribourgs and the Louis-Dreyfuses, were Jews. European Jews, always a
minority, were often prohibited from owning land or joining the army or civil
service. They gravitated, understandably, to trade and finance. Jews were
bankers and givers of credit; it was a natural step from giving farmers credit
to buying their grain. Grain, the "currency of currencies," was good as gold
in most times. Their close-knit family ties were also an asset in the grain
trade, just as they were for Greeks, Quakers, and other minorities who
prospered in the business. Grain trading was becoming a long-distance
enterprise, requiring the confidence that some newcomer in the firm would not
take advantage of a situation and run off with the money, or squander it
speculating on his own account. It was prudent to keep things in the family as
much as possible.
Little has been written about these old families, but it is evident from what
knowledge we do have that many of the qualities that distinguish them today
were already characteristic in their earliest days.
Georges Andre, in his early years, stayed put in Switzerland, letting his
frugality and his talent for clever calculation do his work for him. The son
of a watch assembler, he handled his business with all the serious attention
to detail his father might have given to the springs of some delicate
timepiece. He was a strict Calvinist who lived simply and austerely. When he
died in 1942, at the age of eighty-six, he had never been in an airplane or
owned his own automobile. But in him, as in many of his countrymen, there was
more dash and daring than met the eye. His first successful venture was a
shrewd speculation. Using some of his father's capital, he bought Russian hard
durum wheat for macaroni and dumplings. The grain was unloaded. at Marseilles
and railed up to Switzerland. Swiss farmers did not grow "pasta" wheat, but
there was a demand for it; Andre's Russian wheat undersold the bread wheat
from Swiss farmers, and still made him money.
The Fribourgs, on the other hand, were a wandering, mysterious clan with a
flair for a spectacular flourish. At the end of the eighteenth century, they
lived in Metz, in French Lorraine. in 1813, Simon Fribourg was in Arlon,
Belgium, running a small grain business. By 1870, Simon's grandson Arthur had
moved to Antwerp and was building flour mills in Luxembourg and Belgium. In
between, Simon's son Michel satisfied his wanderlust with a dangerous journey
through the Balkans. In the 1840s, when there were food shortages in northern
Europe, Michel Fribourg, carrying sacks of gold, went out on behalf of
millers and importers to buy wheat in Bessarabia. He dodged highwaymen and
armed Turks�and he came back with receipts for the grain. In the nineteenth
century, the Fribourgs were still brokers-middlemen between importers and
merchants. They earned commissions on grain sold on behalf of others who took
the risks of owning grain. It was not until the next century that the
Fribourgs'
itinerant spirit and bent toward adventure were to assert themselves fully.
When Leopold Louis-Dreyfus started out in the grain business in 1850 he was
not much different from the Russian peasants who were then carting their wheat
to market in Odessa. Leopold, who had twelve older brothers, perceived that
future opportunities on his father's farm in Sierentz would be limited. In
1850, at the age of seventeen, he piled sacks of locally grown wheat on a cart
and set out for Basel, eight miles away across the Swiss border. The Swiss
city, pinched into a crevice between France and Germany on the Rhine River,
was a crossroads for the whole continent. The towers of its red-painted Gothic
Rathaus looked out at barges plying the Rhine. And Leopold, mingling with the
farmers, townsmen, and traders in the marketplace after selling his wheat, had
his eyes opened to the world. Two years later, in 1852, he left home for good
and established his own grain business in Basel.*[* * Louis Dreyfus
headquarters in Paris uses "Sierentz" as its cable address to this day.] Soon
he also joined the stream of wandering merchants, extending his buying
excursions to Bern, and later to central Europe.
It was-natural that he was drawn eastward. Budapest, which got its wheat from
the flat, rich plains of the Banat and the Vojvodina extending northward from
Belgrade, was the flour-milling center of the world (though its supremacy was
soon to be challenged by Minneapolis). Uprisings were rapidly driving the
Turks out of the Danube River basin, and the rich peasantry of Moldavia and
Wallachia (in what today is Romania) began to supply London and Liverpool,
rather than Constantinople, with grain.
When Leopold reached Odessa sometime in the 1860s, the Greeks who had once
dominated the business on the Black Sea were in decline. By then, new wheat
sources in America had made the importers less dependent on Russian wheat and
on the Greek merchants who controlled this source of supply. Larger volumes of
grain, and the needs of merchants to own their own warehouses, docks, and
ships in order to stay competitive, had increased the requirements for large
amounts of capital. The British, French, and German merchants who began to
take over in Odessa had the advantage of financial backing from their home
banks. As the risks and hazards of the still speculative and volatile wheat
trade grew, so did the need for credit to maintain liquidity when wheat
markets were depressed-as they often were as more sources of wheat became
available. British trading companies such as Ross T. Smythe and W. H. Pim
expanded into Russia and the Balkans in this period. British merchant
companies also laid off some of the risks of wheat by diversifying into
insurance, land investment, copper, oil, lumber, cement, and salmon fishing in
the western United States. Greeks had no such advantages, and when the wheat
trade went global, their influence waned.
It did not help that English importers began, in midcentury, to complain of
inferior quality in the Russian shipments. Sharp practices abounded among the
merchants who operated in Odessa in the interim period 1850-70 after the
decline of Greek influence. One chronicler, Max Winters, wrote that "one can
hardly say that one quarter of the traders have the desired moral qualities�or
adequate capital." Russian wheat's reputation in Liverpool diminished. The
middlemen in Odessa blamed it on the shoddy farming practices of newly
emancipated (1861) serfs; the producers said that the merchants mixed dirt,
stones, and worthless filler in the shipments abroad.
But Leopold Louis-Dreyfus assessed these difficulties as temporary. There was
still a strong market for Russian wheat (Russia remained England's principal
source for grain until 1874), and I million cartloads reached Odessa in 1866.
With the completion of the railroads connecting wheat ports such as Odessa and
Rostov on the Don with the hinterlands, Leopold foresaw opportunities for
expansion. He invested the capital he had acquired through his own trading,
borrowed from French financiers in Paris to purchase grain elevators, and sent
his own agents to the countryside to purchase grain on the spot. In 1870, he
began importing Russian wheat into Marseilles. Soon thereafter he was
marketing grain through a network of offices in Hamburg, Bremen, Berlin,
Mannheim, Duisburg' and Paris.
In the process, he left behind every trace of his humble origins in the muddy
streets of his Alsatian village. He cut an imposing figure, with his sparkling
eyes peering out above a large square black beard. In Leopold there was none
of the peasant's humbling himself before his betters. Leopold was a self-
assured merchant, with the air of an aristocrat. He must have been one of the
most upwardly mobile entrepreneurs of his times. Leopold made a close friend
of King Carol I of Romania, and he charmed as well the king's English-born
wife, the poetess Carmen Sylva�so much so that he became a councillor at the
Romanian court. It is not hard to see the reasons, in addition to his charm,
why Leopold, together with a few other merchants, was so favored by Balkan
royalty. Carol I depended on merchants to market Romanian agricultural
products, particularly the Romanian corn that was the best and highest-
yielding in Europe. To the king, agriculture was a source of wealth to be
tapped to pay for the financial, industrial, and urban development to which he
gave precedence.
The policy unabashedly exploited the peasants. There was nothing unusual about
that. As in the case of coal, the other essential resource of nineteenth-
century industrialization, the producers were the last to derive the benefits
of the dirty work. It had been so in Poland and Ireland in the eighteenth
century; it was so in Russia in the nineteenth century; and it was to be so,
as well, in Argentina. In 1907, an embittered Romanian peasantry, driven by
neglect and a desire for land, rose up in revolt, and before Carol I had
regained control, 10,000 Romanians had died. Afterward, Romania continued to
export corn. Three years before the revolt, in 1904, Leopold had named his
first Black Sea vessel after his friend King Carol. He was rewarded with an
appointment as Romania's consul in Paris.
Even when grain was grown under miserable or difficult conditions, it still
served a "great human need." But the needs were changing in the final third of
the century. Misery and hunger existed in west European cities, but they-were
not widespread. Europe was on a prosperity binge; the cafes of Paris, Vienna,
and Berlin were full, and the French were so well fed that they made light of
the Prussian siege of their capital in 1870�until they finally were forced as
a last resort to give up their crepes, baguettes and patisseries and eat their
house pets. As the world was to see in the next century, prosperity and
affluence increased rather than diminished the dependence of many rich
countries on outside sources of grain.
Without developments in technology, changes in demography, and alterations of
economic institutions, Europe would not have been in reach of distant food
supplies. The Industrial Revolution not only created a larger appetite for
wheat and grain but also provided the wherewithal for merchants, farmers, and
mariners to satisfy it. Mechanized, water-powered flour mills (replacing
windmills in the late eighteenth century) made it possible to grind more
flour. A steam-operated system for removing bulk grain from the holds of ships
with a bucket lift was invented in America in 1843, and rodent-proof and
weatherproof concrete storage silos replaced wooden warehouses and elevators
at the end of the century. New canal and railroad systems opened up new
wheatlands. Iron-hulled ships, stronger, larger, and more fire-resistant than
the successful clipper ships and down-easters, appeared at the grain ports in
the 1880s, and ocean freight rates declined steadily all through the century,
so that distance became a minor factor in the cost of wheat. New farm
machinery brought larger acreages under tillage for individual farmers. The
transatlantic cable, laid in 1866, facilitated fast communication between the
major supplier and the major consumer of grain in the last third of the
century.
Leopold and his associates in the eastern Mediterranean benefited from the new
efficiencies and from the new institutions streamlining the grain trade. In
1883, the Liverpool Corn Trade Association authorized "futures" trading, which
meant that contracts could be bought and sold for grain to be delivered months
later. When Leopold's agent bought grain from Russian peasants in the Black
Sea hinterland, Louis Dreyfus agents, in Liverpool were notified to sell
similar quantities of wheat, at profitable prices, for future delivery. This
"arbitrage" reduced some of the risks.
The commodity exchanges had begun in London in the eighteenth century as
primitive "rings" or "clubs" that met in coffee houses to discuss the prices,
shipping possibilities, and other details of trade in tea, tallow, hemp, and
finally grain. Gradually, the exchanges became more formal institutions, with
contracts, rules, and finally, -futures trading that made it possible for
members to fix prices months into the future. As milling became mote
sophisticated and more varieties of wheat became available from all over the
world, millers needed to keep on hand dozens of different wheats for blending
purposes. Since these wheats were harvested and shipped at different times of
year in the northern and southern hemispheres, it was necessary to buy them in
advance in order to keep a supply on hand through the year. The futures
markets, the millers and merchants said, enabled them to do this without undue
exposure to the risk of adverse price fluctuations.
None of these advances would have sufficed without the migrations that
populated the empty plains and grasslands abroad and turned them to
agriculture. America's wheat shipments to England were negligible until the
Civil War, but as wheat rose on the new farms of California and the Plains,
they increased sharply, until they overtook Russia's shipments in 1874. In
1873, with the opening of the Suez Canal, the first wheat arrived from India,
after a push by British entrepreneurs to obtain a cheap, secure source of
wheat under British control. The British envisagred India as a potential great
source of wheat for the Empire. Industrial tycoons pushed railroads and canals
into the Indus and Ganges river basins, where farmers had been growing wheat
for centuries.*[* Peasants in British India unknowingly made a major
contribution to the prosperity of North America. They had patiently developed
a wheat that, could ripen quickly between Indian monsoons. The seeds developed
by these poor peasants subsequently were used in adapting Marquis wheat, which
became Canada's premium grain, to the short, northern growing season of the
prairies.]
At first, Australia did not seem nearly so promising a wheat source for
British millers as India. In the waning years of the nineteenth century, it
was still raw, untamed land, inhabitated by fortune seekers who had been
attracted to it by the discovery of gold in Victoria, and by desperadoes
looking for adventure and quick riches. Sheep farming had predominated in the
first part of the century, and wheat took hold only slowly; it was still
necessary to import wheat from Chile and India to feed the shifting
population. But as new drought-resistant strains of wheat ("Purple Straw")
were introduced, wheat growers pushed out into the dry, marginal, inland
wastes, and wheat began to flow from Australia to Liverpool.
By the 1880s, this wheat from Australia mingled with wheat from California,
the Great Plains, the Argentine Pampas, and the Ganges on the docks of
Liverpool, Hull, London, Bristol, and Glasgow. In 1883, The Economist waxed
almost poetic in describing Britain's heavy dependency on other sources of
wheat:
People think of the old days when the British harvest really fed the British
people. Now we have to go further afield. A good wheat harvest is still as
much needed as ever to feed our closely packed population. But it is the
harvest already turning brown in the scorching sun of Canada and the Western
States-the wheat already ripe in India and California, not the growth alone of
the Eastern counties and of Lincolnshire, that will be summoned to feed the
hungry mouth of London and Lancashire.
The two merchant houses that were most adept at exploiting these developments,
Bunge and Louis Dreyfus, could not have been more different. By the time
Leopold left the mud of Sierentz behind, Bunge was already an established
merchant company with an illustrious name. The Bunges had come down to the
Continent from the island of Gotland in the early seventeenth century, when
King Gustavus of Sweden was spreading his military power into Denmark and
Estonia. The emigres split into three branches: Bunges in Russia became
scholars and jurists, while in Germany the descendants performed brilliantly
as intellectuals, Lutheran clergymen, and civil servants; in Holland, Bunges
were drawn to commerce. By the time that Charles Bunge moved company
headquarters from Amsterdam to Antwerp in 1850, Bunge had been trading in
hides, spices, and rubber from Dutch overseas possessions for a century.
Charles's two sons�Edouard, in Antwerp, and Ernesto, who emigrated to Buenos
Aires in 1876�established a dual merchant monarchy straddling the Atlantic
Ocean. Its ubiquitous operations were to earn Bunge a sinister nickname in
South America: "the Octopus." In Antwerp, Edouard, like Leopold LouisDreyfus,
also had a king for a friend, but his king was far more powerful and
considerably more useful to a merchant than Carol I of Romania. The Congo Free
State, established in 1885 as the personal domain of King Leopold 11 of
Belgium, was created to satisfy the ruler's fervent desire for a foreign
colony. Edouard Bunge was the king's broker and a royal business associate who
administered economic and commercial activities in one of the ivory- and
rubber-producing regions. The conditions under which the king exploited these
resources were criticized abroad for their harshness. Edouard's role in this
aspect of the Congo trade is murky. But whatever Edouard may have had to do
with Congolese exploitation, his royal ties undoubtedly helped cement the
Bunge company's position in northern Europe.
Ernesto, meanwhile, was seeking to establish a Bunge trading monopoly over the
grain that began to move out of the ports of the Plate River in Argentina. He
had reached Argentina just as the empty grasslands of the Pampas were being
transformed into one of the world's wheatlands. These lonely fields had been
unfarmed since Spanish conquistadores first came upon them in the sixteenth
century. They had been left instead to Indians and to gauchos, to pursue wild
horses and cattle across them. It was a desolate and unpromising landscape,
broken only by a gnarled tree or the low flight of a flamingo.
As long as the rangy cattle of the Pampas were used for hides, tallow, and
tough, salted meat, the natural grasslands provided a very adequate pasture.
Prosperous Europeans and Englishmen wanted juicy steaks, but their palates
were too refined to eat the tough meat of Argentine range cattle. But in the
1880s, it became possible to ship cattle to Europe, on the hoof or as frozen
carcasses. It was the incentives to raise beef for European tastes that
indirectly made Argentina a great wheat-growing country, for beef animals
needed forage and alfalfa, these needed farmers to grow them, and farmers
needed a cash crop-wheat, corn, or maybe wool.
At this time, a few families with estancias of a million acres or more
controlled most of the Pampas and, with it, the financial resources and
political, power of the nation. They had no intention of working the land
themselves, so they invited European farmers in as tenants to fence the open
fields and cultivate hay and alfalfa for the animals. These tenant farmers
came from Ireland, Germany, and Switzerland, but mainly from the Italian
provinces of Lombardy and the Piedmont. They traded the farms and sunny
vineyards of Europe for the harsh environment of the grasslands. The Pampas
were fenced for Shorthorn, Hereford, and Black Angus stock, and the old gaucho
culture was supplanted by dirt farming. The soil was unexpectedly productive
and rich. The new tenant farms raised corn for England and the Continent, wool
for, Belgian and French carpet factories and textile mills, and wheat. To pay
their rents, the farmers sold their wheat to the agents of Leopold Louis-
Dreyfus and Ernesto Bunge.
In the United States, wheat farmers fought battles against the railroads and
grain warehousemen whom they thought exploited them, and they won some
concessions through the courts. In Argentina, recourse to such action was out
of the question. Most of the tenant farmers had no land of their own, and less
power. The grain production and merchandising system favored the huge
landowners, the railroads, the exporters, and the grain exchanges in Buenos
Aires and Rosario. The railroads, financed in part by British capital, could
set whatever rates they wanted and could provide freight service at their
convenience.
The two European exporting companies and several smaller ones were also in a
position to dictate prices. The companies linked Argentina to the world wheat
economy; and when there were profits to -be made, the growers were usually the
last to get them.
It was said, some years later in Argentina, that "Bunge gives the farmer his
credit, sells him his seed, and buys his grain. And when the crops are in,
Bunge sells the farmer the rope to hang himself." This comment only slightly
exaggerates the power of the Argentina grain exporters in the late nineteenth
century. Farmers sold their wheat to acopiadores�country storekeepers or
millers�many of whom were virtual agents of the export houses in Rosario and
Buenos Aires. From Bunge and Dreyfus came the funds that enabled the acopiador
to advance money or seed to farmers before the harvest. The exporters, in
effect, established the price for the crop, and they did this on the basis of
their exclusive knowledge of the price (fixed to wheat's gold value) in
European markets. Any disputes over prices and contracts were settled through
the arbitration procedures of the Comision Arbitral de Cereales, a board that
was strongly influenced by the export firms. In some cases, Dreyfus and Bunge
dealt directly with the farmers through their own rural agents, thus cutting
out the acopiadores and increasing their own profits. A final exercise of
control was the requirement that farmers sell their grain bagged. The bags
were made from precut pieces of jute that entered the country duty-free and
then were sold at inflated prices to the farmers. To protect this system,
stiff duties were levied on ready-to-use, imported bags. Bunge pioneered in
the import of raw jute from India to Argentina and thus profited in several
different ways from the bagged-wheat trade.
The companies wasted no time investing grain profits in more durable fixed
assets. Bunge channeled its profits into flour mills, paint plants-utilizing
the abundant supply of Argentine linseed for oil bases-and textile mills
employing local cotton. By the turn of the century Bunge's Argentine
operations outstripped those of the parent company in Antwerp.
Ernesto Bunge had formed a partnership with his brother-in-law, Jorge Born,
who had emigrated with him. In Argentina, the company went under the name
Bunge y Born. But the firm grew so fast that more help was needed. In 1897,
the partners brought in a group of German traders, including a Mannheim Jew by
the name of Alfredo Hirsch. Hirsch became president of Bunge y Born in 1927,
and remained president for thirty years. Hirsch had joined Bunge as if he were
entering the priesthood. While he accumulated estancias of his own, as part of
a personal fortune, he was in some respects as austere and frugal as Georges
Andre, over in Switzerland. In his final years, he suffered from painful
rheumatism and was confined to a wheelchair. He rejected the treatment that
doctors said would cure him, for it would have involved an extended
recuperation. Time away from Bunge was time ill spent.
As Leopold Louis-Dreyfus's empire grew to encompass Russia as well as
Argentina, the United States, Canada, and all of Europe, he too needed help.
But Leopold had three sons, Louis, Charles, and Robert, and he was able to
follow the merchant precept of keeping control in the family. Leopold sent
Charles to manage the company facilities on the Black Sea in the 1890s. And by
the time of World War 1, the Louis Dreyfus company was nothing less than a
produce merchant for all of Europe, a wholesaler of grain that purchased
enormous quantities of wheat, corn, barley, and other crops from farmers or
small middlemen in Russia, the Balkans, Canada, the United States, and
Australia and delivered it to small customers on the European continent, in
Berlin, London, Rome, Antwerp, Brussels, and Rome. The food deficit was
growing, as industrialization continued and populations grew, and Leopold had
an organization on three continents that served the "great human and economic
need."
England more than sixty years after repeal of the Corn Laws was the greatest
market for food the world had ever seen. Its own farmers were producing only
enough wheat to feed their countrymen for eight weeks a year. The remainder
floated steadily toward Liverpool, Hull, Bristol, and London month after month
over the seven seas. In 1914, there were 5 million tons of wheat arriving by
sea. As the world turned and the harvests swung across the planet, the sources
of the wheat changed. In March the shipments began arriving from Argentina and
Uruguay; in April, from Australia; in June, from Africa and India; in August
came the fall-Planted, wheat from Russia and America; and in November, the
spring-planted wheat from Canada. Huge flour mills were situated at major
ports.
The Louis Dreyfus company's Paris headquarters, in a renovated nineteenth-
century mansion on a handsome square near the Paris bourse, gave a sense of
the firm's imperial reach. In the traders' cramped working quarters, coded
messages arrived by transatlantic cable from New York, to be quickly
deciphered for the information they contained about the price of wheat offered
from various ports in various months of the year. Elsewhere in the building,
Leopold Louis-Dreyfus managed his affairs in opulent surroundings. To an awed
visitor in those premises, the great merchant looked confident, kindly, and
patriarchal, with no hint that this was the son of an Alsatian farmer. His
office, a huge drawing room with high ceilings decorated in the First Empire
style, was stately. Behind a polished desk sat the founder himself, eyes clear
and penetrating, peering out from above a crisply cropped beard. Business
associates came and went, bowing from the waist. In 1915, Leopold died,
leaving the business in the hands of his two surviving sons, Charles and
Louis. His legacy to them was a merchant empire unsurpassed except perhaps by
Bunge. The family dynasty was secure and well positioned for a century in
which Russian grain would play no less a role in the fortunes of the merchant
families than it had in the preceding one.
pps. 53-74
-----
Aloha, He'Ping,
Om, Shalom, Salaam.
Em Hotep, Peace Be,
Omnia Bona Bonis,
All My Relations.
Adieu, Adios, Aloha.
Amen.
Roads End
Kris
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