-Caveat Lector-
An excerpt from:
Merchants of Grain
Dan Morgan�1979,1980
Penguin Books
ISBN 01400.5502 9
--[3]--
3
Grain Barons
"I saw the wheat running in rivers."
�ANTHONY TROLLOPE IN CHICAGO, 1861
"Take the robber corporations and shake them all to Hell."
�GRANGER NEWSPAPER, 1870s
Europe's insatiable appetite for wheat in the nineteenth century coincided
with the heyday of the business entrepreneur in the United States. So it was
not surprising that the spread of wheat cultivation into the prairies and the
inland valleys of California called forth a cast of speculators and
capitalists worthy of the era of the "robber barons." California had its
Isaac Friedlander ("the Grain King"); the milling industry of Minneapolis had
the Washburns and the Pillsburys; and the whole Midwest became a vast
Monopoly board for the most successful of the grain warehousemen, William W.
Cargill and his rival Frank H. Peavey ("Grain Elevator King of the World").
The wheat business was as rough and ready as railroading or oil, as the
fluctuating fortunes of those early grain barons show. Friedlander died in
1878, only a year after losing the fortune he had amassed cornering wheat and
sailing vessels in San Francisco. After Will Cargill's death in 1909, his
Midwest empire only narrowly avoided bankruptcy and liquidation as a result
of speculative investments made by a Cargill son in an irrigation project in
the Montana wilds. Fortunes made and lost, rivals outsmarted and bankrupted,
opportunities seized-this was the natural order of business. All of the wheat
and flour men were in search of the American dream-growth, expansion,
wealthand they pursued it unrelentingly. When Cadwallader Washburn's
Minneapolis flour mill exploded in 1878, in the worst milling accident in
American history, "the governor"*[* Washburn served as governor of Wisconsin
in 1872 and 1873.] came straight to the smoldering, body-littered wreckage,
summoned his advisers, and paced off the dimensions of a new mill, which he
announced on the spot would be the most up-to-date ever built in the United
States. This kind of resilience, this kind of betting on the country's
future, was a common characteristic among the early capitalists of wheat.
Like other aspects of the American dream, the wheat business often promoted
progress and economic exploitation simultaneously. Wheat provided the
economic incentive for the settling of the prairies; it gave value to the
land homesteaded by landless immigrants; and it helped to finance the
extension of the railroads across the continent. However, wheat was also the
cause of a fierce economic struggle played out according to the harsh rules
of nineteenth-century capitalism.
Wheat was the main cash crop, and therefore the main source of accumulating
agricultural wealth as the frontier moved west. Wheat profits were,
therefore, up for grabs. There were as yet no great international markets for
such crops as corn and oats, but there was for wheat. Corn was consumed by
frontier farmers and their families in the form of corn bread, corn pone, and
corn whiskey, and fed to hogs and to the horses, mules, and oxen that broke
the sod and pulled the wagons and harvesters. But trade in corn was hindered
by the absence of an efficient method for separating the grain from the cob
(a problem that was not overcome until the cylinder-type corn sheller became
available in 1902). Oats was not a marketable crop, either. It was grown
everywhere in the United States; and was too light, requiring too much space
in railroad cars for its weight, to be moved economically to distant markets.
Grain prices were wheat prices in the new territories, and it was wheat that
Trollope saw "running in rivers" when he visited the granaries of Chicago in
1861. At the time, the nearby farmlands of Wisconsin and Illinois were still
the main wheatproducing areas. But as rising land values encouraged more
intensive forms of agriculture in these two states, the frontier pushed west
and wheat spread to Minnesota, the Dakotas, western Iowa, and Kansas.
Before the railroads caught up with the pioneers, the settlers found that
their fortunes depended completely on the markets and merchants in river
towns. For a Minnesota farmer in the early 1860s, the closest place to sell
wheat might be a 150-mile trip away over forest trails and rutted paths
menaced by robbers and Indians. The elements were another obstacle. Wheat
farmers with ox-drawn carts battled the cold and floods on the way to market
towns, and Minnesota newspapers regularly reported the names of wheat farmers
who had frozen to death alongside their carts on these journeys. When the
farmer reached his destination, he had no guarantee that he could sell his
wheat for a price that seemed fair to him.
The grievances of the settlers were real. But their problems often stemmed as
much from the economic structure of the wheat business as from the greed. of
individual entrepreneurs. Wheat prices were established in Liverpool, Buenos
Aires, Karachi, Odessa, Antwerp, and Marseilles, not just in Chicago and New
York. Ultimately, Americans had no control over the price of wheat in the
towns along the Mississippi River, or in Chicago.
Given this fact, margins of profit had to be extracted "upstream"�along the
railroad lines and at the storage terminals in the interior., In the struggle
among farmers, merchants, millers, and exporters for their share of the wheat
price that was determined in world markets, the advantage always went to
those who controlled the storage and transportation of grain. This was the
decisive factor, as well, in the ability of the grain barons to amass
fortunes.
Nowhere was this more evident than in California, which rose to prominence in
the world wheat trade after the Gold Rush, long before wheat grew in large,
quantities in Kansas or the Dakotas. Wheat thrived in the Sacramento and San
Joaquin valleys. Once the gold fever abated, the more enterprising newcomers
to California made this discovery. They staked out ranches and began growing
wheat as a permanent and (they hoped) reliable source of income. The soil,
climate, and topography of the inland valleys, as well as the large ranches,
were well suited to the "desert plant." As railroads began to penetrate more
deeply from San Francisco, the volumes of marketable wheat increased. It soon
turned out that wheat could be as speculative as gold in California.
The problem, of course, was that the main domestic market for this wheat-the
eastern cities of the United States-was not accessible. The transcontinental
railroads had not crossed the Rocky Mountains in the 1850s, and although New
York, Baltimore, and Boston could be reached by sea, those markets already
were well supplied by the rivers of wheat from the Midwest. Foreign export
markets therefore became an urgent necessity for California wheat growers and
merchants. At first, British and American merchants newly arrived in San
Francisco shipped some wheat to Australia, China, Alaska, South America, and
the Sandwich Islands. But as the volume increased, it was clear that only
England could absorb the surpluses. So it was that "rural California and
mercantile San Francisco became almost a colonial appendage of Victorian
Britain [recognizing] no economic overlord save Liverpool."*[*Rodman Paul,
"The Wheat Trade Between California and the United Kingdom."]
By 1870, California had become so dependent on the English market that it
used a British measurement (the cental: 100 pounds) instead of the bushel,
and it was said that there were only two subjects of conversation on the
wheat ranches: the weather in California and the price of wheat in Liverpool.
"California No. 1" was one of the standard varieties traded by the merchants
and millers at the Liverpool Corn Trade Association in the 1880s.
The California wheat trade that evolved with Europe in the 1850s was one of
the most remarkable feats of commerce in history. The distance to Liverpool
was 14,000 nautical miles, a treacherous route around Cape Horn that took
four to five months. Naturally, the tendency developed to overload the huge
sailing vessels�clipper ships and down-easters�that made the journey (it was
not economical for coal-burning steamers to make so long a haul). And from
the outset, control of the ocean shipping was the key to control of the trade
overall. Control of the shipping was, in fact, the secret to the inordinate
power and influence of Isaac Friedlander, one of the century's most audacious
commodity speculators.
Friedlander was a German-Jewish immigrant who grew up in Charleston,
South Carolina, and went to San Francisco in the 1849 Gold Rush. He was a
six-foot-six, 300-pound giant of a man whose figure, striding around the
docks of San Francisco, was an awesome though familiar sight. In 1852, he
made his first for-tune-not in gold but in flour. The adroit German cornered
most of the available flour supplies and forced up the price at the ex-pense
of the gold miners, who paid more for bread. Friedlander invested some of his
profit in the first flour mills built on the West Coast. He lost most of his
fortune in more speculation several years later, but by 1858 he was back in
business, exporting wheat to Britain and Australia,
As the trade with England began to pick up, Friedlander positioned himself to
control the incoming ships and the outgoing wheat, thereby taking the
California grain markets into his own hands.
Friedlander quickly grasped the importance of ocean shipping in the cycle of
harvesting and marketing California's grain. There was no regular European
steamer service to and from San Francisco in the 1850s and 1860s, as there
was from Atlantic Coast ports. Vessels had to be chartered, since the four-
and five-masted sailing vessels would not call at San Francisco without a
guaranteed charter for the run to England. Friedlander developed a system for
estimating the size of the California crop and booking the required number of
vessels to haul the wheat. He had the financial backing of San Francisco
bankers, who were eager to put the city on world trade routes. Friedlander's
agents and intelligence sources fanned out through California each spring to
collect estimates on crops. Then, Friedlander would charter the needed
sailing vessels early in the season. As the size of the coming harvest became
more widely known, freight rates rose. If someone had the temerity to
challenge Friedlander's monopoly, he would bid up the cost of tonnage to
exclude all competitors until he completely controlled the shipping needed to
haul the wheat crop.
At the same time that he chartered vessels, he also bought wheat from local
merchants, who in turn had a strong hold over wheat farmers. Farmers put up
their crops as security-this was often their only way to obtain loans from
urban bankers. These loans gave bankers and middlemen-financiers the power to
force the crop to market whenever the time was propitious for them. When the
crops came in to the San Francisco docks, Friedlander sold the wheat to
representatives of foreign export houses and then provided these companies
with the shipping required to move the grain.
Friedlander's hold over the wheat trade made him an obvious target in the
1870s for the Patrons of Husbandry (the Grange), the agrarian reform movement
that fought for regulation of the railroads and grain warehousemen across the
country. Friedlander's access to capital led the California Patron, the
Grange's organ, to call him "the money king as well as the grain king."
However, the Grange's only determined effort to break his power, in 1873-74,
failed when the British agent the Grange picked to market its wheat
overchartered shipping.
In 1877, Friedlander himself overchartered vessels and went into bankruptcy.
A year later, he died while attempting another of his comebacks. His demise
was unmourned by the Grange, which claimed that Friedlander "used his power
with such a merciless hand that farmers would receive no more for a large
crop than for a small one. He had the wheat growers so completely under his
control that even with larger crops, farmers were growing poorer and poorer,
year by year."
The Grange did not know it in 1878, but California's days as a great wheat
exporter already were numbered. Like the rest of the country, California
suffered the effects in the 1880s of low prices due to competition in its
overseas markets from such new producers as Canada, Argentina, India, and
Australia. California was able to stay in the wheat trade mainly because the
increasingly large and economical sailing vessels reduced freight rates. In
1891, the four-masted Shenandoah, driven by a spread of two acres of canvas,
left San Francisco with 5200 tons of wheat, the largest grain cargo on record
up to that time. But the appearance of the spectacular vessel was a glorious
epitaph. California wheat exports dwindled rapidly. By the end of the century
the conversion of many wheat holdings into irrigated plots for other crops
was well under way, and the California wheat trade was fading into history.
Across the plains and prairies of the Midwest, however, wheat grew and grew.
The endless prairies became the nation's last frontier after the Civil War.
There had never been anything like prairie farming in the whole history of
agriculture. The first farms of America had been hacked out of eastern
forests so thick that the sun never broke through the canopy of foliage, and
it took a man a year to "ring" the trees, push them over, pull out the
stumps, and clear a couple of acres for corn. But in the Midwest, one settler
wrote, "you could aim your team west and plow in a straight line until you
were an old man�and you still wouldn't be out of the prairies!" There were
sinister hazards-fire, rampaging buffaloes, and tornadoes�but once those were
overcome, the thin topsoil, mixed as it was with "gumbo" clay that clung to a
farmer's boots, produced an excellent yield of wheat.
The new labor-saving machinery available to farmers made the cultivation of
these large acreages possible. McCormick's reaper made its appearance in
1831, and John Deere began making steel plows six years later. Other
weird-looking metal contraptions (such as the spidery "New Yorker self rake")
were also revolutionizing farming practices. In 1837, it took 148 manhours to
plant, cultivate, and harvest an acre of wheat; in 1890 it was down to only
37 hours.
The government and the railroads offered inducements to settle, and after the
Civil War the states west of the Mississippi River filled up with young war
veterans eager for the freedom and opportunities of the frontier; immigrants
from Europe; and eastern farmers disillusioned with a long series of
depressions back home.
However, the very productivity of the new lands was often the settlers' worst
enemy. Surpluses were a problem as early as 1860 in Minnesota, where the
entire prosperity of the two-yearold state depended on finding outlets for
surplus agricultural products. The development of Minneapolis as a major
flourmilling center, rivaling or surpassing St. Louis, Buffalo, Liverpool,
and even Budapest by the 1880s, helped to solve this surplus problem and make
the upper Midwest one of the great wheat centers of the world.
This development was hastened by the competition for dominance between two
families that came to Minneapolis from New England in the 1860s�the
Pillsburys and the Washburns. Neither had any extensive experience in
milling; good instincts apparently drew them to Minneapolis, a village
becoming a city with scarcely any transitional period as a town. In 1863,
when the Chippewa Indians ceded the Red River Valley, more excellent
agricultural land became available, and Minneapolis's population rapidly
increased. Its main milling asset was the Falls of St. Anthony on the
Mississippi River, considered by the Sioux Indians to be the shrine of a
great spirit and by Pillsbury and Washburn to be the potential source of
power for mills to grind the new wheat produced in the state. By the end of
the decade, flour had surpassed lumber as the city's main manufactured
product.
By 1866, when Cadwallader Washburn began building his six-story stone "B"
mill at the Falls, he was already rich and prominent. He was an American of
Jeffersonian breadth: patrician, politician, patriot, interested in
everything. A biographer described him as "a kind of universal genius of
business enterprise, the archetype entrepreneur who laid his hands on any
project that could turn him a profit but who touched all his interests with a
fastidiousness that allowed the dictates of idealist and patriot to dominate
those of the man of affairs."*[ James Gray, Business Without Boundaries: The
Story of General Mills.]
Descended from a long line of Massachusetts Puritans on both sides of his
family and raised in Maine, Washburn left the East in 1839 and made a fortune
in pine, mineral, and agricultural lands in Wisconsin territory, was elected
to Congress, and reached the rank of major general in the Civil War
cavalry-all before getting seriously involved in the Minneapolis company that
was the ancestor of General Mills.
Charles Alfred Pillsbury was young (twenty-seven) and inexperienced when
he arrived in Minneapolis and purchased a small interest in a mill at the
Falls in 1869. But he was energetic and had the backing of his uncle John
Sargent Pillsbury, who already had extensive lumber, real estate, and
hardware interests in Minnesota. By 1872, the Pillsburys had increased their
holdings in the milling business and were actively organizing the purchase of
wheat and the extension of railroads into the surrounding countryside.
Great as their waterpower asset at the Falls was, the Minne-apolis
millers had several serious problems to overcome. The first was that their
flour was worthless without good railroad connections to eastern markets.
Initially, Minneapolis products went downstream to St. Louis and thence east
by rail; the Northern Pacific Railroad reached Minneapolis in 1862; but
reg-ular service to the east from Minneapolis did not begin until 1871.
The second problem, a technical one, was worse. When Washburn and Pillsbury
began work in Minneapolis, milling was still a dirty, imperfect business
employing stone millstones of the kind that had been used for centuries. The
millstone, crashing down on the wheat berry, was a crude instrument, but
effective enough in dealing with the soft-kernelled wheats that grew east of
the Mississippi River. The white flour could be separated from the bran
fairly cleanly. Millers, bakers, and consumers liked the white texture of
bread from this flour. But as wheat cultivation moved west, farmers planted
harder-kernelled wheats, which stood up better in the cold, continental
climate. In northern latitudes such as Minnesota and the Dakotas, the
fall-planted wheat could not survive the winter, and wheats with even harder
kernels (some varieties of which had migrated from Russia, Germany, and
Scotland) were sowed in the spring. The Minneapolis millers had difficulty
dealing with these hard wheats. As the millstones came down on the flinty
kernels, the kernels cracked and left specks of bran in the flour,
discoloring it. For this reason, Minnesota spring wheat sold at a discount of
ten cents a bushel in the 1860s. Washburn and Pillsbury, therefore, began an
urgent search for methods that would eliminate the disadvantage of Minnesota
flour. The financial stakes were very high. Washbum was the first to succeed,
with the help of a French-trained engineer by the name of Edmund La Croix.
France and Hungary possessed the most advanced flourmilling technology in the
world at the time, and European experience, such as La Croix had, was an
invaluable asset for American mill planners. The reputation of Hungarian
milling was especially awesome, for Budapest's mills were the most elaborate
in the world. It was said that these mills, drawing on the wheats that grew
in the Banat, along the Danube River, were capable of producing as many
grades of flour as there were social classes in Hungary. They ranged from the
premium, milky white Kaiserauszug (Emperor Extract) to the rich dark,
inferior grades for the bread of the poor and the lower classes.
The trouble with both the French and Hungarian milling systems was that they
required large amounts of manual labor. The system of separating the product
into dozens of different grades of flour fit for the bread of separate social
strata was inappropriate for the United States, which had a single food
standard. Inferior flours still made up half of French production before
1850; substandard flour financed the elaborate system that made it possible
for the French and Hungarian mills to produce superior white flour also, for
those who could afford it. One Hungarian mill produced eighty-four different
flours, all requiring individual handling.
Washburn put La Croix to work in the B mill in 1871, with instructions to
develop a more efficient system for purifying flour. A year later, the "new
process" was in place. La Croix's system functioned with moving sieves
passing over delicate jets of air that suspended the clean, lighter flour
while the heavier impurities were whisked away from underneath it. This air
separation system, refined many times over, is still in use in American mills.
In the milling community at the Falls of St. Anthony, proprietary information
of such momentous value could not be kept secret for long, and Washburn's
method soon leaked out to Charles Pillsbury via an employee who switched to
the rival company.
The results of this relatively small, obscure technological improvement were
felt across the whole upper Northwest and insured the prosperity of the
region for years to come. The "new process" milling reversed the economic
position of Minnesota flour on the bakers' scale of preferences, not only in
the United States but in England as well. Once it could be sold as a white
product free of impurities, Minneapolis flour became the premium flour of the
United States. The reason was that the springplanted wheats of Minnesota and
the Dakotas, ripened as they were in the dry, sunny climate, contained a
higher percentage of protein, or "gluten," than soft eastern wheats. This was
an advantage of enormous economic significance. Gluten gives flour the
capacity to absorb water and, when yeast is added, to rise. To bakers this
meant that hard, spring wheat flour produced more loaves per pound. To
consumers, the benefit was bread that tended to stay fresh longer.*[ * The
delicious, distinctive-tasting French bread has the disadvantage of staling
quickly�thus the French housewife's frequent trips to the bakery and the
existence of 40,000 decentralized bakeries in that country. The reason is
that French bread is made mainly from soft wheats short on gluten. British,
Dutch, and German flours are blends of soft wheat and hard, high-protein
wheat and tend to make bread that keeps longer.] Minnesota flour was soon in
demand not only in New York but also in London and Liverpool. The profits of
Pillsbury, Washburn, and other Minneapolis millers rose accordingly. In 1871,
profits had averaged 50 cents a barrel; by 1874, they were $4.00 to $4.50 a
barrel.
For all the economic advantages of the new process, milling was still a dirty
and dangerous business-more so, perhaps, than ever, since volume increased
and productivity often took precedence over safety. The noise, the heat, the
thick flour dust, and the sweetish smell made the mills as unpleasant to work
in as coal mines. And the danger of explosions from spontaneous combustion or
sparks was a constant threat.
At six-thirty in the evening of May 2, 1878, a loud noise was heard all over
Minneapolis and people saw a firebolt rushing upward, followed by clouds of
thick black smoke. The Washbum A mill was wrecked, eighteen men were buried
beneath it, and nearly half the city's milling capacity had been destroyed.
Washburn, in go-getter style, seized the opportunity to build the world's
most modern mill on the site of the blackened ruin. He summoned a
Vienna-trained milling engineer named William de la Barre and dispatched him
to Europe to gather all the latest intelligence about milling. American
millers had been interested since the early 1870s in Hungarian "roller"
milling, a technique that utilized porcelain rollers rather than millstones
to break the wheat kernels. The process performed the operation with repeated
gentle blows on the kernel instead of pulverizing it with one grinding. De la
Barre knew of this, as well as of Gustav Behrn's exhaust system for
ventilating mills. But de la Barre still needed more up-to-date information
and he set out for Europe on a mission of industrial espionage. An atmosphere
of intrigue surrounded his trip. Mills in Switzerland, Germany, and Austria
refused to admit him. In Budapest, finally, he slipped into a mill disguised
as a workman, studied the equipment carefully, and emerged with the
information he needed. Back in Minneapolis the stolen Hungarian technology
was copied and improved on-with the use of chilled steel rollers instead of
porcelain ones.
Pillsbury and his associates had also been traveling in and out of Hungary on
similar missions, and despite the Hungarians' attempts to keep their
techniques secret, Pillsbury obtained several rollers, brought them back to
Minneapolis, and installed them in his mills. Pillsbury, in 1879, ordered a
six-story mill built that was to be even larger than the Washburn facility.
But disaster also dealt his plans a setback when, in 1881, an explosion and
fire leveled many of Pillsbury's mills, killed four persons, and injured and
burned others.
The hectic growth in Minneapolis milling is evident in the fact that the
volume of flour produced there increased from 850,000 barrels in 1875 to 5
million barrels in 1885�despite the two disastrous explosions. By now flour
milling was one of the most profitable businesses in the Midwest, thanks to
the improvement of milling technology, the rapid expansion of wheat growing,
and the advancement of the railroads. Wheat was the mainstay of the Midwest's
new economy. The mills needed prodigious amounts of it.
The millers wasted no time insuring that they, not the farmers, got the
primary benefits of the increased value of wheat that resulted from the
milling improvements. The Pillsbury and Washburn families took the lead in
organizing a buyers' cartel of sixteen of the eighteen Minneapolis mills. The
Minneapolis Millers Association, incorporated in 1876 and lasting until 1885,
exercised its power along several of the railroad lines that had begun to run
out from Minneapolis like spokes of a wheel. Although the association could
not fix the price of wheat at the grain elevators along all the lines, it was
arbitrary in its grading and pricing of the farmers' grain in some places.
Still, the millers did not have everything their own way, for they often
found themselves at odds with other powerful interests. Minneapolis had to
compete for its wheat against such cities as Duluth, Green Bay, and
Milwaukee, and that competition often brought them into conflict with the
bankers, railroads, and warehousemen who had a vested financial interest in
promoting grain traffic to those cities. The best spring wheat grew along the
route of the Northern Pacific Railroad, but for a time, the road favored
traffic to the Great Lakes port of Duluth over traffic to Minneapolis.
Minneapolis- did not establish a direct railroad route to the eastern
seaboard until 1888, when the Soo Line linked up with the Canadian Pacific,
making possible through service to Boston.
As the railroads reached west across the Mississippi, they took an active
hand in the wheat business. They needed wheat traffic to supply them with
freight, and they used all kinds of devices to stimulate the business-for
example, lowering freight rates at grain collection points where there was
competition from other nearby railroads and raising them stiffly elsewhere.
Favoritism, under-the-table dealing, and inequity were the rule of thumb in
the Midwest wheat trade.
It was in these difficult conditions that Will Cargill and Frank Peavey
accumulated their fortunes-by collecting and shipping the farmers' grain.
Will Cargill was a short, stocky man with soft, round eyes. Like Leopold
Louis-Dreyfus, he was the son of a farmer. In 1865 (when Leopold was just
beginning to do business in Odessa) Will was still pushing a plow on the
Wisconsin farm of his father, a retired Scottish sea captain. When the Civil
War ended and the frontier began to expand once again, Will bought a railroad
ticket to the end of the line and then purchased a small interest in a small
wooden grain elevator in Conover, Iowa.
It quickly became apparent, however, that the one-crop wheat economy would
develop north of Iowa, so Will and his brother Sam began in about 1870 to
build or buy grain elevators along the Southern Minnesota railroad. Financing
was not a problem: Banks in Milwaukee were eager to invest in the grain trade
so as to increase the business that moved through their city; with some of
this Milwaukee money and some capital from his father, Will began playing
Monopoly across southern Minnesota and Wisconsin. The financial panic of 1873
had sent many elevator operators into bankruptcy and Cargill bought them out
at distress prices. In 1874, Will moved to a picturesque Victorian mansion
overlooking the Mississippi River at La Crosse, Wisconsin. From this base in
LaCrosse, he pioneered the system of "integration" that made his company a
major power in the Midwest.
Cargill created a "moving belt" of grain that transported wheat from small
countryside depots all the way to Chicago, and he hauled coal back through
the same system. The cooperation of the railroads was essential for his
schemes. Will Cargill's plans hinged on the building of a large grain
terminal at Green Bay to serve the Great Lakes; but for the depot to be
successful, it was necessary to get a railroad spur built across the Green
Bay peninsula, so that grain could be moved to Milwaukee when the lakes were
frozen. Cargill persuaded the Green Bay and Western and the Chicago and
Northwestern railroads to share in the cost of building the Green Bay depot
and the connecting link of railroad spur. This small rail route was so
strategically placed that Cargill sold it later at a substantial profit.
Cargill used his moving belt to haul coal back on his own steamships from
Milwaukee or Chicago and sell the coal to farmers through his own retail
outlet at LaCrosse.
Meanwhile, Will's brothers Samuel and James expanded Cargill's elevator
holdings along James J. Hill's Great Northern railroad line west of
Minneapolis, and into the Red River Valley as far as North Dakota. While Will
worked with the bankers and dreamed up new schemes, Sam handled the
day-to-day operations from Minneapolis with the same uncompromising toughness
that still characterized the Cargill company a century later. A glowering man
with a thick mustache, Sam was so intimidating that when he barked an order
to an employee to go to St. Paul, the hapless man was halfway there on a
streetcar before he realized he had forgotten to ask the reason for his
mission.
Frank Peavey's elevator system, which began a little later,
eventually outstripped even that of the Cargills. But not much is known about
the maneuvers be used to establish his holdings; very little is written
down, and the company's history depicts
Peavey as a bland, kindly soul who enjoyed helping newsboys get a start in
life-surely not the driving entrepreneur who established one of the largest
nineteenth-century business conglomerates in the United States.
Peavey, a tall, bearded man with deep-set hawklike eyes, reached the Midwest
in 1865 from his home in Maine, where his father had prospered in the coastal
shipping and sawmill business. Peavey worked for a while as a messenger for a
Chicago grain firm (where he developed a phobia against speculation in grain
futures) and later invested in a farm-implements company in Iowa whose
factory burned down. In 1874, Peavey got his start as an independent grain
man working for the Minneapolis Millers Association in Sioux City, Iowa.
Peavey impressed the millers with his ambitious plans to divert wheat from
Iowa to Minneapolis. He then convinced officials of the Chicago-St.
Paul-Minneapolis railroad to permit him to extend his line of grain
warehouses all the way from Sioux City to St. Paul. That line became the
nucleus of Peavey's holdings. In 1886, one year after he established his
headquarters in Minneapolis, Peavey constructed one of the world's largest
grain terminals in Minneapolis at a cost of $3.5 million. The Minneapolis
millers continued to be Peavey's biggest customers, even as he extended his
network of collection facilities west along the Union Pacific, Northern
Pacific and Great Northern rail lines.
Installed on the West Coast, with his own one-million-bushel elevator at
Portland, Oregon, Peavey attempted another logistical coup in 1895, when he
shipped Oregon wheat to Liverpool in a little over thirty days. The cargo was
taken by sailing vessel to the Isthmus of Panama, transported in open rail
cars across land, and loaded onto another vessel. The grain arrived in
England in reasonable condition despite its exposure to sun and rain in the
tropics, but the experiment did not make money and Peavey discontinued it.
The West Coast grain business was still transacted in 100-pound sacks, and
Peavey became discouraged with this practice, too cumbersome a method for his
liking. Three years later, Peavey's firm sold the Portland terminal.
It was not only the millers who were plagued by fires and explosions. By the
late 1890s, insurance premiums on a single large wooden grain terminal
sometimes ran $150,000 a year, a very large sum in those times. Most grain
men believed that silos had to be made from wood because of its "give." It
was commonly believed that a concrete tank holding grain would explode or
crack when grain was drawn from the bottom. But Peavey proved these experts
wrong in 1899 by building an eightyfoot-high experimental grain silo at the
outskirts of Minneapolis. This edifice, nicknamed "Peavey's Folly," was such
a major breakthrough that even The New York Times reported it: "a mammoth
elevator of a style of construction novel to this country."
The European masters of the grain trade and flour business were beginning to
be impressed. In 1900 representatives of the Russian tsar invited Peavey's
son-in-law to Moscow and St. Petersburg to discuss the possibility of a joint
venture that would modernize grain handling on the Siberian railroad route.
The project did not materialize, but the Peavey delegation took the
opportunity to look at concrete grain warehouses in Romania. Some of them
probably were used or owned by Leopold LouisDreyfus and his firm. The Peavey
people were impressed.
At his death, in 1901, Peavey's business stretched across the United States.
He operated four of the largest steamships on the Great Lakes and had
extensive interests in railroads, banking, land, and a piano company. Most of
all, though, as the obituaries put it, he was the "Grain Elevator King of the
World."
Elevator men like Peavey and his associates also were active north of the
border in the new wheat country that was opening up in the Canadian provinces
of Saskatchewan and Manitoba. The Canadian-Pacific Railroad ("the Great
Colonizer," it was called) reached the Pacific Ocean in 1885. It had a
charter that included tax concessions, rate privileges, and 25 million acres
of land for "resettlement." Canadian wheat acreage began to increase
dramatically near the end of the century, as the railroad network was
extended and new wheat varieties spread. Peavey's heirs were in at the start
of this boom, contracting in 1906 to build fifty elevators along the Canadian
Pacific railroad line in Saskatchewan. Thirty of these were built before the
crop of that year was even harvested.
There was always some semblance of competition for the farmers' wheat at the
grain-collection points along the railroad tracks. In some cases, there was
more than one elevator. And "floaters"�representing millers, Great Lakes
steamship owners, and eastern brokers-did ride out to meet farmers on the
market roads, jumping on their carts, sampling the wheat, and offering a spot
price. But often this "competition" was more perfunctory than real. By the
early 1880s, Cargill and another LaCrosse firm, Hodges and Hyde, controlled
525,000 bushels out of the 920,500 bushels of elevator capacity on the
Southern Minnesota railroad. In her book The Wheat Market and the Farmer in
Minnesota, Henrietta Larson has noted that even after the two firms formed
different companies, "they did not compete seriously" and "their attempt to
keep up the appearance of competition was often so ill concealed-as to make
farmers suspicious."
By 1895, Peavey, Cargill, and a third company, Northern Grain, owned almost
all the grain storage capacity in Duluth, the port at the far western end of
the Great Lakes that was strategically situated to handle the grain of the
upper Midwest. Central grain terminals such as those in Duluth were very
profitable, as was seen whenever their balance sheets were brought to the
knowledge of the public. Between 1883 and 1889, for example, two large
terminals in Minneapolis (Empire Grain and Minnesota and Northern Grain)
averaged annual returns on capital investment of 40 per cent and 30 per cent
respectively, rates that make the era of the "grain robberies" seem like a
time of thin margins.
The lot of any small-town businessman who wanted to compete with the big
"line companies" such as Cargill or Peavey, without the support of some big
railroad company, was never an easy one. The line elevators along the Great
Northern, Soo, Northern Pacific, and Minneapolis and St. Louis railroads, Ms.
Larson writes, "could not afford to compete among themselves and tried to
prevent others from competing, and no small independent elevator could
withstand the methods of lines bent on destroying him."
The consolidation process also moved ahead quickly in milling. By the end of
the century, virtually all the milling capacity in Minneapolis was owned by
the Pillsburys, Washburns, Crosbys,*[ *Consolidation was expedited by a
short-lived British takeover of Pillsbury's mills in 1889. The syndicate
combined them with the mills of Cadwallader Washburn's brother, William D.
Washburn, to form the PillsburyWashburn company. Meanwhile, another Maine
Yankee, John Crosby, had become a partner of Cadwallader's in the newly
constituted WashburnCrosby Company. In 1889, another outsider, James S. Bell,
became president of Washburn-Crosby; in 1928, his son, James F. Bell, took
over. Minneapolis milling really has been dominated by just four families:
the Washburns, Pillsburys, Crosbys, and Bells.] and the Northwest
Consolidated Grain Company.
In many cases, both the millers and the warehousemen interlocked with
railroad companies or, in some cases, owned their own railroads. Will
Cargill's ventures in railroading in the Green Bay peninsula contributed to
his fortune, and the Cargill family established a close enough rapport with
the tycoon James J. Hill to obtain favored positions for Cargill elevators
all along Hill's Great Northern Railroad west of Minneapolis to the South
Dakota line. Peavey, likewise, was sitting on the boards of two railroad
companies when he died. One of the most important rail lines into the wheat
country out of Minneapolis was named after Pillsbury, and The Minneapolis
Tribune commented that this line gave the Minneapolis millers "practical
control of the wheat grown in the Northwest." Cadwallader Washburn promoted
the Soo Line that by 1888 gave the millers a through route to Boston,
bypassing Chicago, and he was one of the builders and stockholders of the
Minneapolis and St. Louis Railroad.
The impression that many farmers and smaller merchants had of being at the
mercy of powerful economic monopolies was anything but modified by the
shenanigans that took place year in and year out at the Chicago Board of
Trade, where speculators and gamblers vied with each other to corner the
wheat market. The Board of Trade, which was created in 1848 at the
instigation of Chicago's merchants, soon became a sort of international
symbol of the worst elements of American free enterprise: greed; the cycle of
riches and ruin, boom and bust; corruption. There was an orgy of speculation
and market manipulation during the Civil War. The Board printed rules
governing trading in 1869, but abuses of all kinds continued-fraud, bribery
of telegraph operators to obtain confidential Information (until coded
messages were used), and the spreading of false rumors to influence prices.
Outside the trading floor at Jackson and La Salle streets, bucket shops, not
much different from bookie joints or other gambling establishments,
flourished.
The first big "corner" came in 1888. In May of that year, government crop
reports predicted a wheat shortage, and prices rose moderately. B. P. ("Old
Hutch") Hutchison began buying September futures in August. Hutchison
received and paid for much of the wheat in September, and started buying
December futures. As it became apparent that the Midwest had suffered a major
crop disaster and that European crops were also "short," the price of wheat
rose from $1.00 to $2.00 a bushel between September 22 and September 29.
Hutchison controlled a substantial amount of all the wheat in Chicago, or
deliverable to it, for long enough to extract profits of up to $1.00 a bushel
in the course of selling it to millers or speculators with commitments to
deliver wheat in Chicago.
Then, in 1897, a 28-year-old Harvard graduate by the name of Joseph Leiter
launched what the Chicago Tribune called, with its usual flair for
understatement, "probably the most gigantic and sensational attempted coup in
the history of modern commerce." Leiter was a young man of charm and good
fortune, and a carefree romantic to boot. He once talked of buying the Great
Wall of China, and he had sailed his own yacht around the world. His
millionaire father was Levi Leiter, the cofounder of Chicago's Marshall Field
department store. Leiter entered the trading pits of the Board of Trade like
a light-haired young Lochinvar with the aim of cornering all the wheat in
America. For a while it seemed that fortune would smile on him. With $1
million of his father's money, he began buying wheat futures. The. Indian and
European wheat crops had been poor, and Chicago prices rose steadily above
the price at which Leiter had begun accumulating the wheat. Leiter kept
buying, leaving the sellers with larger and larger commitments to deliver
this wheat in Chicago.
The man on the spot was Philip Armour, whose family's fortune in the city's
meat and grain business rivaled that of Leiter's. It became a point of pride,
as well as a question of money, to put Leiter in his place. Armour directed
huge quantities of wheat into Chicago, and as the Great Lakes routes from
Duluth and Canada began to freeze, he kept the waterways open for his vessels
by dynamiting passages through the ice. Armour met all of his commitments,
and the price of spring wheat from Minnesota and the Dakotas fell to under $1
a bushel. Leiter held on through the spring, and wheat prices again rose,
from 90 cents a bushel in January to $1.83 a bushel in May. But Leiter was
too greedy and refused to take his profits and quit. In June the federal
government predicted a record wheat crop and wheat prices collapsed, leaving
Leiter holding enormous quantities of overpriced wheat. He lost almost $10
million, which his father paid by selling or mortgaging his Chicago real
estate.*[ * Nigel Nicolson's Mary Curzon (New York, 1977) adds a curious
footnote to this episode. Joseph Leiter's sister Mary married George Curzon,
later to become Lord Curzon, Viceroy of India. The couple had figured on the
help of Leiter money to finance the expenses of that post, but as a result of
Joseph's losses, only $3000 of Leiter money was available. Curzon almost
turned down the job.]
These episodes caused a public clamor for reform at home and abroad. The
German government was so appalled by the developments across the Atlantic
that it banned "futures" trading from the Berlin Exchange in 1897, and
traders, merchants, and speculators there had to move their business to
Amsterdam and Liverpool.
Yet, there were reasons why the Board of Trade survived all the attacks and
barbs of its critics. The board, after all, had replaced a system that was
even more chaotic. Before the Chicago exchange opened, farmers who hauled
their grain over plank roads to the raw, new city often had to go from
merchant to merchant to find a buyer, sometimes to no avail. Sometimes, after
the harvest, when the grain converged on Chicago, there was so much of it
that it had to be dumped into Lake Michigan, and later, shortages would
develop. There was no organized system for spacing the marketing of crops out
over the year. Futures contracts gave traders, millers, merchants, and
exporters an incentive to sell grain at different times all through the year,
with the price at time of delivery guaranteed, and this in turn provided
incentives to hold grain in storage. Moreover, the fact that there was a
public price for all to see in Chicago reduced the chances that merchants
could cheat the farmers. True, the markets were often manipulated�but often
to the benefit of farmers. During Leiter's attempt to corner the wheat
market, hundreds of Midwest farmers lit candles for the man who was helping
to raise the price of wheat with his buying spree.
The grain exchanges that existed by the end of the century in Winnipeg, New
York, Buenos Aires, and many European cities were a sign that the grain
business was achieving a global organization and integration. The exchanges
were connected by the new high-speed international communications equipment;
the grain trade was the first great international business to make full use
of this new technology and of all the modern logistical systems that reduced
the size of the planet in the twentieth century.
Still the monopolies and the grain exchanges made easy and often justifiable
targets for reformers, populists, and radicals. In the 1870s, farmers felt
that railroad companies, grain elevator owners, bankers, farm implement
dealers, commission men, and speculators all were flourishing while they
often failed to, get a fair return. Typical of this sentiment was an article
in a Swedish-language newspaper published in the Midwest in 1883: "When our
people arrived in this free country, took land on the prairie, dwelt in sod
huts and endured hunger and sickness in the thought that they might become
their own master, it was only to become slaves under the president -of one or
another railroad company. We escaped from one slavery only to be soon under
another which is more unbearable now when the spirit of freedom has been
awakened in us."
The hard, lonely life on the vast prairie contributed to the farmers'
profound sense of isolated helplessness. Settlers had to contend with
grasshoppers, tornadoes, rampaging buffaloesand a silence deeper than that in
midocean. "The Great Plain drinks the blood of Christian men and is
satisfied," wrote 0. E. Rolvaag in Giants in the Earth, his pessimistic novel
of madness overtaking a prairie family. Yet difficult as it was for such
families to comprehend, they were anything but isolated. They were, in fact,
part of the world economy, and that very fact was sometimes the real source
of low grain prices.
After the Civil War, the prairie farmer, the sharecropper on the Pampas, and
the immigrant farmer in southern Australia were linked with factory workers
in Berlin, Paris, Hamburg, and Liverpool. Most of the time, this
interdependence was extremely advantageous for the United States. Wheat was
part of the patrimony of the New World. Dollar-a-bushel wheat was a worthy
goal, not just for farmers but for the whole country. Europe's wheat
requirements spurred the rapid development of the Midwest and was a source of
American well-being and prosperity. Exports of wheat and flour rose steadily,
from $60 million in 1870 to $200 million in 1898. This trade provided a
permanent transatlantic connection, and sometimes (as in the case of San
Francisco) added American ports to the trade routes of the world.
America became a crucial source of food for Europe whenever its harvests
failed or war and politics disrupted its supply lines. European importers
hurried to America during the Crimean War in 1854, again during the
Franco-Prussian War of 1870, and once more at the end of that decade when
crops failed all over Europe. Visiting America, Trollope felt that "in the
corn lands of Michigan, and amid the bluffs of Wisconsin, and on the high
table plains of Minnesota, and the prairies of Illinois, God prepared the
food for the increasing millions of the Eastern world as also for the coming
millions of the Western." *[* Anthony Trollope, North America (London,
1862).] Another, less obvious side of this was that the aggressively
marketed U.S. grain exports cut into the exports from Russia and must have
affected the prosperity of the Odessa wheat regions.
Interdependence worked both ways, of course. American agricultural prosperity
also could be affected adversely by political decisions and natural
occurrences beyond the control of anyone in the United States. It was
particularly frustrating for independent-minded Americans to recognize that,
where wheat prices were concerned, they did not control their own destiny.
"Would to God [our legislators] would rise to the present emergency and
deliver the American farmers from one of the most unjust, unfair and crushing
burdens," wrote Ivan Michels in a report to the United States Senate in March
1886. The "unfair burden" was the competition that American wheat was meeting
from Indian grain exports in the British market�a situation that American
politicians claimed had been rigged by an artificial sterling/rupee exchange
rate. And when in 1879 Chancellor Otto von Bismarck imposed stiff duties on
grain imported into Germany, the reason was political: to help the
grain-producing Junker landlords on whom his political support depended. Even
then, a century ago, agricultural trade had become a matter that was far too
important to be left to the grain traders.
The barons did prosper from the growth of the American grain business, but
their investments and innovations also helped to create, the most efficient
system in the world for producing and distributing grain. The system was
streamlined not only by advances in agricultural technology but also by the
rapid adaptation of the new. technology of communications and transportation
and by flexible new institutions, such as the futures markets. Chicago
offices were flashing prices to the hinterland by wireless in the 1880s.
Ports such as Chicago, Milwaukee, Boston, Baltimore, Philadelphia, Galveston,
and Portland, Oregon, were becoming more and more efficient in grain
handling. The building of the Erie Canal in 1825 had made it possible for
Midwest grain to reach New York City by water, via the Hudson River.
Railroads subsequently brought larger quantities of Canadian and American
grain to the Hudson River piers of lower Manhattan and Hoboken. In 1874, the
New York Produce Exchange abandoned the old system of buying grain in parcels
and lots and adopted a system of commingling grain of like grade and quality,
certifying ownership through warehouse receipts which were as good as money.
The system vastly expedited the handling and storage of grain. At the turn of
the century, ocean liners of American and European shipping lines did a
lively grain business out of New York and Boston, sometimes using grain as
ballast on passenger vessels, and at other times hauling grain back to Europe
on the same ships that had transported European emigrants to America.
In the farmers' fights with the "interests" to get their fair share of the
benefits of these efficiencies, both the courts and the government came (if
slowly) to the side of the farmers. The oppressive feudalism that prevailed
in Europe and in the Argentine Pampas never took hold in the American grain
belt. The 1862 Homestead Act heeded rural demands for "free soil" by opening
up large tracts of public land for settlement on 160-acre plots. It was a
commitment to the family farmer. In that same presidential term, Abraham
Lincoln established the land-grant college system and created the Department
of Agriculture, steps that helped regionalize the nation's educational
infrastructure to the benefit of the farm states of the Midwest. With its
landmark decision in 1876 in Munn v. Illinois, the Supreme Court established
the right of the states to regulate private-grain warehouses (and, by
implication, other private corporations such as the railroads). Eleven years
later Congress passed the Interstate Commerce Act. In 1902, Congress
tightened restrictions against railroad "rebating"�the practice by which the
roads subsidized favored grain companies and kept their control over the
wheat economy.
To the north, in Canada, farmers also made some progress in their demands for
a better deal from railroads and grain merchants. The Manitoba Grain Act of
1900 provided for regulation of grain dealers and for increased competition
at shipping points. Subsequently, a federal agency took over the job of
assigning boxcars to grain collection points, and in 1912 the Canada Grain
Act established mandatory federal grading of grain to prevent merchants from
cheating farmers.
In America, the foundations of the- future grain power had been constructed
by the time of World War I-and in an epochally American way: with
opportunists, go-getters, technical efficiency, and crude exploitation, but
also with a sense, conveyed especially by the immigrants arriving in the
Midwest, that it was still better than anything that had been left behind.
pps 75-101
-----
Aloha, He'Ping,
Om, Shalom, Salaam.
Em Hotep, Peace Be,
Omnia Bona Bonis,
All My Relations.
Adieu, Adios, Aloha.
Amen.
Roads End
Kris
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