-Caveat Lector-

DISMANTLING FORMER YUGOSLAVIA,
               RECOLONISING BOSNIA

                    by Michel Chossudovsky

          The author is Professor of Economics at the University of Ottawa.
          Copyright by Michel Chossudovsky, Ottawa, 1996. This text can
          be posted. For publication in printed form kindly request
          permission from the author: E-Mail:[EMAIL PROTECTED], fax:
          1-613-7892050.

     As heavily-armed NATO troops enforce the peace in Bosnia, the press and
     politicians alike portray Western intervention in the former Yugoslavia as a
     noble, if agonizingly belated, response to an outbreak of ethnic massacres
     and human rights violations. In the wake of the November 1995 Dayton
     Peace Accords, the West is eager to touch up its self-portrait as saviour of
     the Southern Slavs and get on with "the work of rebuilding" the newly
     sovereign states.

     But following a pattern set since the onslaught of the civil war, Western public
     opinion has been misled. The conventional wisdom, exemplified by the
     writings of former US Ambassador to Yugoslavia Robert Zimmermann, is
     that the plight of the Balkans is the outcome of an "aggressive nationalism",
     the inevitable result of deep-seated ethnic and religious tensions rooted in
     history.1 Likewise, much has been made of the "Balkans power-play" and
     the clash of political personalities: "Tudjman and Milosevic are tearing
     Bosnia-Herzegovina to pieces".2

     Drowned in the barrage of images and self-serving analyses are the
     economic and social causes of the conflict. The deep-seated economic
     crisis which preceded the civil war has long been forgotten. The strategic
     interests of Germany and the US in laying the groundwork for the
     disintegration of Yugoslavia go unmentioned, as does the role of external
     creditors and international financial institutions. In the eyes of the global
     media, Western powers bear no responsibility for the impoverishment and
     destruction of a nation of 24 million people.  But through their domination of
     the global financial system, the Western powers, pursuing their collective and
     individual "strategic interests" helped from the beginning of the 1980s, bring
     the Yugoslav economy to its knees, contributing to stirring simmering ethnic
     and social conflicts. Now, the efforts of the international financial community
     are channelled towards "helping Yugoslavia's war-ravaged successor
     states". Yet while the World's attention is focused on troop movements and
     cease fires, creditors and international financial institutions are busy at work
     collecting former Yugoslavia's external debt, while transforming the Balkans
     into a safe-haven for free enterprise.

     Adopted in several stages since the early 1980s, the reforms imposed by
     Belgrade's creditors wreaked economic and political havoc leading to
     disintegration of the industrial sector and the piece-meal dismantling of the
     Yugoslav Welfare State. Despite Belgrade's political non-alignment and
     extensive trading relations with the US and the European Community, the
     Reagan administration had targeted the Yugoslav economy in a "Secret
     Sensitive" 1984 National Security Decision Directive (NSDD 133) entitled
     "United States Policy towards Yugoslavia". A censored version of this
     document declassified in 1990 largely conformed to a previous National
     Security Decision Directive (NSDD 54) on Eastern Europe issued in 1982.
     Its objectives included "expanded efforts to promote a `quiet revolution' to
     overthrow Communist governments and parties"... while reintegrating the
     countries of Eastern Europe into the orbit of the World market.3

     Secessionist tendencies feeding on social and ethnic divisions, gained
     impetus precisely during a period of brutal impoverishment of the Yugoslav
     population. The first phase of macro-economic reform initiated in 1980
     shortly before the death of Marshall Tito "wreaked economic and political
     havoc... Slower growth, the accumulation of foreign debt and especially the
     cost of servicing it as well as devaluation led to a fall in the standard of 
living
     of the average Yugoslav... The economic crisis threatened political stability ...
     it also threatened to aggravate simmering ethnic tensions".4 These reforms
     accompanied by the signing of debt restructuring agreements with the official
     and commercial creditors also served to weaken the institutions of the
     federal State creating political divisions between Belgrade and the
     governments of the Republics and Autonomous Provinces. "The Prime
     Minister Milka Planinc, who was supposed to carry out the programme, had
     to promise the IMF an immediate increase of the discount rates and much
     more for the Reaganomics arsenal of measures..."5

     Following the initial phase of macro-economic reform in 1980, industrial
     growth plummeted to 2.8 percent in the 1980-87 period, plunging to zero in
     1987-88 and to -10.6 percent in 1990.6 The economic reforms reached their
     climax under the pro-US government of Prime Minister Ante Markovic. In the
     Autumn of 1989 just prior to the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the federal
     Premier had travelled to Washington to meet President George Bush. A
     "financial aid package" had been promised in exchange for sweeping
     economic reforms including a new devalued currency, the freeze of wages, a
     drastic curtailment of government expenditure and the abrogation of the
     socially owned enterprises under self-management.7 The "economic
     therapy" (launched in January 1990) contributed to crippling the federal State
     system. State revenues which should have gone as transfer payments to the
     republics and autonomous provinces were instead funnelled towards
     servicing Belgrade's debt with the Paris and London clubs. The republics
     were largely left to their own devices thereby exacerbating the process of
     political fracturing. In one fell swoop, the reformers had engineered the
     demise of the federal fiscal structure and mortally wounded its federal
     political institutions. The IMF induced budgetary crisis created an economic
     "fait accompli" which in part paved the way for Croatia's and Slovenia's
     formal secession in June 1991.       The Agreement with the IMF

     The economic package was launched in January 1990 under an IMF
     Stand-by Arrangement (SBA) and a World Bank Structural Adjustment Loan
     (SAL II). The budget cuts requiring the redirection of federal revenues
     towards debt servicing, were conducive to the suspension of transfer
     payments by Belgrade to the governments of the Republics and Autonomous
     Provinces thereby fuelling the process of political balcanisation and
     secessionism. The government of Serbia rejected Markovic's austerity
     programme outright leading to a walk-out protest of some 650,000 Serbian
     workers directed against the Federal government.8 The Trade Union
     movement was united in this struggle: "worker resistance crossed ethnic
     lines, as Serbs, Croats, Bosnians and Slovenians mobilised (...) shoulder to
     shoulder with their fellow workers (...).9

     The 1989 Enterprise Reforms

     The 1989 enterprise reforms adopted under Premier Ante Markovic played
     a central role in steering the industrial sector into bankruptcy. By 1990, the
     annual rate of growth of GDP had collapsed to -7.5 percent.10 In 1991, GDP
     declined by a further 15 percent, industrial output collapsed by 21 percent.11
     The restructuring programme demanded by Belgrade's creditors was
     intended to abrogate the system of socially owned enterprises. The
     Enterprise Law of 1989 required abolishing the "Basic Organizations of
     Associated Labour (BAOL)".12 The latter were socially-owned productive
     units under self-management with the Workers' Council constituting the main
     decision making body. The 1989 Enterprise Law required the transformation
     of the BOALs into private capitalist enterprises with the Worker's Council
     replaced by a so-called "Social Board" under the control of the enterprise's
     owners including its creditors.13 "The objective was to subject the Yugoslav
     economy to massive privatisation and the dismantling of the public sector.
     Who was to carry it out? The Communist Party bureaucracy, most notably its
     military and intelligence sector, was canvassed specifically and offered
     political and economic backing on the condition that wholesale scuttling of
     social protections for Yugoslavia's workforce was imposed...".14

     Overhauling The Legal Framework

     A number of supporting pieces of legislation were put in place in a hurry with
     the assistance of Western lawyers and consultants. A new Banking Law was
     enacted with a view to triggering the liquidation of the socially owned
     "Associated Banks". More than half the country's banks were dismantled, the
     emphasis was on the formation of "independent profit oriented
     institutions".15 By 1990, the entire "three-tier banking system" consisting of
     the National Bank of Yugoslavia, the national banks of the eight Republics
     and autonomous provinces and the commercial banks had been dismantled
     under the guidance of the World Bank.16 A World Bank Financial Sector
     Adjustment Loan was being negotiated in 1990. It was to be adopted by the
     Belgrade government in 1991...

     The Bankruptcy Programme

     Industrial enterprises had been carefully categorised. Under the IMF-World
     Bank sponsored reforms, credit to the industrial sector had been frozen with
     a view to speeding up the bankruptcy process. So-called "exit mechanisms"
     had been established under the provisions of the 1989 Financial Operations
     Act.17 The latter stipulated that if an enterprise were to remain insolvent for
     30 days running, or for 30 days within a 45 day period, it must hold a meeting
     within the next 15 days with its creditors in view of arriving at a settlement.
     This mechanism allowed creditors (including national and foreign banks) to
     routinely convert their loans into a controlling equity in the insolvent
     enterprise. Under the Act, the government was not authorised to intervene. In
     case a settlement was not reached, bankruptcy procedures would be
     initiated in which case workers would not normally receive severance
     payments.18

     In 1989, according to official sources, 248 firms were steered into
     bankruptcy or were liquidated and 89,400 workers had been laid off.19
     During the first nine months of 1990 directly following the adoption of the IMF
     programme, another 889 enterprises with a combined work-force of 525,000
     workers were subjected to bankruptcy procedures.20 In other words, in less
     than two years "the trigger mechanism" (under the Financial Operations Act)
     had led to the lay off of more than 600,000 workers (out of a total industrial
     workforce of the order of 2.7 million). The largest concentrations of bankrupt
     firms and lay-offs were in Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and
     Kosovo.21

     Many socially owned enterprises attempted to avoid bankruptcy through the
     non payment of wages. Half a million workers representing some 20 percent
     of the industrial labour force were not paid during the early months of 1990,
     in order to meet the demands of creditors under the "settlement" procedures
     stipulated in the Law on Financial Organisations. Real earnings were in a
     free fall, social programmes had collapsed, with the bankruptcies of
     industrial enterprises, unemployment had become rampant, creating within
     the population an atmosphere of social despair and hopelessness. "When
     Mr. Markovic finally started his "programmed privatisation", the republican
     oligarchies, who all had visions of a "national renaissance" of their own,
     instead of choosing between a genuine Yugoslav market and hyperinflation,
     opted for war which would disguise the real causes of the economic
     catastrophe".22

     The January 1990 IMF sponsored package contributed unequivocally to
     increasing enterprise losses while precipitating many of the large electric,
     petroleum refinery, machinery, engineering and chemical enterprises into
     bankruptcy. Moreover, with the deregulation of the trade regime in January
     1990, a flood of imported commodities contributed to further destabilising
     domestic production. These imports were financed with borrowed money
     granted under the IMF package (ie. the various "quick disbursing loans"
     granted by the IMF, the World Bank and bilateral donors in support of the
     economic reforms). While the import bonanza was fuelling the build-up of
     Yugoslavia's external debt, the abrupt hikes in interest rates and input prices
     imposed on national enterprises had expedited the displacement and
     exclusion of domestic producers from their own national market.

     "Shedding Surplus Workers"

     The situation prevailing in the months preceding the Secession of Croatia
     and Slovenia (June 1991) (confirmed by the 1989-90 bankruptcy figures)
     points to the sheer magnitude and brutality of the process of industrial
     dismantling. The figures, however, provide but a partial picture, depicting the
     situation at the outset of the "bankruptcy programme". The latter has
     continued unabated throughout the period of the civil War and its aftermath...
     Similar industrial restructuring programmes were imposed by external
     creditors on Yugoslavia's successor states.

     The World Bank had estimated that there were still in September 1990,
     2,435 "loss-making" enterprises out of a remaining total of 7,531.23 In other
     words, these 2,435 firms with a combined work-force of more than 1,3
     million workers had been categorised as "insolvent" under the provisions of
     the Financial Operations Act, requiring the immediate implementation of
     bankruptcy procedures. Bearing in mind that 600,000 workers had already
     been laid off by bankrupt firms prior to September 1990, these figures
     suggest that some 1.9 million workers (out of a total of 2.7 million) had been
     classified as "redundant". The "insolvent" firms concentrated in the Energy,
     Heavy Industry, Metal processing, Forestry and Textiles sectors were among
     the largest industrial enterprises in the country representing (in September
     1990) 49.7 percent of the total (remaining and employed) industrial
     work-force.24

     Political Disintegration

     Supporting broad strategic interests, the austerity measures had laid the
     basis for "the recolonisation" of the Balkans. In the multi-party elections in
     1990, economic policy was at the centre of the political debate, the
     separatist coalitions ousted the Communists in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina
     and Slovenia.

     Following the decisive victory in Croatia of the rightist Democratic Union in
     May 1990 under the leadership of Franjo Tudjman, the separation of Croatia
     received the formal assent of the German Foreign Minister Mr. Hans Dietrich
     Genscher who was in almost daily contact with his Croatian counterpart in
     Zagreb.25 Germany not only favoured secession, it was also "forcing the
     pace of international diplomacy" and pressuring its Western allies to grant
     recognition to Slovenia and Croatia. The borders of Yugoslavia are
     reminiscent of World War II when Croatia (including the territories of
     Bosnia-Herzegovina) was an Axis satellite under the fascist Ustasa regime:
     "German expansion has been accompanied by a rising tide of nationalism
     and xenophobia... Germany has been seeking a free hand among its allies
     to pursue economic dominance in the whole of Mitteleuropa..."26
     Washington on the other hand, favoured "a loose unity while encouraging
     democratic development... [the US Secretary of State] Baker told [Croatia's
     President] Franjo Tudjman and [Slovenia's President] Milan Kucan that the
     United States would not encourage or support unilateral secession... but if
     they had to leave, he urged them to leave by a negotiated agreement"... 27

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