-Caveat Lector- from: http://www.vietvet.org/jeffviet.htm <A HREF="http://www.vietvet.org/jeffviet.htm">How the U.S. Got Involved In Vietnam </A> --[2]-- The Geneva Conference As the time for the Geneva conference approached, a CIA propaganda team in Singapore began to disseminate fabricated news items to advance the idea that "the Chinese were giving full-armed support to the Vietminh" and to "identify" the Vietminh "with the world Communist movement." The CIA believed that such stories would strengthen the non-Communist side at the Geneva talks.(34) The Geneva Conference was held from April 26 to July 21, 1954 and officially registered France's defeat by the Vietminh. It was meant as a face-saving method for France to disengage from Vietnam. The conference agreements were designed to open the way for internationally supported accords by which outstanding problems between the contending parties could be peacefully resolved. By now, France was under considerable political pressure back home to get the hell out of Vietnam. The US was not happy with the whole idea of the Geneva conference since it precluded any further military effort to defeat the Vietminh. In fact, while the conference was still in session in June, the US began assembling a paramilitary team inside Vietnam. By August, just days after the close of the conference, the team was in place. This, of course, was strictly contrary to the spirit of the Geneva Conference and the agreements that were made. This team, under the guidance of Colonel Edward Lansdale (whose activities were later enshrined in two semi-fictional works, The Ugly American and The Quite American), carried out a campaign of military and psychological warfare against the Vietminh.(35) Washington was walking a political fence with regard to the Geneva conference. Congressional elections were coming up and everyone knew that Eisenhower had won his election as a Peacemaker in Korea. No one would relish another war so soon after Korea. On the other hand, Washington was determined not to allow Vietnam to go communist. This would have exposed the Republicans to the same charges they leveled against the Democrats in 1952, when the 'loss of China to communism" charge was prominent. So they decided to have it both ways -- appear to go along with the agreements while simultaneously working to undermine them. The US refused to give its full approval to the Geneva agreements, but did issue a "unilateral declaration" in which it agreed to "refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb" the accords -- a bold-face lie. Washington had additional concerns about a negotiated settlement. As early as 1948, top policy makers were afraid that Vietnamese independence might fan "anti-Western Pan-asiatic tendencies in the region," undermining the "close association between newly-autonomous peoples and powers which have been long responsible [for] their welfare." In Indochina, the responsible authority was France, whose tender care had left the area devastated and starving. Washington also wanted to keep China from exerting any influence "so that the peoples of Indochina will not be hampered in their natural developments by the pressure of an alien people and alien interests," unlike the US and France, of course. The hypocrisy expressed here is quite incredible.(36) That the US had the right to restore the "close association" noted above is somehow taken for granted. It follows then that any problems in the area are going to come from nationalistic aspirations of the Vietnamese, not our own imperialistic tendencies. Thus, again in 1948, the CIA warned Washington that "The gravest danger to the US is that friction engendered by [anti-colonialism and economic nationalism] may drive the so-called colonial bloc into alignment with the USSR." In other words, we must make sure that the traditional "colonial economic interests" of the industrial countries must prevail if "friction" interferes with US global plans. The intent is that Indochina would have to remain under "its traditional subordination," as Melvyn Lefler observes, reviewing a broad scholarly consensus.(37) Another Washington concern was Japan, sometimes referred to as the "superdomino" (John Dower). The old order had to be restored following World War II, and Japan had to be protected from what the State Department called the "concealed aggression" of the Russians, referring to internal political developments that might threaten business rule. Japan had to be deterred from independent foreign and economic policies, from "the suicide of neutralism" (General Omar Bradley) and any accommodation to China. The only hope, according to George Kennan (US Global Planner and referred to as "the father of the Cold War"), lay in restoring for Japan "some sort of Empire toward the South." In effect, the US must provide Japan with its wartime "co-prosperity sphere," now safely within the US-dominated world system, with no fear that US business interests would be denied their proper place.(38) On April 7, 1954, President Eisenhower warned in a news conference that Japan would have to turn "toward the Communist areas in order to live" if Communist success in Indochina "takes away, in its economic aspects, that region that Japan must have as a trading area." The consequences would be "just incalculable to the free world." Walter LeFeber observed in 1968 that "This thesis became a controlling assumption: the loss of Vietnam would mean the economic undermining and probable loss of Japan to Communist markets and ultimately to Communist influence if not control." Eisenhower's public statements expressed the conclusion of NSC 5405 (January 16) that "the loss of Southeast Asia, especially of Malaya and Indonesia, could result in such economic and political pressures in Japan as to make it extremely difficult to prevent Japan's eventual accommodation to communism." Thus, Communist domination of Southeast Asia "by whatever means" would "critically endanger" US "security interests," understood in the usual se nse. The "loss of Vietnam" would therefore be of great significance. That it is somehow ours to "lose" is again taken for granted.(39) Given such doctrines, it is obvious why a diplomatic settlement at the 1954 Geneva conference was regarded as a disaster. Washington reacted vigorously. For six months, starting with the Geneva conference, Colonel Lansdale's paramilitary team carried out the following operations, all while the United States publicly was pretending to promise not to interfere with the conference agreements: Encouraged the migration of Vietnamese from the North to the South through "an extremely intensive, well-coordinated, and, in terms of its objective, very successful... psychological warfare operation. Propaganda slogans and leaflets appealed to devout Catholics with such themes as 'Christ has gone to the South' and 'Virgin Mary has departed from the North'"(40) Distributed other bogus leaflets, supposedly put out by the Viet Minh, to instill trepidation in the minds of people in the north about how life would be under Communist rule. The following day, refugee registration to move south tripled. This exodus of people moving to the south after the Geneva Accords was often cited by American officials in the 1960's, as well as earlier, as proof that the people did not want to live under communism. They claimed that "they voted with their feet." Other "Viet Minh" leaflets were aimed at discouraging people in the south from returning north. Infiltrated paramilitary forces into the north under the guise of individuals choosing to live there. Contaminated the oil supply of the bus company in Hanoi so as to lead to a gradual wreckage of the bus engines. Took "the first actions for delayed sabotage of the railroad (which required teamwork with a CIA special technical team in Japan who performed their part brilliantly)..." Instigated a rumor campaign to stir up hatred of the Chinese, with the usual stories of rapes. Created and distributed an almanac of astrological predictions carefully designed to play on the Vietnamese fears and superstitions and undermine life in the north while making the future of the south appear more attractive. Published and circulated anti-Communist articles and "news" reports in the newspapers and leaflets. Attempted, unsuccessfully, to destroy the largest printing establishment in the north because it intended to remain in Hanoi and do business with the Viet Minh. Laid some of the foundation for the future American war in Vietnam by: sending selected Vietnamese to US Pacific bases for guerrilla training; training the armed forces of the south who had fought with the French; creating various military support facilities in the Philippines; smuggling into Vietnam large quantities of arms and military equipment to be stored in hidden locations; developing plans for the "pacification of the Viet Minh and dissident areas."(41) At the same time, the US began an economic boycott against the North Vietnamese and threatened to blacklist French firms which were doing business with them. While the US was trying to appear aloof to the Geneva conference (while taking steps to undermine them), the Russians and the Chinese were pushing the Vietminh to come to a peaceful settlement. Both of these powers applied pressure to the Vietminh in order to get them to reduce their demands on the French. This restraint probably was induced by their recently adopted stance of "peaceful coexistence," which aimed at reducing international tension. Plus, they were both concerned that US support of the French might extend beyond Indochina. No doubt they realized that overly severe demands on the French would play into the hands of those US politicians who had advocated using the "bomb" at Dienbienphu. Germany was also on Russia's mind. The Soviet Union reportedly hoped that by moderating the Vietminh's demands on the French and upholding some of France's proposals, this might induce the French to stay out of the projected US-sponsored European Defense Community. As for China, her economic programs and newly-embarked upon moderation in foreign policy, demanded that she oppose any spread of the fighting in Indochina. Besides, after Korea, China didn't want to give the US any excuse for putting troops on her southern border. Thus, the Chinese joined the Russians in advising the Vietminh to settle for an incomplete victory over the French. The Vietminh also had their own reasons for negotiating a settlement with the French. The effort it would have taken to finish the French off completely would have been extremely costly, especially if the US were to enter the conflict. Vietminh political leaders were not willing to assume the responsibility for failing to come to a settlement. The Vietnamese people were war-weary and the Vietminh depended on their support for any continued conflict, so it was wise to end the fighting as soon as possible. And if the Geneva agreements were fully implemented, they would have met these objectives. Under the Geneva Agreement, the Vietminh could (and did) expect to win on a political plane the struggle it was already winning militarily. It could expect to regain control over the South. The firm pledge of nation-wide elections was of key importance in the Vietminh's agreement to the temporary surrender of the 17th parallel. Without this promise of elections, the Vietminh would never have agreed to withdraw their force into less than half the country's territory. By the time the Geneva conference opened, the Vietminh already dominated three-quarters of the country and was poised to take more. At Geneva, the Vietminh agreed to evacuate the rich rice-growing Mekong delta and the vast stretch of land between the 13th and 17th parallels that had constituted one of its major political bastions. Had the Vietminh any indication that this evacuation was going to be permanent, they would never have agreed to such a major concession. In withdrawing to the North, the Vietminh was not being asked to give up its struggle for all of Vietnam, but only to transfer their struggle from the military plane to the political plane. Either way, the Vietminh fully expected victory. This was an expectation also shared by most of the Western participants of the conference. The Geneva conference produced two important agreements: the bilateral armistice agreement between France and the Vietminh and the later and more publicized multilateral Final Declaration.(42) The "Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet Nam" was signed on July 20, 1954, by Brigadier Henri Delteil, acting for the "Commander in Chief of the French Union forces in Indo-China" and by Ta Quang Buu, Vice-Minister of National Defense of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, in behalf of the "Commander in Chief of the People's Army of Vietnam." It incorporated the following features: First, there was to be established a "provisional military demarcation line" (fixed at the 17th parallel) "on either side of which the forces of the two parties of the People's Army of Viet Nam [Vietminh] to the north of the line and the forces of the French Union to the south" (Article 1). The maximum period of this regrouping was not to exceed 300 days from the date of the armistice entered into force (Article 2). Civil administration of the north was to be in the hands of the Vietminh, and the area south of the parallel was to be in the hands of the French (Article 8). Article 14 detailed provisions for political and administrative control of the two regrouping zones pending general elections. Paragraph (a) states in full: "Pending the general elections which will bring about the unification of Viet Nam, the conduct of civil administration in each regrouping zone shall be in the hands of the party whose forces are to be regrouped there in virtue of the present Agreement." Paragraphs (c) and (d) of Article 14 provided that during the 300-day period allotted for regroupment of troops, civilians residing north and south of the parallel were to be "permitted and helped" to cross the parallel if they so desired. Both parties to the agreements promised "to refrain from any reprisals or discrimination against persons or organization on account of their activities during the hostilities and to guarantee their democratic liberties." Article 16 banned the introduction into any part of Vietnam, North or South, of "any troop reinforcements and additional military personnel" from the outside world. Article 17 banned "the introduction into Viet Nam of any reinforcements in the form of all types of arms, munitions and other war materiel, such as combat aircraft, naval craft, pieces of ordnance, jet engines and jet weapons, and armoured vehicles." Article 18 forbade the establishment of "new military bases." The purpose of Article 19 was the neutralization of all of Vietnam. It stated: "[N]o military base under the control of a foreign State may be established in the re-grouping zone of either party; the two parties shall ensure that the zone assigned to them do not adhere to any military alliance and are not used for the resumption of military hostilities or to further an aggressive policy." Article 29 and many others provided for the establishment of an International Commission (consisting of Canada, India and Poland) to oversee the implementation of the agreements and make sure that both sides were complying. (Its authority was undermined however, by the fact that a unanimous vote was required to get anything done.) The day after the signing of the above armistice agreement the Final Declaration was brought before the delegates. This agreement endorsed the preceding armistice agreement for Vietnam, together with those for Laos and Cambodia. Two particular paragraphs are important enough to be quoted in full. Paragraph 6 reads: "The Conference recognizes that the essential purpose of the agreement relating to Viet Nam is to settle military questions with a view to ending hostilities and that the military demarcation line is provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary. The Conference expresses its conviction that the execution of the provisions set out in the present declaration and in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities creates the necessary basis for the achievement in the near future of a political settlement in Viet Nam." Paragraph 7 focused on the election and reunification: "The Conference declares that, so far as Viet Nam is concerned, the settlement of political problems, effected on the basis of respect for the principles of independence, unity and territorial integrity, shall permit the Vietnamese people to enjoy the fundamental freedoms, guaranteed by democratic institutions established as a result of free general elections by secret ballot. In order to ensure that sufficient progress in the restoration of peace has been made, and that all the necessary conditions obtain for free expression of the national will, general elections shall be held in July 1956, under the supervision of an international commission composed of representatives of the Member States of the International Supervisory Commission, referred to in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities. Consultations will be held on this subject between the competent representative authorities of the two zones from July 20, 1955, onwards." This last paragraph is often misrepresented. Please note that in no way did it render the internationally supervised elections to be dependent on the prior establishment of "fundamental freedoms and democratic institutions" in either of the regrouped areas. Rather, consistent with Article 14a of the armistice, it stated that these freedoms and institutions were the anticipated benefits of a unified Vietnamese nation to be established as a result of the nation-wide elections. The Vietminh justifiably expected that the French would back the International Commission by arranging for the pre-election consultations and in supervising the actual balloting in mid-1956. The Vietminh had the further assurance that any administration succeeding the French prior to the 1956 elections would legally assume France's obligations and "be responsible for ensuring the observance and enforcement of the terms and provisions" of the agreements entered into between the Vietminh and France.(43) The declaration was endorsed by the recorded oral assent of the representatives of the United Kingdom, the People's Republic of China, the USSR, Cambodia, and Laos, as well as by France and the Vietminh. The delegates had to change to an oral declaration rather than a written at the last minute, due to the refusal of US Secretary of State Dulles to affix an American name to the settlement. The US and Bao Dai's State of Vietnam refused to register even an oral assent. The fact that the USSR, China and Great Britain all endorsed the basic provisions of the armistice no doubt further strengthened the Vietminh's belief that a feature as central as the promised elections would certainly be honored. And even though the US refused to endorse the agreements, it did make a unilateral declaration with regard to the elections. Under-Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith stated: "In connection with the statement in the Declaration concerning free elections in Viet Nam, my government wishes to make clear its position which it has expressed in a Declaration made in Washington on June 29, 1954, as follows: 'In the case of nations now divided against their will, we shall continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections, supervised by the United Nations to ensure that they are conducted fairly.'" With no indication whatsoever that the US would oppose the elections, the Vietminh felt confident that they would be held. The US also declared that it would "refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb them" [the agreements] and "would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security." (Knowing what we know now, it's obvious that the US was only referring to Vietnamese aggression and not our own.) It is important to note that the US declaration made no reference at all to a "South" or "North" Vietnam. In fact, every reference in the US declaration referred to a single Vietnam. Many people believe today that the Geneva Conference split Vietnam into two separate pieces or states. It did not! What it did do is split the country into two contesting parties within a single national state. Both the Vietminh (the Democratic Republic of Vietnam) and the French-supported Bao Dai (the State of Vietnam) continued after the Geneva accords to lay claim to the entire country. The difference after the conference was that the argument between the two contending parties would now, by agreement, be carried out politically rather than militarily. However, there was one important disparity in the positions of these two contestants: The Geneva Agreements authorized the Vietminh to administer the North while preparing for elections in both; on the other hand, the responsibility for administration of the South lay not with the Vietnamese party headed by Bao Dai, which was to compete in the elections, but with the French instead. This was an advantage for the Vietminh, for while they would be administrating their regroupment zone and preparing for elections in both zones, Bao Dai in the south would be partnered with the French, thus disadvantaged by its popular image as a semi-colonial subordinate of the French administration. The division of Vietnam was military, not a physical dismemberment of the country. There was nothing in the agreements preventing the peaceful political activity of either contestant in the zone of the other. In fact, the very scheduling of the elections demonstrated that political campaigning was to be expected. Had this not been the case, the Vietminh certainly would not have agreed to the concessions. France signed the armistice in Geneva on behalf of all Vietnamese in the areas it still controlled including the 369,000 members of the Vietnamese National Army that constituted part of the French Union. Bao Dai couldn't sign because the military he had command of only consisted of a personal bodyguard. Although nothing prevented the French from transferring political power to Bao Dai, remember that the Geneva Agreement specified that any successor to the French would have to comply with the agreements. Knowing this, later popular arguments that Bao Dai's refusal to assent to the Final Declaration therefore provided him with the right to reject selected aspects of the agreements don't hold up. In fact, the political "State of Vietnam" remained an artificial construction of France, quite devoid of any popular following. France, halfway through the Geneva Conference, did issue a statement promising more independence, but this was not to happen until well after the conference ended. Indeed, it was not until January 1, 1955 that Bao Dai's Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem could proclaim real independence from France, and it was another two months before the French handed control over the French Union forces to the Saigon government. Given the fact that Bao Dai's representatives at the Geneva Conference couldn't really play a role and lacked any genuine authority among the Vietnamese, it is understandable that they would oppose an agreement that had elections as its political keystone. They could easily foresee that an election would expose the meagerness of their following and demonstrate all the more clearly that the State of Vietnam owed its existence solely to French military power rather than the will of the Vietnamese people. Vietnamese politicians who owed their position to France would be facing men in the election who were regarded by all their countrymen as the victorious leaders of Vietnam's independence struggle. But, by now France wanted out of Vietnam so bad that she was willing to pay the political price. Of course, Washington was extremely upset about the prospect of elections in Vietnam, for Washington knew who would win. A high-ranking State Department official said: "it would be an understatement to say that we do not like the terms of the cease-fire agreement just concluded."(44) In 1961, the State Department "White Paper" declared: "It was the Communist's calculation that nationwide elections scheduled in the Accords for 1956 would turn all of Viet-Nam over to them. With total control over the more populous North in their hands, the Communists assumed they would be able to promote enough support in the South for their cause to win in any balloting. The primary focus of the Communists' activity during the post-Geneva period was on political action -- promoting discontent with the Government in Saigon and seeking to win supporters for Hanoi. The authorities in South Viet-Nam refused to fall into this well-laid trap."(45) Trap? What trap? In fact, this "trap" constituted an essential provision of the Geneva Agreements and was the major reason the Vietminh had accepted the armistice. More than willing to undermine the Geneva Agreements covertly, but unwilling to give the outward appearance of contradicting the agreements, Washington went about circumventing them by forming a defense treaty for the other Asian countries that might fall like "dominoes" after a successful Communist victory in Vietnam. The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and Protocol (signed at Manila, September 8, 1954) which became known as SEATO was supposed to serve as a barrier against the further spread of communist political power. It was meant to provide a cloak of protection for Cambodia and Laos against aggression from communist power and inhibit the Vietminh from establishing control over the rest of Vietnam. However, SEATO was never embraced by the major neutralist states of Burma, India and Indonesia. As a result it ended up as an arrangement dominated by the United States and its Western allies. The only Asian members it attracted were Thailand, the Philippines and Pakistan (who saw the pact as a means of strengthening itself against India rather than support of American purposes in Southeast Asia). The other signatories to SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization) were the US, the United Kingdom, France, Australia and New Zealand. On the day the treaty was signed, the same parties unanimously designated the states of Cambodia and Laos as "the free territory under the jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam" (Article IV of the treaty). This fell short of a commitment by the US to aid any government or state of South Vietnam, which would have been a direct violation of the Geneva Agreements, but definitely still violated the spirit of the agreements, implying that the 17th parallel had a political character and went against the neutral status of the southernmost regroupment zone. This was an early signal of the American intent to underwrite a separate state in southern Vietnam if, despite the inadmissibility of this under the Geneva Agreements, one could be established. Paragraph 3 of Article IV stipulated that should the states of Cambodia and Laos or "the free territory under the jurisdiction of the States of Vietnam" so request, they could be recipients of the same protection by SEATO as was accorded to the non-Indochina areas covered in the body of the agreement. Thus, Washington utilized SEATO negotiations to offset the results of the Geneva accords. Through SEATO, the US helped provide statehood for a territory that was in fact nothing more than one of two temporary zones, thereby ignoring the stipulation that the country was to be unified in two years time. By providing protection in advance to the southern regrouping area from an attack by indigenous forces based in the other half of the same country, SEATO encouraged Vietnamese with a vested interest in this artificial division to maintain it and transform the 17th parallel into a permanent political boundary. But SEATO was only one half of a two-pronged US effort to scuttle the Geneva accords. The other prong was the US effort to inject sufficient power into the regime headed by Bao Dai and Ngo Dinh Diem in order to render it politically viable to stand as a separate state. --[cont]-- Aloha, He'Ping, Om, Shalom, Salaam. Em Hotep, Peace Be, Omnia Bona Bonis, All My Relations. Adieu, Adios, Aloha. Amen. Roads End Kris DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER ========== CTRL is a discussion and informational exchange list. Proselyzting propagandic screeds are not allowed. Substance�not soapboxing! 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