-Caveat Lector- washingtonpost.com http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A12030- 2003Jan18?language=printer
> The highest-profile case of tribal justice occurred in 1996, when > Hussein's two sons-in-law, Hussein Kamel Hassan Majeed and Saddam > Kamel Hassan Majeed, returned to Iraq after defecting to Jordan and > disclosing secrets about Iraq's weapons programs. The brothers were > killed during a night-long gun battle, not with the police or the > military, but with members of their own tribe seeking to redeem the > family's honor. Iraqi Wild Card Tribal Loyalties Hard to Predict By Rajiv Chandrasekaran Washington Post Foreign Service Sunday, January 19, 2003; Page A01 RASHIDIYA, Iraq -- The sheik gazed left, then right, looking at a half-dozen farmers in mud- speckled robes seated in his vast receiving room. Supplicant in posture and effusive in flattery, they drank several cups of sweet tea before a young man named Mohammed summoned the courage to ask the question that had brought them to their leader at dinnertime. Was their tribe, the Fudhool, ready for a U.S. attack? The sheik, Fadhil Abbas Jassim, 69, with a gravelly voice and a gray-speckled beard, smiled. Then he chortled, causing his gold-fringed cloak to flap about. The Fudhool recently received a few thousand automatic rifles from the government, he informed the farmers, and more were on the way. The guns would be handed out soon. Everyone would be armed. After the farmers departed into the balmy night, appearing reassured, Jassim turned to a visitor. "If there is a war, they will fight on my command," he proclaimed. "They will defend our land against foreign aggression." He added after a moment's pause, "But if there is a need for peace, of course they will listen to me." As Bush administration officials and U.S. military commanders try to predict how Iraqis would react to a possible U.S. invasion aimed at toppling President Saddam Hussein, the behavior of the country's armed and influential tribes has emerged as a wild card. The vast majority of Iraq's 24 million people affiliate themselves with tribal groups, and sociologists here estimate that more than a third retain some degree of loyalty to their tribal leaders. Will the tribal leaders stick by Hussein, who has wooed them since the end of the 1991 Persian Gulf War by doling out cash, land and cars, as well as increased authority in rural Iraq? Or will they welcome the Americans and help them fight the Iraqi army? Or will they sit out the fighting, despite their bellicose rhetoric, out of fear of choosing the wrong side? Several prominent sheiks insisted their allegiance is firmly with Hussein, a man they referred to as "his excellency," "our dear leader" and "the great president." If there is a war, they said they would mobilize hundreds of thousands of fighters, from schoolboys to old men ineligible to join the military, to defend their villages and the roads leading to Baghdad. "We will fight to the death against any invaders," said Rashash Imarrah, chief of the Imarrah tribe, most of whose members live near the intersection of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers in southern Iraq. "If the Americans think they can just march up here, they are sadly mistaken," said the sheik, who claims to command 4,000 armed fighters. "We will be waiting for them." Past Invaders The last time a foreign army sought to capture Baghdad, during World War I, British forces moved up the Tigris from the Persian Gulf to expel the Ottoman Turks who controlled most of present-day Iraq. Expecting the tribes to help fight the Ottomans, or at least remain neutral, the British instead found themselves under attack by several tribes that remained loyal to the Turks. As people here are fond of mentioning, tens of thousands of British soldiers died, many from disease, before Baghdad finally fell in 1917. "The Americans," Imarrah said, "should remember this." Nobody knows for sure when tribes such as the Imarrah were formed, but historians and tribal leaders say many of the groups predate the start of Islam on the Arabian Peninsula in the 7th century. The tribes thrived for centuries, providing order and community in an otherwise lawless desert. Sheiks settled disputes, dispensed charity and approved marriages. But in 1958, when Iraq's British-installed monarchy was overthrown, the new military government set out to eliminate tribal networks, regarding sheiks as little kings who considered themselves above the law. When the Baath Party, the political machine through which Hussein rose to power, took over in 1968, that effort intensified. And when Hussein assumed the presidency in 1979, it accelerated further: Sheiks who represented a threat to his hold on power were killed or jailed. Tens of thousands of people from tribal areas were forced to migrate to cities. The Baathists, whose ideology called for a secular, modern Arab nation, "regarded the tribal system as a backward system that did not fit in with modern life," said Ihsan M. Hassan, a sociology professor at Baghdad University. But tribalism has remained strong, even in the uppermost echelons of government. In a practice that continues today, Hussein, a member of the Al-Bu Nasir tribe, filled almost all the senior posts in his administration, particularly those concerning security, with fellow tribesmen or those belonging to allied clans from his home town of Tikrit. At the same time, Hussein banned the use of tribal names, a move some believe was designed to mask the predominance of Tikritis in the government. It was not until the Gulf War that official disapproval of tribalism ended. With his army facing postwar uprisings by ethnic Kurds in the north and Shiite Muslims in the south, Hussein decided to revive tribal groups and co-opt their leaders as a way to prevent future rebellions. Tribal leaders received money and other emoluments to resume their activities -- if they pledged to support Hussein. Most readily accepted, using the offer as a way to reclaim some of their authority. In much of rural Iraq, functions once performed by the government were assumed by tribal elders. Here in Jassim's village of Rashidiya, on the outskirts of Baghdad, the poor and unemployed depend on tribal handouts. Loans for marriage dowries are handled by the sheik. When villagers want a new well or to repair a road, they see Jassim, who in turn communicates with the relevant government agencies. "For the government, it is easier to have one person talking to them instead of hundreds," he said. Jassim also plays the role of local magistrate, settling disputes ranging from sheep rustling to murder. "If one member of my tribe has killed someone from another tribe, the prominent figures of this tribe will visit the other man's tribe," he explained. "We will have a tribal meeting. We will speak about the incident. And we will give them blood money." Sometimes, such actions keep a murderer out of jail. In other cases, he said, "they will receive a much lighter sentence because they settled the matter" through the tribal system. Buying Loyalty Sensing that the campaign to promote tribalism was working to its advantage in rural areas, the government extended offers of money and gifts to tribal elders and members of notable families who lived in cities, hoping to shore up an urban population that was growing restive because of U.N. sanctions. "The government even came to my family and said, 'We'll give you land, money, weapons and salaries to reorganize your tribe, but your allegiance will be for the government, for the Baath Party and President Saddam Hussein,' " said Hassan, the sociology professor. "They were ready to give us a tribal seal and a stick and a shroud, and even a monthly salary." Residents of Baghdad have increasingly begun identifying with their tribal groups, sometimes choosing the places they shop and eat by the owner's tribal affiliation. Jassim, whose village is about 25 miles north of Baghdad, said many members of his tribe live in the city but regularly return to the village for tribal ceremonies and to resolve disputes. "If you have a car accident, you don't sort it out in the courts anymore," said Wamidh Nadmih, a professor of political science at Baghdad University. "Even if you live in the city, you sort it out in the tribe." Nadmih said tribal affiliations can play a big role in determining whether an applicant gets a job or parents consent to a marriage. Tribal affiliation can often identify whether Iraqis are Sunni or Shiite Muslims, where they hail from and whether their extended family has political connections. "It is a network, just like you have in America with university graduates and your religious groups," he said. The highest-profile case of tribal justice occurred in 1996, when Hussein's two sons-in-law, Hussein Kamel Hassan Majeed and Saddam Kamel Hassan Majeed, returned to Iraq after defecting to Jordan and disclosing secrets about Iraq's weapons programs. The brothers were killed during a night-long gun battle, not with the police or the military, but with members of their own tribe seeking to redeem the family's honor. Hussein holds regular meetings with influential tribal leaders, where he dishes out gifts and receives expressions of fealty. Hussein now appears so confident about support within many of Iraq's 150 major tribes, which comprise about 2,000 smaller clans, that he has given them tens of thousands of light weapons to distribute to their members with the hope they will turn into a guerrilla army in the event of a U.S. invasion, ambushing American soldiers in villages and along roads. Swaying the Sheiks Many analysts and diplomats dismiss the notion that tribal fighters will pose a significant threat to U.S. forces, but they could form pockets of resistance in areas where American soldiers might not otherwise expect to encounter armed opposition. Whether that occurs may depend on which way the sheiks sway. While government officials expect that tribesmen will heed Hussein's military directives, others here believe the decision will be made by individual tribal leaders. "We've gone back decades, to the ages of darkness, where rural peasants are under the control of chieftains," Hassan, the sociology professor, said. "It's a negative phenomenon. It does not coincide with modern society. And now, subconsciously, a man's allegiance goes to the tribe, not to the state." As a consequence, foreign military analysts said, U.S. officials are plotting a strategy to buy off tribal leaders as they did with some success in Afghanistan. But for the fence-sitters, the smell of victory might be more important than money. Although Iraqi tribes are notoriously fickle, Jassim and other tribal chiefs sneer at the idea that they could be influenced by money. Hussein's gifts to them over the years, they insisted, were intended to trickle down to ordinary people, not to curry their favor. "This is not Afghanistan," Jassim said. "Our loyalties cannot be purchased." But if the Americans still want to invade Iraq, he said, they are welcome to descend upon his village. 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