-Caveat Lector-

December 17, 2000

Behind Colin Powell's Legend: Part One

Editors Note:

On Dec. 12, a 5-4 vote by the conservative majority of the U.S. Supreme
Court awarded George W. Bush the presidency. To do so, the
conservatives applied "equal-protection" safeguards that historically had
protected blacks and other minorities from discrimination.

In this case, however, "equal protection" was used to stop the counting of
votes -- many from African- American precincts -- that likely would have
given Al Gore the victory in Florida and thus the presidency.

As Bush's strategy was underway, retired Gen. Colin Powell -- one of the
nation's most prominent African-Americans -- met with Bush at his ranch in
Texas. Based on the available record, Powell did nothing to dissuade Bush
from his course of action, which effectively disenfranchised the 90
percent of the African-American voters who cast their ballots for Gore.

On Dec. 16, four days after the U.S. Supreme Court ruling, Bush appointed
Powell to be secretary of state, the first African-American who would hold
that post. As he has at other times in his military-political life, Colin Powell
advanced his career by staying silent in the face of what many other
African-Americans considered a gross injustice.

In view of these new developments and the questions they raise about
Colin Powell's character, we are presenting an updated version of a series
� "Behind Colin Powell's Legend" � that originally appeared at this Web site
several years ago.

Behind Colin Powell's Legend � Part One

By Robert Parry & Norman Solomon

On a sunny autumn afternoon, Sept. 25, 1995, hundreds lined up on a
sidewalk in San Francisco to grab a glimpse of a national icon.

Indoors, dozens of reporters and photographers packed into a room baking
under the hot lights of television cameras.

An electricity filled the air, as if the crowd were waiting for a TV actor or
a rock star, some super- hot celebrity. In a sense, they were. That day, on
a mega-successful book tour, retired General Colin L. Powell was
scheduled to answer a few questions and sign a few hundred books.

Preparations for the news conference were going smoothly, too, until two
minutes before Powell was to appear.

Then, the bookstore managers fell into in a small panic over an intruder
who was holding forth at the back of the room.

"How did he get here?" one manager asked the other.

"I don't know," the other answered. "I don't know how he got in here."

"He slipped in," said the first.

Their fretting focused on a middle-aged man in a wheelchair who was
speaking to a cluster of reporters. He was hunched inside his silvery metal
contraption. His jeans-clad legs dangled as if inert. His clothes were tidy
but informal. His thinning hair was slightly unkempt.

The man spoke quietly, at a deliberate pace. He paused occasionally to
search for and capture an elusive word. The reporters, most younger than
he was, leaned over him with microphones and note pads. They seemed
intrigued, but uncertain of his news value.

The bookstore managers did not have a quick solution to the intrusion, so
they drifted back to their anticipation of Powell's arrival. "I have so much
respect for this man," bubbled the store's director of sales.

The Hero Arrives

Moments later, San Francisco's mayor swept into the room. A wave of
excitement followed as Colin Powell arrived and strode to the rostrum. He
was the picture of confident authority, in his wire-rim executive-style
glasses, a well-tailored pinstripe black business suit, a crisp pastel-blue
shirt, a tasteful burgundy tie.

The mayor pumped Powell's hand and proclaimed a formal welcome for the
first African-American to serve as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Reporters competed to toss some softball questions that the general
smoothly swatted over the fence. Powell offered only a well- rehearsed
glimpse into his private side.

"Writing the book," the retired general explained about My American
Journey, "you learn a lot about yourself, you learn a lot about your family,
you learn a lot about people who helped you along the way that you have
forgotten about. So, it was very introspective for me, and I came away
with a deeper appreciation of my own family roots, but an even greater
appreciation of the nation we live in, the society we are a part of, and a
faith in this society that I hope, as a result of this book and whatever I
might do in the future, faith that I hope we can continue to pass on to
new generations."

The second query was a self-help question about race: "What do you say
to all the kids from all the Bronxes around this country who say, 'race is a
stumbling block, poverty is a stumbling block?'"

"Race is a problem," Powell responded firmly. "Let it be someone else's
problem. What you have to do is do your very best, study, work hard,
believe in yourself, believe in your country."

As the news conference rolled on, Powell showed off the qualities that
had set so many political hearts aflutter in fall 1995. But Powell
encountered some friction when he started explaining why Americans
were dazzled by the military again, a quarter century after the disastrous
Vietnam War.

"Why that comes about," Powell said, "because of the superb performance
of the armed forces of the United States in recent conflicts, beginning
with the, I think, Panama invasion, and then through Desert Shield and
Storm. And Americans saw that these young men and women were
competent, proud, clean, patriotic, and they kind of fell in love with them
again. And so it's not so much I think what--"

The voice from the back of the room suddenly broke in, an accusatory
voice belonging to the man in the wheelchair. "You didn't tell the truth
about the war in the Gulf, general," the man shouted.

Powell first tried to ignore the interruption, but the man persisted,
hectoring Powell about the tens of thousands of civilian dead in the wars
in Panama and Iraq, conflicts that brought Powell his national fame. Finally,
Powell responded with a patronizing tone, but he called the dissenter by
name.

"Hi, Ron, how are you? Excuse me, let me answer one question if I may."

"But why don't you tell them, why don't you tell them why--"

"The fact of the matter is--"

"My Lai--"

"I think the American people are reflecting on me the glory that really
belongs to those troops," Powell continued, brushing aside the
interruption.

Then, Ron Kovic's voice could be heard only in snippets beneath Powell's
amplified voice. "General, let me speak--"

"I think what you're seeing is a reflection on me of what those young men
and women have done in Panama, in Desert Storm, in a number of other
places--"

"A hundred-and-fifty-thousand people, the bombing--"

"So it's very, it's very rewarding to see this change in attitude toward the
military. It's not just Colin Powell, rock star. It's all of those wonderful men
and women who do such a great job."

Born on the Fourth

Ron Kovic, a veteran of the Vietnam War, a soldier paralyzed in combat,
was one of the few dissident voices at the bookstore that day. Kovic,
author of the autobiography, Born on the Fourth of July, which was later
made into a movie, tried to warn reporters not to swallow Powell-mania.

As Powell moved off to sign copies of his own book and the reporters
began to depart, too, Kovic pleaded, "Colin Powell is not the answer. He
sets a very dangerous precedent for this country."

>From his wheelchair, Kovic had struggled to make that case. "I want the
American people to know what the general hid from the American public
during the Gulf War," Kovic said. "They hid the casualties. They hid the
horror. They hid the violence. We don't need any more violence in our
country. We need leaders who represent cooperation. We need
leadership that represents peace. We need leaders that understand the
tragedy of using violence in solving our problems. We have enough violence
in this country."

To Kovic, Powell lacked a truly critical eye toward war.

"Did Colin Powell really learn the lessons of the Vietnam War? Did he learn
that the war was immoral? I think that he learned another lesson. He
learned to be more violent, to be more ruthless. And I've come as a
counterbalance to that today. I've come as an alternative voice. And I
think I speak for many, many people in this country when I say that
General Colin Powell is a detriment to democracy; he's a danger to our
Constitution; he's a danger to our democracy."

Kovic tried to persuade the journalists that the United States should
confront its Cold War past, the way other nations, both right-wing and
left- wing, have begun to do.

"America has got to go through its own perestroika, its own glasnost,"
Kovic continued. "I came down today because I just can't allow this to
continue -- this honeymoon, this love affair with someone who was part of
a policy which hurt so many human beings."

But few Americans listened to the advice of Ron Kovic that day or since.
Hundreds of thousands bought Powell's 1995 memoirs, My American
Journey, and the national press corps accorded the retired general near-
unanimous acclaim. Besides being a hero for his accomplishments as the
first black American to lead the nation into war, Powell became the most
celebrated U.S. military officer since Dwight Eisenhower.

In the early days of the 1996 presidential campaign, journalists pined
openly for Powell's candidacy. Liberals and centrists saw Powell as a role
model for young blacks. Many conservatives admired Powell's success
despite his humble origins. What slight criticism there was came mostly
from the far right because of Powell's avowal that he was a "Rockefeller
Republican" who supported abortion rights and affirmative action.

Questions

Still, what about Kovic's questions? What is Colin Powell's unvarnished
record?

What did Powell do in Vietnam? What was his role in the Iran-contra
scandal? How did he rise so smoothly as a black man in a white-dominated
Republican national security establishment? Were Powell's victories in
Panama and Iraq excessively violent and insufficiently concerned with
civilian dead?

These are questions perhaps even more relevant today as Colin Powell
stands as President-elect George W. Bush's first Cabinet choice, the man
who would be the nation's first African-American secretary of state. Given
Bush's inexperience in foreign affairs, the former general likely will wield
broad power over U.S. foreign policy.

Many Americans see Colin Powell as a reassuring figure on the national
stage. Yet, the accolades have prevented any balanced analysis of his
positives and his negatives. Indeed, Powell's legend has created its own
mystery.

Drawing from the available public record, including Powell's own memoirs,
this series will address that mystery. Who is Colin Powell?

Page 2: Vietnam Lessons

December 17, 2000

Behind Colin Powell's Legend

Page 1, 2, 3

Vietnam Lessons

On Jan. 17, 1963, in South Vietnam's monsoon season, U.S. Army Capt. Colin
Powell jumped from a military helicopter into a densely forested combat
zone of the A Shau Valley, not far from the Laotian border.

Carrying an M-2 carbine, Capt. Powell was starting his first -- and only --
combat assignment. He was the new adviser to a 400- man unit of the Army
of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). Across jungle terrain, these South
Vietnamese government troops were arrayed against a combined force of
North Vietnamese regulars and local anti-government guerrillas known as
the Viet Cong.

The 25-year-old Powell was arriving at a pivotal moment in the Vietnam
War. To forestall a communist victory, President John F. Kennedy had
dispatched teams of Green Beret advisers to assist the ARVN, a force
suffering from poor discipline, ineffective tactics and bad morale.

Already, many U.S. advisers, most notably the legendary Col. John Paul
Vann, were voicing concerns about the ARVN's brutality toward civilians.
Vann feared that the dominant counterinsurgency strategy of destroying
rural villages and forcibly relocating inhabitants while hunting down enemy
forces was driving the people into the arms of the Viet Cong.

But as Colin Powell arrived, he was untainted by these worries. He was a
gung-ho young Army officer with visions of glory. He brimmed with trust in
the wisdom of his superiors. Capt. Powell also felt the deepest sympathy
for the ARVN troops under his command, but only a cold contempt for the
enemy.

Soon after his arrival, Powell and his ARVN unit left for a protracted patrol
that fought leeches as well as Viet Cong ambushes. From the soggy jungle
brush, the Viet Cong would strike suddenly against the advancing
government soldiers. Often invisible to Powell and his men, the VC would
inflict a few casualties and slip back into the jungles.

In My American Journey, Powell recounted his reaction when he spotted
his first dead Viet Cong. "He lay on his back, gazing up at us with sightless
eyes," Powell wrote. "I felt nothing, certainly not sympathy. I had seen too
much death and suffering on our side to care anything about what
happened on theirs."

While success against the armed enemy was rare, Powell's ARVN unit
punished the civilian population systematically. As the soldiers marched
through mountainous jungle, they destroyed the food and the homes of
the region's Montagnards, who were suspected of sympathizing with the
Viet Cong. Old women would cry hysterically as their ancestral homes and
worldly possessions were consumed by fire.

"We burned down the thatched huts, starting the blaze with Ronson and
Zippo lighters," Powell recalled. "Why were we torching houses and
destroying crops? Ho Chi Minh had said the people were like the sea in
which his guerrillas swam. ... We tried to solve the problem by making the
whole sea uninhabitable. In the hard logic of war, what difference did it
make if you shot your enemy or starved him to death?"

For nearly six months, Powell and his ARVN unit slogged through the
jungles, searching for Viet Cong and destroying villages.

Then while on one patrol, Powell fell victim to a Viet Cong booby trap. He
stepped on a punji stake, a dung-poisoned bamboo spear that had been
buried in the ground. The stake pierced Powell's boot and quickly infected
the young soldier's right foot. The foot swelled, turned purple and forced
his evacuation by helicopter to Hue for treatment.

Although Powell's recovery from the foot infection was swift, his combat
days were over. He stayed in Hue, reassigned to the operations staff of
ARVN division headquarters. As part of his work, he handled intelligence
data and oversaw a local airfield. By late autumn 1963, Powell's first
Vietnam tour ended.

On his return to the United States, Powell did not join Vann and other
early American advisers in warning the nation about the self-defeating
counterinsurgency strategies. In 1963, Vann carried his prescient concerns
back to a Pentagon that was not ready to listen to doubters. Then, when
his objections fell on deaf ears, Vann resigned his commission and
sacrificed a promising military career.

In contrast, Powell recognized that his early service in Vietnam put him on
a fast track for military success. He signed up for a nine-month Infantry
Officer Advanced Course that trained company commanders. In May 1965,
Powell finished third in a class of 200 and was the top- ranked infantryman.
A year later, he became an instructor.

In 1966, as the numbers of U.S. servicemen in Vietnam swelled, Powell
received a promotion to major, making him a field-grade officer before his
30th birthday. In 1968, Powell continued to impress his superiors by
graduating second in his class at Fort Leavenworth's Command and General
Staff College, a prestigious school regarded as an essential way station for
future Army generals.

Recognizing Powell as an emerging "water- walker" who needed more
seasoning in the field, the Army dispatched Powell to a command position
back in Vietnam. But on his second tour, Powell would not be slogging
through remote jungles. On July 27, 1968, he arrived at an outpost at Duc
Pho to serve as an executive officer.

Then, to the north, at the Americal headquarters in Chu Lai, division
commander Maj. Gen. Charles Gettys saw a favorable mention of Powell in
the Army Times. Gettys plucked Powell from Duc Pho and installed him on
the general's own staff at Chu Lai.

Gettys jumped the young major ahead of more senior officers and made
him the G-3 officer in charge of operations and planning. The appointment
made "me the only major filling that role in Vietnam," Powell wrote in his
memoirs.

But history again was awaiting Colin Powell. The Americal Division was
already deep into some of the cruelest fighting of the Vietnam War. The
"drain-the-sea" strategy that Powell had witnessed near the Laotian border
continued to lead American forces into harsh treatment of Vietnamese
civilians.

Though it was still a secret when Powell arrived at Chu Lai, Americal troops
had committed an act that would stain forever the reputation of the U.S.
Army. As Major Powell settled into his new assignment, a scandal was
waiting to unfold.

My Lai

On May 16, 1968, a bloodied unit of the Americal division stormed into a
hamlet known as My Lai 4. With military helicopters circling overhead,
revenge-seeking American soldiers rousted Vietnamese civilians -- mostly
old men, women and children -- from their thatched huts and herded them
into the village's irrigation ditches.

As the round-up continued, some Americans raped the girls. Then, under
orders from junior officers on the ground, soldiers began emptying their
M-16s into the terrified peasants. Some parents used their bodies futilely
to shield their children from the bullets. Soldiers stepped among the
corpses to finish off the wounded.

The slaughter raged for four hours. A total of 347 Vietnamese, including
babies, died in the carnage. But there also were American heroes that day
in My Lai. Some soldiers refused to obey the direct orders to kill and some
risked their lives to save civilians from the murderous fire.

A pilot named Hugh Clowers Thompson Jr. from Stone Mountain, Ga., was
furious at the killings he saw happening on the ground. He landed his
helicopter between one group of fleeing civilians and American soldiers in
pursuit.

Thompson ordered his helicopter door gunner to shoot the Americans if
they tried to harm the Vietnamese. After a tense confrontation, the
soldiers backed off. Later, two of Thompson's men climbed into one ditch
filled with corpses and pulled out a three-year-old boy whom they flew to
safety.

Several months later, the Americal's brutality would become a moral test
for Major Powell, too.

A letter had been written by a young specialist fourth class named Tom
Glen, who had served in an Americal mortar platoon and was nearing the
end of his Army tour. In the letter to Gen. Creighton Abrams, the
commander of all U.S. forces in Vietnam, Glen accused the Americal
division of routine brutality against civilians.

Glen's letter was forwarded to the Americal headquarters at Chu Lai where
it landed on Major Powell's desk.

"The average GI's attitude toward and treatment of the Vietnamese people
all too often is a complete denial of all our country is attempting to
accomplish in the realm of human relations," Glen wrote.

"Far beyond merely dismissing the Vietnamese as 'slopes' or 'gooks,' in both
deed and thought, too many American soldiers seem to discount their very
humanity; and with this attitude inflict upon the Vietnamese citizenry
humiliations, both psychological and physical, that can have only a
debilitating effect upon efforts to unify the people in loyalty to the Saigon
government, particularly when such acts are carried out at unit levels and
thereby acquire the aspect of sanctioned policy."

Glen's letter contended that many Vietnamese were fleeing from
Americans who �for mere pleasure, fire indiscriminately into Vietnamese
homes and without provocation or justification shoot at the people
themselves.� Gratuitous cruelty was also being inflicted on Viet Cong
suspects, Glen reported.

�Fired with an emotionalism that belies unconscionable hatred, and armed
with a vocabulary consisting of 'You VC,' soldiers commonly 'interrogate' by
means of torture that has been presented as the particular habit of the
enemy. Severe beatings and torture at knife point are usual means of
questioning captives or of convincing a suspect that he is, indeed, a Viet
Cong. ...

�It would indeed be terrible to find it necessary to believe that an
American soldier that harbors such racial intolerance and disregard for
justice and human feeling is a prototype of all American national
character; yet the frequency of such soldiers lends credulity to such
beliefs. ...

�What has been outlined here I have seen not only in my own unit, but
also in others we have worked with, and I fear it is universal. If this is
indeed the case, it is a problem which cannot be overlooked, but can
through a more firm implementation of the codes of MACV (Military
Assistance Command Vietnam) and the Geneva Conventions, perhaps be
eradicated."

In 1995, when we questioned Glen about his letter, he said he had heard
second-hand about the My Lai massacre, though he did not mention it
specifically. The massacre was just one part of the abusive pattern that
had become routine in the division, he said.

Powell's Response

The letter's troubling allegations were not well received at Americal
headquarters.

Major Powell undertook the assignment to review Glen's letter, but did so
without questioning Glen or assigning anyone else to talk with him. Powell
simply accepted a claim from Glen's superior officer that Glen was not
close enough to the front lines to know what he was writing about, an
assertion Glen denies.

After that cursory investigation, Powell drafted a response on Dec. 13,
1968. He admitted to no pattern of wrongdoing. Powell claimed that U.S.
soldiers in Vietnam were taught to treat Vietnamese courteously and
respectfully. The Americal troops also had gone through an hour- long
course on how to treat prisoners of war under the Geneva Conventions,
Powell noted.

"There may be isolated cases of mistreatment of civilians and POWs,"
Powell wrote in 1968. But "this by no means reflects the general attitude
throughout the Division." Indeed, Powell's memo faulted Glen for not
complaining earlier and for failing to be more specific in his letter.

"In direct refutation of this [Glen's] portrayal," Powell concluded, "is the
fact that relations between Americal soldiers and the Vietnamese people
are excellent."

Powell's findings, of course, were false, though they were exactly what his
superiors wanted to hear.

It would take another Americal hero, an infantryman named Ron
Ridenhour, to piece together the truth about the atrocity at My Lai. After
returning to the United States, Ridenhour interviewed Americal comrades
who had participated in the massacre.

On his own, Ridenhour compiled this shocking information into a report
and forwarded it to the Army inspector general. The IG's office conducted
an aggressive official investigation, in marked contrast to Powell's review.

Confirming Ridenhour's report, the Army finally faced the horrible truth.
Courts martial were held against officers and enlisted men who were
implicated in the murder of the My Lai civilians.

But Powell's peripheral role in the My Lai cover- up did not slow his climb
up the Army's ladder. After the scandal broke, Powell pleaded ignorance
about the actual My Lai massacre.

Luckily for Powell, Glen's letter also disappeared into the National Archives
-- to be unearthed only years later by British journalists Michael Bilton and
Kevin Sims for their book, Four Hours in My Lai.

Page 3: Powell's Admissions

December 17, 2000

Behind Colin Powell's Legend

Page 1, 2, 3

Powell's Admissions

In his best-selling memoirs, Powell did not mention his brush-off of Tom
Glen's complaint.

Powell did include, however, another troubling recollection that belied his
1968 official denial of Glen's allegation that American soldiers "without
provocation or justification shoot at the people themselves."

After a brief mention of the My Lai massacre in My American Journey,
Powell penned a partial justification of the Americal's brutality. In a chilling
passage, Powell explained the routine practice of murdering unarmed male
Vietnamese.

"I recall a phrase we used in the field, MAM, for military-age male," Powell
wrote. "If a helo spotted a peasant in black pajamas who looked remotely
suspicious, a possible MAM, the pilot would circle and fire in front of him.
If he moved, his movement was judged evidence of hostile intent, and the
next burst was not in front, but at him.

"Brutal? Maybe so. But an able battalion commander with whom I had
served at Gelnhausen [West Germany], Lt. Col. Walter Pritchard, was killed
by enemy sniper fire while observing MAMs from a helicopter. And
Pritchard was only one of many. The kill-or-be-killed nature of combat
tends to dull fine perceptions of right and wrong."

While it's certainly true that combat is brutal and judgments can be
clouded by fear, the mowing down of unarmed civilians in cold blood does
not constitute combat. It is murder and, indeed, a war crime.

Neither can the combat death of a fellow soldier be cited as an excuse to
murder civilians. Disturbingly, that was precisely the rationalization that
the My Lai killers cited in their own defense.

But returning home from Vietnam a second time in 1969, Powell already
had begun to prove himself the consummate team player. Those skills were
tested again when Powell was drawn into another Vietnam controversy
involving the killing of civilians.

In a court martial proceeding, Powell sided with an Americal Division
general who was accused by the Army of murdering unarmed civilians while
flying over Quang Ngai province. Helicopter pilots who flew Brig. Gen. John
W. Donaldson had alleged that the general gunned down civilian
Vietnamese almost for sport.

In an interview, a senior investigator from the Donaldson case told us that
two of the Vietnamese victims were an old man and an old woman who
were shot to death while bathing. Though long retired -- and quite elderly
himself -- the Army investigator still spoke with a raw disgust about the
events of a quarter century earlier. He requested anonymity before talking
about the behavior of senior Americal officers.

"They used to bet in the morning how many people they could kill -- old
people, civilians, it didn't matter," the investigator said. "Some of the stuff
would curl your hair."

For eight months in Chu Lai during 1968-69, Powell had worked with
Donaldson and apparently developed a great respect for this superior
officer.

When the Army charged Donaldson with murder on June 2, 1971, Powell
rose in the general's defense. Powell submitted an affidavit dated Aug. 10,
1971, which lauded Donaldson as "an aggressive and courageous brigade
commander."

Powell did not specifically refer to the murder allegations, but added that
helicopter forays in Vietnam had been an "effective means of separating
hostiles from the general population."

Mysterious Interview

Powell apparently was questioned by Army authorities about his knowledge
of Donaldson's alleged atrocities. But his answers may be lost to history. In
his memoirs, Powell provides a brief -- and incorrect -- description of the
1971 interview in the context of the My Lai massacre.

"I was serving in the Washington area, and was called to appear before a
board of inquiry conducted by Lt. Gen. William Ray Peers at Fort Belvoir,
Virginia," Powell wrote. "The board wanted me to give a picture of fighting
conditions in the Batangan Peninsula in 1968 [where the My Lai massacre
had occurred].  I knew it had been a hellhole, a rough piece of territory
inhabited by VC sympathizers."

Powell's account of the interview is itself a bit of a mystery. While it's true
that in 1971, a commission headed by Gen. Peers was investigating the My
Lai cover-up, all the Peers interviews were conducted at the Pentagon,
not at Fort Belvoir.

Also, by 1971, the Army knew a great deal about the "fighting conditions in
the Batangan Peninsula" and would not need the opinion of an officer who
arrived months after the My Lai massacre. Further, when we examined the
Peers Commission records at the National Archives branch at Suitland, Md.,
we found no indication that Colin Powell ever had been interviewed by the
board.

There was, however, an investigation at Fort Belvoir conducted in the
same time frame by the Army's criminal investigation unit. It was examining
the murder allegations against Powell's friend, Gen. Donaldson.

The retired Army investigator told us that Powell was questioned in that
case. But the investigator said Powell volunteered little knowledge about
the atrocities. The investigator doubted that any record was made of the
interview.

Nevertheless, the investigator claimed that "we had him [Donaldson] dead
to rights," with the testimony of two helicopter pilots who had flown
Donaldson on his shooting expeditions. Still, the investigation collapsed
after the two pilot- witnesses were transferred to another Army base and
apparently came under pressure from military superiors.

The two pilots withdrew their testimony, and the Army dropped all
charges against Donaldson. "John Donaldson was a cover-up specialist," the
old investigator growled.

While thousands of other Vietnam veterans joined the anti-war movement
and denounced the brutality of the war, Powell held his tongue. To this
day, Powell has avoided criticizing the Vietnam War other than to complain
that the politicians should not have restrained the military high command.

With the My Lai cloud dissipated, Major Powell's career advanced smartly.
Powell often says he learned many lessons from Vietnam. One lesson he
doesn't mention is that a military bureaucrat succeeds best by
sidestepping controversy and keeping quiet when superiors screw up.

As the years unfolded, that proved to be a very valuable lesson indeed.


Forwarded for your information.  The text and intent of the article
have to stand on their own merits.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107, this material
is distributed without charge or profit to those who have
expressed a prior interest in receiving this type of information
for non-profit research and educational purposes only.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
"Do not believe in anything simply because you have heard it. Do
not believe simply because it has been handed down for many genera-
tions.  Do not believe in anything simply because it is spoken and
rumoured by many.  Do not believe in anything simply because it is
written in Holy Scriptures.  Do not believe in anything merely on
the authority of teachers, elders or wise men.  Believe only after
careful observation and analysis, when you find that it agrees with
reason and is conducive to the good and benefit of one and all.
Then accept it and live up to it." The Buddha on Belief,
from the Kalama Sut

<A HREF="http://www.ctrl.org/";>www.ctrl.org</A>
DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER
==========
CTRL is a discussion & informational exchange list. Proselytizing propagandic
screeds are unwelcomed. Substance�not soap-boxing�please!  These are
sordid matters and 'conspiracy theory'�with its many half-truths, mis-
directions and outright frauds�is used politically by different groups with
major and minor effects spread throughout the spectrum of time and thought.
That being said, CTRLgives no endorsement to the validity of posts, and
always suggests to readers; be wary of what you read. CTRL gives no
credence to Holocaust denial and nazi's need not apply.

Let us please be civil and as always, Caveat Lector.
========================================================================
Archives Available at:
http://peach.ease.lsoft.com/archives/ctrl.html
 <A HREF="http://peach.ease.lsoft.com/archives/ctrl.html";>Archives of
[EMAIL PROTECTED]</A>

http:[EMAIL PROTECTED]/
 <A HREF="http:[EMAIL PROTECTED]/";>ctrl</A>
========================================================================
To subscribe to Conspiracy Theory Research List[CTRL] send email:
SUBSCRIBE CTRL [to:] [EMAIL PROTECTED]

To UNsubscribe to Conspiracy Theory Research List[CTRL] send email:
SIGNOFF CTRL [to:] [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Om

Reply via email to