-Caveat Lector- http://lark.cc.ukans.edu/~ronfran/dictatorsdilemma.htm
The Dictator’s Dilemma Ronald A. Francisco Department of Political Science University of Kansas 1541 Lilac Lane, Lawrence KS 66044 e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] telephone: 785-864-9023 fax: 785-864-5700 website: http://lark.cc.ukans.edu/~ronfran/ data site: http://lark.cc.ukans.edu/~ronfran/data/index.html Paper prepared for the Conference on Repression and Mobilization: What Do We Know and Where Do We Go From Here? University of Maryland, June 21-24, 2001 The Dictator’s Dilemma[1] “History has already made its judgment. We were simply forced to act. We didn’t want to. . . . In ten or twenty years you will come to realize that these measures were necessary for the stability of China and for world peace.” Speaking in Austria in 1994, China’s Prime Minister Li Peng defended the 1989 massacre in Tiananmen Square (Reuters, July 1, 1994). Will an evaluation in eight more years show this self-serving statement to be correct? Does a massacre enhance stability and the endurance of dictatorship? How do dissidents and their leaders view these repression events? Do they in fact retreat in model obedience to the state? Or do they lash out at the state and its violence? These questions ground this paper. It was once accepted that dictatorship was stable and enduring. Recent regime collapses have altered this perception, but dictatorships aplenty still remain—many for decades. Long-lasting autocracies have little or nothing to do with citizen support of the dictator. Instead long-lived dictatorships imply that the dictator a repressive and monitoring force that has not repressed sufficiently for dissidents to backlash and mobilize (Wintrobe 1998). Dictators do not require “legitimacy” or popular support, much as they might desire it. Control is the vital ingredient here. Yet most dictators are surprised at their lack of control over dissident acts. Unexpected events, harsh repression, and natural disasters can weaken state control over citizens’ actions. In this study, we concentrate on harsh repression and consequent citizen backlash. From the dictator’s perspective we investigate the backlash threshold? How much repression is sufficient to deter protest without causing backlash and high-level mobilization? This, essentially, is the dictator’s dilemma. Definitions and Cases What is a dictator? Thomas Jefferson’s definition serves well even in the twenty-first century: “a dictator [is] invested with every power: legislative, executive, and judiciary, civil and military, of life and death over persons and property” (Malone 1948, 360). Given Jefferson’s definition, foreign military occupiers of a country are also dictators (e.g., the British in India, Portugal in Guinea-Bissau or Israel in the West Bank and Gaza Strip). While an eighteenth- century definition works for current dictatorships, the role dictators’ methods of repression changed in the twentieth century. As Hannah Arendt (1973, 6) notes: “A fundamental difference between modern dictatorships and all other tyrannies of the past is that terror is no longer used as a means to exterminate and frighten opponents, but as an instrument to rule masses of people who are perfectly obedient.” What is repression? Wintrobe (1998, 34) defines repression as “restrictions on the rights of citizens to criticize the government, restrictions on the freedom of the press, restrictions on the rights of opposition parties to campaign against the government, or, as is common in totalitarian dictatorship, the outright prohibition of groups, associations, or political parties opposed to the government.” We are concerned with harsh repression, including massacres, Bloody Sunday (or any other “bloody” day), all involving the one-sided and overwhelming use of state force. Massacres in real civil wars generally lie outside our purview (e.g., the massacres in the English civil war [Coster 1999]). What is backlash? The goal of this paper is to study and analyze at least some instances when the entire population is not perfectly obedient. In particular, it attempts to account for the causes of backlash, i.e., massive, rapid and accelerating mobilization in the wake of harsh repression. Backlash generally forms a point of inflection, i.e., the concavity of the mobilization level shifts from down to up (Francisco 1996). What is a security police? All dictators depend on forces of political police, secret police, riot police, prison guards, cadres of military officers and all judges in courts. As Wintrobe (1998) notes, the security force is often of dubious loyalty and constitutes the main threat to the dictator. The ways a dictator rewards and controls the state security force is a principal determinant of the probability of backlash. Backlash in democratic countries is easy to understand, but why does it happen in dictatorships? Particularly vexing is the fact that backlash does not always occur. That is, in some instances harsh coercion dampens public protest, but in others it accelerates mobilization (Lichbach 1987). This forms the principal puzzle that has been partially solved, but does the solution relate to the problem of mobilization after a massacre? This paper focuses upon a narrow, but heretofore-unanalyzed piece of the repression/backlash puzzle. While Lichbach (1987) solved the general problem of the relationship of protest and repression, we still find niches or contexts that are not fully explored empirically. Lichbach (1987 and 1995) proved that rational dissidents shift tactics based upon the level and consistency of state repression. The cases considered in this paper are all single-day harsh repressions perpetrated either by dictators or foreign military occupiers who play the role of dictator. For every case the repression is consistent and harsh both before and after the massacre. Under these objective circumstances we would expect to find a strong deterrent to public protest. Indeed, at a high and broad level, this seems to be the case. Yet sometimes dissidents seem spontaneously to act collectively; often this directly follows a massacre or repression of outrageous proportion. Why does this happen? How do dissidents know that others will act as well? Why do risk- averse dissidents come out on the street after harsh repression, but generally not before it occurs? Above all, why do they seem to act only on the basis of the public good itself, not on the basis of selective benefits (Karklins and Peterson 1993)? An analysis of these questions includes a set of ten twentieth-century harsh coercions selected for repression events claiming many dissident deaths and injuries, but few regime casualties. Table 1 reports the basic information on these well-known middle-level massacres. Table 1 Short & Long-Term Results of Harsh Repressions Event Date Killed Injured Short-Term Result Long-Term Outcome Endurance of Dictator Amritsar, India massacre 4/13/ 1919 530 3001 backlash Gandhi’s campaign 29 years Bloody Sunday, Derry, Ulster 1/30/ 1972 13 14 backlash Provisional IRA terror 26 years Bachelor’s Walk massacre, Dublin 7/26/ 1914 4 29 backlash Easter Rising, 1916 & IRA campaign 7 years Pidjiguiti, Guinea- Bissau massacre 8/3/1959 50 101 retreat guerrilla war 14 years Prague repression 11/17/ 1989 0 44 backlash Resignation 20 days Sharpeville massacre, South Africa 3/21/ 1960 67 186 backlash terror & imprisonment of leaders 30 years Soweto massacre, South Africa 6/15/ 1976 1,000 3,000 backlash continued struggle against apartheid 14 years Bloody Sunday, St. Petersburg, Russia 1/9/ 1905[2] 175 625 backlash accession & 1917 revolution 12 years Tiananmen Square massacre, Beijing, PRC 6/4/1989 2,600 3,000 backlash little protest; communist party still rules PRC 12+ years Wujek mine massacre, Poland 12/16/ 1981 16 39 backlash tactical shift to clandestine protest 8 years Sources: Bell 1993; Furneax 1963; Fein 1977; Forrest 1992; Goldstone 1998; Honda 1999; Jackson 1999; Lopes 1987; Mandela 1994; Meredith 1977; Mullan 1997; Nan 1992; Sablinsky 1976; and Suhr 1989. The events in Table 1 are selected to provide diversity across space and time. They occur in a wide variety of cultural and geographic contexts at widely varying times. The cases exclude several other twentieth-century massacres. For example, the 1981 massacre at El Mozote in El Salvador (Danner 1993). The El Salvadorian army elite battalion killed everyone in the village except one hidden woman and one fleeing child. There was no one left to lash back. Similarly, few escaped the Japanese army massacre in Nanjing, China in December 1937 (Honda 1999). The paper also ignores systematic, long-term state genocide such as the Holocaust and ethnically based slaughters, e.g., Rwanda in 1994 (Gourevitch 1998). Instead, massacre figures shown in Table 1 represent populations in which the majority of citizens survived the event and were able to initiate public responses. The Dictator’s Illusions Dictators and their agents regularly make assumptions or simply take actions to preserve the stability of their country. Serious and effective repression, they believe, will deter public protest. Additionally, they assume that known dissident leaders foment most protest. So, arrest all the dissident leaders and no protest emerges. We investigate these policies along with several e dictatorships or countries under foreign military occupation. Does Harsh Repression Deter Protest? Does consistently severe repression actually preclude public protest? Consider two examples of short-term deterrence and immediate backlash. On August 3, 1959, Portuguese police confronted a dock worker strike in Pidjiguiti (presently in Guinea-Bissau). Police opened fire, killing 50 workers and wounding more than 100. This massacre caused dissidents to retreat but then to reemerge in a guerrilla war against the Portuguese colonial army. There was no immediate public backlash (Forrest 1992; Lopes 1987). Contrast this with the Czechoslovak experience. On November 17, 1989 a rumor circulated that Czechoslovak police had killed one student and wounded dozens in a banned Prague demonstration. In each of the succeeding three days, mobilization accelerated in one order of magnitude per day (see Table 2). Within 20 days protesters overwhelmed the state’s repression force and caused the regime to collapse.[3] The question then becomes, what limits the must the dictator recognize? When and how can the dictator repress harshly and dampen repression without backlash? Consider the following illustration of the assumption that harsh repression stills dissent. On April 13, 1919 British General Reginald Dyer ordered the massacre at Amritsar in India in which 530 died and thousands were injured. The general later said: “It was a horrible duty I had to perform. I think it was the merciful thing. I thought I should shoot well and shoot strong, so that I or anybody else should not have to shoot again” (Payne 1969, 340). In the long term, and even often in the short term, it is my conjecture that massacres and other acts of harsh repression are rarely efficacious for dictators. The obverse, of course, is that harsh repression, in the long run, helps dissidents to eliminate dictatorship. If that is the case, the dictator’s dilemma is better termed the dictator’s illusion. Even if immediate backlash does not occur, often clandestine and guerrilla conflict arise. A dictator who faces a daily guerrilla war is not a happy dictator. Arrest All the Dissident Leaders Arresting all the usual suspects, or certainly all the dissident entrepreneurs is a common dictatorial policy. It is analogous to the United States policy of sentencing criminals and drug dealers in prison to long prison terms. The idea in both cases is that within the controlled environment of prison, inmates can initiate neither public protest events nor. Success of the U.S. criminal policy is still undetermined, but incarcerating protest leaders has failed many times. The idea of forced imprisonment assumes that the current dissident entrepreneurs are the last of their lot. When South Africa sent Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu of the ANC and Robert Sobukwe of PAC as well as many other leaders to Robben Island, the government assumed victory for apartheid (Mandela 1994; Meredith 1998). This was an illusion of the first order. Conditions that bred Mandela, Sisulu and Sobukwe had, if anything, increased. Illegal strikes, the Soweto rising, Steve Biko and other, increasingly violent challenges revealed dissident entrepreneurs who were even more virulently anti-apartheid than those languishing on Robben Island. The Shah of Iran likewise thought he had solved his dissident problems. By 1976 the Shah’s SAVAK security force had either incarcerated or killed 90 percent of the members of the Mojahendin-e Khalq and Fedaii organizations (Colburn 1994). Furthermore, the Ayatollah Khomeni was safely exiled in Iraq. But three years later the Shah fled Iran, driven by a coalition of Shia Islamists and middle-class citizens. There are two concomitant disadvantages of putting dissident entrepreneurs in prison. The first is that a prison sentence confers on the inmate a badge of honor. One reason that Nelson Mandela was feted after his release from Robben Island was the many decades he spent there as a martyr. Vaclav Havel’s moral authority was enhanced considerably by his long prison sentence that lasted from January 1989 until the Czechoslovak revolution began. In India in the early 1930s, Mahatma Gandhi’s Yeravda jail cell became the prime dissident publication source, with Gandhi’s writings receiving rapid publication and distribution (Payne 1969). The fact that the material emanated from prison enhanced their effectiveness as mobilization devices. A second and related problem of imprisoning dissident leaders is the probability that dissident movements will shift their tactics to increase their productivity (Lichbach 1995). For example, when Charles Stewart Parnell, head of the Irish National Land League in 1881, was imprisoned by the British for treason, he said that “Captain Moonlight” would take his place (Jackson 1999). Captain Moonlight referred to agrarian terror—and it did certainly take place. Under cover of night aristocrats and British officers were killed in rural areas in Ireland. In South Africa, after Mandela and his colleagues were jailed on Robben Island, black South Africans collectively withheld their labor and organized unions, despite their being forbidden by the state, and forced concessions regarding working conditions and rules. The Paradox of Democratic Countries’ Repression in Colonies No one should be surprised that Portuguese police under orders from dictator Salazar shot and killed striking dock workers in colonial West Africa. Nonetheless, three of our cases are in the colonies of the United Kingdom. While no such massacres occurred within the UK, India, Ireland and Northern Ireland suffered consistent harsh repression during the first three-quarters of the century. Foreign military occupation by democratic countries does not necessarily imply democratic governance in colonies. The tenacity of foreign military occupation is also remarkable. The Portuguese fought a debilitating guerrilla war against insurgents in Guinea- Bissau, steadily losing land over a period of nine years. By 1969 Portugal controlled only one-quarter of the country, but it stayed for five more years. British occupation of India and Ireland was finally ended by dissent, but only after long periods of struggle. Given the findings in this paper, as long as the casualty rate stays at a ratio of approximately 10 to 1, i.e., ten of native dissidents, one of the foreign occupation state, then colonial leaders have no incentive to grant independence to native citizens. Once the ratio moves to a lower level, costs become a significant issue at home. The Analytical Problem of Backlash Against Consistent Repression The driving conjecture of this paper, as noted above, is that consistently harsh repression is never optimal for a dictator in the long run—and frequently not in the short run. This view conforms to the theorems Lichbach (1984) proved on optimality policies of a regime. Lichbach’s theorems demonstrate that consistent repression necessarily increases the amount of revolutionary zeal in a country. From Lichbach’s work, one would expect a consistently repressive dictator to be an embattled dictator. Certainly the notion of a battle-weary dictator relates to the United Kingdom’s experience with Ireland and India, to Guinea-Bissau’s guerrilla war against the Portuguese army, to the East European dictators in 1989, as well as to the South African dictators’ experience. The price of consistent repression is revolutionary action. The price of extremely harsh repression, however, is sometimes even higher. In order to analyze the cases for the paper, we must consider the relationship between the dictator and his (there has never been a female dictator) security force. Rewarding and Punishing the Security Force The dictator’s relationship to the security force is similar to Calvert’s (1987) leadership dilemma that was analyzed with game theory. Calvert attempts to discover how a political leader most effectively sanctions followers’ uncooperative behavior. Directly concerned about legislative leaders, Calvert even denies that his paper has any relevance to a national leader. Nonetheless, the problem is analogous to those faced by dictators. A leader must have cooperative behavior of his minions. If a follower rebels, the dictator faces a choice. To deter future defection, punishment is in order. Yet punishment might jeopardize the dictator’s unassailable leadership position. Calvert shows that only the leader can know the initial cost of a follower’s punishment. Consequently, dictators will punish when the cost is minimal. Disgruntled followers learn ever more about costs over time, but a resolute dictator can establish a reputation that deters rebellion. Considering Calvert’s outcome, we can assume that dictators both readily reward and punish their security forces in order to develop a consistent reputation. Joseph Stalin solved the dictator’s problem with the security force by subdividing his security and military ministries into several separate divisions. Stalin punished severely any section that he thought disobeyed him, thereby establishing a reputation of ruthlessness that in turn kept other sections in line (Hingley 1974; McNeal 1988). South African dictators attempted to protect themselves from the majority population by recruiting black police to control black African villages and townships. The disadvantage of this approach, of course, was the relative ease of persuading black police to defect during instances of conflict in black villages or townships. Defection of the police or militia was a major factor in the Russian revolution of 1917, the Iranian revolution of 1979, the Philippine revolution of 1986 and in almost all of the East European revolutions in 1989 (see, for example, Süß 1999). In all of these circumstances, dictatorial regimes fell because the security force could not or would not repress dissident citizens. The obvious solution to these problems is to reward a security force well for obedience (i.e., consistent repression) while at the same time maintaining a reputation of toughness and ruthlessness (Wintrobe 1998). Even under these circumstances, however, loyal security personnel can go too far by repressing dissidents so harshly that backlash against the state occurs. Backlash is a perilous event for a dictator. By definition it involves large and accelerating mobilization. Any mobilization approaching four percent of a population, or even of the urban population, is usually sufficient to overwhelm security forces. As Lichbach (1995) notes, no more than five percent of any population is ever mobilized, so three or four percent of a local population is a formidable challenge to any government. Dictators know all of this, of course, but they cannot always elude backlash. Why Do Rational Dissidents Backlash After Harsh Repression? The real puzzle resides with the dissidents. Why do they emerge after harsh coercion—in these cases, massacres—of a consistently repressive state? Backlash seems to contradict what we know about mobilization. First, usually no dissident entrepreneur appears to be present during backlash. Dissidents emerge on their own—seemingly spontaneously. Second, no visible selective incentive is apparent in backlash mobilization. The public good itself stands as the solitary putative cause of action. Third, there is neither regime accommodation nor inconsistent regime action. The regime policy in all of our cases is consistent harsh repression against dissent. Finally, the risk of action is large. If the regime has just committed a massacre, why would it not commit another? In the absence of accommodation from the regime, why would dissent action accelerate? Answering these questions necessitates a close examination of the ten cases in this study and at previous literature findings. We have four puzzles from the dissident perspective: no mobilizing leader, no selective incentive, consistent regime policy of repression and great danger of injury or death. Let us take these four puzzles in turn and attempt to understand the mechanism of backlash in a dictatorship. No Mobilizing Leader Except perhaps for the Bachelor’s Walk massacre, dissident leaders organized all ten of our basic repression events. Punjab Sikh leaders amassed 15,000 citizens to stand quietly holding hands in an Amritsar park before General Dyer ordered them shot. The Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association organized the Bloody Sunday demonstration, after leaders had secured assurance from the IRA that it would stay away from the demonstration in order to remove all possible provocation (Mullan 1997). The Bachelor’s Walk incident was inspired by the Irish Volunteers’ success in importing illegal firearms. A great crowd assembled when, at 6:30 pm, troops misunderstood a command and fired into the crowd. Many fell or were injured in the ensuing chaos. The African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde organized the dock strike that triggered the Portuguese army action in 1959. In Prague forces in Charter 77 and incipient dissident organizations formed the November 17, 1989 demonstration that led to harsh repression. The Sharpeville massacre was one tragic result of a nation-wide mobilization by the Pan African Congress against a new policy in South Africa requiring women to have passes. Student leaders organized the Soweto rising of students against the hated Afrikaans language requirement. Father Gapon, an idealistic cleric, led the 1905 Bloody Sunday demonstration in St. Petersburg in order to secure more food and better living conditions for his flock. The Federation of Beijing Autonomous Unions set up almost all of the protests that culminated in the Tiananmen Square massacre. Finally, the Wujek mine workers protesting against martial law in 1981 were all members of Solidarity. There was no absence of leadership, then, at the outset of these events. What happens after the massacre? Does leadership vanish? Surprisingly, it seems to continue in almost all of these cases. Subsequent to the Amritsar massacre, Punjab union organizations led strikes and sabotage. Religious leaders urged all citizens in Punjab to perform hartals, a religious ritual of fasting and desisting from daily business which became an Indian version of a general strike against the British (Fein 1977). And, of course, Gandhi used the massacre to build momentum for his own nonviolent, hartal-based campaign. Backlash in Derry after Bloody Sunday took the form of a general strike, terror in Belfast, and then a vigil and funeral procession in Derry. The general strike was apparently universal among Catholics, to the point that grocery stores and banks opened for only a few specified hours, and then immediately closed. Clearly, there was extreme coordination power within the Catholic region. Planning began two hours after the massacre. A crowd gathered in a vacant shop. An official IRA member moved for a general strike; the motion was seconded by a provisional IRA member. The motion passed unanimously. It was then transmitted to journalists, broadcast the call over Northern Ireland and Ireland itself McCann 1992). In the earlier Bachelor’s Walk incident in Dublin, a similar pattern emerged. First, it was a continuous backlash. Young men milled around British soldiers’ barracks all night after the massacre. Second, in a union meeting rank-and-file police refused to disarm Irish Volunteers, even as 2,000 armed Volunteers appeared on the street in protest of the massacre. Dublin police met again on the third day to demand reinstatement of police who were fired for refusing to disarm Volunteers. Finally, a massive funeral procession moved slowly through Dublin on the third day. The situation in Guinea-Bissau is the stark exception in the 10 cases. The independent leadership that organized the strike learned from it. The African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde ordered a retreat and reorganized the movement as a guerrilla war against the Portuguese (Forrest 1992; Lopes 1987). Leadership was constant throughout the massacre—and that is the reason no backlash occurred. The dissidents’ leaders realized that urban protest would never be successful against Portuguese colonial police. The accelerating demonstrations in Prague in November 1989 had organized leadership that was abetted by knowledge of what was happening in East Germany, Hungary, Poland and other collapsing communist countries in East Central Europe. The demonstrations were accompanied by a massive and almost complete student strike— including not only university students, but high school students as well. This was a tremendously effective adaptation tactic. How could the police reach every apartment to force students into school? The combination of demonstrations and student strikes brought the regime to its knees. Pan African Congress (PAC) leadership remained intact during and after the Sharpeville massacre. In fact, the PAC was the principal mobilizing force in the backlash demonstrations. The African National Congress also grew more active in the wake of the massacre, even though its leadership was under constant pressure from the apartheid state. Students initially controlled the Soweto rising with backlash, mainly strikes, occurring throughout the country. Riots continued for over two days and were met with brutal repression, resulting in over 100 dead and 1,100 injured. Fighting finally ebbed on the third day, mainly due to the repression, but also because of extremely cold weather and a severe shortage of food. In St. Petersburg in 1905 Father Gapon suddenly and mysteriously disappeared after shooting began. In his wake students and militant workers mobilized the building of barricades. Thereafter, Menshevik revolutionary leaders directed the backlash—Bloody Sunday had transformed a welfare-based religious movement into a revolutionary force dedicated to reducing and even removing the Tsar’s power (Sablinsky 1976). The Tiananmen Square massacre failed to destroy totally the student movement. Two days after the event, an estimated half-million dissidents blocked a critical bridge, even as the army roamed throughout Beijing firing indiscriminately at any challengers. Eventually the obstruction dissolved and the state arrested or deported most of the student leadership. Finally, the Wujek mine massacre emerged from a protest against the previous imposition of martial law. Coal miners had refused to leave the mine, refused to acknowledge martial law and refused to recognize the proscription of Solidarity. Workers continued to resist when security forces marched in to clear the mines; in response, police opened fire and 16 men lay dead. Other mines and factories held out for as much as two more weeks. By then Solidarity had adapted to the repression by changing its structure and tactics. Thus was Underground Solidarity born; it came to dominate all planning and implementing of dissent within Poland for the next four years. It is apparent from our investigation that leadership after a massacre either remains intact or new leaders emerge almost immediately. Typically, the new dissident entrepreneurs are more radical than those they supplant. In none of our cases was backlash mobilization bereft of leadership and direction. Mobilization without Selective Incentives? Muller and Opp (1986) argued that the public good itself is the most important incentive to perform rebellious action. Karklins and Peterson (1993) also note the absence of selective incentives in the Eastern Europe revolutions. But while selective incentives are a major factor in Olson’s (1965) collective action theory, Lichbach (1995) demonstrates that these incentives are merely one of scores of approaches to the solution of collection action. Moreover, Karklins and Peterson (1993) underscore the special nature of severe repression. They call it a “focal event”, an event that marks a critical tipping point in a society. Lohmann (1994) goes even farther. She notes that extreme public repression of dissident citizens sets in motion an informational cascade that reveals to an ever-widening public increasing evidence of the hidden malign nature of the regime. A massacre or Bloody Sunday is likely to provide that moral tipping point. Kuran (1995) argues that most citizens in a dictatorial regime rationally falsify their public preferences. These preferences remain false as long as the regime shows no vulnerability. When the regime commits a serious error, such as a public massacre, Kuran (1995, 248) contends that many citizens break through a revolutionary threshold to mobilize dissidents quickly and to accelerate their own participation. Should they be able to sustain their activity, they can quickly imperil the dictatorial regime. If immediate large-scale organization is impossible, the specter of a massacre still matters—dissident leaders mobilize more easily on anniversaries of massacres. The act of harsh repression focuses a spotlight on the regime and makes mobilization less problematic than if coercion had not occurred. Mobilization under a Consistent Repression Policy Lichbach (1984; 1987) demonstrates that a consistent repressive policy reduces violent dissent. The cases in our sample had (or have in the case of the PRC) a consistent repressive policy. Even the UK was consistent. After a massacre, the first step was to rationalize the troops’ actions and defend the state. The second step established an inquiry committee which inevitably exonerated the forces that killed the dissidents. Even General Dyer was found innocent of killing 530 unarmed Sikh Indians in 1919. Governability models show that consistent repression reduces violence but augments revolutionary activity (Lichbach, 1984). Karklins (1987) examined the dissent/coercion nexus in the USSR and discovered that the Soviet Union allowed some dissent, as long as it did not exceed prescribed limits. In almost all, if not all of the cases in this paper, authorities perceived dissidents as having exceeded the country’s low limit of protest. Yet in every case the dissidents were unarmed and nonviolent. Thus, when state- sponsored shooting began, a focal event emerged. After a massacre any tacit bargain with the state is null and void. Such a signal event changes the threshold level of action. As Geifman (1993) notes, Russians were ebullient after the Bloody Sunday massacre. A Russian source explained, “Surprisingly, no one among the Russians was depressed. . . . On the contrary, [they] were in a lively, uplifted mood. It was clear that 9 January would be the signal for a victorious struggle” (Geifman, 1993, 263). Massacres appear to generate a life beyond simple consistent repression. The real question remaining, then, is the level of risk that backlash dissidents accepted by acting. The Repression Risk of Backlash Action Do backlash dissidents know the probability of repression when they decide to act in response to particularly harsh repression? They have good reason to be wary. After all, our cases document massacres. If we assume that our protesters are risk averse but are nonetheless incensed, what options do they have for venting their anger? Tables 2 and 3 show backlash mobilization levels, casualties and the dissidents’ clear shift of tactics. The numbers in Table 2 are basic estimations of mobilization and casualties from the sources indicated. At minimum, they represent a probable proper order of magnitude. The principal tale of Tables 2 and 3 is that after a massacre dissidents adapt their tactics to elude repression while they continue to protest. This adaptation generally is effective. Tables 4 and 5 show paired two-sample t-tests between the percentages of death and injuries in the original event and backlash protest. In each table are the original 10-case t-test as well as resampling with the bootstrap with 1,000 repetitions. Differences of injuries and deaths are not statistically significant with only ten cases, but each difference is significant with the resampling. Zero is not in any of the bootstrap confidence intervals of Tables 4 and 5. Backlash adaptation does appear to help to elude repression. The deaths during backlash are easily explained. First, the only known deaths after the Tiananmen Square massacre occurred in Shanghai when thirty dissidents lay down on the rails challenging a stationary train. State agents ordered the engineer to drive forward and all 30 protesters were killed. In Soweto, it was rioters who died after the first day of protest—any person who confronted the police and the army was likely to be shot. Most backlash, however, took the form of strikes. Protesters adapted after the Wujek mine massacre. But since the state previously had imposed martial law, mobile riot police (ZOMOS) and the army rooted miners out of mines and workers out of factories and eventually arrested the dissidents. Table 2 Backlash Estimations Event Mobilization at event Post-1 day Post-2 day Post-3 day Deaths Injuries Sources Amritsar, India massacre 15,000 30,000 30,000 60,000 0 0 Fein 1977; Times (London) 4/14-4/30/ 1919; Irish Times 4/14-4/21/1919 Bloody Sunday, Derry 3,000 15,000 18,000 20,000 0 0 Irish Times 1/31-2/2/1972 Bachelor’s Walk massacre, Dublin 1,000 3,000 6,000 9,000 0 0 De Rosa 1990; Times (London) 7/28-7/ 30/1914 Pidjiguiti, Guinea- Bissau massacre 1,000 0 0 0 0 0 Forrest 1992; Lopes 1987 Prague repression 50,100 2,500 20,000 528,700 0 0 http://lark.cc.ukans.edu/~ronfran/data/ index.html Sharpeville massacre, South Africa 6,000 15,000 30,000 30,300 0 0 Pogrund 1991 Soweto massacre, South Africa 10,000 50,000 70,000 30,000 109 1,100 New York Times 6/18-6/20/1976 Bloody Sunday, St. Petersburg, Russia 16,000 30,000 300,000 300,000 0 0 Sablinsky 1976; Suhr 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, Beijing 6,000 30,000 30,000 500,100 30 301 Ming Pao News 1989; Salisbury 1989 Wujek mine massacre, Poland 3,001 28,993 315,855 353,127 13 1,039 http://lark.cc.ukans.edu/~ronfran/data/ index.html Table 3 Event and Backlash Tactics Event Event Tactics Post-Event Tactics Amritsar, India massacre rally hartals (general strike) & railroad strike Bloody Sunday, Derry, Ulster demonstration general strike; funeral procession Bachelor’s Walk massacre, Dublin march rallies & funeral processions, accompanied by Irish Volunteers Pidjiguiti, Guinea-Bissau massacre strike none; reorganized for guerrilla war Prague repression demonstration strikes and demonstrations Sharpeville massacre, South Africa demonstration rallies & strikes Soweto massacre, South Africa stone-throwing & demonstrations rioting & strikes Bloody Sunday, St. Petersburg, Russia demonstration general strike Tiananmen Square massacre, Beijing, PRC occupation civil disobedience Wujek mine massacre, Poland occupation occupation Despite all the problems in backlash mobilization cited above, our investigation shows that dissidents, at least in these ten cases, solve the difficulties naturally. Leadership either continues after massacres or is replaced by still more zealous leaders. The massacre itself becomes a focal event, rendering the public good against the state more salient than ever. Perhaps the most remarkable finding is the general acceleration of mobilization over the three days after the massacre. Tables 6 through 8 show paired two-sample t-tests and resampling t-tests of mobilization between the massacre day and all three post-days. The day following the massacre exhibits tentative mobilization—so tentative that not even the bootstrap t-tests are statistically significant. Nonetheless, subsequent numbers of dissidents are significant and generally demonstrate acceleration. The difference between massacre mobilization and the third day after the massacre is statistically significant even with only ten cases (Table 8). Table 4 Paired 2-sample t-test: Event Deaths – Post-Event Deaths: Raw Data & Bootstrapping Tests t-statistic N/Repetitions Mean Standard Error 95% Confidence Interval 1.686 10 430.4 255.2787 -147.0805 1007.88 1.686001 1000 430.4 0.4971479 0.7104267 2.661574 (normal) 1.192761 3.143427 (percentile) 1.076285 2.393544 (bias corrected) Table 5 Paired 2-sample t-test: Event Injuries-Post-Event Injuries: Raw Data & Bootstrapping Tests t-statistic N/Repetitions Mean Standard Error 95% Confidence Interval 1.8273 10 759.9 415.8594 -180.8394 1700.639 1.8273 1000 759.9 0.8817809 0.0969448 3.557655 (normal) 0.1948344 3.847119 (percentile) 0.1009356 3.582225 (bias corrected) The apparent absence of selective incentives is less important than in conventional mobilization. There is an elevated chance of making a difference by acting, and the public good can be enhanced to include the defeat of the state (as in Czechoslovakia in 1989 or St. Petersburg in 1905). Finally, the risk of repression after a massacre is real, but it is mitigated effectively by adaptive tactics and refusal to cooperate with the repressing state. Table 6 Paired 2-sample t-test: Event Mobilization & Post-Day 1 Mobilization: Raw Data & Bootstrapping Tests t-statistic N/Repetitions Mean Standard Error 95% Confidence Interval 1.2662 10 9339.2 7375.739 -26024.28 7345.881 1.266205 1000 7375.739 1.97753 -5.146794 2.614383 (normal) -6.331904 0.5356 (percentile) -5.89242 0.6912 (bias corrected) Table 7 Paired 2-sample t-test: Event Mobilization & Post-Day 2 Mobilization: Raw Data & Bootstrapping Tests t-statistic N/Repetitions Mean Standard Error 95% Confidence Interval 1.8338 10 70875.4 38648.62 -158304.6 16553.85 1.83384 1000 70875.4 0.654137 -3.11822 -0.5494611 (normal) -3.355679 -0.901269 (percentile) -3.135592 -0.54739 (bias corrected) Table 8 Paired 2-sample t-test: Event Mobilization & Post-Day 3 Mobilization: Raw Data & Bootstrapping Tests t-statistic N/Repetitions Mean Standard Error 95% Confidence Interval 2.6337 10 172012.6 65313.19 -319761.3 -24263.9 2.633658 1000 172012.6 0.7692145 -4.14312 -1.124197 (normal) -4.54435 -1.492892 (percentile) -4.4669 -1.449867 (bias corrected) Modeling Revolutionary Backlash One of the cases in our sample led to almost immediate dissolution of the Czechoslovak communist state because of enormous backlash mobilization. The same pattern occurred throughout East Central Europe in 1989 and early 1990: after a particularly egregious repression event, the dictator loses control of state security forces, dissident leaders mobilize easily in a repression-free environment, and the state collapses under the overwhelming protest. Figure 1 shows the level of revolutionary mobilization in Czechoslovakia from 1986 through regime transition on December 10, 1989. The figure’s top level should be 500,000 per day to show all of the backlash. Instead it is set at 100,000 per day in order to depict at least some of the smaller level protests that preceded the backlash in late November. A total of 8,767,913 Czechoslovak citizens protested between November 17 and December 10. As we have seen, these exponential bursts in mobilization are not uncommon after especially harsh repression events. How can we understand the mechanism of these often startling events? Conventional action- reaction or predator-prey models are inappropriate for the sudden emergence of huge mobilization levels. Instead, a more appropriate model is one that explicitly incorporates exponential growth from a small initial base. One such mathematical formalism is the insect outbreak model (Murray 1993). This is a relatively simple logistic single-equation model that can be estimated from the data available on Czechoslovakia: where N = mobilization levels, a = the logistic rate of mobilization in the absence of repression K = the carrying capacity of the environment b = the declining rate of mobilization due to repression This is a biological model, of course, so we must modify it for our purposes. First, we cannot assume continuity. Dissidents do not remain constantly on the street. Therefore, we transform the model from a differential to a difference equation (Elaydi 1996). Second, the notion of a carrying capacity is irrelevant for our purposes—the street can contain sufficient numbers of dissidents given the 5 percent rule (Lichbach 1995). We eliminate the carrying capacity, leaving us with the following difference equation: where N = mobilization levels, a = mobilization in the absence of repression, b = the rate of decline of mobilization due to repression, and R = repression (arrests, injuries, and deaths) We estimated this model with Czechoslovak daily-aggregated data from January 1, 1980 to regime transition on December 10, 1989. The results of this test are shown in Table 9. Table 9 Results of the Model Estimation Parameter Parameter Estimate Standard Error t-value p(t) a 0.00000017 0.000000004515 36.88 <0.0001 b 20.342 78.7954 0.26 0.7963 Durbin-Watson = 1.9999 In this estimation repression does not appear to matter, but of course it was a single repression event that triggered the enormous backlash mobilization, with virtually no repression thereafter. The logistic parameter a is nonetheless highly statistically significant, indicating that the model mechanism of exponential growth fits well to this sort of backlash sample. Repression did not “remove” many dissidents after the burst in mobilization and that accounts for its non-significance in the estimation procedure. This model might be useful in more general terms of protest and repression. It assumes that once dissent reaches a threshold level, repression intervenes. If mobilization is able to continue through the repression as in Czechoslovakia, then we have the kind of results noted above. If, however, repression contains the dissent, then mobilization either reaches a plateau or approaches it asymptotically. The Efficacy of Harsh Repression and Backlash Mobilization This paper investigates ten instances of massacres by a state. It argues that such egregious repression is never really efficacious for a dictator. The arguments, at least in the cases investigated here, are compelling. Let us start with the logical outcomes of massacres. What are the possibilities after particularly harsh repression? First, nothing—the repression was effective. Second, backlash—the repression mobilizes dissidents. Third, a delayed reaction with a tactical shift—the repression moved dissidents to do two things: change tactics in order to elude future coercion and mobilize more dissidents (Lichbach 1987). Two out of these three possibilities are bad for the dictator. Moreover, even deterrence may be temporary at best. Durable dictators must then have an uncanny sense of how to use and limit repression for deterrence alone. But this seems unlikely. Consider the triggers of backlash in Table 1. In Prague, it was a rumor of one student shot and killed. In Amritsar, in contrast, it was 530 shot dead and thousands wounded. Context matters, as does the number of citizens killed and injured. Pragmatically speaking, it is very difficult for a dictator to judge accurately his country’s tolerance level of repression. Protest, random in nature, is usually triggered by an event. Repression is committed by a security force that cannot always be controlled. A dictator can require training, but instructors cannot anticipate well which kind of event might occur. Natural disasters can upset equilibrium, as can other sorts of events: Hungary’s decision to open its border in 1989 knocked the foundation out from under the German Democratic Republic. Once the GDR lost control of emigration, it lost its basis as a government. Almost anything can trigger an event that later might be depicted as a massacre or Bloody Day. Once such an event occurs, life changes for a dictatorship. No longer can a dictator ignore the loyalty issues his security force presents. An embattled dictator faces episodic challenges of the sort that occurred in South Africa, India and Ireland, and the guerilla war in Guinea- Bissau. A regime may have fighter jets, armored personnel carriers and helicopter gunships, but it still must fight hard to hold the ground it claims. Table 1 lists the post-massacre tenure of the dictators in our ten cases. For the most part, their years in power are impressive. Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson (1995) investigated the office tenure of political leaders who engage their nations in war. Their data suggest that dictators are far more robust than democratic leaders—they enjoy lengthier leadership and they defray many of the costs associated with war that often topple democratic governments. Losing a war, however, especially one with high costs, is an equal hazard to political leaders of all stripes. International war exposes dictators to widespread attention, to the consequences of losing and to heavy costs in general. In contrast, harsh domestic repression, finely tuned to context, apparently carries small risks to tenure. Since the focus is domestic, outside attention is limited and publicity inside the country is under state control. Dictators can limit their risks in these ways, but after a massacre, they have a high probability of embattlement. In our single ongoing regime case, the PRC, the government must continue to negotiate with an international community resistant to harsh repression and with ongoing challenges from internal groups such Falun Gong. One easy way to reduce the risk of overthrow is to avoid using harsh repression. What is the efficacy of backlash protest from the dissidents’ perspective? In the case of Czechoslovakia, it was quick overthrow of the dictatorship (20 days). For most other cases, though, backlash mobilization was either a first or continuing effort against the regime. Against a resolute dictator dissidents can hope at best for a state of continued embattlement. The key for dissidents is to minimize losses as they attempt to maximize the productivity of adaptation tactics. Dissidents stay away from work and schools, they engage in work slowdowns and in other ways signal non-cooperation with the state. To the extent that a large number of community members participate, they can inflict significant damage to the dictator’s prestige, reputation and economic collateral. Dissidents achieved this minimum goal in all of our cases. Massacres appear to strengthen dissident leadership and mobilization. Organizing a dissident movement is much easier after a massacre. Pre-existing associations tend to become at once stronger and more radical, and resources tend to increase as well. A close examination of historical sources and contemporary newspapers reporting on the ten events studied here leads to a rich catalog of solutions to the Rebel’s Dilemma (Lichbach 1995). Extreme levels of repression help dissidents to remove the mask of benevolence from a dictatorial regime. Sablinsky (1976) notes that Russians no longer regarded the Tsar as their natural leader after January 9, 1905. Gandhi’s campaign against the British used the Amritsar massacre and its whitewash as an important mobilization device (Payne 1969). Derry’s Bloody Sunday accelerated the IRA terror campaign that led to prison hunger strikes and the deaths of British soldiers in the Netherlands, Germany and elsewhere in Europe during the 1980s. In South Africa the 1976 Soweto rising signaled apartheid’s demise. The students’ cause was clearly just and the repression meted out was sufficiently harsh as to lead to widespread international criticism and withdrawal of investment from the South African economy. Similarly, St. Petersburg’s Bloody Sunday initiated the Tsar of Russia’s downward spiral. From the disastrous Japanese-Russian war through World War I, the Tsar lacked the broad base of support from his subjects that would have conferred legitimacy to his reign. Even when the regime faced few repercussions from backlash, e.g., Poland, Tiananmen and Guinea-Bissau, the initial repression caused great difficulties for the regime in the long term. In Poland it was the Underground Solidarity movement that daunted and humiliated Jaruzelski’s martial law regime. China saw huge international and domestic political costs arising from the massacre in 1989. “Tiananmen Square” echoes repeatedly whenever China seeks better accommodation in international organizations. For the Portuguese, more than a decade of guerrilla war and significant losses in Guinea-Bissau threatened Salazar’s dictatorship at home. The start of this paper quoted PRC leader Li Peng’s assertion that history would verify China’s response during the Tiananmen Square demonstrations. Recently released transcripts document the Chinese Communist Party debate about controlling protest in Tiananmen Square (New York Times, 1/6/2001). The papers reveal two factions, one recommending slight accommodation, the other demanding harsh repression. The latter group prevailed, but history refuses to vindicate the PRC. In fact, all over the world Chinese dissidents continue to mark June 4 as a signal mobilization date. References Arendt, Hannah. 1973. The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Harcourt Brace & Co. Bell, J. Bowyer. 1993. The Irish Troubles: A Generation of Violence, 1967-1992. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and Randolph M. Siverson. 1995. “War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability.” American Political Science Review 89:4: 841-855. Calvert, Randall L. 1987. “Reputation and Legislative Leadership.” Public Choice 55: 81-119. Colburn, Forrest. 1994. The Vogue of Revolution in Poor Countries. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Coster, Will. 1999. “Massacre and Codes of Conflict in the English Civil War,” in Mark Levine and Penny Roberts, eds., The Massacre in History. New York: Berghahn Books. Danner, Mark. 1993. The Massacre at El Mozote. New York: Vintage Books. De Rosa, Peter. 1990. Rebels: The Irish Rising of 1916. New York: Doubleday. Elaydi, Saber N. 1996. An Introduction to Difference Equations. New York: Springer Verlag. Fein, Helen. 1977. Imperial Crime and Punishment: The Massacre at Jallianwala bagh and British Judgment, 1919-1920. Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii. Forrest, Joshua B. 1992. Guinea-Bissau: Power, Conflict, and Renewal in a West African Nation. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Francisco, Ronald A. 1996. “Coercion and Protest: An Empirical Test in Two Democratic Societies.” American Journal of Political Science 40 (4): 1179-1204. Furneaux, Rupert. 1963. Massacre at Amritsar. London, UK: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. Geifman, Anna. 1993. Thou Shalt Kill: Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia, 1894-1917. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Goldstone, Jack A. 1998. The Encyclopedia of Political Revolutions. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly. Gourevitch, Philip. 1998. We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families: Stories from Rwanda. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux. Hingley, Ronald. 1974. Joseph Stalin: Man and Legend. New York: Konecky and Konecky. Honda Katsuichi. 1999. The Nanjing Massacre. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. Jackson, Alvin. 1999. Ireland 1798-1998: Politics and War. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers. Karklins, Rasma. 1987. “The Dissent/Coercion Nexus in the USSR.” Studies in Comparative Communism 20 (3/4): 321-341. Karklins, Rasma and Roger Peterson. 1993. “Decision Calculus of Protesters and Regimes: Eastern Europe 1989.” The Journal of Politics 55 (3): 588-614. Lichbach, Mark I. 1995. The Rebel’s Dilemma. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Lichbach, Mark I. 1987. “Deterrence or Escalation? The Puzzle of Aggregate Studies of Repression and Dissent.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 31 (2): 266-297. Lichbach, Mark I. 1984. “An Economic Theory of the Governability: Choosing Policy and Optimizing Performance.” Public Choice 44: 307-337. Lohmann, Susanne. 1994. “The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989-1991.” World Politics 47 (1): 42-101. Lopes, Carlos. 1987. Guinea-Bissau: From Liberation Struggle to Independent Statehood. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Malone, Dumas. 1948. Jefferson the Virginian. Boston: Little, Brown. Mandela, Nelson. 1994. Long Walk to Freedom. Boston: Little, Brown. McCann, Eamonn. 1992. Bloody Sunday in Derry: What Really Happened. Dingle, County Kerry, Ireland: Brandon Book Publishers. McNeal, Robert H. 1988. Stalin: Man and Ruler. New York: New York University Press. Meredith, Martin. 1998. Nelson Mandela: A Biography. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Ming Pao News staff. 1989. June Four: A Chronicle of the Chinese Democratic Uprising. Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press. Mullan, Don. 1997. Bloody Sunday: Massacre in Northern Ireland. Niwot, CO: Roberts Rinehart Publishers. Muller, Edward N. and Karl-Dieter Opp. 1986. “Rational Choice and Rebellious Collective Action.” American Political Science Review 80 (2): 471-487. Murray, James D. 1993. Mathematical Biology. New York: Springer Verlag. Nan Lin. 1992. The Struggle for Tiananmen: Anatomy of the 1989 Mass Movement. Westport, CT: Praeger. Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Payne, Robert. 1969. The Life and Death of Mahatma Gandhi. New York: Konecky and Konecky. Pogrund, Benjamin. 1991. Sobukwe and Apartheid. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Sablinsky, Walter. 1976. The Road to Bloody Sunday: Father Gapon and the St. Petersburg Massacre of 1905. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Salisbury, Harrison E. 1989. Tiananmen Diary: Thirteen Days in June. Boston: Little, Brown. Süß, Walter. 1999. Stattssicherheit am Ende [State Security at the End]. Berlin: Christoph Links Verlag. Suhr, Gerald D. 1989. 1905 in St. Petersburg: Labor, Society and Revolution. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Wintrobe, Ronald. 1998. The Political Economy of Dictatorship. New York: Cambridge University Press. [1] I am grateful to the National Science Foundation (award SBR-9631229) and the Kansas General Research Fund for partial support of the data in this paper. I also thank Joshua B. Forrest for his assistance on the Guinea-Bissau case. [2] January 9 is the date on the old calendar. It is equivalent to January 22 on the Gregorian calendar. [3] When examples from 1980 through 1995 in Europe occur with no citation, then the data come from our NSF coding, see http:// lark.cc.ukans.edu/~ronfran/data/index.html. Forwarded for your information. The text and intent of the article have to stand on their own merits. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107, this material is distributed without charge or profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this type of information for non-profit research and educational purposes only. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ "Do not believe in anything simply because you have heard it. Do not believe simply because it has been handed down for many genera- tions. Do not believe in anything simply because it is spoken and rumoured by many. Do not believe in anything simply because it is written in Holy Scriptures. Do not believe in anything merely on the authority of teachers, elders or wise men. Believe only after careful observation and analysis, when you find that it agrees with reason and is conducive to the good and benefit of one and all. Then accept it and live up to it." The Buddha on Belief, from the Kalama Sutra <A HREF="http://www.ctrl.org/";>www.ctrl.org</A> DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER ========== CTRL is a discussion & informational exchange list. Proselytizing propagandic screeds are unwelcomed. Substance—not soap-boxing—please! These are sordid matters and 'conspiracy theory'—with its many half-truths, mis- directions and outright frauds—is used politically by different groups with major and minor effects spread throughout the spectrum of time and thought. That being said, CTRLgives no endorsement to the validity of posts, and always suggests to readers; be wary of what you read. CTRL gives no credence to Holocaust denial and nazi's need not apply. Let us please be civil and as always, Caveat Lector. ======================================================================== Archives Available at: http://peach.ease.lsoft.com/archives/ctrl.html <A HREF="http://peach.ease.lsoft.com/archives/ctrl.html";>Archives of [EMAIL PROTECTED]</A> http://archive.jab.org/[EMAIL PROTECTED]/ <A HREF="http://archive.jab.org/[EMAIL PROTECTED]/">ctrl</A> ======================================================================== To subscribe to Conspiracy Theory Research List[CTRL] send email: SUBSCRIBE CTRL [to:] [EMAIL PROTECTED] To UNsubscribe to Conspiracy Theory Research List[CTRL] send email: SIGNOFF CTRL [to:] [EMAIL PROTECTED] Om
