-Caveat Lector-
http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?StoryID=20030402-102747-7735r
Commentary: Lessons of Shock and Awe
By Thomas Houlahan
>From the International Desk
Published 4/2/2003 10:54 AM
WASHINGTON, April 2 (UPI) -- There has been a great deal of official
resistance to the proposition that the
Pentagon's "Shock and Awe" war plan hasn't worked particularly well. It has
been argued that the strategy has been a success because whatever
setbacks may have occurred, coalition forces are 50 miles from Baghdad
and have lost fewer than 100 dead.
I wish I could be as satisfied with what has been achieved as Pentagon
officials claim to be, but facts, as John Adams said, are stubborn things. In
four days of ground operations in 1991, coalition forces destroyed 40
divisions and took 89,000 prisoners. In 10 days of serious ground operations
in 2003, using better weapons, coalition forces have destroyed one Iraqi
division, have one bottled up in Basra, and they have taken 8,000 prisoners.
Had the Pentagon followed the "Powell Doctrine" of overwhelming force
that served the coalition so well in the last Gulf War, the war would
probably already be over, and fewer U.S. and British servicemen would
have been killed.
The Powell Doctrine was effective because it realistically addressed the
issue of what makes men fight and what makes them stop fighting. The
present "Shock and Awe" theories ("Shock and Awe" is a collection of
untested schemes, not a doctrine) have run into problems because they
didn't.
There are four main reasons why soldiers fight. It therefore follows that if
these motivations are undermined, soldiers will be more likely to
surrender.
First, men will fight if they believe that their resistance is accomplishing
something important for their country. This is the main reason that the
Pentagon and Centcom have pounded the "resistance is futile" theme and
manage to work the phrase "Saddam Hussein's regime is finished" into
seemingly every media briefing. The problem with the coalition's strategy in
this war is that these statements don't resonate with Iraqi soldiers in the
trenches. Iraqi infantrymen don't watch or listen to Pentagon or Centcom
press briefings.
Attempting to awe soldiers by bombing Baghdad has not worked either.
Soldiers on the front lines probably don't know the extent of the damage
in Baghdad. Even if they did, it is highly unlikely that they would be sitting
in their trenches far from the capital saying: "Gee, they're pounding
Baghdad to a pulp. I guess the jig's up and we'd better surrender." There is
not a direct enough connection between what is happening in Baghdad
and their prospects for effective resistance for the bombing to make much
difference to them.
In the first Gulf War, the coalition did not tell Iraqi soldiers that resistance
was futile with rhetoric. It demonstrated that it was futile with
overwhelming ground power. The balance of combat power was so
lopsided in 1991 that Iraqis literally delayed our combat units longer by
surrendering than they did by resisting. It took Coalition combat units
longer to round up and process a battalion of prisoners than it did to blast
their way through a battalion. Under those circumstances, it was obvious
that in resisting, Iraqi soldiers were not accomplishing anything for their
country, and were merely throwing their lives away. As a result, there
were mass surrenders.
The main irony of this war has been that a battle plan specifically designed
to convince the once-defeated Iraqi army that resistance is futile has gone
awry and has made believers out of Saddam's soldiers. There is an old
saying in boxing: "Never let a scared fighter get brave. Knock him out early
or he'll start thinking he can win." The cumulative effect of the coalition's
early disappointments has been to provide encouragement to an Iraqi army
that came into the war lacking confidence.
Soldiers will also fight because they don't want to let their comrades
down, or because they don't want to be seen as cowards. Overwhelming
force also works against this motivation. When, an approaching wave of
Abrams tanks makes it clear that resistance would be a waste of time and
lives, troops will begin to surrender. The more troops surrender, the less
guilty each remaining soldier feels about joining the parade.
I mentioned earlier that bombing Baghdad doesn't do much to affect a
soldier's will to resist. It also doesn't do anything to degrade his unit's
cohesion. In the first Gulf War, Iraqi units were forced to spread out to
avoid destruction by air or artillery strikes. The men in those units were
also forced to stay in their holes by those strikes. As a result, Iraqi units
were atomized and unit cohesion was broken. Infantry companies were
reduced to a series of isolated two-man fighting positions. Just as
individuals find strength in numbers, they find weakness in isolation. This
made them more likely to surrender when coalition ground units arrived.
The decision to dispense with a pre-ground war bombing campaign against
Iraqi units in the field in this war resulted in these units being harder to
crack by coalition ground units. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has
claimed that it is unfair to compare the results of the ground operations of
the first Gulf War with those achieved so far in this one because there was
a month-long bombing campaign before the 1991 ground war. That is less a
defense than an admission that a similar preparation of the battlefield
would have produced better results. Iraqi units could have been bombed
for a month before ground operations began in this war, but someone high
in our government chose not to do it, and our troops have paid for it. The
situation has improved recently as Republican Guard units have been the
target of intense bombing.
The two reasons for fighting above can be classified as positive motivations.
There are also two negative motivations.
Men sometimes fight because they are coerced into doing so. This
motivation is common in dictatorships. Frederick the Great said that his
men must "fear their officers more than any danger." A hard look at that
statement reveals why leadership through fear is fatally flawed as a
doctrine. Men who are compelled to fight primarily by fear will give up,
run away, or shoot their officers the first time they have to face a danger
that scares them more than their commanders. In the first Gulf War, Iraqi
troops were more afraid of Coalition ground units than they were of their
own officers. Because the Pentagon has decided to go in so light in this
war, the balance of fear has tipped in the other direction.
There have been several excuses offered for why the coalition went in so
light, but the main reason was that planners were out to prove a point.
"Outside-the-box thinkers" in the Pentagon were determined to
demonstrate that the armed forces could win without heavy ground
forces. Since George Bush took office, senior Pentagon officials have been
talking about how heavy divisions were a "relic of the Cold War." The
future, they claimed, would belong to "leaner, meaner forces." In Iraq,
they saw a chance to prove their point and they pounced. Unfortunately,
they encountered a fundamental rule of military psychology: heavy forces
are a lot scarier than light forces.
The present coalition strategy has also enabled Iraqi coercion by allowing
the Iraqi army to maintain stable defensive lines. Behind those lines, Baath
Party enforcers and execution squads have enforced discipline. During the
ground war of 1991, the Iraqi army was destroyed so quickly that these
coercion units couldn't operate effectively. They were busy running for
their lives.
Finally, soldiers often fight because they are afraid that they will be
mistreated or killed if they surrender. Many Americans wonder why the
United States generally treats its prisoners of war so well while our
opponents tend to abuse U.S. prisoners. Quite simply, the humane
treatment of our prisoners benefits our soldiers in the long run. Knowing
that they will be treated humanely if they surrender, enemy soldiers will
be more willing to surrender and will see less need to fight to the death.
This part of our doctrine has not changed since the first Gulf War and we
are still reaping benefits from it.
It has been said that truth is the first casualty of war. I would argue that
bad ideas and unmerited reputations are war's first casualties. A lot of
high-ranking Pentagon officials who only a month ago were being hailed as
geniuses with visionary ideas have come in for some rough treatment
recently. They deserve every bit of it. The coalition is going to win this
war, but it will owe that victory to the quality of our troops and their
equipment, not to Pentagon or Centcom planning. Our troops will win in
spite of their senior leaders.
In an attempt to stop the criticism, Gen. Richard Myers, chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, has claimed that continued criticism of the war plan
is hurting the troops. That prompts two fairly obvious responses. The first
is that the quickest way for the Pentagon to stop the criticism is to just
admit that it underestimated its opponent. All it takes is three simple
words to stop the criticism: "We ... were ... wrong." The second is that if
anyone has hurt the troops, it was the people who put this plan together
and those who went along with it against their better professional
judgment.
Hopefully, the disappointments of this war will prompt both a return to
common sense and a healthy skepticism of "visionary" ideas in the
Pentagon.
--
(Thomas Houlahan is the director of the Military Assessment Program of
the William R. Nelson Institute at James Madison University. A veteran of
the Army's 82nd Airborne Division and the XVIII Airborne Corps staff, he is
the author of "Gulf War: The Complete History," Schrenker Military
Publishing, 1999.)
Copyright © 2001-2003 United Press International
Forwarded for your information. The text and intent of the article
have to stand on their own merits.
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In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107, this material
is distributed without charge or profit to those who have
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for non-profit research and educational purposes only.
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