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http://www.knowledge.co.uk/lobster/articles/l29consp.htm
> 'Conspiracy Theories' and Clandestine Politics
>
> by Jeffrey M. Bale From Lobster 29
>
> Very few notions generate as much intellectual resistance,
> hostility, and derision within academic circles as a belief
> in the historical importance or efficacy of political
> conspiracies. Even when this belief is expressed in a very
> cautious manner, limited to specific and restricted
> contexts, supported by reliable evidence, and hedged about
> with all sort of qualifications, it still manages to
> transcend the boundaries of acceptable discourse and violate
> unspoken academic taboos. The idea that particular groups of
> people meet together secretly or in private to plan various
> courses of action, and that some of these plans actually
> exert a significant influence on particular historical
> developments, is typically rejected out of hand and assumed
> to be the figment of a paranoid imagination. The mere
> mention of the word 'conspiracy' seems to set off an
> internal alarm bell which causes scholars to close their
> minds in order to avoid cognitive dissonance and possible
> unpleasantness, since the popular image of conspiracy both
> fundamentally challenges the conception most educated,
> sophisticated people have about how the world operates and
> reminds them of the horrible persecutions that absurd and
> unfounded conspiracy theories have precipitated or sustained
> in the past. So strong is this prejudice among academics
> that even when clear evidence of a plot is inadvertently
> discovered in the course of their own research, they
> frequently feel compelled, either out of a sense of
> embarrassment or a desire to defuse anticipated criticism,
> to preface their
-> SNETNEWS Mailing List
http://www.knowledge.co.uk/lobster/articles/l29consp.htm
> 'Conspiracy Theories' and Clandestine Politics
>
> by Jeffrey M. Bale From Lobster 29
>
> Very few notions generate as much intellectual resistance,
> hostility, and derision within academic circles as a belief
> in the historical importance or efficacy of political
> conspiracies. Even when this belief is expressed in a very
> cautious manner, limited to specific and restricted
> contexts, supported by reliable evidence, and hedged about
> with all sort of qualifications, it still manages to
> transcend the boundaries of acceptable discourse and violate
> unspoken academic taboos. The idea that particular groups of
> people meet together secretly or in private to plan various
> courses of action, and that some of these plans actually
> exert a significant influence on particular historical
> developments, is typically rejected out of hand and assumed
> to be the figment of a paranoid imagination. The mere
> mention of the word 'conspiracy' seems to set off an
> internal alarm bell which causes scholars to close their
> minds in order to avoid cognitive dissonance and possible
> unpleasantness, since the popular image of conspiracy both
> fundamentally challenges the conception most educated,
> sophisticated people have about how the world operates and
> reminds them of the horrible persecutions that absurd and
> unfounded conspiracy theories have precipitated or sustained
> in the past. So strong is this prejudice among academics
> that even when clear evidence of a plot is inadvertently
> discovered in the course of their own research, they
> frequently feel compelled, either out of a sense of
> embarrassment or a desire to defuse anticipated criticism,
> to preface their account of it by ostentatiously disclaiming
> a belief in conspiracies. (1)
>
> They then often attempt to downplay the significance of the
> plotting they have uncovered. To do otherwise, that is, to
> make a serious effort to incorporate the documented
> activities of conspiratorial groups into their general
> political or historical analyses, would force them to
> stretch their mental horizons beyond customary bounds and,
> not infrequently, delve even further into certain sordid and
> politically sensitive topics. Most academic researchers
> clearly prefer to ignore the implications of conspiratorial
> politics altogether rather than deal directly with such
> controversial matters.
>
> A number of complex cultural and historical factors
> contribute to this reflexive and unwarranted reaction, but
> it is perhaps most often the direct result of a simple
> failure to distinguish between 'conspiracy theories' in the
> strict sense of the term, which are essentially elaborate
> fables even though they may well be based upon a kernel of
> truth, and the activities of actual clandestine and covert
> political groups, which are a common feature of modern
> politics. For this and other reasons, serious research into
> genuine conspiratorial networks has at worst been
> suppressed, as a rule been discouraged, and at best been
> looked upon with condescension by the academic community.
> (2) An entire dimension of political history and
> contemporary politics has thus been consistently neglected.
> (3)
>
> For decades scholars interested in politics have directed
> their attention toward explicating and evaluating the merits
> of various political theories, or toward analyzing the more
> conventional, formal, and overt aspects of practical
> politics. Even a cursory examination of standard social
> science bibliographies reveals that tens of thousands of
> books and articles have been written about staple subjects
> such as the structure and functioning of government
> bureaucracies, voting patterns and electoral results,
> parliamentary procedures and activities, party organizations
> and factions, the impact of constitutional provisions or
> laws, and the like. In marked contrast, only a handful of
> scholarly publications have been devoted to the general
> theme of political conspiracies--as opposed to popular
> anti-conspiracy treatises, which are very numerous, and
> specific case studies of events in which conspiratorial
> groups have played some role -- and virtually all of these
> concern themselves with the deleterious social impact of the
> 'paranoid style' of thought manifested in classic conspiracy
> theories rather than the characteristic features of real
> conspiratorial politics. (4)
>
> Only the academic literature dealing with specialized topics
> like espionage, covert action, political corruption,
> terrorism, and revolutionary warfare touches upon
> clandestine and covert political activities on a more or
> less regular basis, probably because such activities cannot
> be avoided when dealing with these topics. But the analyses
> and information contained therein are rarely incorporated
> into standard works of history and social science, and much
> of that specialized literature is itself unsatisfactory.
> Hence there is an obvious need to place the study of
> conspiratorial politics on a sound theoretical,
> methodological, and empirical footing, since ignoring the
> influence of such politics can lead to severe errors of
> historical interpretation.
>
> This situation can only be remedied when a clear-cut
> analytical distinction has been made between classic
> conspiracy theories and the more limited conspiratorial
> activities that are a regular feature of politics.
> 'Conspiracy theories' share a number of distinguishing
> characteristics, but in all of them the essential element is
> a belief in the existence of a 'vast, insidious,
> preternaturally effective international conspiratorial
> network designed to perpetrate acts of the most fiendish
> character', acts which aim to 'undermine and destroy a way
> of life.' (5)
>
> Although this apocalyptic conception is generally regarded
> nowadays as the fantastic product of a paranoid mindset, in
> the past it was often accepted as an accurate description of
> reality by large numbers of people from all social strata,
> including intellectuals and heads of state. (6) The fact
> that a belief in sinister, all-powerful conspiratorial
> forces has not been restricted to small groups of clinical
> paranoids and mental defectives suggests that it fulfills
> certain important social functions and psychological
> needs.(7)
>
> First of all, like many other intellectual constructs,
> conspiracy theories help to make complex patterns of
> cause-and-effect in human affairs more comprehensible by
> means of reductionism and oversimplification. Secondly, they
> purport to identify the underlying source of misery and
> injustice in the world, thereby accounting for current
> crises and upheavals and explaining why bad things are
> happening to good people or vice versa. Thirdly, by
> personifying that source they paradoxically help people to
> reaffirm their own potential ability to control the course
> of future historical developments. After all, if evil
> conspirators are consciously causing undesirable changes,
> the implication is that others, perhaps through the adoption
> of similar techniques, may also consciously intervene to
> protect a threatened way of life or otherwise alter the
> historical process. In short, a belief in conspiracy
> theories helps people to make sense out of a confusing,
> inhospitable reality, rationalize their present
> difficulties, and partially assuage their feelings of
> powerlessness. In this sense, it is no different than any
> number of religious, social, or political beliefs, and is
> deserving of the same serious study.
>
> The image of conspiracies promoted by conspiracy theorists
> needs to be further illuminated before it can be contrasted
> with genuine conspiratorial politics. In the first place,
> conspiracy theorists consider the alleged conspirators to be
> Evil incarnate. They are not simply people with differing
> values or run-of-the-mill political opponents, but inhuman,
> superhuman, and/or anti-human beings who regularly commit
> abominable acts and are implacably attempting to subvert and
> destroy everything that is decent and worth preserving in
> the existing world. Thus, according to John Robison, the
> Bavarian Illuminati were formed 'for the express purpose of
> ROOTING OUT ALL THE RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENTS, AND
> OVERTURNING ALL THE EXISTING GOVERNMENTS IN EUROPE.' (8)
>
> This grandiose claim is fairly representative, in the sense
> that most conspiracy theorists view the world in similarly
> Manichean and apocalyptic terms.
>
> Secondly, conspiracy theorists perceive the conspiratorial
> group as both monolithic and unerring in the pursuit of its
> goals. This group is directed from a single conspiratorial
> centre, acting as a sort of general staff, which plans and
> coordinates all of its activities down to the last detail.
> Note, for example, Prince Clemens von Metternich's claim
> that a 'directing committee' of the radicals from all over
> Europe had been established in Paris to pursue their
> insidious plotting against established governments. (9)
>
> Given that presumption, it is no accident that many
> conspiracy theorists refer to 'the Conspiracy' rather than
> (lower case)conspiracies or conspiratorial factions, since
> they perceive no internal divisions among the conspirators.
> Rather, as a group the conspirators are believed to possess
> an extraordinary degree of internal solidarity, which
> produces a corresponding degree of counter solidarity
> vis-a-vis society at large, and indeed it is this very
> cohesion and singleness of purpose which enables them to
> effectively execute their plans to destroy existing
> institutions, seize power, and eliminate all opposition.
>
> Thirdly, conspiracy theorists believe that the
> conspiratorial group is omnipresent, at least within its own
> sphere of operations. While some conspiracy theories
> postulate a relatively localized group of conspirators, most
> depict this group as both international in its spatial
> dimensions and continuous in its temporal dimensions. '[T]he
> conspirators planned and carried out evil in the past, they
> are successfully active in the present, and they will
> triumph in the future if they are not disturbed in their
> plans by those with information about their sinister
> designs.'(10)
>
> The conspiratorial group is therefore capable of operating
> virtually everywhere. As a consequence of this
> ubiquitousness, anything that occurs which has a broadly
> negative impact or seems in anyway related to the purported
> aims of the conspirators can thus be plausibly attributed to
> them.
>
> Fourthly, the conspiratorial group is viewed by conspiracy
> theorists as virtually omnipotent. In the past this group
> has successfully overthrown empires and nations, corrupted
> whole societies, and destroyed entire civilizations and
> cultures, and it is said to be in the process of
> accomplishing the same thing at this very moment. Its
> members are secretly working in every nook and cranny of
> society, and are making use of every subversive technique
> known to mankind to achieve their nefarious purposes.
> Nothing appears to be able to stand in their way--unless the
> warnings of the conspiracy theorists are heeded and acted
> upon at once. Even then there is no guarantee of ultimate
> victory against such powerful forces, but a failure to
> recognize the danger and take immediate countervailing
> action assures the success of those forces in the near
> future.
>
> Finally, for conspiracy theorists conspiracies are not
> simply a regular feature of politics whose importance varies
> in different historical contexts, but rather the motive
> force of all historical change and development. The
> conspiratorial group can and does continually alter the
> course of history, invariably in negative and destructive
> ways, through conscious planning and direct intervention.
> Its members are not buffeted about by structural forces
> beyond their control and understanding, like everyone else,
> but are themselves capable of controlling events more or
> less at will. This supposed ability is usually attributed to
> some combination of demonic influence or sponsorship, the
> possession of arcane knowledge, the mastery of devilish
> techniques, and/or the creation of a preternaturally
> effective clandestine organization. As a result, unpleasant
> occurrences which are perceived by others to be the products
> of coincidence or chance are viewed by conspiracy theorists
> as further evidence of the secret workings of the
> conspiratorial group. For them, nothing that happens occurs
> by accident. Everything is the result of secret plotting in
> accordance with some sinister design.
>
> This central characteristic of conspiracy theories has been
> aptly summed up by Donna Kossy in a popular book on fringe
> ideas:
>
> Conspiracy theories are like black holes--they suck in
> everything that comes their way, regardless of content or
> origin...Everything you've ever known or experienced, no
> matter how 'meaningless', once it contacts the
> conspiratorial universe, is enveloped by and cloaked in
> sinister significance. Once inside, the vortex gains in size
> and strength, sucking in everything you touch. (11)
>
> As an example of this sort of mechanism, one has only to
> mention the so-called 'umbrella man', a man who opened up an
> umbrella on a sunny day in Dealey Plaza just as President
> John F. Kennedy's motorcade was passing. A number of
> 'conspiracy theorists' have assumed that this man was
> signalling to the assassins, thus tying a seemingly trivial
> and inconsequential act into the alleged plot to kill
> Kennedy. It is precisely this totalistic, all-encompassing
> quality that distinguishes 'conspiracy theories' from the
> secret but often mundane political planning that is carried
> out on a daily basis by all sorts of groups, both within and
> outside of government. It should, however, be pointed out
> that even if the 'umbrella man' was wholly innocent of any
> involvement in a plot, as he almost certainly was, this does
> not mean that the Warren Commission's reconstruction of the
> assassination is accurate.
>
> However that may be, real covert politics, although by
> definition hidden or disguised and often deleterious in
> their impact, simply do not correspond to the bleak,
> simplistic image propounded by conspiracy theorists. Far
> from embodying metaphysical evil, they are perfectly and
> recognizably human,
>
> with all the positive and negative characteristics and
> potentialities which that implies. At the most basic level,
> all the efforts of individuals to privately plan and
> secretly initiate actions for their own perceived mutual
> benefit --insofar as these are intentionally withheld from
> outsiders and require the maintenance of secrecy for their
> success--are conspiracies. Moreover, in contrast to the
> claims of conspiracy theorists, covert politics are anything
> but monolithic. At any given point in time, there are dozens
> if not thousands of competitive political and economic
> groups engaging in secret planning and activities, and most
> are doing so in an effort to gain some advantage over their
> rivals among the others. Such behind-the-scene operations
> are present on every level, from the mundane efforts of
> small-scale retailers to gain competitive advantage by being
> the first to develop new product lines to the crucially
> important attempts by rival secret services to penetrate and
> manipulate each other. Sometimes the patterns of these
> covert rivalries and struggles are relatively stable over
> time, whereas at other times they appear fluid and
> kaleidoscopic, as different groups secretly shift alliances
> and change tactics in accordance with their perceived
> interests. Even internally, within particular groups
> operating clandestinely, there are typically bitter
> disagreements between various factions over the specific
> courses of action to be adopted. Unanimity of opinioon
> historical judgements. There is probably no way to prevent
> this sort of unconscious reaction in the current
> intellectual climate, but the least that can be expected of
> serious scholars is that they carefully examine the
> available evidence before dismissing these matters out of
> hand.
>
> Footnotes
>
> 1. Compare Robin Ramsay, 'Conspiracy, Conspiracy Theories
> and Conspiracy Research', Lobster 19 (1990), p. 25: 'In
> intellectually respectable company it is necessary to
> preface any reference to actual political, economic,
> military or paramilitary conspiracies with the disclaimer
> that the speaker "doesn't believe in the conspiracy theory
> of history (or politics)".'This type of disclaimer quite
> clearly reveals the speaker's inability to distinguish
> between bona fide conspiracy theories and actual
> conspiratorial politics.
>
> 2. The word 'suppress' is not too strong here. I personally
> know of at least one case in which a very bright graduate
> student at a prestigious East Coast university was
> unceremoniously told by his advisor that if he wanted to
> write a Ph.D. thesis on an interesting historical example of
> conspiratorial politics he would have to go elsewhere to do
> so. He ended up leaving academia altogether and became a
> professional journalist, in which capacity he has produced a
> number of interesting books and articles.
>
> 3. Complaints about this general academic neglect have often
> been made by those few scholars who have done research on
> key aspects of covert and clandestine politics which are
> directly relevant to this study. See, for example, Gary
> Marx, 'Thoughts on a Neglected Category of Social Movement
> Participant: The Agent Provocateur and the Informant',
> American Journal of Sociology 80:2 (September 1974),
> especially pp. 402-3. One of the few dissertations dealing
> directly with this topic, though not in a particularly
> skilful fashion, is Frederick A. Hoffman, 'Secret Roles and
> Provocation: Covert Operations in Movements for social
> Change' (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation: UCLA Sociology
> Department, 1979). There are, of course, some excellent
> academic studies which have given due weight to these
> matters--for example, Nurit Schleifman, Undercover Agents in
> the Russian Revolutionary Movement: The SR Party, 1902-1914
> (Basingstoke: Macmillan/ St. Anthony's College, 1988); and
> Jean-Paul Brunet, La police de l'ombre: Indicateurs et
> provocateurs dans la France contemporaine (Paris: Seuil,
> 1990)--but such studies areunfortunately few and far
> between.
>
> 4. The standard academic treatments of conspiracy theories
> are Richard Hofstadter, 'The Paranoid Style in American
> Politics', in Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American
> Politics and Other Essays (New York: Knopf, 1966), pp. 3-40;
> Norman Cohn, Warrant for Genocide: The Myth of the Jewish
> World-Conspiracy and the Protocols of the Elders of Zion
> (Chico, CA: Scholars, 1981 [1969]); J. M. Roberts, The
> Mythology of the Secret Societies (London: Secker & Warburg,
> 1972); Johannes Rogallavon Bieberstein, Die These von der
> Verschwrung, 1776-1945: Philosophen, Freimaurer, Juden,
> Liberale und Sozialisten als Verschwrergegen die
> Sozialordnung (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1976); and
> Carl F. Graumann and Serge Moscovici, eds., Changing
> Conceptions of Conspiracy (New York: Springer, 1987). See
> also the journalistic studies by George Johnson, Architects
> of Fear: Conspiracy Theories and paranoia in American
> Politics (Los Angeles: Tarcher, 1983); and Jonathan Vankin,
> Conspiracies, Cover-Ups, and Crimes: Political Manipulation
> and Mind Control in America (New York: Paragon House, 1992).
>
> 5. See Hofstadter, 'Paranoid Style', pp. 14, 29.
>
> 6. Although conspiracy theories have been widely accepted in
> the most disparate eras and parts of the world, and thus
> probably have a certain universality as explanatory models,
> at certain points in time they have taken on an added
> salience due to particular historical circumstances. Their
> development and diffusion seems to be broadly correlated
> with the level of social, economic, and political upheaval
> or change, though indigenous cultural values and
> intellectual traditions determine their specific form and
> condition their level of popularity.
>
> 7. As many scholars have pointed out, if such ideas were
> restricted to clinical paranoids, they would have little or
> no historical importance. What makes the conspiratorial or
> paranoid style of thought interesting and historically
> significant is that it frequently tempts more or less normal
> people and has often been diffused among broad sections of
> the population in certain periods. Conspiracy theories are
> important as collective delusions, delusions which
> nevertheless reflect real fears and real social problems,
> rather than as evidence of individual pathologies. See, for
> example, Hofstadter,'Paranoid Style', pp. 3-4.
>
> 8. See his Proofs of a Conspiracy Against All the Religions
> and Governments of Europe, Carried on in the Secret Meetings
> of free Masons, Illuminati, and Reading Societies, Collected
> from Good Authorities (New York: G. Forman, 1798), p. 14.
> This exhibits yet another characteristic of 'conspiracy
> theorists'--the tendency to over-dramatize everything by
> using capital letters with reckless abandon.
>
> 9. See his 'Geheime Denkschrift nber die Grundung eines
> Central-Comites der nordischen Machte in Wien', in Aus
> Metternichs nachgelassenen Papieren, ed. by Richard
> Metternich-Winneburg (Vienna: 1881),vol. 1, p. 595, cited in
> Rogalla von Bieberstein, These von der Verschwrung, pp.
> 139-40.
>
> 10. Dieter Groh, 'Temptation of Conspiracy Theory, Part I',
> in Changing Conceptions of Conspiracy, p. 3. A classic
> example of conspiratorial works that view modern
> revolutionary movements as little more than the latest
> manifestations of subversive forces with a very long
> historical pedigree is the influential book by Nesta H.
> Webster, Secret Societies and Subversive Movements (London:
> Boswell, 1924). For more on Webster's background, see the
> biographical study by Richard M. Gilman, Behind World
> Revolution: The Strange Career of Nesta H. Webster (Ann
> Arbor: Insight, 1982), of which only one volume has so far
> appeared.
>
> 11. Kooks: A Guide to the Outer Limits of Human Belief
> (Portland: Feral House, 1994), p. 191.
>
> 12. For more on P2, see above all the materials published by
> the Italian parliamentary commission investigating the
> organization, which are divided into the majority (Anselmi)
> report, five dissenting minority reports, and over one
> hundred thick volumes of attached documents and verbatim
> testimony before the commission. Compare also Martin Berger,
> Historia de la loggia masonica P2 (Buenos Aires: El Cid,
> 1983); Andrea Barbieri et al, L'Italia della P2 (Milan:
> Mondadori, 1981); Alberto Cecchi, Storia della P2 (Rome:
> Riuniti, 1985); Roberto Fabiani, I massoni in Italia (Milan:
> L'Espresso, 1978); Gianfranco Piazzesi, Gelli: La carriere
> di un eroe di questa Italia (Milan: Garzanti, 1983); Marco
> Ramat et al, La resistabile ascesa della P2: Poteri occulti
> e stato democratico (Bari: De Donato, 1983); Renato
> Risaliti, Licio Gelli, a carte scoperte (Florence: Fernando
> Brancato, 1991); and Gianni Rossi and Franceso Lombrassa, In
> nome della 'loggia': Le prove di come lamassoneria segreta
> ha tentato di impadronarsi dello stato italiano. Iretroscena
> della P2 (Rome: Napoleone, 1981). Pro P2 works include those
> of Gelli supporter Pier Carpi, Il caso Gelli: La verita
> sulla loggia P2 (Bologna: INEI, 1982); and the truly
> Orwellian work by Gelli himself, La verita (Lugano: Demetra,
> 1989), which in spite of its title bears little resemblance
> to the truth.
>
> 13. For the AB, see Ivor Wilkins and Hans Strydom, The
> Super-Afrikaners: Inside the Afrikaner Broederbond
> (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1978); and J.H.P.Serfontein,
> Brotherhood of Power: An Expose of the Secret Afrikaner
> Broederbond (Bloomington and London: Indiana University,
> 1978).Compare also B. M. Schoeman, Die Broederbond in die
> Afrikaner-politiek (Pretoria: Aktuele, 1982); and Adrien
> Pelzer, Die Afrikaner-Broederbond: Eerste 50 jaar (Cape
> Town: Tafelberg, 1979).
>
> 14. See his Historians' Fallacies: Toward a Logic of
> Historical Thought (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), pp. 74-8.
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
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