-Caveat Lector-
In a message dated 10/21/04 4:00:41 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:


PANIC AND PROFITS
by Chris Mayer

"To be ignorant of what happened before you were born is to be ever a child."
-Cicero

George Peabody may not be a name familiar to you, but surely, you have heard of
J.P. Morgan. Well, there may never have been a Morgan if not for George Peabody.
What follows is a bit of his story, a small study in the creation of wealth in
19th-century America. The opportunity for Peabody emerged in the aftermath of the
Panic of 1837.

The Panic of 1837 itself is a great tale, not only because of its useful
parallels with today's markets, but also because it gives us an example of the
great truth about financial crises - they are midwives of opportunity.

Generally, the study of the bubbles and busts of the past should be a staple in
every investor's diet, because speculative manias and panics are bound to be a
part of every investor's experience. There is much to be learned in mining these
old experiences. The more we know (so we hope), the better prepared and less
surprised we will be when things start to break.

Panics always have their beginnings in the boom that precedes them. Just as all
hurricanes first develop over warm waters from pre-existing conditions, financial
storms are spawned by surging growth in money, debt and speculation - the tres
hombres of financial upheaval, if you will.

>From the perspective of European investors, 1830s America was a booming emerging
market full of promise and potential, a lure for hungry European capital.

The cotton industry was thriving, as the United States was a major global
exporter of cotton. Cotton prices were probably as important as the price of oil
is today for Middle Eastern countries like Saudi Arabia.

In addition to the cotton industry, there was a great surge in canal
construction. The Erie Canal was completed in 1824 and made a big impact on
trade. As Marc Faber reports in his excellent book Tomorrow's Gold, the Erie cut
travel expenses by 90% on some routes. New canals linking the St. Lawrence River
to the Great Lakes allowed for easier transportation of Midwestern grains to New
York.

The canal was like any of our recent technological marvels, in that it cut costs
and improved productivity. This should concern those investors who are banking on
productivity and breakthrough technologies to make them rich, because the canal
boom and bust is another in a long line of examples (including airlines and
automobiles) in which investors lost boatloads of money betting on life-changing
technologies.

In any event, the success of New York's canals helped make the state the
financial and commercial center of the young republic. It also inspired numerous
imitators, as other towns and cities sought to copy its successes. New bubbles
need a crowd of support to wreak havoc, just as politicians need votes to get
started.

The canal mania also stimulated rampant speculation in land as speculators tried
to position themselves to profit from the growing canal boom. Land prices soared,
and properties were flipped like Internet stocks.

Much of this expansion - the cotton boom, the canal construction and the
speculation in land - was financed on credit. The banking business, too, was a
growth industry. The number of banks in the United States rose from 330 in 1830
to 788 in 1837 - a 139% increase.

The Second Bank of the United States (an embryonic Federal Reserve, which was
disbanded in 1836 after Andrew Jackson vetoed the bill to renew its charter) and
its coterie of state banks fueled a credit binge that would have made Greenspan
proud.

Total bank loans and money supply more than doubled in the six years running up
to 1836. In short, there was a huge amount of money chasing cotton plantations,
canal projects and speculating on land.

Austrian business cycle theory, as crafted by economists Ludwig von Mises and
Murray Rothbard, dictates that any bank credit inflation leads to the boom-bust
cycle. All that money and debt creation leads to malinvestments. Malinvestments
are investments that later prove to be unprofitable. The word is perfect to
express what happens in a
boom - malinvestments multiply. The 1830s boom would be no exception.

The immediate causes of the bust were numerous, and all happened in 1837,
precipitating a period of tighter money in which the house of cards began to
collapse on itself.

But the immediate causes of the Panic are not important. What is important to
remember is that massive borrowing and speculation put the economy on the
inevitable path of all bubbles. It also important to note that as prosperous as
America was to become, it was plagued in its early stages with regular economic
crises - in 1819, 1837, 1857, 1873, 1884 and 1893. Emerging market investors of
today take note (because as promising as China looks today, it will not have a
smooth ride, if history is any guide. In fact, I think 19th-century America is
probably a good metaphor for China).

During the ensuing depression, cotton prices would fall 70%, bankrupting a number
of speculators and plantation owners who had paid inflated prices for their land.
U.S. banks, facing the withdrawal of foreign credit, began to shut their doors,
unable to meet the redemption demands of their depositors. U.S. bank shares fell
to small fractions of their previous highs.

Many of the investments made in canal construction were based on unrealistic
high-growth assumptions and caused great losses for investors. Many projects,
starved for capital after the Panic, were never finished and became worthless.

It was in this maelstrom that George Peabody would build the fortune that founded
the House of Morgan. A Baltimore merchant, he opened a merchant house in London
in 1838, trading in dry goods and trade finance. American securities had become a
specialty of Peabody's, and he sold many U.S. bonds to British investors. State
governments had become big debtors in the infrastructure boom - spending money on
canals and public works projects.

Peabody actually saw what was coming, and in anticipation, he began to curtail
some of his operations, collecting debts he was due, selling stock and getting
into cash-building a kitty that would see his business through the Panic and give
Peabody some dry powder to take advantage of inevitable new opportunities once
the air finally came out of the balloon.

Like contemporary Russia or Brazil, the United States was the emerging market
crisis of that time. The state governments were the deadbeat debtors of the day.
As author Ron Chernow notes, "British investors cursed America as a land of
cheats, rascals and ingrates."

The stain of default also tainted the federal government's credit standing. When
the United States sent Treasury representatives to meet with the august James de
Rothschild, he reportedly answered, "Tell them you have seen the man who is at
the head of the finances of Europe and that he had told you that they cannot
borrow a dollar. Not a dollar."

Because of U.S. debt troubles, Peabody became persona non grata around London
(after all, he had sold the Brits much of that debt). But that did not deter him.
He bought the depreciated state bonds when they were trading for pennies on the
dollar. When these bonds paid interest again, in the late 1840s, Peabody reaped a
fortune. By 1848, American securities had come to be seen as something of a safe
haven as Europe was engulfed in the flames of revolution. The American railroad
boom was going strong too, and gold was soon discovered in California.

The promise of America once again won the hearts (and investment dollars) of
Europe's moneyed elite. Proof once again that investors of all times and places
have short memories.

Peabody's reputation was restored, as America once again became the place to
invest. By the 1850s, he had amassed a fortune of some $20 million and had an
annual income exceeding $300,000. He was financing everything from Chinese silk
to iron rail exports to America.

Peabody, though, was careful with his money. "My capital is ample," he wrote,
"but I have passed too many money panics not to have seen how often large
capitals are swept away and that even with my own I must use caution."

Junius Spencer Morgan, J.P. Morgan's father, was invited to become Peabody's
partner in 1854. Fortunately for Morgan, Peabody had no heirs or a spouse - not
even a nephew to whom he could pass on his vast fortune and thriving business.
Not only that, he was determined to find an American of good standing and talent
to take the reins. As Chernow writes, "This placed the Morgans in the exceedingly
nice position of inheriting somebody else's empire on a platter."

It was to Morgan that such a fortune would fall when Peabody retired, although
Peabody broke their agreement by refusing to allow Morgan to use the Peabody name
(or perhaps the House of Morgan would have become the House of Peabody). In
September of 1864, George Peabody & Co. became J.S. Morgan & Co.

The Morgan family would prove to be good stewards of Peabody's empire. The senior
Morgan, whether you view him as villain or hero, was a shrewd investor. Morgan
and his partners were patient, taking a long view of their investments and
allowing their companies to develop without panicking at short-term setbacks.

Long-term patience like that is not a hallmark of today's institutional money. A
whole culture of meeting quarterly earnings estimates seems to have vastly
shortened investment horizons - to the detriment of today's shareholders.


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-Caveat Lector-

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On the days that I don't publish, like today, you will
receive Bill Bonner's DAILY RECKONING. This will help you
to keep pace with the changes in the markets.  Bonner and
I agree on most things in the field of economics, so the
two letters will reinforce each other.

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Panic and Profits

The Daily Reckoning

London, England

Thursday, October 21, 2004

---------------------

*** Anyone have a spare crystal ball?... credit's running out...

*** "Finance" companies... BOGO... bubble burst in U.K... .

*** Written in the stars... the worst kind of liberals... tears for fears... and
more!


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The dollar hit a seven-month low against the euro yesterday.

The greenback hit a low in January... rose in the spring... and barely budged in
the summer.

"Look at this," said colleague Dan Denning yesterday. He pointed to MoneyWeek's
Chart of the Week, clearly showing that though the dollar rose in 2004, it never
actually left its downward channel. Now, it's dropping again.

We don't know where it will end up. Nor do we know what is ahead for stocks or
residential real estate. We can neither predict the future nor control the
present in this great big world of ours. But in our tiny little sphere, at least,
we still have some influence. Whatever the answer the future gives, we don't want
to be holding dollars, stocks or leveraged houses when we get it.

If consumers were earning more money, we might expect them to buy more from
American companies. The sales should increase profits and make stocks worth more.
But consumers aren't earning more. What they spend comes from borrowing, not
earning. And even the credit seems to be running out.

"BOGO." That's the new offer from GM dealerships in Kansas City. Buy one, get one
free. They're giving away a new Chevy Aveo when you pay full price for an SUV.
Not a great way to make money. And GM doesn't. It loses money on every car it
sells... and makes it up by being in "finance" - offering more credit to
consumers.

Yesterday, too, Countrywide Financial Corp. stock dropped 12%. The company
finances houses. It said the volume of refinance deals has fallen... and its
margins have been squeezed. Of course, this is what happens to "finance"
companies when credit begins to contract. Not that we know for sure we've reached
the end of the credit boom. But when it comes, you won't find our names on lists
of "finance" company shareholders.

The worldwide property boom began in London in the mid-'90s. Here in London, it
seems to be over. The Halifax House Price Index fell to its lowest level in nine
years yesterday.

Houses go up in price when more people have more money to spend on them. But by
many measures, American families have never had so little spending power. They
owe more than ever before. Good-paying new jobs are scarce. During the boom
years, new houses were put up on practically every empty plot of land and
abandoned factory lot. What would make them go up - except more credit?

And the dollar itself? What would make it go up is exactly what America hasn't
got - a positive and improving trade balance. If U.S. industries were selling
more things overseas, the foreigners would want dollars to buy them. Instead, it
is the foreigners who sell... and it is the foreigners who end up with billions
of U.S. dollars on their hands, and wonder what to do with them. For the present,
they turn them into their central banks... who recycle them into U.S. assets.
That they will not always do so is written in the stars and on the walls. When
they will not do so is an open question... but the day surely approaches. And
when it arrives would not be a good day to be holding too many dollars [Ed. Note:
For more brilliant insights like these, check out what our currency counselor,
Chuck Butler has to say in today's issue of

The Daily Pfenning... ].
http://www.dailyreckoning.com/body_headline.cfm?id=4197

More news from New York City:

--------------

Eric Fry, reporting from Manhattan...

How exactly is the United States comparable to a "foolish virgin"?  Apparently,
the answers lie within a biblical parable.  Read all about it in today's issue of
The Rude Awakening...
http://www.dailyreckoning.com/home.cfm?loc=/body_headline.cfm&qs=id=4198

--------------

Bill Bonner, back in London:

*** "Oh, I can't stay," said a friend with whom we had a drink last night. "I've
got to get back to my hotel room. The BBC has a great documentary on tonight. It
shows how the neocons fabricated this war on terror... "

We went home too and turned on the "telly." What we discovered was that the BBC
has gone on the attack against America's neoconservatives. We were glad to see
it; we despise the neoconservatives too... though not necessarily for the same
reasons. All the media is biased - and generally biased in the neoconservatives'
direction. As we've pointed out many times, the neoconservatives are not
conservatives at all, but the worst kind of liberals. They favor government
programs of all kinds - especially those that that get people killed. They've
even stirred up the Bible-thumpers to back an absurd and anti-Christian crusade
against Islam. Neos talk about faith, freedom and democracy, but what they really
seem to want is what all meddlers want... to tell other people what to do.


*** "Oh Dad, you won't believe it."

Maria, in her first year of theater school in London, described what goes on:

"We all form a circle. And you're supposed to go into the circle and say
something personal. I mean, you're supposed to make some sort of confession or
something. It is amazing. It does seem to do something strange. I am in tears
each time. Some of the kids tell us the most remarkable things... about how their
parents didn't like them... or how awful other people were to them. I really
don't have anything like that to say. I didn't know what to say... so I just
cried. And then I had to apologize for crying. I don't know what makes me cry.
But they seem to accept it. Others cry too. And I feel so sorry for them. But I
really don't want to say anything too personal... anything that I will regret
later. Besides, I don't really have any deep emotional scars. And I find it a
little weird. The way people open up.

"But I think we're getting a little tired of it. It was interesting at first. But
now, we've all made fools of ourselves. So yesterday... people went into the
circle and said that they liked being at school... and that everything was
basically all right. And then one boy went in, and he told us how upset he was
that we were all so complacent and so... well, happy... I don't know really what
was bothering him. He seemed most bothered by the fact that the rest of us
weren't bothered.

"And then a girl went into the circle to answer him. I mean, you hear the most
amazing things. She said that if he had a problem, it was his own fault...

"At the beginning of these sessions, we were told that we could say anything we
wanted... that we should be open... and we could be as critical as we wanted. We
were supposed to say exactly what we think. But that does not seem like a good
idea to me. I mean... if we all did that, the world wouldn't be fit to live in...
Would it?"

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---------------------

The Daily Reckoning PRESENTS: Americans seem to be carelessly floating away on
the housing bubble... Chris Mayer gives us a closer look at the history of
financial cycles and shows us that this boom has nowhere to go - but down...

PANIC AND PROFITS
by Chris Mayer

"To be ignorant of what happened before you were born is to be ever a child."
-Cicero

George Peabody may not be a name familiar to you, but surely, you have heard of
J.P. Morgan. Well, there may never have been a Morgan if not for George Peabody.
What follows is a bit of his story, a small study in the creation of wealth in
19th-century America. The opportunity for Peabody emerged in the aftermath of the
Panic of 1837.

The Panic of 1837 itself is a great tale, not only because of its useful
parallels with today's markets, but also because it gives us an example of the
great truth about financial crises - they are midwives of opportunity.

Generally, the study of the bubbles and busts of the past should be a staple in
every investor's diet, because speculative manias and panics are bound to be a
part of every investor's experience. There is much to be learned in mining these
old experiences. The more we know (so we hope), the better prepared and less
surprised we will be when things start to break.

Panics always have their beginnings in the boom that precedes them. Just as all
hurricanes first develop over warm waters from pre-existing conditions, financial
storms are spawned by surging growth in money, debt and speculation - the tres
hombres of financial upheaval, if you will.

>From the perspective of European investors, 1830s America was a booming emerging
market full of promise and potential, a lure for hungry European capital.

The cotton industry was thriving, as the United States was a major global
exporter of cotton. Cotton prices were probably as important as the price of oil
is today for Middle Eastern countries like Saudi Arabia.

In addition to the cotton industry, there was a great surge in canal
construction. The Erie Canal was completed in 1824 and made a big impact on
trade. As Marc Faber reports in his excellent book Tomorrow's Gold, the Erie cut
travel expenses by 90% on some routes. New canals linking the St. Lawrence River
to the Great Lakes allowed for easier transportation of Midwestern grains to New
York.

The canal was like any of our recent technological marvels, in that it cut costs
and improved productivity. This should concern those investors who are banking on
productivity and breakthrough technologies to make them rich, because the canal
boom and bust is another in a long line of examples (including airlines and
automobiles) in which investors lost boatloads of money betting on life-changing
technologies.

In any event, the success of New York's canals helped make the state the
financial and commercial center of the young republic. It also inspired numerous
imitators, as other towns and cities sought to copy its successes. New bubbles
need a crowd of support to wreak havoc, just as politicians need votes to get
started.

The canal mania also stimulated rampant speculation in land as speculators tried
to position themselves to profit from the growing canal boom. Land prices soared,
and properties were flipped like Internet stocks.

Much of this expansion - the cotton boom, the canal construction and the
speculation in land - was financed on credit. The banking business, too, was a
growth industry. The number of banks in the United States rose from 330 in 1830
to 788 in 1837 - a 139% increase.

The Second Bank of the United States (an embryonic Federal Reserve, which was
disbanded in 1836 after Andrew Jackson vetoed the bill to renew its charter) and
its coterie of state banks fueled a credit binge that would have made Greenspan
proud.

Total bank loans and money supply more than doubled in the six years running up
to 1836. In short, there was a huge amount of money chasing cotton plantations,
canal projects and speculating on land.

Austrian business cycle theory, as crafted by economists Ludwig von Mises and
Murray Rothbard, dictates that any bank credit inflation leads to the boom-bust
cycle. All that money and debt creation leads to malinvestments. Malinvestments
are investments that later prove to be unprofitable. The word is perfect to
express what happens in a
boom - malinvestments multiply. The 1830s boom would be no exception.

The immediate causes of the bust were numerous, and all happened in 1837,
precipitating a period of tighter money in which the house of cards began to
collapse on itself.

But the immediate causes of the Panic are not important. What is important to
remember is that massive borrowing and speculation put the economy on the
inevitable path of all bubbles. It also important to note that as prosperous as
America was to become, it was plagued in its early stages with regular economic
crises - in 1819, 1837, 1857, 1873, 1884 and 1893. Emerging market investors of
today take note (because as promising as China looks today, it will not have a
smooth ride, if history is any guide. In fact, I think 19th-century America is
probably a good metaphor for China).

During the ensuing depression, cotton prices would fall 70%, bankrupting a number
of speculators and plantation owners who had paid inflated prices for their land.
U.S. banks, facing the withdrawal of foreign credit, began to shut their doors,
unable to meet the redemption demands of their depositors. U.S. bank shares fell
to small fractions of their previous highs.

Many of the investments made in canal construction were based on unrealistic
high-growth assumptions and caused great losses for investors. Many projects,
starved for capital after the Panic, were never finished and became worthless.

It was in this maelstrom that George Peabody would build the fortune that founded
the House of Morgan. A Baltimore merchant, he opened a merchant house in London
in 1838, trading in dry goods and trade finance. American securities had become a
specialty of Peabody's, and he sold many U.S. bonds to British investors. State
governments had become big debtors in the infrastructure boom - spending money on
canals and public works projects.

Peabody actually saw what was coming, and in anticipation, he began to curtail
some of his operations, collecting debts he was due, selling stock and getting
into cash-building a kitty that would see his business through the Panic and give
Peabody some dry powder to take advantage of inevitable new opportunities once
the air finally came out of the balloon.

Like contemporary Russia or Brazil, the United States was the emerging market
crisis of that time. The state governments were the deadbeat debtors of the day.
As author Ron Chernow notes, "British investors cursed America as a land of
cheats, rascals and ingrates."

The stain of default also tainted the federal government's credit standing. When
the United States sent Treasury representatives to meet with the august James de
Rothschild, he reportedly answered, "Tell them you have seen the man who is at
the head of the finances of Europe and that he had told you that they cannot
borrow a dollar. Not a dollar."

Because of U.S. debt troubles, Peabody became persona non grata around London
(after all, he had sold the Brits much of that debt). But that did not deter him.
He bought the depreciated state bonds when they were trading for pennies on the
dollar. When these bonds paid interest again, in the late 1840s, Peabody reaped a
fortune. By 1848, American securities had come to be seen as something of a safe
haven as Europe was engulfed in the flames of revolution. The American railroad
boom was going strong too, and gold was soon discovered in California.

The promise of America once again won the hearts (and investment dollars) of
Europe's moneyed elite. Proof once again that investors of all times and places
have short memories.

Peabody's reputation was restored, as America once again became the place to
invest. By the 1850s, he had amassed a fortune of some $20 million and had an
annual income exceeding $300,000. He was financing everything from Chinese silk
to iron rail exports to America.

Peabody, though, was careful with his money. "My capital is ample," he wrote,
"but I have passed too many money panics not to have seen how often large
capitals are swept away and that even with my own I must use caution."

Junius Spencer Morgan, J.P. Morgan's father, was invited to become Peabody's
partner in 1854. Fortunately for Morgan, Peabody had no heirs or a spouse - not
even a nephew to whom he could pass on his vast fortune and thriving business.
Not only that, he was determined to find an American of good standing and talent
to take the reins. As Chernow writes, "This placed the Morgans in the exceedingly
nice position of inheriting somebody else's empire on a platter."

It was to Morgan that such a fortune would fall when Peabody retired, although
Peabody broke their agreement by refusing to allow Morgan to use the Peabody name
(or perhaps the House of Morgan would have become the House of Peabody). In
September of 1864, George Peabody & Co. became J.S. Morgan & Co.

The Morgan family would prove to be good stewards of Peabody's empire. The senior
Morgan, whether you view him as villain or hero, was a shrewd investor. Morgan
and his partners were patient, taking a long view of their investments and
allowing their companies to develop without panicking at short-term setbacks.

Long-term patience like that is not a hallmark of today's institutional money. A
whole culture of meeting quarterly earnings estimates seems to have vastly
shortened investment horizons - to the detriment of today's shareholders.

Taking the lesson of past crashes and heeding the warnings about rampant debt
creation and widespread speculation, let's look at today's market for areas that
might be potential panic spots for 2005 and beyond.

It is hard to look at today's market and not see housing as a potential panic
spot. It is like looking at a normal-sized man with elephant ears: It's hard not
to notice. The housing market has all the makings of a bubble - lots of debt
(mortgages), artificial government stimulation, incredible price increases and a
belief that housing is always a good investment. As Grant's Interest Rate
Observer notes, "Since the stock market peaked, Americans have shifted their
hopes for capital appreciation to the roofs over their heads, net of the
mortgages on their backs."

The United States has not seen such a long bull market in housing since at least
the 1950s.

In some parts of the country, the gains have been staggering. Since 2000, in the
Washington, D.C., area market, where I live, prices have gained 70%. Housing
prices do decline, lest we forget. According to research by HSBC, "Declines
occurred in 1975, 1979-82 and 1989-94, using the OFHEO House Price Index. In the
past 116 quarters that we have data for (1975Q2-2004Q1), real prices rose 73
times and fell 41 times and were flat twice. In other words, real prices declined
35% of the time." This time, the run-up in prices was unprecedented. Will we soon
be able to add housing to the long list of great bubbles in American history -
along with canals, railroads and all the rest?

In short, the housing bubble is stretching itself awfully thin. Take this story
to heart and become more knowledgeable about risks, and learn to appreciate the
timeless qualities of financial cycles. Like Peabody, let's heed the warnings and
keep our capital safe.

Regards,

Chris Mayer
for The Daily Reckoning

Editor's Note: Christopher W. Mayer is a veteran of the banking industry,
specifically in the area of corporate lending. A financial writer since 1998,
Christopher's essays have appeared in a wide variety of publications, from the
Mises.org Daily Article series to here in The Daily Reckoning. He is also the
editor of Fleet Street Letter.

As Mr. Mayer writes above, it is inevitable that the housing bubble will burst.
When will it happen... and how will it affect American investors?

Fleet Street Letter - at $59 for an annual subscription - has the details...

https://www.agora-inc.com/secure/form1.cfm?pubcode=FST&pcode=WFSTEA04&alias=nopdfs



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