-Caveat Lector-
an excerpt from:
Revelations of an International Spy
I. T. T. Lincoln
Robert M. McBride & Company©1916
New York
--[7]--
CHAPTER VII
THE DANGEROUS RUSE WHICH WON THE CONFIDENCE OF THE BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE
WHEN Legationsrath Gneist, the German Consul at Rotterdam, reads these words
he will understand the dangerous game I was playing and the necessity for
deception that I had to practise even upon him. When it finally became clear,
that life in England for me, and every other naturalized foreigner, had
become impossible, the cumulative effect of the spy hunting epidemic, the
impending ruin of my business and the personal insult to which I was
subjected under the roof of my own club (the National Liberal) filled me with
a bitter desire for revenge. I made up my mind to shake England's 'dust from
my feet but not without "getting even."
The plan I mapped out to achieve this will seem to many rather startling. It
was certainly original. It was nothing less than a decision to find out
important naval and military secrets and to betray them to Germany, and,
having achieved that, to quit England forever, if still alive.
This is no mere figure of speech. I knew that what I was going to do—was
technically high treason, but my blood was boiling in me at all the
calculated barbarities inflicted by a haughty, perfidious race upon innocent
people.
My aim as stated was simplicity itself, but to carry it out meant clever
acting. Indeed, to effectively carry out my scheme it was essential that my
plan of campaign should be known only to me.
To obtain the secret information required in my hazardous undertaking
necessitated a confidential berth in the War Office. This was not so easily
accomplished. I offered my services in turn to the Home Secretary, to Sir
Edward Grey and to Mr. Churchill, all of —whom I knew personally, but they
were not accepted. Next I attempted to get into the Counter-Espionage
Department (M. 0. 5 J.) at the War Office. Just what happened I will set out
in some detail.
On December 10, I called on Lieutenant-Colonel Bellamy at the War Office and
asked him to introduce me to the Secret Service officers. Fortunately for my
plans I had for several weeks at the outbreak of hostilities served under
this officer as censor of all Hungarian and Rumanian correspondence and
cables at the War Office and at the Mount Pleasant Post Office.
My old chief at once presented me to Major Anderson in room 225 of the War
Office, who next day presented me to Capt. P. W. Kenny, who is the acting
chief of the Secret Service at the War Office, or rather of the military
CounterEspionage service. Captain Kenny is an officer of rare intelligence
and ability and is one of the best linguists I had met in England. But then
he is an Irishman. As an ex-M. P. I was cordially received.
Now my aim really was nothing less than to lure part of the British fleet
into a certain quarter of the North Sea on a certain day and to have the
German fleet within easy steaming distance. In order to procure this, I
proposed just the reverse to Captain Kenny and laid before him a carefully
prepared scheme, the ostensible purpose of which was to destroy part of the
German navy.
The plan I proposed to Captain Kenny was as follows:
"You lose, as a risk of war, vessels of all description. Battleships,
cruisers, destroyers, etc. Why not sacrifice one or two of these with a view
of destroying part of the German Navy?"
"Now what do you mean?" he queried.
"You will send two or three cruisers, or one dreadnought and two cruisers,
with attendant destroyers and torpedo boats, on some errand in the North Sea.
You will let me know three or four days beforehand. I will notify the Germans
and they will naturally send a more powerful squadron to the same vicinity on
the same day in order to destroy them. In order not to send your men to
certain death, you will tell them what is going to happen. They will be
prepared; they will fight. Surely, some of your vessels will be sunk, for the
Germans, knowing the type and number of your vessels, will be well prepared
to deal with you. Yet it is almost certain that some of your vessels, at any
rate, will escape and it is equally probable that in the fight you will
damage or sink a German vessel. The Germans will then see that my information
was correct. Now we will do this twice more; each time you must be ready to
sacrifice some war vessels of old types.
"After we have done this, say, three times, you will send a bigger squadron
in order to lure out a large, or the largest, part of the German High Sea
Fleet. In addition to your 'bait' squadron, you will have a very powerful
squadron of dreadnoughts and battle cruisers within easy steaming distance,
but far enough that even with the most powerful glasses they cannot be
discerned on the horizon. You will give instructions to your 'bait' squadron
how to fight and in which direction to run during the fight, luring the
Germans into a trap; of course, you must have this well out in the North Sea,
otherwise the Germans will not follow you towards your own coast. You might
make an apparent attempt to force Heligoland, or bombard Borkum, and then
keep up a running fight towards Rosyth. You can then have a powerful squadron
north and south of the prescribed fighting course and capture or destroy the
pursuing Germans." This was the scheme submitted to Captain Kenny.
My real scheme was as follows: Not to tell the Germans what I told the
English. In secret service one must -not and cannot trust any one. I would
have worked on the assumption that at the very first "bait" fighting the
English would have had a powerful squadron waiting within steaming distance,
so that the Germans would not have taken them by surprise, but would have
found them adequately prepared in any event. The Germans would have taken the
necessary precautions.
Now, supposing the English had acted according to my scheme two or three
times, and I knew that the next time would have been the big scoop, two ways
were open for the Germans: either to be satisfied with the number of ships,
they had destroyed during the previous two or three rendezvous, and keep
away; or, send all their available ships to outnumber the English. They could
have done what they considered best. Of course, if the Germans had -not
turned up at the rendezvous after two or three smaller naval battles, the
Admiralty would have known that I was a German spy and would have shot me if
they had still found me in England. But they would not have found me there.
To carry out my plan was not so simple. I could not possibly propose this
audacious plan to the Germans, for they would have mistrusted me. It is one
of the safeguards of diplomatic espionage to distrust your immediate and
"most trusted" agents, as well. I was sure, however, that after a few weeks I
could have worked it so that they would have followed my lead. Independent of
everybody I intended managing the scheme myself as follows:
I would have advised the Admiralty, with whom I was connected, that I knew
from the Germans that they are going to raid the English coast again. How did
I know this without creating the suspicion that I was a German spy? Oh, very
easily. By telling the English at the very outset that I was indeed a German
spy, but only in order to accomplish a very complicated and daring ruse for
England. In corroboration of this I gave them valuable German information,
including two codes, keeping one for myself so that I could communicate with
the Germans.
I hope the reader follows me in this tangled vein of cross-plotting. Now,
then, I would have walked up to the Admiralty and said: "I met a German spy
to-day and I got very valuable information from him, but I can only tell you
if you do not arrest him, for that will give both of us away. He just tells
me that he had orders to be in Seaton Carew, take a room facing the sea in a
high building on such and such a day and signal during the night out to sea,
because a raid will be made on the Hartlepools."
It is certain that the English would have sent a squadron to deal with the
supposed "German raiders," and naturally enough they would not have come too
near to Hartlepools so as not to frighten away the Germans.
I would have, indeed, sent one of the numerous Germans in London to Seaton
Carew with instructions what to do. But what is more important, I would have
immediately cabled to the Germans that a squadron will be near the
Hartlepools on the night of such and such a day, because the English have
information that the Germans are to make a raid. How could I have sent such a
telegram out of England? Wait and see. All will be explained below. Now the
Germans would have seen that I had advance naval intelligence of the English
squadron, while the English would have seen that my information about a
German raid somewhere at the Hartlepools was correct. Of course, I would have
refrained from mentioning how many German warships would come; so that the
Germans would have been at liberty to send ten or sixteen vessels of various
types and descriptions. It is certain that the English would not have
expected more than four or six raiders. The Germans would have won. Needless
to say I could not repeat this very same operation; but I could have executed
a second one like this:
"I have information that in a few days' time the Germans will send during the
night two fast battle cruisers to bombard Dunkirk."
What arrangements would the British have made?
It is certain that they would have made a twofold arrangement. First, to send
a small squadron to fight the Dunkirk raiders; second, a big and powerful
squadron would have been cruising about the North Sea to intercept these two
raiders and prevent them reaching their bases. This would have been my
opportunity. I would have advised the Germans that about six British war
vessels will cruise off Dunkirk, and that a very large and powerful squadron
will be north of Wilhelmshaven, or about there, on such and such a date. The
Germans would have known the whole story, the English only a small part of
it, and they would have been caught in a fearful trap. Why and how this
scheme could not be carried out—I will explain further on.
In order to succeed the easier I explained my alleged scheme to a friend of
mine, an M.P., who was so struck with its feasibility that he promised to
mention it to Mr. McPherson, M.P., who is Parliamentary Secretary to Lord
Kitchener. He also spoke to Mr. McKenna, the Home Secretary, in the Commons.
Needless to say, he did not know of my real intentions. If this should reach
his eyes he will be not a little surprised. Of course Mr. McPherson and Mr.
McKenna in reading this will immediately know to which M.P. I am referring.
My object in doing this was to forestall Captain Kenny's probable inquiries.
On December 7, I met Captain Kenny at the War Office by appointment. He told
me my plan was under consideration and he then went once more into a
discussion of my scheme.
On December 16, I again met Captain Kenny. He told me that my plan, though
most admirable could not be accepted, as it would necessitate disclosing to
me the whereabouts of the British fleet, or part of it, which could not be
disclosed to any one, no matter what advantages might result from it.
I was balked. However, by my plan and other factors I had evidently gained
the confidence of Captain Kenny, who told me of a possibility of sending me
in a few weeks I time to a neutral country for certain purposes.
It was evident that I must adopt a new line of procedure. I knew that the
headquarters of the German Espionage for England were at the German Consulate
in Rotterdam and that the English, too, had many agents in that country.
"Incidentally," he remarked, "we might ask you to go to Rotterdam to find out
how much cocoa and other foodstuffs are exported from Holland into Germany,"
adding that they had found it hitherto very difficult to find this out. This
at once showed me an opening.
I said to myself, if such a comparatively easy matter causes the
Counter-Espionage difficulties, provided I could find out this or other more
important things, surely that would enable me to get behind the scenes, and
thus accomplish my purpose.
Next day, December 17, I left London for Rotterdam, where I arrived on the
evening of the 18th. My trip to Rotterdam was not known to any one.
Once there I had to devise means to gain the confidence of the German Consul.
For it was evident that I might prejudice my case if I should straightway
offer my services to him. No matter how sincerely I wished to help him, he
might consider me as an emissary of England, in which case the achievement of
my purpose would be altogether impossible.
Now my object was to obtain important secrets from the Germans which I would
use as a means to get into the confidence of the English and find out and use
things to their harm.
Consequently I am constrained to admit that I worked the German Consul in
Rotterdam as my tool, by not disclosing to him my true plan. I hope Consul
Gneist will appreciate my explanation and not feel annoyed.
But a word of advice to him. He must be more careful in the future. For
indeed, if I had been an English agent the consequences might have been
disastrous, so important were the official secrets he confided to me.
Had I desired it to be so most if not all the German spies concerned would
have been caught by the English. From the foregoing it will be clear that
nothing was further from my thoughts. The information that would have enabled
me to do this came unwittingly from the German Consul at Rotterdam, as we
shall see.
He knows now, of course, that while I could not carry out my scheme, I
prevented the information he gave me from being of any real service to the
English by warning him the very moment I saw my plan had miscarried.
On December 30, I had so far succeeded that next day the German Consul
promised me the delivery of certain documents.
During my conversation with Captain Kenny in London he told me once on
service that although he knew that there were many German spies in England,
he could not "unearth" their organization nor discover the general methods by
which they sent their information to Germany.
The information. I got from the Consul on the 30th placed in my hands the
absolute and unquestionable power and means to hunt down most, if not all, of
the German spies in England-had I wished to do so.
In passing, I should like to remark that the Germans are better informed of
the Secret Service of England than the English of the Germans. I will only
give two instances.
On December 29, I had a conversation at the German Legation at The Hague with
Lieut.-Col. Von Ostertag, Military Attache of Germany, who, as Major
Ostertag, was for seven years prior to the war German Military Attache in
London.
Lieut.-Col. von Ostertag during our conversation complained about a slighting
remark Captain Kenny made about him to some one, following the outbreak of
the war. This was very significant, for, knowing Captain Kenny to be a
gentleman, I knew that he would not make a remark of that nature about any
one except to one in his confidence. It was obvious, therefore, that in
Captain Kenny's entourage there was some one who was in Germany's service.
The other instance was furnished by Herr Legationsrath Gneist, the German
Consul in Rotterdam. He not only knew a great deal of the Secret Service work
of England, and of the disposition of part of the British Fleet, but he also
knew one of the principal codes used by Captain Kenny's agents.
I had to see the German Consul at 10 A.M. on December 31 by appointment. When
I called at the Consulate he was not there, but had left a message for me,
explaining that he had left for Wesel, Germany, that morning specially in my
behalf, but would be back at 6 P.m. When I said that he could not do the
return journey in that short time I was informed that a German motor car from
Wesel was to meet him at Arnheim, take him to Wesel, and bring him back
there. Wesel, it should be pointed out, is the headquarters of the
Nachrichtendienst (Information Service) connected with Great Britain.
Accordingly I called at 6 P.m. This was my final interview with the German
Consul, and he promised to have all my instructions and codes copied out for
me and sent to my hotel next morning. It was considered advisable not to call
again at the consulate as I might have been shadowed by English spies.
Now I must describe the nature of the information and documents I obtained
from the German Consul in Rotterdam, information-it should be borne in
mind—by the use of which I hoped to obtain secrets of the British Secret
Service for purposes already indicated:
1. Exact knowledge how and by what means German spies in England transmitted
their intelligence to Rotterdam.
2. Two codes generally used by the German spies in England for the
transmission of intelligence by cable and one code specially prepared for me.
3. Some addresses in Rotterdam to which information was being sent.
4. A questionnaire drawn up by the Nachrichtendienst in Wesel.
5. The means by which the German spies in England were being financed.
A detailed description of some of the above points may be of interest. As
will be pointed out later, when my plan miscarried, I took steps to notify
the Germans and warned them to effect immediate changes all around. This was
nearly ten months ago, so that no harm can result from disclosing these
details now:
Methods and channels of intelligence, are divided into two categories: Urgent
and Nonurgent. All urgent information is sent by cable, of course. It may be
asked how it is possible for a German spy in England to send a telegram to
Rotterdam, since there is a strict censorship in England and nothing but
plain language messages were passed.
To the uninitiated this may indeed seem an insurmountable difficulty; in
fact, however, it is the simplest thing imaginable.
The three codes above referred to are known in the German Secret Service as
the "family code," the "oil code" and the "Lagenscheidt" code respectively.
The "family code" and the "oil code" are restricted to reporting movements of
the British Fleet.
These two codes had key words for steering eastward, westward, north and
south and for various longitudes and latitudes. Why? Because it was used
extensively on the ocean and in the North Sea during the first few months of
the war by German spies who were passengers on board ships. Whenever one of
them saw a British squadron passing he promptly sent a wireless to a
prearranged address sending love or best love to father, Alice, Daisy,
Dorothy or Elsie, giving exact information of the number and type of war
ships, longitude and latitude and direction in which they were steering.
I can state as an absolute fact that British ships transmitted wireless
messages not knowing that they reported their own fleets' movements. This
code was used frequently until one wireless spy was caught by the British and
put away.
EXAMPLES OF THE "FAMILY CODE" AND "OIL CODE"
(1) WEBER ROTTERDAM
Best love to May love to Alice and fondest love to Aunt in Rosendaal Do write
JOE
(2) SCHERENSKy AMSTERDAM
Cable prices 5 consignments of vaseline, 8 paraffin 12 gasoil invoice per
waggon need it
KELLETT
(3) VAN STAGEN CO ROTTERDAM
Quote without delay linseed oil cod blueoil 30 days draft vaseline invoice
per barrel
BAXALL
________
TRANSLATIONS - Keywords Code
(1) WEBER ROTTERDAM
Dearest love to May = two Lord Nelson Class Battleships
Best love to Alice = two Super dreadnoughts
and fondest love to Aunt in Rosendaal do write = four Torpedo Boats in
Harwich riding at anchor
(2) SCHERENSKY ROTTERDAM
Cable prices 5 consignments vaseline 8 paraffin = Dover 5 first class
cruisers 8 seagoing destroyers
12 gasoil invoice per waggon need it = 12 torpedo boats (dummy) steaming out
northly direction
(3) VAN STAGEN Co ROTTERDAM
quote without delay linseed oil c.o.d. blueoil 30 days draft = Tyne two
dreadnoughts four battle cruisers 5
vaseline invoice per barrel = first class cruisers (dummy) repairing
______
As will be seen it is very easy once you have thekey. But if you have -not
the key, no amount of ingenuity, experience, or patient effort could ever
decipher any of these messages. I will now give for the benefit of my readers
three full and actual codes, which have been used during the first seven
months of the war. I feel at liberty of disclosing them, for every one of
them has been withdrawn, after a hint from me.
Designation of Ships, Family Code Oil Code
Harbors, Etc. Key Words Key
Words
Super-Dreadnought Alice Shale oil
Dreadnoughts Daisy
Linseed oil
Lord Nelson Class
Battleships May,
Benzin
Majestic Class Battle-
ships Hilda
Kerosene
King Edward VII
Class Battleships Ethel Gasolene
Triumph and Swift-
sure (only these
two exist of this
type) Florence
Crude oil
Battle Cruisers Amy
Blue oil
First-Class Cruisers Rose Vaseline
Second-Class Cruisers Ella Lubricating
oil
Third-Class Cruisers Pauline Petroleum
Scouts Elsie Vegetable oils
Seagoing Destroyers Father Paraffin
Other Destroyers Uncle Residues
Torpedo Boats Aunt Gas oil
Submarines Sister Fuel
oil
Older Battleships (re-
serve fleet) Brother
Benzol
The Tyne Amsterdam quote
The Clyde Helder can you
sell
Rosyth Naval Base Utrecht can you deliver
The Wash Tilborg have
you on stock
Grimsby Vlissingen how soon can you
ship
Hull Hook of Holland how quick can you
deliver
The Hartlepools Leyden when
could you ship
Harwich Rosendaal when do you expect
Dover Harlem
cable prices
Folkestone Arnheim wire
prices
Chatham Dockyard Ymuiden can quote
Portsmouth Dockyard Breda could you
offer
Portland Dockyard Zandvoord can you offer
The Nore Schiedam can you
ship
Boulogne Gennep could
you ship
Calais Dortrecht buy for me
Dunkirk Maastricht quote for me
Cherbourg Bergen-op-Zoon why didn't
you ship
Havre Middleburg why didn't you
send
Brest 0ldenloe can you
acquire
Berehaven Venloe
could you acquire
in damaged condition am well tons
repairing am quite well
barrel
riding at anchor do write
cisterns
steaming out am feeling well
waggons
passed squadron thinking of you cwt
steaming north sending
need it
steaming south am sending
need it much
steaming east sending you
very urgent
steaming west sending to you
urgently wanted
cruising about hope all well
much needed
I love I or quickly
2 bestlove 2 or without delay
3 dearest love 3 or f.o.b.
4 fondest love 4 or c.o.d.
5 much love 5 or 30 days draft
6 deepest love 6 or 45 days draft
7 greetings 7 or 60 days draft
8 best greetings 8 or 75 days draft
9 heartiest greetings 9 or 90 days draft
10 greetings and love 10 or 120 days draft
11 love and greetings 11 or as
soon as pos-sible
12 best regards 12 or by return immediately
over 12 kindest regards
The two codes given, the "Oil" and the "Family" codes, can only be used for
naval intelligence; nothing else can be transmitted in them. How could I,
then, notify the Germans of other matters? Supposing I wanted to send any of
the following messages:
1. Raid will be made on Heligoland within week.
or
2. Four divisions new troops leaving for France. or
3. Am suspected be careful advise changing all codes notify all your agents.
or
4. New dreadnought added to navy.
To enable me to send any messages on any subject, I bad a third code, known
to the Secret Service as Dictionary Code, because I take the necessary words
out of any dictionary—English-German, German-Englisb, French-English or
German-French. I simply cable the numbers of page, column and place of word.
To mislead the censor I put dummy words into the message. The addressee of my
message, as already pointed out, did not possess the key to my message; he
simply acted as go-between out of sympathy for the German cause. Any
dictionary will do, as long as the recipient of my message has the same, the
very same, edition of same year. Pocket dictionaries of Lagenschneidt are the
best, for they do contain two columns of twelve words on each page, which, in
view of the fact that a shilling has 12 pence, is rather an advantage. But it
is not absolutely necessary. The examples to follow are taken out of
Wessely's Hand Dictionary (Enghsh-German), revised edition.
I will now translate all the four messages above:
1. WEBER ROTTERDAM
Market on account of Russian reverses disorganized not much business done
your holdings following quotations
(raid) (will) (be) (made) (on) (island) (Fortress)
169/39 239/15 21/45129/10 144/22119/39 92/15
(Within) (week)
239/36 237/21
Advise you buy American war stock.
Laming
It will be noted I did -not code the word Heligoland, simply because my
dictionary does not contain that word, so I had to describe it in some other
way. It will be obvious that to mention Heligoland would have been sheer
madness.
The second message would read as follows:
2. VAN SPANGE UTRECHT
Your letter received prices too high am willing to close as follows:
(four) (divisions) (new) (troops) (leaving) (for)
92/02 70/019 140/07 217/033 124/026 91/13
(France)
93/15
Bullock
The 0 signifies second column word 2, or second column 19, etc.
The third message would read as follows:
3. VANDEN BERGH ROTTERDAM
Goods despatched to-day via Batavier Line mailing invoice as
follows
(am suspected) (be) (careful) (advise) (changing) (all)
2060/19 21/45 340/36 6/022 38/4 9/10
(codes) (notify) (all) (Your) (agents)
43/17 1410/32 9/10 2420/4 7/017
Calvert
It will be noted that 0 is in this message sometimes affixed to the first
figure, sometimes to the second. It is a simple device to confuse the censor
or the Counter-Espionage. The meaning is the same: second column. To take
above message, for instance: Page 206, word 19 in second column; page 34,
word 36 in second column. How does he know that it is not page 3407 Simply
because my dictionary and his have only 250 pages. In other words, I can put
the 0 to the first or second figure in numbers exceeding 250; but certainly
not in numbers below 250, for that would cause not only confusion but might
make the deciphering impossible.
The fourth message would read as follows:
4. WEBER ROTTERDAM
Upon publication of Field Marshall French's report market
recovered
(new) (dreadnought) (added) (to) (Navy)
1400/7 720/16 5/16 214/11 1390/25
Laming
All words in dictionary codes are merely dummies.
Needless to say, I was provided with various addresses and for each address
another signature previously agreed upon.
A word about non-urgent messages sent by mail. It is known that all letters
coming into Great Britain, or leaving Great Britain, are opened by the
censors and read. Yet for many months information reached the Germans in
ordinary or business letters.
These letters did not contain any indication that they were not bona fide.
But between the lines, dealing with family, business or other matters, were
written in invisible ink the messages of the spies. This went on during the
first six months of the war. The boast of the English that they knew this and
used it in the name of Kuepferle needs qualification. Indeed, I am bold
enough to flatly contradict it, and I challenge both Captain Kenny of the War
Office, and Captain Hall, R. N., Director of Naval Intelligence at the
Admiralty, to contradict me when I say that before January 32 1915, they had
no idea of this, although they spent thousands of pounds trying to find it
out.
Another means of transmitting information through the mail from England was
to write in invisible ink on the white margin of English daily papers,
weeklies or magazines and then to send them in an ordinary wrapper to a,
prearranged address in Holland. As Consul Gneist laughingly remarked to me:
"They can open all the letters they like; I am getting most of my postal
information on the Times and other English papers.''
Information to the spies in England from headquarters in Rotterdam was
conveyed in the same manner and by messengers crossing from Holland.
Two kinds of invisible inks are, most generally used, i. e., lemon juice and
cream milk. They are preferred to chemical invisible inks on account of their
simplicity of use. You write a letter to a supposed friend. Between the
written lines you write in lemon juice or cream milk. When dry they are
invisible. Your "friend," when receiving the letter, heats them and the
writing immediately appears.
Now I come to the questionnaire drawn up by the Nachrichtendiest in Wesel. It
put several questions to me on which they desired information. This
questionnaire disclosed the fact that the Germans knew but little about
Kitchener's army, its recruiting, composition, organization, the transport of
troops from England to France, the training camps in England, and about
numerous matters connected with the Indian troops, their camps in France, etc.
It was this document which evoked from Captain Kenny the following remark:
"How interesting, how interesting. I must show this to Lord Kitchener at
once. He will be awfully amused and interested."
Having gathered all the information, as above described, or rather having
known on the 30th that I should get it next day in writing, I had carefully
to consider how to use it.
There was the first difficulty of carrying the papers into England to face. I
was not satisfied with sending this kind of information to Holland. My
ambition went higher; to obtain the confidence I needed, I determined to
pretend to the English that I had gone to Holland to get possession of
important German secrets in order to be of service to England.
I set out to accomplish something. To do it successfully I had to obtain the
assistance of the German Secret Service agents. If I had disclosed my entire
plan to the German Consul in Rotterdam he would not have entertained it for a
minute: I, therefore, only told him part of my scheme. He quite understood,
however, that I wanted to be and was going to be, of help to him and his
service. I was not on his staff. I did not ask any remuneration for my
services; indeed, I distinctly told him I wanted none. I was free to act to
the best of my own judgment, and under these circumstances I felt justified
in not disclosing to him the precise nature of my scheme.
One thing, however, I was bound to consider:
In case my scheme should miscarry I had to prevent any great or lasting harm
resulting therefrom to the Germans. This I did. Indeed, there was only one
chance that I would not succeed, one chance only. I knew how it could arise;
whence it might come. It was indeed this one thing which nullified my
efforts. It was not the cleverness of the English Secret Service, it was this
accidental and incidental circumstance which for the time being enabled
Captain Hall to stultify me. He will know what I mean.
But he is not yet through with me. We shall meet at Philippi. I owe him yet a
reply to the last interview I had with him in his room at the Admiralty on
January 28, in reply to an official telegram I received from him. I will pay
him in my own way and time.
On December 30, 1914, I knew, as already remarked, that next day I should
have the various codes, documents, etc.
I sat down and wrote a letter to Captain Kenny somewhat on the following
lines:
"Dear Captain Kenny:
"You will no doubt be surprised to get a letter from me from Rotterdam.
Seeing that for some reason unknown to me you hesitated to employ me, I came
here on the 17th inst. in order to prove to you that I could indeed be of
great service to you.
I prefer not to divulge in a letter the result of my work, but I can tell you
so much that you will be astonished and pleased. I shall leave here on
Friday, January 1, arriving in London Saturday evening, and if possible,.
should like to see you the same evening. Please drop me a line to my club.
"I shall call there on my way home.
"I am sending this letter through the British Consul here so that it shall
quickly and safely reach you."
I want to draw attention to the last paragraph. There was a reason for this.
In order to cross to England I had to have my passport viseed at the British
Consulate General in Rotterdam. To avoid unpleasant questions about my
sojourn in Rotterdam and in order to obtain unmolested access into England I
put the letter in an envelope and addressed it as follows:
Capt. P. W. Kenny,
M. 0. 5 J.
War Office.
and headed straightway with it to the British Consulate.
The mystic letters M. 0. 5 J. I knew would do everything for me. They did.
Arriving at the Consulate General I asked to see the Consul General himself.
The nature of my business? That was only for the Consul's ears. My card was
taken in and forthwith I was shown into the Vice-Consul's room.
I pulled the envelope from my inside pocket with studied deliberation and
showed it to the Vice-Consul. When he saw the letters M. 0. 5 J. and the name
of Captain Kenny, he thought I must be of the English Secret Service. He
looked up at me like a shot, pulled a chair as close as possible and asked me
to be seated. In whispering tones he asked me whence I came, what I had done,
etc. I gave him such replies as I wanted. I told him my object in calling was
to ask him to forward my letter at once in his official despatch bag to the
Foreign Office in London for safe transmission to Captain Kenny and to vise
my passport. He readily consented. We had quite an interesting conversation
and he suggested that he introduce me to the Consul General. He took me into
the Consul General's private room. He is Mr. E. G. B. Maxse, a brother of the
notorious German eater, the editor of the National Review (London). We had
about an hour's conversation, of which I must mention two details; first to
show how inefficient the English Secret Service is, and secondly, how easily
it is fooled.
During our conversation the British ConsulGeneral complained to me that he
had a certain letter (how obtained I do not know) which he had reasons to
believe contained matters in invisible ink. Could I tell him how to make
invisible ink visible? He had tried all kinds of thing's but could not make
the ink visible. Comment unnecessary. I told him that I was returning to
London in a day or two with very important documents and I wanted him to
allow me to put them into his official envelope under his own official seal.
He suggested that he should send them to the Foreign Office. To this I
demurred. He then readily agreed to my request. Could he read them? I said he
better not. He ultimately agreed.
Next day, December 31,1914, 1 saw the German Consul after his return from
Wesel and it was arranged that he would send everything I had asked for to my
hotel next morning.
Friday, January 1, 1 received through a messenger of the Consulate all he
promised. Forthwith I drove to the British Consulate where the documents were
put under seal without being read or even seen, and a code message sent to
the Foreign Office, London, at my dictation, somewhat to the following effect.
"Advise Captain Kenny, War Office, Mr. Lincoln leaving to-night with
important documents."
I left Rotterdam New Year's Day, arriving in London next day-Saturday
evening. When I arrived at Folkestone all passengers were subjected to a
close scrutiny, examination and search.
When the Secret Service men there started questioning me, instead of replying
to their questions I pulled out the large official envelope bearing the
official seal of the British Consulate General in Rotterdam and showed it to
the man at my left (there was a Secret Service man on each side). When he saw
the seal and the address he let me pass, remarking to the one on my right,
"M.O.5J." They both saluted me and I pas" through.
I drove to my club (the National Liberal), where I found this letter from
Captain Kenny:
"2-1-115.
"War Office, Whitehall, S. W. "Dear Mr. Lincoln:
"I shall be very interested to hear your news. I am here till 7.30 P.m. From
7.30 to 9.30, p.m. Telephone No. 3460 Vic. will find me, if you care to call
me up. To-morrow, Sunday, I can see you any time between 11 and 1, or between
3.30 and 6.30, only please let me know by 'phone when I may expect you. Yours
sincerely,
(Signed) P. W. KENNY, Capt."
I accordingly called up the number indicated, but Captain Kenny had already
left the place. I left a message for him that I would call at the W. 0. next
day at 11 as suggested. I did. And I was closeted with Captain Kenny exactly
three hours.
Captain Kenny was keenly anxious to hear my story. First of all I told him
that I went to Rotterdam because the British Secret Service would not employ
me and I was desirous of showing him that I could be of great service to him.
"You are a sportsman," remarked Captain Kenny. I then asked him the following
questions:
"What amount of money is the British Government willing to spend in order to
obtain the following information and documents?
"1. The code by which the movements of the British fleet have been and are
being reported to Germany.
"2. A code which is being used by German spies in England for the
transmission of telegrams (in plain language) to Holland.
"3. The means, methods and channels they employ to send intelligence through
the mails.
"4. Some addresses to which telegrams and letters are being sent.
"5. A disclosure how they are financed and through what channels.
"6. A document which would show what the Germans do and do not know of the
British Army."
Captain Kenny was speechless. Before be recovered from his evident surprise I
pointedly asked him: "Do you know any of these things?" He hesitated to reply.
"It is no use, Captain, I said, "to tell me that you do, for I know that you
do not."
"Mr. Lincoln," he replied, "it is no use to ask that question because it is
impossible to obtain any of that information."
"But supposing it were possible," I replied, "what are you willing to spend
to obtain possession of it ?"
"Granted for the sake of argument that it were possible-money would be no
consideration."
"Very well, then," I said, "I have much pleasure supplying all this to you
free."
Words fail me to describe the effect of my words upon the captain.
"What do you mean? I cannot understand you," he said.
"I mean that all this information is in this room," said I, reaching into my
pocket, "and I have much pleasure in handing it to you unconditionally."
I drew the large envelope from my pocket, pointed out that the seal was
untouched and handed it to the captain.
Captain Kenny broke the seals, eagerly read through all the documents, made
copious notes and drew up a long report of all I told him.
He was quite beside himself with excitement.
He could not sufficiently express his thanks, his astonishment. Before I left
it was agreed that I must be employed in connection with this matter, indeed
he insisted I must continue to work the thing, which augured well for my
success. He said he was going to make a report of the whole matter that very
afternoon and present it to Lord Kitchener, who, he said, would be immensely
pleased, and to the Admiralty, and would let me know next day.
Next morning, January 4, I went to my club and found the following letter
from Captain Kenny:
"Dear Mr. Lincoln: "War Office.
"A certain naval officer would very much like to
see you. He proposes calling on you (with me)
at your club between 12 and 1 to-morrow. He is
an authority on oil. I hope you will be in the
club then; in any case I shall expect you here at
3.30 P. M. "Yours sincerely,
"(Signed) P. W. KENNY, Capt."
The words "he is an authority on oil" were put into the letter as a "blind."
Captain Kenny called at my club at 12.20 P. M. and told me that the naval
officer would not be introduced to me by his name, as that must remain a
profound secret. Indeed I do not know to this day who he is. He is simply
known to me as "C."
Captain Kenny also asked me not to be surprised if our meeting place be
somewhat unusual. A few minutes later a page boy came to me and told us that
a naval officer was waiting in a taxi downstairs.
"This means, the captain said, that we shall 'have to go."
We entered the taxi and drove about the streets of London one hour and twenty
minutes. It was explained to me that this was done for absolute secrecy in
order to prevent German agents shadowing us. The naval officer, I learned, is
and has been for ten years the chief officer of England's Secret Service.
When we met he thanked me profusely and promised to let me have matter which
his department would ask me to transmit to Rotterdam to hoodwink the Germans.
Here I must explain that I withheld from the British one piece of information
which would enable me at any time things did not go according to my program
to warn the German Consul in Rotterdam.
Between January 4th and 7th nothing happened, and I took it that they were
preparing and outlining work for me. On January 7th, not hearing anything
from either the War Office of the Admiralty, I went to the War Office and
remonstrated with Captain Kenny for the delay. I was growing uneasy about the
silence on personal grounds. I was afraid the British might be acting behind
my back to take the matter out of my hands and effectively deceive the
Germans. Consequently, in order to play my role of pretending to serve them,
I had to take a strong attitude; in other words, to whistle, because I was
afraid.
Captain Kenny rang up "C" in my presence and told him that I was there and
that we (Captain Kenny and I) thought it important that something should be
done. "C" said he was very busy that day, but in a day or two he would be
ready for me.
When two days later I still had no news I grew very uneasy and considered
myself in constant danger. On January 9, I again rang up Captain Kenny. He
promised me that he would attend to the matter at once and asked me to call
at the War Office Monday, January 11. This I did.
Captain Kenny could not give me a satisfactory reason for the delay and
silence of "C." Indeed, I gained the impression that the captain, himself,
did not know what was going on. The matter apparently had been taken out of
his hands. I gave him a friendly ultimatum, saying that unless I heard from
him by the morrow I would lay the facts of the case before the Right Hon. Sir
Henry Dalziel Bart, M.P.
I had to show plenty of courage and resentment. Indeed, I made up my mind to
find out what was going on behind the scenes. If developments were proceeding
contrary to my plan I could then disappear quickly from England and warn the
Germans.
Next day, January 12, there was still no news. It was evident that I would
have to act quickly. I decided to see Sir Henry. This I did because I knew
from my parliamentary days that Sir Henry is one of the few independent
Radicals who fear nobody. He is the owner of the great radical weekly,
Reynolds Newspaper, also a kind of unofficial leader of a small set of
extreme Radicals below the gangway in the House, and he wields great
influence.
I saw Sir Henry twice that day and made him red hot. He was very indignant.
He promised to take up the matter with Lord Kitchener himself.
I was fully cognizant of the dangerous nature of my procedure and made all
preparations to leave England at a moment's notice. I notified Captain Kenny,
by letter, of my visits to Sir Henry.
Late at night, on January 13, Sir Henry rang me up to say that he had a
message from the War Office "that the matter is having most urgent
consideration."
I received two letters, one from Captain Kenny, and the other from "C,"
complaining that the secret codes I had furnished did not "fit 'I any of the
messages "caught" by the British, and criticizing me for communicating with
Sir Henry.
On the following afternoon I again saw Sir Henry at the Hotel Cecil. That
night I did not go home to sleep but went to a hotel under an assumed name,
as I expected anything to happen.
Next day at 1 o'clock I had another interview with Sir Henry and I learned
from him that I was to receive a summons from the War Office that day. I
gathered from him that there was as yet no suspicion about me. I waited till
4 o'clock—no news from the War Office. I then decided—with the previous
approval and knowledge of Sir Henry—upon a supremely courageous step.
I went to the Admiralty and asked to see Mr. Winston Churchill. I was taken
at once to his quarters, and he sent out his principal private secretary (Mr.
Marsh) to tell me that he was too busy; would I tell his secretary what I
came to see him about.
I handed a long typewritten statement to Mr. Marsh, addressed to Mr.
Churchill, complaining bitterly about the delay in my case. Mr. Marsh, after
reading the document, left me, as he explained, for a few minutes. I was left
there in his room and felt as though I were in the very lion's den. I did not
know what might happen the next minute.
Mr. Marsh returned about fifteen minutes later and had me conducted to the
director of naval intelligence. This post is one of the most important of the
Admiralty and is, as a rule, a stepping stone to the First Sea Lordship. Lord
Fisher and Admiral Prince Louis of Battenberg were directors of naval
intelligence before becoming First Sea Lords.
I was very well received. The Director, of course, knew everything. During a
conversation lasting more than an hour, I was led to understand that nothing
had yet been done except to send a letter to Holland pretending to come from
me, telling the German Consul that I was laid up with pneumonia and
consequently "I" must ask him (the Consul) to be patient for a while.
I clearly saw that as yet they did not suspect me and that nothing had yet
been found out. So I decided to wait a few days but to be on guard in case
they should meanwhile either do something against me or the Germans.
I waited six days and, not having word from any one, on January 21, I went up
to the War Office and saw Captain Kenny, who asked me to come and see him
next day between eleven and twelve. Accordingly, I called at the War Office
on January 22. Captain Kenny definitely promised to write to me within two
days. "Within two days" sounded just a trifle too definite not to arouse in
me a suspicion that something was going on. All this time I kept in touch
with Sir Henry.
On January 25, I received a letter from Captain Kenny notifying me that my
case had passed out of the jurisdiction of the War Office, and asking me to
communicate with the Admiralty where I was expected. The tone of this letter
was different from the preceding ones.
Immediately after the receipt of this note I went up to the Admiralty, where
I had a long talk with the Director. It was evident, from this conversation,
that things were not proceeding according to my wish or in my favor, and I
then decided to leave for New York by the first American liner sailing. This
was on a Monday. There was no boat available before Saturday, hence I had to
put them off for a while. This I succeeded in doing by hammering at them for
recognition through Sir Henry and by addressing a letter to Mr. Churchill. On
January 27, I received a reply, referring me to the Director and then came
this official telegram:
"Lincoln, 51 Torrington Sq., W.
"Please call and bring your passport. Direc-tor of Intelligence."
I was puzzled by the request to bring my passport with me. As it turned out,
it was a trap.
I called upon the Director of Intelligence. Before I was taken into his room
and after my arrival had been announced to him, I saw two gentlemen being let
into his room. I may remark that at my interviews with the Director,
Lieutenant Herschell, R. N., was always present. When I entered this room I
surmised at once that something had gone wrong. In addition to Lieutenant
Herschell, as usual in his uniform, two gentlemen in civil attire were
present. One of them was pretending to be busy with some books; the other,
with his face turned away, pretended not to be interested in the conversation
at all, though furtively taking shorthand notes.
Captain Hall,. the Director, put an innocent-looking question to me. This
showed me that the game was up. I expected to be arrested at once. Indeed, I
cannot understand even now why they did not arrest me. However, I kept up the
play and finally after a clever tactical conversation, left the room
unmolested. They let me go, thinking that they had me in any case due to the
fact that all passports in circulation were declared void. Indeed Captain
Hall, who at first wanted to keep my passport, returned it to me with the
ironical remark: I I All right, you can have it back, it is only valid two
more days." (The decree above referred to demanded new passports from the
first of February.) In order to be able to flee I "played" information into
their hands that I would try to escape to Holland.
Next morning I left London and sailed on the steamer Philadelphia the
following day, January 30th, for New York, where I arrived on February 9th,
and at once got in touch with a certain German. Through him I got my cable to
Berlin past the English censor without delay. Before leaving London I sent a
note by circuitous route to the German Consul at Rotterdam, telling him in a
prearranged code of all that had happened and advising him immediately to
take the necessary steps.
In spite of the failure of my chief plans I dis-covered during my
dallying with the War Office some plans of tremendous moment to the German
Intelligence Department. Through some inad-vertences of Captain Kenny's, I
learned that the Secret Service of England was then considering and
elaborating a plan to blow up all the railway bridges and important railway
stations of the Rhine by sending into Germany emissaries with false
passports. I also discovered that there were Russian Secret Service men at
this time in Lon-don, who held daily conferences at the War Office with
Captain Kenny and the two colonels, devis-ing a plan of military espionage in
Germany. There was a naturalized American citizen (native of Holland) in
London, holding the temporary rank of Lieutenant in one of the Indian
regiments. He was for a while in Marseilles and afterwards in one of the
Indian troop camps near Orleansbut was on furlough in England. It was decided
to send him into Germany. He was to go first to Holland and make the
necessary arrangements to enable him to travel in Germany as a Dutch
commercial agent and so organize a thorough system of espionage there. My
warnings to Berlin soon made this plan ineffectual. I also obtained accurate
information about the mobilization of Kitchener's army and forwarded it to
Germany. This was of great value to the General Staff, for in spite of the
activities of their spies in England they had but meager knowledge of the new
armies.
Having escaped from the admiralty detectives by a mere chance, you can
imagine my mingled emotions when I read in a New York morning paper two
months later this paragraph:
CODE OF SPY USED TO SPY ON GERMANS
British Correspond with Kaiser's Workers Under
Name of Kuepferle, a Prisoner
LONDON, April 19.—Anton Kuepferle, the American citizen of German birth, who
hails from Brooklyn, and is held for trial on a charge of supplying Germany
with information concerning the movements of British troops and ships, is
said to have been the means of affording British detectives much inside
information concerning the workings of the German spy system, with
headquarters in Holland.
Kuepferle's arrest was kept a secret for nearly two months. Meantime it is
reported that Scotland Yard men were using the prisoner's name as a means of
communicating with German officials in Holland. In Kuepferle's baggage sheets
of paper for use with invisible ink were found. Imitating Kuepferle's
handwriting, the detectives are said to have written letters to German spy
chiefs, between the lines of which they traced in invisible ink all sorts of
questions asking further instructions. A rapid fire correspondence is
reported to have continued until Kuepferle had actually been in jail for many
weeks.
A plain recital of facts like a police inspector's notes, yet of personal and
moving interest to me! There is, however, dramatic surprise in the report
lying hidden in the statement that Scotland Yard actually did correspond with
German officials in Holland in the name of Kuepferle—unknown to the German
Secret Service. This is indeed interesting. The climax, however, is to be
found in the facts that the German Secret Service knew that Kuepferle's
alleged reports came from Scotland Yard and the requested instructions they
ostensibly sent to Kuepferle were indeed meant to mislead the British
officials.
As for my old friend Captain Hall of the Intelligence Department, I only wish
I could witness his chagrin when he reads this narrative of one of the chief
actors in this drama of plot and counterplot. Only now will he understand why
his "dummy " messages in the name of poor Kuepferle were taken at their true
value and the replies he got were fashioned by keener wits at Wilhelmstrasse.
pps. 235-277
--[cont]--
Aloha, He'Ping,
Om, Shalom, Salaam.
Em Hotep, Peace Be,
Omnia Bona Bonis,
All My Relations.
Adieu, Adios, Aloha.
Amen.
Roads End
Kris
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