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BALKAN ENDGAME?
<Picture>Following devastating airstrikes in Yugoslavia, what are the
options for an acceptable settlement on the ground? Richard Bassett
examines the prospects for the future and the lessons of the past
In the wake of NATO's attack on Yugoslavia the Balkans ends the
century much as it began; an expression of great power rivalry and a
source of potentially destabilising conflict.
As at least one military historian of note, John Keegan, has written,
the problems of Bosnia, Macedonia and indeed Kosovo would be wearily
familiar to any official of the Austro-Hungarian empire posted to
Sarajevo in 1908. The inevitable competing spheres of influence led
the great 19th-century German Chancellor, Bismarck, to observe: "The
Balkans are not worth the bones of a Pomeranian Grenadier."
If history is one of the inescapable millstones of the Balkans,
geography is another. Albania today still lies across two of the most
important routes that link Europe with the East.
Its appearance on the global stage, in 1912 at the Ambassador's
conference, when it was described as the "child of Austria, with
Italy acting as midwife" was an attempt to balance the pretensions of
Russia's main proteg� in the region, Serbia, and limit its access to
the Mediterranean.
Today, there is still anxiety on the part of the western powers,
notably the USA, over Serbian and, by extension, Russian influence
over the eastern Mediterranean. At the same time, those in Europe
(judging by recent comments from the French Prime Minister Lionel
Jospin, they include France) who, like Russia, are fretful of the
"naked expansion of US power" in the aftermath of the Cold War, are
equally keen to ensure that the Balkans does not become a US sphere
of influence.
Former West German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, underlined his belief
that this was just a new twist to the old game when he said in a
recent interview: "Only the Americans would be naive enough to
imagine that there could be a lasting peace in the Balkans".
If, after the airstrikes, Milosevic backs down and a multi-national
force is deployed then that force may not be an entirely NATO entity.
Seen in the context of any future envisaged troop deployment in
Kosovo, it is clear that Serbia could only sign up to a deployment
which reflected an agreement between the powers (in this case the
USA, on the one hand, and Russia and Moscow's supporters on the
other).
Such an agreement has proved extremely difficult to reach, not least
because of exaggerated demands on both sides which have had to be
reined in by some very tough negotiation between US Secretary of
State, Madelaine Albright and Russian prime minister and former KGB
spymaster, Yevgeny Primakov.
But all the powers know that only when faced with a credible united
front can Milosevic be persuaded to back down. Eventually the
advantages of having the West disarm the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)
may become apparent to the Serbs and the stationing of Russian troops
will ensure the protection of their fellow Slav citizens in Kosovo.
One of the most sensitive issues is the exact positioning of the
Russian contingent as this will inevitably be the de facto line of
partition in the province. In the eyes of the KLA, the British and
the French, traditional allies of the Serbs in two world wars, can
also be relied on to defend the Serbs, though London and Paris would,
with reason, deny this.
As the French and UK forces would come under a NATO commander, the
KLA believes that US influence which is largely pro-Albanian would
manage to prevent a too tough approach being taken towards the
Albanians.
However, recent suggestions to shift the political control structure
of the deployment from NATO to the Organisation for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) would of course neutralise US influence
and be an ominous development for the Albanians.
It is, however, quite feasible to see a de facto splintering of
Kosovo into separate zones not dissimilar to those which divided
Berlin, Vienna and Trieste and its hinterland after 1945, though
presumably with more cordial relations between the various
participating forces than during the Cold War.
However, given the different interests of the participants and the
fact that a NATO and Russian force would be sitting cheek by jowl
under separate commands, it can be assumed that a great deal of time
and energy will be devoted to working out the correct protocols to
govern this interface of highly sensitive, and in practice divergent,
commands.
However, even if in Kosovo there is an eventual resolution of the
spheres-of-influence problem, the Albanian question, as is frequently
mentioned, also spills into Macedonia and(less frequently mentioned)
Montenegro.
Macedonia has an ethnic population of Albanians which comprises 23%
of the country's entire population. Fears that it would try to break
away from the republic have been behind the generally cordial ties
between Skopje and Belgrade.
Despite denials by the ethnic Albanian leaders, there is no doubt
that, situated as they are close to the Albanian frontier, the
temptations of a future tie-up with a Greater Albania remain high on
the agenda.
Even without the Albanian issue, Macedonia has long been a
controversial hot spot where Greek, Bulgarian and Serbian interests
collide. Greece has long contested the right of the Macedonians to
use the name of Macedonia, saying that it implied a territorial claim
over Greek territory. Moreover, Greek politicians until relatively
recently attempted to undermine the new state at international forums
and in discussions involving new trade links.
However, more recently under Russian, US and European pressure the
Athens government has adopted a more supportive line, though this is
of little comfort to the ethnic Albanian minority.
Bulgaria which has long maintained that Macedonian is only a
Bulgarian dialect, has also become more supportive of the government
in Skopje, though this is partly a result of the government,
dominated by the newly elected VMRO party, enjoying traditional ties
with Bulgaria.
Before the Second World War, Bulgaria financed with Italy the VMRO
party which was then dedicated to destroying the newly created
Yugoslav state and was implicated in the assassination of King
Alexander of Yugoslavia in Marseilles in 1934.
The news earlier this month that Bulgaria is to donate 150 main
battle tanks, including 115 T-55As, and nearly 150 artillery pieces
caused some concern in western embassies. The concern was
particularly acute over the arms import as the Bulgarian donation
came on the heels of the supply by Germany of BTR-70 armoured
personnel carriers. With all Macedonian army leave cancelled and the
deployment of two brigades on the Albanian/Kosovo frontier, analysts
fear that the arsenal now being created in this small country is a
tinderbox awaiting ignition.
More ominously, the build-up of weapons, with the tacit agreement of
Belgrade suggests that the future of Macedonia may have already been
decided by its neighbours.
The emergence of Bulgaria as a regional player is also viewed with
some disquiet in the region - traditionally Bulgaria and Serbia have
a long history of emnity, though some analysts point to the old
Comintern idea of a Serbian-Bulgarian federation possibly being
revived. Such a development, however, has been described as two
stranded swimmers linking hands across a sea of Macedonian troubles.
Certainly the agreement on 22 February by the Bulgarian and
Macedonian governments to "put an end to the artificial problems
between our two countries" suggests that events are moving rapidly
towards some form of anti-Albanian front and that a military
"solution" may be imminent.
The language of the February agreement is adamant in its
reconciliation of the Bulgarian-Macedonian differences claiming that
neither government will allow its territory to be used by groups
hostile to the other. In diplomatic jargon this is a clear warning to
Albanian groups smuggling weapons into or, indeed, out of Macedonia.
It remains to be seen whether this agreement stabilises Macedonia.
The clear anti-Albanian implications of the agreement may drive the
ethnic minority in Macedonia to desperate measures. Moreover, in the
long-term, Bulgarian -Serbian-Greek rivalry over Macedonia is
inevitable and partition may be unavoidable also here.
Montenegro also has a sizeable Albanian community though only forming
8% of the population. Moreover, in contrast to the Albanians in
Macedonia and Kosovo, these Albanians are predominantly Catholic
rather than Muslim.
However, Montenegro is at perhaps one of the most strategic points in
the Adriatic. Already at the beginning of this century, the Imperial
Austrian Navy saw the importance of the great bay of Kotor, which
until the Second World War was one of the most naturally defensible
harbours in the Adriatic.
Even today, the harbour is the major naval installation of the
Yugoslav navy and is Serbia's vital access to the Adriatic. The
harbour is guarded by the Prevlaka peninsular (see map) which has
been the bone of contention between Serbia and Croatia since
hostilities ended between those two countries four years ago. Croatia
is adamant that it cannot cede control of the peninsular without
endangering its own security interests although for the same reason,
Serbia is determined to ensure that the peninsular is controlled by
Belgrade. Otherwise the entire Serbian fleet and its facilities can
be deployed only subject to Croatian veto. Unsurprisingly, these
facilities were a priority target for NATO attack.
Partly for this reason, Serbia last year initiated a plan to move
against Montenegro's democratically elected anti-Belgrade government.
The plan met with considerable resistance among the upper ranks of
the Yugoslav army, many of whose officers are Montenegrin and
provoked the resignation of the Serbian Chief of the General staff,
General Perisic.
A move against Montenegro is still likely, however, for the strategic
reasons outlined above especially if western funds, particularly from
Germany, continue to pour into Montenegro in an attempt to detach the
leadership there from Milosevic's control. As well as German
attention, Montenegro remains a traditional focus for Russian
activity. Before 1914, the Russians established the biggest of the
legations in the Montenegrin capital.
During the Cold War, a small but significant remnant of this legacy
remained in the shape of the small Soviet merchantman spy-vessel
which remained at anchor in the bay of Kotor, despite Tito's break
with the Comintern in 1948. It was a token presence but one which
underlined the Churchill-Stalin deal that Yugoslavia should be
divided 50-50.
For the West that meant a Yugoslavia that was not part of the Warsaw
Pact. For the Soviets that meant despite the formal break no
offensive activity or alliance with NATO. For both sides there were
small intelligence favours of which the Kotor merchantman was one.
Russia's views on events in Montenegro are likely to be consonant
with those of Serbia and therefore hostile to any moves that appear
to detach the country from the Serbian orbit.
Thus as the century ends, the problems of the region remain bound up
with the ambitions and aspirations of the global powers as well as
the hopes of different ethnic groups. It is therefore perhaps
illuminating to examine in some detail the solutions those powers
sought to impose on the region in those times.
Before the First World War, diplomacy was secret though in practice
there were no secrets between ambassadors and those involved in
foreign affairs. An exception, perhaps, occurred during the First
World War with the controversial Treaty of London which lured Italy
into breaking its alliance with Austria and Germany in order to gain
territory at Vienna's expense.
Fortunately for students of diplomacy in the Balkans, the treaty was
published when the Bolsheviks came to power in Russia in 1917.
In addition to the clauses relevant to Italy's northern territorial
acquisitions, there were several which underlined the status of the
Adriatic � the region which is now so hotly contested.
Italy was given important rights over the direction of Albania's
foreign policy. Albania itself remained partitioned between Serbia,
Greece and Italy which had rights over the port of Vlore (Valona),
the key to the Straits of Otranto.
The rump Albania was designated a Muslim state to be governed from
Tirana, a concession few European states would tolerate today in a
period of increasing religious polarisation and anti-islamic feeling.
Above all, however, the signatories to the treaty, which included
Russia and France, all agreed to work together to prevent the Balkans
becoming an area of dispute between them. In the attempted agreements
hammered out between NATO and Russia the spirit of this Treaty can
still be seen, however different the territorial lines drawn on the
map today. Although the USA is a new player in this game, there are
reasons to think that it does wish to work through consensus though
it may not understand as vividly as the Europeans the potential
dangers of an uncontrolled conflict originating in the Balkans.
NATO's surprise guarantee of Albania's territorial integrity last
week is incompatible with the Treaty of London's intentions.
In any event the USA's room for manoeuvre has been dramatically cut
down by the coalition of European and Russian forces which are
traditionally pro-Serbian. It remains to be seen what the USA can do
for the Albanians despite all the talk of this being a "single-polar
world".
For its part, the UK, for which the Balkans has always been a
traditional area of expertise, remains committed to establishing a
lasting solution for the region. Although it no longer stands at
England's imperial jugular, the region remains critical to the
Mediterranean and the long-term interests of Europe. As far as London
is concerned, it is synonymous with the 500-year-old game of erecting
a balance of power.
The interests of the third partner, Russia, however, remain perhaps
the most constant -preservation of some presence, albeit a token one,
along the Adriatic and the prevention of the peninsular being
dominated by any one power. Here the activities of the USA are a
cause for serious alarm in Russian strategic counsels.
The precarious internal situation in Russia also militates against
the confidence-building measures the West feels are essential to any
joint solution of the Balkans crisis. The obvious policy disputes
between Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Primakov may be just
questions of degree but they continue to overshadow the ability to
come to agreements at the highest level which can be seen as having a
chance of sticking.
Yet without such an agreement there is every indication that the
Balkans will continue to smoulder and that the flames of ethnic
cleansing will continue to blaze for several years to come.
Richard Bassett, JDW's Business Editor, is a former Central Europe
correspondent for the Times of London
Jane's Defence Weekly
Jane's Defence Weekly can be bought online from this site in
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The only real voyage of discovery consists not in seeking
new landscapes but in having new eyes. -Marcel Proust
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
A merely fallen enemy may rise again, but the reconciled
one is truly vanquished. -Johann Christoph Schiller,
German Writer (1759-1805)
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
It is preoccupation with possessions, more than anything else, that
prevents us from living freely and nobly. -Bertrand Russell
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
Forwarded as information only; no endorsement to be presumed
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107, this material
is distributed without charge or profit to those who have
expressed a prior interest in receiving this type of information
for non-profit research and educational purposes only.
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